

STUDIES IN THE  
EUCCHARISTIC CONTEMPORANEITY  
OF CHRIST

by

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## PREFACE

There are many ways of expressing the inmost aspiration of the Christian heart. Not the least frequent of them is Kierkegaard's dictum that the Christian must be a contemporary of Christ. "There is no disciple at second hand."<sup>1</sup> Now if "Christhood" is primarily an attribute, not of a historical human being, but of a timeless deity, that is, if the Christ-myth simply figures forth God's concern for mankind, why then there is no problem about achieving contemporaneity with "Christ." If, on the other hand, a historical human existence is regarded as deity's definitive personal self-manifestation, then the achievement of a sort of working contemporaneity with that terribly important sector of the world's process becomes a problem of the first magnitude.

In Luke 24:35, we read "how he was known to them in the breaking of bread"; and in Acts 2:42, how "they devoted themselves to the apostles' teaching and fellowship, to the breaking of bread and the prayers."<sup>2</sup> One of the most obvious characteristics of Christianity has been Christians' persuasion that in the Lord's Supper they somehow draw closer to the historical origin of their salvation. Even so unlikely an observer as Paul de Lagarde perceived that

the sacrifice of the Mass is the strength of Catholicism. The Mass alone makes Christianity . . . a religion; and only a religion, not a surrogate for religion, can absorb the human heart. The eternal spirit of man is not content with something that has taken place. Immersion in the past is not religion but sentimentality. Consciousness of the immanent temporal

life of eternal forms vanishes as the memory, growing weaker every year, of primeval unrepeatable events is exalted to the status of a religion. Our religion then becomes an opinion, a judgement, a belief, an idea, rather than a way of life; until we give up this deadly point of view, no improvement in our condition is possible. We need the presence of God and the divine, not their past.<sup>3</sup>

Still, how are Christians to avoid being disciples at second hand, in the face of the manifest irreversibility of time? The question simply cannot be wished away; and thus the paradoxical nature of Christians' faith in the eucharistic presence of Christ has caused them, no longer content with believing that he is present, to try to conceive how he might be present. There is, of course, no harm in a loving desire to comprehend the sayings and doings of the Master; quite another matter--and one worth every effort at amelioration--is Christians' chronic inability to comprehend one another.

It is the purpose of this paper to explore--as sympathetically as possible--four understandings of the eucharistic presence of Christ, those, namely, of Luther, of Calvin, of some contemporary Roman Catholics, and of Kierkegaard. Why these four? To a certain extent, but one would not want to press this point, these four understandings make rather more comprehensible the feelings of contemporary Lutheran, Reformed, Roman, and non-liturgical Christians. Primarily, however, this paper is an essay in speculative theology, a study for its own sake of four rather clearly defined positions that might be taken vis-à-vis the eucharist. The views of Luther, Calvin, the Catholics, and Kierkegaard are therefore in no sense to be taken as antecedents to a conclusion, but rather as examples illuminative of the central--and mysterious--

reality of the eucharistic presence.

Mention has been made of "rather clearly defined" points of view. One could wish that they were more clearly defined, for then the task would be simpler. The truth of the matter, though, is that however much these four positions contradict one another, the fact remains that, to a surprising extent, they cannot be said to exclude one another. What this essay will do will be to notice variations in emphasis within a common problematic, to observe fluctuations in the importance given to certain constant elements.

It is thus not possible to examine each of these four understandings from a single, unchanging vantage point. Each must be presented as a whole; indeed, as a whole that is an integral part of a much broader theological synthesis. This being said, however, it remains possible to draw out three structural polarities to guide our enquiry. First there is the polarity of space. Is the spatial gap between Christ's presence in heaven, whatever this may mean, and his eucharistic presence among us to be bridged primarily by an interpretation of his heavenly action or by a re-interpretation of our earthly action and symbols? Secondly there is the polarity of time. Is the historical gap between Christ and ourselves to be bridged primarily by an interpretation of Christ's glorified state or by a re-interpretation of our present state? Or is it, perhaps, to be bridged by a re-interpretation of Christ's actions under Pontius Pilate? Thirdly there is the polarity of what we may call "subjective appropriation." Supposing that the first two polarities to have been dealt with satisfactorily, can or cannot the failure of the individual Christian to receive Christ

fittingly in the eucharist actually negate his presence there? ✓

We shall begin with the scandal that so often marred late medieval piety and with Luther's remedy for it: Christ is not only seated in heaven, grimly weighing the works of men; he is everywhere, and for our consolation we are to seek him in the bread and wine, where he is especially present for us. On the other hand, in the face of the same shadowy, self-alienated world, Calvin held that the risen Christ's magnetic power draws us from this sorry place into the really real world of heavenly things. Working from another perspective, and without abandoning the sense of human participation in the divine, present-day Roman Catholic theologians are discovering a Christ who is very much involved with the world of human events. Nevertheless, as the case of Kierkegaard well shows, the Christ's involvement with the bread and wine of human history can end by making him appear quite scandalous or comical, or both.

And though scandals must indeed come, that hapless pamphleteer's example may yet keep this essay from achieving the scandalousness of a purely academic exercise!

## CHAPTER I

### MARTIN LUTHER AND THE OMNIPRESENCE OF CHRIST

In our Introduction we noted that we shall be considering, not four completely different eucharistic theologies, but rather four different patterns of emphasis, four ways of lending more or less importance to the divers elements contained in the basic, scriptural witness to the sacrament. Our purpose in so doing, once again, rests on the conviction that these four points of view are largely complementary, not, to be sure, in what they deny, but rather in what they are able to affirm of the central, transcendent reality of the eucharist. The first point of view to be considered, then, is that of Martin Luther. In terms of the polarities of space, time, and subjective appropriation outlined in the Introduction, what is the peculiar emphasis, indeed, the peculiar richness, of Luther's eucharistic doctrine? To make this emphasis stand forth as clearly as possible, we shall proceed in the following manner: 1) give a brief history of Luther's concern with the Lord's Supper; 2) state his semantic and exegetical position with regard to the words of institution; 3) state his views on the "use" to be made of Christ's presence in the Supper; 4) state his philosophical theology of Christ's presence; and, finally, 5) sum up our discussion in terms of the aforementioned polarities.

At the beginning of his theological career Luther seems not to have been greatly concerned over the doctrine of the Supper which he

presumably had been taught, even if practically the experience of saying Mass profoundly troubled him.<sup>1</sup> His attacks on the Mass began only in 1520, when his reforming efforts had been under way for some time. Previously, when coming to his reformation understanding of grace, he apparently did not--as a study of his works of the period to some extent reveals--concern himself unduly with the Mass. There is not much about the Mass in his commentary on Lombard, which he delivered in 1509-10. In his lectures on the Psalms he has more to say about it, but although some of his remarks are interestingly suggestive of his later development, it cannot really be said that he as yet opposed the Mass. One such observation is to be found in the very first of these lectures: "Prima radix omnium bonorum est voluntatem habere in lege Domini."<sup>2</sup> From this and similar expressions some historians conclude that Luther was quite intent on putting Word ahead of sacrament in these lectures. Nevertheless Luther also writes--

Although the sacrifice of the altar truly is what is here called a sacrifice of praise, in which the prayers and the praises of all are offered, yet it is not the sacrifice of all but only of those who also offer themselves in it and with it in the celebration of the matter of the sacrament.<sup>3</sup>

The point that Luther wishes to make in these lectures, bearing in mind the second part of the above quotation, seems to be aptly put by Carl Wisløff: it is that self-sacrifice is to be bound together with the sacrifice of the Mass rather than set in opposition to it.<sup>4</sup> Wisløff suggests that because Luther was a monk the matter of getting the proper dispositions for the Mass was of much more concern to him than that of discussing how best to explain it.

To continue, the lectures on Romans still contain no criticism

of the Mass itself. In fact, following Reuchlin, Luther defines missa as a Hebrew word meaning a holy act of sacrifice "because the offering or gift signifies . . . a holy service or the performance of holy rites."<sup>5</sup> In the Hebrews lectures the Mass receives more attention, but still no negative criticism. To explain 9:24 Luther states that "what we offer daily is not so much an oblation as a memorial of Christ's oblation." He adds that whereas the oblation of Christ, the Head of the Church, is now completed, that of his spiritual body, the Church, "is offered day by day, until she effectively dies with Christ and celebrates a mystical passover, namely, the passage, with concupiscence mortified, from this world to future glory."<sup>6</sup> Luther's Roman critic Cochlaeus was not slow, in later years, to draw attention to Luther's early--and public--approval of the sacrifice of the Mass. Wislöff concludes that for this period of Luther's life "the decisive matter . . . is that the Sacrament be used properly," and that there is every reason to believe Luther's memory was correct when, in 1538, he said that twenty years previous no one would have been able to take the Mass away from him.<sup>7</sup>

How, then, are we to explain the violent campaign precisely against the sacrifice of the Mass from 1520 on? It would seem that at some point in 1519 or 1520--and rather suddenly--Luther had a much greater insight into the profound unity and finality of the piety of works-righteousness: it all centered about the Mass. Says Wislöff--

Luther's struggle against the sacrifice of the Mass is in reality a struggle against the piety of the Mass. The development of his general faith could proceed without making it necessary for him to question the truth in the ancient conception of the Eucharist as a sacrifice. But a change occurred when the struggle for the absolute sovereignty of the Gospel led him to the point where he saw in the sacrifice of the Mass the strong fortress for that

piety which could not agree with the Gospel. . . . That which he rises up against is not the subtleties of the theology of the Mass, but rather that which we may designate as the religious life-form of the sacrifice of the Mass. . . . When one probes to the bottom of the matter, . . . then it is clear to Luther that "the Mass dominates everything." It is "this dragon's tail," the Mass, "which has engendered all the vermin and idolatry which plague the life of the Church."<sup>8</sup>

If the Mass is a sacrifice, why then God must be angry, and, He being hidden from our gaze, we shall never be in possession of certitude in religious matters, never be sure, that is to say, that our efforts to placate God have succeeded. For Luther, Mass-piety stood for all that he had fought his way through.

There is, finally, a third period in Luther's writings on the Lord's Supper.<sup>9</sup> It represents a kind of explicit filling out of his position--and really no more than this. What happened is that Karlstadt and his friends--and later Zwingli and Oecolampadius--took up their pens to tell the world that not only was the Mass not a sacrifice, but that the traditional doctrine of the "real presence" of Christ in the bread and wine was in fact a papist invention. For them he was not physically present. Thus from about 1524 until his death Luther took the field against "the fanatics." It is important to note that, unlike his passage from the first to the second stage of his eucharistic writings, Luther's moving into the third stage did not involve a change of doctrine; it was only a tactical decision publicly to argue another aspect of his doctrine. (That this is so is illustrated by the coherence of the doctrinal exposition which forms the second part of this chapter, for which exposition references to works both before and after 1524 have been used.) Luther himself took pains to point out, in 1524, that there are

actually two things to be known and proclaimed in this sacrament, the object that is outside the heart and presented to the eyes externally, and the internal attitude.<sup>10</sup> Up to then, he went on, he had not said much of the former, but now things had changed. . . And as the painful climax of the affair, the unsuccessful Marburg colloquy of 1529, indicated, things were not likely to get any better.

In 1524, then, Karlstadt was stirring up trouble in Strassburg, inverting the order of Word and Spirit, turning devotional exercises into good works. A passage from the letter that Luther wrote to reassure the Strassburgers may well serve as a point of departure for presenting Luther's eucharistic doctrine, a doctrine which is really only an extension of his understanding of God's Word. Said Luther--

I confess that if Dr. Karlstadt or anyone else could have convinced me five years ago that only bread and wine were in the sacrament he would have done me a great service. At that time I suffered such severe conflicts and inner strife and torment that I would gladly have been delivered from them. I realized that at this point I could best resist the papacy. . . . But I am a captive and cannot free myself. The text is too powerfully present and will not allow itself to be torn from its meaning by mere verbiage.<sup>11</sup>

The verbiage in question, perhaps a little startlingly, is what grammarians and textual critics produce when they write without taking into account the faith-context within which the Scriptures are to be read. "Something higher than the rules of grammar must always be present when the grounding of faith is concerned."<sup>12</sup> What Luther apparently means is that, ultimately, faith grounds the reading of the Scriptures, and not vice versa. It is thus simultaneously true both that "the words of the Gospel are clear and plain and need no glosses"<sup>13</sup>

and that "one must not do such violence to the words of God as to give any word a meaning other than its natural one, unless there is clear and definite Scripture to do that."<sup>14</sup> Or again, "Every single word should be permitted to stand in its natural meaning; no deviation should be allowed unless faith compels it."<sup>15</sup> In addition, Luther continues, the Scriptures omit nothing needful to the understanding of the Lord's Supper.<sup>16</sup> If it is also true, as Luther staunchly maintains, that it is not contrary to faith that the bread is Christ's body, then there is really nothing to argue about!<sup>17</sup> "For anyone who ventures to interpret words in the Scriptures any other way than what they say is under obligation to prove this contention out of the text of the very same passage or by an article of faith."<sup>18</sup> This, he says, is precisely what the fanatics are unable to do. His faith stands firm; in his Confession of 1528 he lays down once and for all that the true body and blood of Jesus Christ are orally eaten and drunk in the Supper.<sup>19</sup>

The fanatics' contention was that it is neither fitting nor necessary that Christ's body and blood be orally consumed in the Supper.<sup>20</sup> Concretely, they set the synoptic and Pauline accounts of the Supper at odds with the Johannine assertion that flesh is of no avail for salvation--as well as to the fact of the bodily ascension of Christ to heaven. This latter question, whether Christ's being seated at the right hand of the Father precludes his being physically in the bread and wine, will be taken up later in this chapter. For the present it will suffice to summarize the semantic arguments of Luther's gloriously bumptious treatises against those he lumped together as "fanatics." Regrettably, in

the interest of brevity (if not propriety!) Luther's homlier reflections on his adversaries' dialectical finesse will have to be left aside. . .

The general line of the fanatics' arguments is that when Christ said, "This is my body," he was using some sort of figure of speech. Karlstadt's view was simple--and crude.<sup>21</sup> Christ, he said, told the disciples to eat the bread; then, pointing to himself, he said, "This is my body." Luther dismisses Karlstadt with the observation that sentences that are juxtaposed without an intervening qualification are meant to be read one after the other, and "since I find them connected the burden of proof lies on him who would separate them."<sup>22</sup> Christ, moreover, said, "This is the cup of my blood." Quips Luther, "Would it not be better if you made all your ideas completely new and did not call his blood a cup but a dinner basket or a spoonbowl?"<sup>23</sup> Christ is using a figure of speech, Luther concedes, but it is only a lowly synecdoche; after all, when a woman points to a cradle and says, "This is my child," she is surely not claiming to have given birth to a piece of furniture.<sup>24</sup> And this is as figuratively as Luther will allow his Christ to speak.

To deal with the more sophisticated objections of the Swiss reformers Luther uses a variety of restatements of his basic principle, that the words of Scripture are not to be understood figuratively more than is necessary:

a) Is the is of "This is my body" figurative? Well, then, given the radical presence of the verb to be in every affirmation, no statement in Scripture is certain!<sup>25</sup>

b) Should one, perhaps, distinguish between indicative and

imperative statements in Scripture, and thus hold that although the bread and wine at the last supper really were Christ's body and blood the supper narrative has no sacramental relevance to the present? Luther immediately objects with the "Do this in commemoration of me."<sup>26</sup> Do what? Why, repeat Christ's words, which words must necessarily be true, then and now.

c) But can one not say that body is used metaphorically here? No, argues Luther. "In grammar one speaks of a trope or metaphor when a single name is given to two different things on account of a similarity in both."<sup>27</sup> There are now, in effect, two words, the old one and the new one. "In fashioning such new words," he continues, "we Germans customarily prefix 'real' or 'true' or 'a second' or 'new.'"<sup>28</sup> Now it is precisely the words "which is given for you" that will not allow us to say the body referred to in the supper is other than that crucified on Calvary.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, "all metaphors in Scripture signify the true, new object, not the simile of this new object."<sup>30</sup> There are no backward-referring metaphors there, "for Holy Scripture handles its expression in the same way as God handles his works. Now God always works so that the figure or type appears first, and then the true reality and fulfillment of the type follows."<sup>31</sup> Thus an inversion, like "This (i.e., my body) is bread" is ruled out. It does no good, finally, to suggest (as Zwingli did) that these characteristics of metaphorical speech can be transcended by a simple appeal to the interchange of properties (communicatio idiomatum), whereby what Christ did in his humanity is predicated of his divinity, or what Christ does by bread is said of bread.<sup>32</sup> You

cannot explain "This is my body" as you would, for example, "Mary is the Mother of God." If you insist on such a parallel, and do so, indeed, in the name of a non-realist reading of these words of Christ, you ought logically to deny the reality of the incarnation!<sup>33</sup> (Presumably all the human authors of Scripture always used the same grammar book! The fact that Luther here assumes that the communicatio idiomatum is not only a linguistic but a metaphysical reality is a matter to which we shall return presently.) Participation in Christ's body does not, therefore, mean some vague assimilation of ordinary bread into a mystical Christ--at least not primarily--but rather our sharing the pieces of the broken consecrated bread.<sup>34</sup>

d) Nevertheless, does not the sacrament have some referent beyond itself? Of course, replies Luther; the sacrament "must indeed be a sign or figure of something else, but the words in their simplicity must signify nothing else but what they say."<sup>35</sup> Now when a speaker uses the word is explicitly, he means to designate a substance, not its representation.<sup>36</sup> Is refers to essence, not signification. This does not mean, however, that the same essence--the same body, even--cannot be present in different modes, or forms, as, for example, being present in one place visibly and in another invisibly.<sup>37</sup> So, says Luther--

the Sacrament of the Supper must indeed prefigure or signify something, namely, the unity of Christians in one spiritual body of Christ through the Spirit, faith, love, and the cross, etc. . . . But Oecolampadius makes out of a form of a thing a figure of speech, in this manner: "The object is figurative; therefore the words pertaining to figurative objects are figurative."<sup>38</sup>

To Oecolampadius' citation of a passage from Tertullian Luther objects

that a phantom Christ cannot have a form, at least not in Tertullian's sense:

We say that Tertullian employs the word forma in accordance with proper usage in the Latin language, where it means a form or figure in the mathematical sense--stating whether a thing is low, thick, broad, round, white or black, which one can see, feel, and handle; as we Germans also say about the sacrament that Christ's body is present under the form of bread and his body under the form of wine. Exactly what we call gestalt, "form," Tertullian calls in Latin "form."<sup>39</sup>

It is thus quite acceptable to say even that only the form of bread remains in the Supper, as long as, whatever you do, the body and blood of Christ are not taken away. After all, Scripture does call the Sacrament bread.<sup>40</sup> In "This is my body," therefore, body is not an expression that has two modes of significance. Christ's real body, rather, has at least two modes of ontological being, whatever its normal mode is and its invisible eucharistic one.

But then, how is such sacramental realism to be reconciled with the Johannine statement that flesh is of no avail? Luther argues that if the flesh is of no avail in the supper it is of no avail anywhere else either. We might as well be gnostics or manichaeans.<sup>41</sup> Besides, it is up to the fanatics to prove that flesh in John 6 means Christ's flesh.<sup>42</sup> This, he says, they cannot do, for John 6 does not refer to sacraments at all!<sup>43</sup> Flesh and spirit have adverbial force here; they refer to ways of acting.<sup>44</sup> What comes from man's natural powers is flesh and what comes from the Holy Spirit is spirit, in such a fashion that even though an object may not be spiritual its use always ought to be. Luther goes a step beyond considering the manducatio indignorum and states that if mice were to nibble at the sacred bread even they,

albeit unknowingly, would receive the body of Christ.<sup>45</sup> Regarding the manducatio dignorum Luther simply points out that a single grace is received in a double mode.<sup>46</sup>

Nobody, then, has so much as smudged the chalk on that Marburg table top. Luther's faith tells him that Christ's physical body and blood are physically eaten and drunk in the Sacrament, and no textual argument can withstand the ardor of that faith in God's Word. It is worth noting that Luther's textual counter-arguments are aimed simply at showing that it is not necessary to read the texts as the fanatics do. It is always they who must prove their case, they who must demonstrate their right to dam the intuitive onrush of faith.

Having established the fact of Christ's presence in the Supper, we must now consider the use to be made of it. The proper use of the Sacrament is best understood from the standpoint of its structure. Now the Sacrament has three parts: the sacrament proper, or sign; its significance; and the faith required of us toward each of these.<sup>47</sup>

The significance, or effect, of the Lord's Supper is fellowship with the saints, communion.<sup>48</sup> This fellowship is the sharing of the spiritual possessions of Christ, and receiving the sign of fellowship is rather like getting a document of citizenship. The Sacrament is given to us so that we can put into practice the fellowship signified. Thus we can say, too, that this sign of our new citizenship is provided for us as a help in adversity, in Anfechtung; and this is the chief reason why the Sacrament is received often--to help us in our constant infirmity. As a result, really to benefit from the Supper one must

sense his need for it. In fact, we can say that it was provided only for those who have a truly afflicted, disturbed, perplexed, and erring conscience, and that they alone communicate worthily.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, if received with dispositions other than these the Sacrament does God's alien work.<sup>50</sup>

Now the fact of man's sinful estrangement from God imposes a specific character on the God-man relationship:

God does not deal, nor has he ever dealt, with man otherwise than through a word of promise. . . . We in turn cannot deal with God otherwise than through faith in the Word of his promise. For anyone can easily see that these two, promise and faith, must necessarily go together. For without the promise there is nothing to be believed; without faith the promise is useless, since it is established and fulfilled through faith.<sup>51</sup>

And, Luther insists, faith must be real, positive faith, not just, as Scotus and Biel said, the absence of disbelief.<sup>52</sup> And moreover, God must deal with man first, that is, by taking the initiative with his promise. Luther cites the cases of Adam, Noah, Abraham, and Moses as examples of the God-man relationship.<sup>53</sup> What God gave to these Old Testament figures, however, was a promise, and not, strictly speaking, a testament.<sup>54</sup> It is only in Christ that we have God's new, or real, testament. Luther's conclusion is that the Lord's Supper is the New Testament.<sup>55</sup>

Not every promise is a testament. Only one about to die makes a testament. Only as a figure did the paschal lamb die. This time, though, God dies.<sup>56</sup> The true lamb, the God-man, dies for our sins, and so, the night before he dies, he makes his testament, the new, true testament. Luther carries this theme to considerable length. Christ is the testator, we are the heirs, forgiveness of sin is the inheritance,

the words of institution are the testament, and the sacramental sign is like a notary's seal assuring authenticity.<sup>57</sup> In the Lord's Supper we have a compendium of our whole faith: we find here what we are to know of Christ, what we are to do in Christ's memory, and the most powerful illustration of his love for us, a love that both empowers and exemplifies our actions toward God and fellow man.<sup>58</sup> We do not know, of course, why God chose to give us himself through the humanity of Christ and through the Supper,<sup>59</sup> but once it is granted that he has done so, it is not in the least unbecoming to say that Christ died only so he could leave us this testament-supper.<sup>60</sup> We are gratefully to accept the full sweep of the divine plan:

Because this grace would benefit no one if it remained so profoundly hidden and could not come to us, the Holy Spirit comes and gives himself to us also, wholly and completely. He teaches us to understand this deed of Christ which has been manifested to us, helps us receive and preserve it, use it to our advantage and impart it to others, increase and extend it. He does this both inwardly and outwardly--inwardly by means of faith and other spiritual gifts, outwardly through the Gospel, baptism, and the sacrament of the altar, through which as three means or methods he comes to us and inculcates the sufferings of Christ for the benefit of our salvation.<sup>61</sup>

Because of God's great mercy, there are in every one of his promises two elements, word and sacrament, that is, Gospel-preaching and baptism-eucharist in the case of the New Testament.<sup>62</sup> Of old his covenant was accompanied with signs like the rainbow, circumcision, and the dew on the fleece.<sup>63</sup> It is the same now, except that, to put it more exactly, by reason of the Real Presence God's most intimate Word is the sign--and all this is for the greater strengthening and assurance of our faith. Suppose the aforementioned divine fellowship were somehow

made visible; there would then be no more room for faith--the faith that alone saves.<sup>64</sup> God masks his saving work in signs because "everything that is bound to time and sense must fall away, and we must learn to do without them if we are to come to God."<sup>65</sup> A sacrament is--

a sign by which we train and accustom ourselves to let go of all visible love, help, and comfort and to trust in the invisible love, help, and support of Christ and his saints. For death takes away all the things that are seen and separates us from men and transitory things. To meet it we must therefore have the help of things that are unseen and eternal. And these are indicated to us in the sacrament and sign to which we cling by faith until we finally attain to them also with sight and senses. Thus the sacrament is for us a ford, a bridge, a door, a ship, and a stretcher by which we pass from this world into eternal life. Therefore everything depends on faith.<sup>66</sup>

How magnificently this divine plan is exemplified in the signs of the Supper! Luther repeats the comparison of the Didache: as the fruit of many grains and grapes is changed into the one natural body of Christ, so are we united, changed into his spiritual body, put into possession of his virtues and mercies.<sup>67</sup> Because we live in a world of sense we have a deep need of these signs, and precisely as sacramental signs, containing and signifying something spiritual.<sup>68</sup> For the sake of our assurance Christ will die, but he will also give his body and blood for a sign and seal so we shall remember what he has done. For the devil would be only too happy were we to forget.<sup>69</sup>

"Even if we could not show how it is useful and necessary for Christ's body to be in the bread, how should God's Word be false?"<sup>70</sup> Luther always emphasizes the primacy of Word over sign. In the Supper rite, or Mass, we must attend to Christ's words of institution. They are the chief part of the Mass, in a sense; therein lies the whole

Mass.<sup>71</sup> Signs simply help our faith in the promise, the promise that grounds the signs:

Now as the testament is much more important than the sacrament, so the words are much more important than the signs. For the signs might well be lacking, if only one has the words; and thus without sacrament, yet not without testament, one might be saved. . . . We see, then, that the best and greatest part of all the sacraments and of the Mass is the words and promise of God, without which the sacraments are dead and nothing at all.<sup>72</sup>

Thus, even if religious ritual is not absolutely necessary, it is not wrong either.<sup>73</sup> It can be quite helpful, or it can be abused. Even if the main reason why we assemble for public worship is to hear the Word of God's promise,<sup>74</sup> we should not be too hard, practically, on those who in their weakness tend to turn the sacraments into magic. Let Christian love, never violence, be the inspiration of liturgical reform!<sup>75</sup>

Doctrinally, however, we should give no quarter in our fight for the truth. God's truth is supposed to make us free, but the more laws there are the less freedom we have.<sup>76</sup> Thus when God speaks to us in Christ he abrogates the many laws of the Old Testament and gives us but one, new Law. It is the law of the Mass.<sup>77</sup> The more our religious life centers on the Mass the better off we are. The trouble is, says Luther, that whereas religious life still centers around the Mass, it centers around it as misunderstood. All religious life has thus been poisoned at the source. To set things right, then, one must begin at the beginning and see what the Mass is all about.

We have already seen how the Mass grows out of God's salvific plan: "The whole power of the Mass consists in the words of Christ, in

which he testifies that forgiveness of sins is bestowed on all those who believe that his body is given and his blood poured out for them."<sup>78</sup> A corollary of this truth is that Christ has made the "validity" of the Mass rest on his words, not on men.<sup>79</sup> A further corollary is that "where there is a divine promise, there everyone must stand on his own feet; his personal faith is demanded."<sup>80</sup> If sacrifice be defined as "a work in which we present and give to God something of our own,"<sup>81</sup> it is obvious that, strictly speaking, the Mass is not a sacrifice; for in the Mass we receive God's Word, which gives to man the grace and mercy of God. We receive, we do not give. Of course, we experience an immense gratitude for God's gift to us, but we must bear in mind that this gratitude is itself part of the gift. We may, if we wish, and there is Scriptural precedent for this, refer to gratitude thus understood as a sacrifice of praise; in this sense it is possible to say that in so far as each one's faith "offers sacrifice" all are priests.<sup>82</sup> We must never imagine, however, that at Mass the officiating minister, or "priest," does more than merely represent the congregation of "priests." There is now no special class of priests, or sacrificers, as there once was in the Old Law. In the New Law there is but one High Priest, Jesus Christ, and the priestly office of all who are incorporated in him by grace clearly is to proclaim what he has done.<sup>83</sup> The sacrificial victim, moreover, must be killed and given wholly to God.<sup>84</sup> Now Christ gave himself wholly to God once for all, so that God might give him wholly to us. To offer the bread and wine back to God is an affront;<sup>85</sup> it is robbing his people, for "to sacrifice to God and to be consumed by us are not compatible

ideas."<sup>86</sup> If the Scriptures truly say all that is necessary concerning the Supper, and, Luther says--

if we have properly understood what has been said above, namely, that the Mass is nothing else than a testament and sacrament in which God makes a pledge to us and gives us grace and mercy, I think it is not fitting that we should make a good work or merit out of it. For a testament is not beneficium acceptum, but datum; it does not take benefit from us, but brings it to us.<sup>87</sup>

Wisloff suggests that the thrust of the Real Presence is precisely the reason why the Mass cannot be a sacrifice.<sup>88</sup> The movement goes one way-- to and for us.

With these lines, one is tempted to say, our picture of Luther's eucharistic doctrine is complete. He was a professor of biblical theology, and he tended to become impatient with what he considered unnecessary philosophical constructions on biblical data, particularly if such constructions were somehow made equal in importance with God's Word in Scripture and its correlative, the inner, intuitively perceived word spoken by the Spirit. We eat Christ "truly and physically," he wrote, but how this takes place or how he is in the bread we do not know nor are meant to.

There are those who practise their arts and subtleties by trying to fathom what becomes of the bread when it is changed into Christ's flesh and of the wine when it is changed into his blood, and how the whole Christ, his flesh and blood, can be encompassed in so small a portion of bread and wine. It does not matter if you do not see it. It is enough to know that it is a divine sign in which Christ's flesh and blood are truly present. The how and the where we leave to him.<sup>89</sup>

At any rate, the Christian is not to rely religiously on those "vain words" ex opere operato. "Everyone has a right to his opinion, but such fables do not please me."<sup>90</sup> After all, the sacraments are for our sake,

not God's; is it not foolish to suppose that the sacramental economy pleases him when we misuse it?<sup>91</sup> Still, Luther could not avoid becoming involved in philosophical arguments about the eucharist, and for a fuller understanding of his eucharistic doctrine it is helpful to hear what he said. What he said, however, turned out to be one of the real curiosities of philosophical theology; because of the intrinsic interest of his texts, as well as the difficulty of paraphrasing them truly, his remarks on the ubiquity of Christ will be quoted rather more extensively.

Any discussion of the philosophical background of the eucharist must consider, among others, these two questions: how or to what extent the bread and wine remain present, and how or to what extent Christ becomes present with respect to them. Luther treats the first question chiefly in his discussion of transubstantiation in The Babylonian Captivity of the Church, 1520,<sup>92</sup> and in the section on "The Law of Identical Predication" in the Confession concerning Christ's Supper, 1528.<sup>93</sup> He treats the second chiefly in his discussion of the ubiquity of Christ, also in the Confession.<sup>94</sup>

Regarding this first question, if Christ's body and blood are truly and physically present in the sacramental signs, there are really only two possibilities, metaphysically speaking. Either the ontological reality of the signs is somehow diminished by their being caught up in the power-of-being of Christ (transubstantiation), or they remain just as they are, their inner reality becoming the bearer of the reality of Christ (consubstantiation). In other words, at the deepest, "substantial," level of being there is either Christ alone or Christ and the

signs together.

Now it is important to remember that Luther is writing about these two modes of Christ's presence, not for the sake of philosophical theology, but out of a concern for Christian liberty. Innocent III and the fourth Lateran council of 1215, he thought, had gone beyond their mandate in making transubstantiation a doctrine of faith:

Since the Roman bishop has ceased to be a bishop and has become a tyrant, I fear none of his decrees; for I know that it is not within his power, nor that of any general council, to make new articles of faith. . . .<sup>95</sup>

Therefore I permit every man to hold either of these opinions, as he chooses. My one concern at present is to remove all scruples of conscience, so that no one may fear his being called a heretic if he believes that real bread and real wine are present on the altar, and that everyone may feel at liberty to ponder, hold, and believe either one view or the other without endangering his salvation.<sup>96</sup>

Luther felt the same way, we may note in passing, about withholding the cup from the laity; although it is not absolutely necessary for them to participate fully in the sacramental signs, still popes and councils had no authority to change what Christ had instituted.<sup>97</sup>

Luther himself, though, prefers consubstantiation, the view, that is, that real bread and wine are present on the altar, not just their "accidents," his reason being that it seems to require fewer miracles to explain it.<sup>98</sup> He got this idea, he tells us, from reading Pierre d'Ailly's commentary on the Sentences, where that author makes the rather surprising observation that consubstantiation would be more probably than transubstantiation had not the Church decreed otherwise! Luther goes on to point out that Aquinas' transubstantiation doctrine requires a real wrenching of Aristotle's thought, in that substance and accident are now held to

be separable, the "bread" of the text being understood to mean, not bread, but "accidents-of-bread." In a sort of reductio ad absurdum Luther suggests that since Aristotle says that accidents can, in a secondary sense, be the subjects of a predication, why should we not have "transaccidentation" as well? After all, the body and blood of Christ should no more be identified with the accidents of bread than with its substance!

In 1528 Luther again took up this matter of the identity of subject and predicate in "This is my body." Two distinct substances--bread and body--seem here to be spoken of as one substance. Christ, he says, is--as we saw above--using the figure of synecdoche, and Luther understands this figure--as was also noted--in not only a linguistic but a metaphysical sense as well. Luther explains this "metaphysical figure" in the following manner:

When two diverse beings become one being, grammar embraces these two beings in a single expression, and as it views the union of the two beings, it refers to the two in one term.

For example, as in Christ God and man constitute one personal being, grammar speaks thus of the two beings: "He is God; he is man." Likewise of the dove, John 1:32, "This is the Holy Spirit; this is a dove." Likewise of the angel, "This is a wind; this is an angel." (Ps. 104:4) "This is bread; this is my body." On the other hand, occasionally the one substance is called the other: "Man is God; God is man"; "The dove is the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit is the dove"; "This is my body; my body is the bread." Here one must not speak of the beings as diverse and distinct in themselves, as Wycliffe and the sophists misuse logic, but in terms of the nature of the union, according to the fact that the diverse beings have become one single being, each in its own fashion. It is in truth the case that these diverse natures which thus have united have acquired a new, unique being by this convergence, whereby they are rightly and properly called a single being, even though each has its particular unique nature. . . .<sup>99</sup>

Even though body and bread are two distinct substances, each one existing by itself, and though neither is mistaken for the other

where they are separated from each other, nevertheless where they are united and become a new, entire substance they lose their difference so far as this new, unique substance is concerned. As they become one, they are called and designated one object. It is not necessary, meanwhile, that one of the two disappear or be annihilated, but both the bread and the body remain, and by virtue of the sacramental unity it is correct to say, "This is my body," designating the bread with the word "this." For it is no longer ordinary bread in the oven, but a "flesh-bread" or "body-bread," i.e., a bread which has become one sacramental substance with the body of Christ.<sup>100</sup>

Now Luther deals with the second question, that of the presence of Christ in the signs, in exactly the same manner. The fanatics argued that since Christ has bodily ascended to heaven and sits now at the right hand of the Father he cannot therefore be present bodily anywhere else, namely, in the bread and wine of the Supper. Luther rejects this reasoning as absurd, noting that all through the Scriptures the hand of God is not a place but simply a way of describing the power of God, which by essence--wesentlich und gegenwertig--is present everywhere.<sup>101</sup> ("Everywhere" here means simply everywhere in the finite universe where there can be said to be a place. It does not mean that God's infinity is contracted to the dimensions of the finite universe, nor that the universe is somehow infinitized. Briefly, wherever there is something, there God is active.)<sup>102</sup> Luther concludes that if God's powerful hand is everywhere, and if Christ ascended bodily to the right hand of God, therefore Christ himself, in his bodily humanity, must be everywhere. In consequence, his being bodily in the bread and wine is no problem at all.

The problematic word in this discussion is, of course, presence.<sup>103</sup> Following Occam, Luther speaks of three modes of being present. The first is local, or circumscriptive, presence, in which "the space and the

object occupying it exactly correspond and fit into the same measurements."<sup>104</sup> The trouble with the fanatics is that with their "crude, fat, puffy ideas" they can never get beyond this first understanding of presence. But the second mode of presence is had when an object is in a place definitively, i.e., here, and not elsewhere, yet in an uncircumscribed manner. Such is the case "if the object or body is not palpably in one place and is not measurable according to the dimensions of the place where it is but can occupy more room or less."<sup>105</sup> Luther gives as examples the passage of sound through a wall or of one's vision through air. Christ, he says, used this mode of presence when he left the closed grave and came through the closed doors, when he was born of a Virgin, and in the bread and wine in the Supper.<sup>106</sup>

Now in the third mode of presence "an object occupies places repletively, i.e., supernaturally." This occurs--

if it is simultaneously present in all places whole and entire and fills all places, yet without being measured or circumscribed by any place, in terms of the space which it occupies. This mode of existence belongs to God alone, . . . is altogether incomprehensible, beyond our reason, and can be maintained only with faith, in the Word.<sup>107</sup>

Whereas according to the second mode one being can be in another in such a way that the latter does not feel, touch, measure, or circumscribe it, "how much more marvellously" is God present "in all created things according to this third mode, where they cannot measure or circumscribe him but where they are present to him so that he measures and circumscribes them."<sup>108</sup>

Strictly speaking, all figures of speech refer to operations of beings, not their inner reality.<sup>109</sup> Zwingli's alloiosis holds true for

the works of Christ, as when we say, "God died on the cross." He erred, of course, when he wanted to have Christ say, "This--in effect, as far as it is of benefit to you--is my body." Luther held rather that the words of institution involve a synecdoche, a part-for-the-whole construction: "This which you see in my hand, is really part of a larger complex that includes my body." These words, nevertheless, taken in themselves, tell only what happens at the Supper, not why it can happen. As we have seen, the distinct essences of bread and body must be "held together" in a higher unity, a unity that eludes all figures of speech precisely because to have a figure of speech you must maintain the essential distinction of the elements of the figure. The intention of one who speaks figuratively is, though, to join the elements of the figure; it is in God's power, Luther seems to be saying, ontologically, and not merely verbally, to join disparate essences. The resulting higher union can thus be described (although Luther, to the writer's knowledge, never does so in just this way) as the metaphysical projection of a figure of speech, a sort of super-figure. Now it is Luther's daring vision that what happens in the Supper can happen only because it has already happened in the hypostatic union. The real ground of Christ's ability to be in the bread and wine uncircumscriptively is not some special miracle but simply his ability repletively to transcend space and time by reason of the union of his humanity with his divinity. Essentially disparate bread and body are held in a higher unity precisely because--following the same metaphysical figure (or form, curve, gestalt)--essentially disparate Godhood and manhood are held in a higher unity.

We do not say that divinity is humanity, or that the divine nature is the human nature, which would be confusing the natures into one essence. Rather we merge the two distinct natures into one single person, and say: "God is man and man is God."<sup>110</sup>

Developing the consequences of this vision--

The one body of Christ has a threefold existence, or all three modes of being at any given place.<sup>111</sup>

Our faith maintains that Christ is God and man, and the two natures are one person, so that this person may not be divided in two; therefore he can surely show himself in a corporeal, circumscribed manner at whatever place he will, as he did after the resurrection and will do on the Last Day. But above and beyond this he can also use the second, uncircumscribed mode, as we have proved from the Gospel that he did at the grave and the closed door.

But now, since he is a man who is supernaturally one person with God, and apart from this man there is no God, it must follow that, according to the third, supernatural, mode, he is and can be wherever God is, and that everything is full of Christ through and through, even according to his humanity--not according to the first, corporeal, circumscribed, mode, but according to the supernatural, divine mode.

And if you could show me one place where God is and not the man, then the person is already divided and I could at once say truthfully, "Here is God who is not man and who never has become man." But no God like that for me! For it would follow from this that space and place had separated the two natures from one another and thus had divided the person, even though death and all the devils had been unable to separate and tear them apart. This would leave me a poor sort of Christ, if he were present only at one single place, as a divine and human person, and if at all other places he had to be nothing more than a mere isolated God, and a divine person without humanity. No, comrade, wherever you place God for me you must also place the humanity for me. They simply will not let themselves be separated and divided from each other.<sup>112</sup>

Citing Ephesians 1:22 and 4:10, Luther explicitly states that our faith in the Supper is shielded and sustained by our faith, not only in the incarnation, but in creation itself.<sup>113</sup> Where, therefore, is the Lord?

You must place this existence of Christ, which constitutes him one person with God, far, far beyond things created, as far as God transcends them; and, on the other hand, place it as deep in and as near to all created things as God is in them. For he is one indivisible person with God, and wherever God is, he must be also; otherwise our faith is false.<sup>114</sup>

The warmth of Luther's conception of the eucharist never shines out more attractively than when he speaks of why the Lord "rises" from the impenetrable abyss of this third mode of existence or presence in all things up to that second mode wherein he comes to us in the bread and wine. For Christ is free and unbound; there is a great gap between his being present and our finding him, for our sin-corrupted minds find only an illusory god in the natural inspection of nature. Another way of putting it is to say that even though Christ is everywhere, he is not everywhere for us--in such a way that we might hope to find him. Luther's Christ tells us--

I wish to attach myself here with my word in order that you may not have to buzz about, trying to seek me in all the places that I am; this would be too much for you, and you would also be too puny to apprehend me in these places without the help of my word.<sup>115</sup>

God's internal word, then, directs us to the Word of Scripture, which in turn directs us to Christ the Word in his Supper. There is no better summary of Luther's doctrine of the Supper than these lines from the 1528 Confession:

See, then, what a beautiful, great, marvelous thing this is, how everything meshes together in one sacramental reality. . . . The words first connect the bread and cup to the sacrament; the bread and cup embrace the body and blood of Christ; the body and blood of Christ embrace the new testament; the new testament embraces the forgiveness of sins; forgiveness of sins embraces eternal life and salvation. See, all this the

words of the Supper offer and give us, and we embrace it by faith. Ought not the devil, then, hate such a supper and rouse fanatics against it?<sup>116</sup>

Where, then, we must now ask, does this doctrine stand in relation to the structural polarities suggested in our Introduction? First of all there is the polarity of time, the polarity arising from the gap between the historical Christ and us. Luther's solution of this problem lies in that doctrine for which his eucharistic theology is chiefly known, the doctrine of ubiquity. Thus for Luther the problem of time is not solved by a new understanding of our present state; we are not spirited out of history. His emphasis falls, rather, on the power of the glorified Christ; he who once suffered for us is now able, through the divinization of his humanity, to be our contemporary in the eucharist. Properly understood, the words of institution make clear that in the eucharist there is no "action" on the part of Christ, above all no mysterious history-spanning sacrificial action that perchance we could share in. Luther surely does not mean to deny that Christ now intercedes for us in some sense, but nevertheless his Christ is not somehow re-enacting his passion in the bread and wine, but rather simply present for our consolation. Hence Luther's insistence that the eucharist is exclusively a gift from God, and not something to be offered back to God. Hence, too, his vehemence against the Mass understood as the center of a piety of works-righteousness. In terms of the polarity of time, then, Luther opts for a renewed understanding of Christ, not of us.

The doctrine of ubiquity functions similarly in regard to the polarity of space, the polarity arising from the gap between Christ in

heaven and us on earth. The right hand of the Father is, as we have seen, not a place but a metaphysical mode of being. The glorified, divinized Christ is everywhere, including, of course, the space occupied by the bread and wine. It is simply that, because we cannot see him everywhere, he has chosen to direct us, by the inspiration of the Spirit, to seek him in the eucharist; there it is that he is present for us. We may note in this connection that, if Christ is already present everywhere, there is no necessity for a special priesthood to make him "more" present (Someone is either present, or he is not.) in the eucharist. In terms of the polarity of space, then, Luther stands on the side that makes Christ our contemporary here on earth.

Finally, it is quite plain what Luther's position will be with regard to the polarity of subjective appropriation. In the fullest sense of the term, perhaps, presence may denote mutual subjective interaction. Luther's conception of presence, however, is thoroughly objectivistic; Christ is present in the eucharist by the power of his divinity, and thus no human sinfulness can negate that presence. This much is quite clear. Paradoxically, however, Luther points out that the best disposition for receiving the eucharist is sinfulness. The sacrament was provided, in other words, for the man of faith, for him who, conscious of his weakness, despairs over himself. It is only the man who lacks this radical receptivity who does not enter into subjective interaction with Christ. And even he, Luther adds, has some kind of mysterious dealings with Christ, for in those without faith the sacrament does God's alien work, that strange action of God designed to lead man to despair over himself and

begin to listen, in faith, to the Spirit directing him to Word and Sacrament.

On the surface, it is true, Luther's way of reading Scripture has gone out of style. At a deeper level, however, it has not. One thing form-criticism has emphasized is that our Scriptures come out of a community of faith; it may not be so bad, then, if faith, expressing itself in intuitions, guides the reading of them. The real trouble with the fanatics, Luther thought, is that they restricted the object of faith to "spiritual" things.<sup>117</sup> In fact, Luther's description of poor Karlstadt makes him sound like another Harnack (which, for Luther, was a very bad thing).<sup>118</sup> Luther sensed--without, it would seem, ever really being able to say why--that the Scriptural Word belongs with the sacramental Word, the existential, historical Word. Luther never forgets that God's Word is sent to and for us--in our misery; Lutheran theology is not a vehicle to spirit one "out of this world." Perhaps this is the basic reason why the Christ of Scripture, who is in his very being the primal sacrament of God, must be the Christ who is everywhere in his humanity. One could point to a sort of monophysitism here; but it might be better to reflect that, though one can have imperfect ideas of the two essences joined in Christ, one can have no idea at all of their one act of being, because, after all, no act of being, of factual givenness, can ever be captured with an idea.

Perhaps the hardest thing here is to take Luther at his word when he tells of his cosmic vision. At any rate, the sacramentalized Word is for us. Regin Prenter describes what the full Lutheran vision

can mean to us:

That the Word is accompanied by the Sacrament means that the Word is the living, dynamic Word. We can make it static. A static Word would give us everything at once. But it would fail to tell us of our shortcomings; it would fail to remind us that we can continue to claim the gift only when our old man is daily subdued as long as we live. In order to make the Word static, we would have to eliminate the Sacrament from the Word. The Word would then lie dead in dead men; it would speak a dead, abstract "idea" to dead men who would remain dead. The Word would then be a caricature, a caricature which is law without Gospel, promise without fulfillment; a caricature which has removed death and resurrection, pilgrimage, time, and struggle from the Word. All this, which is the life of the Word, is found in the Word only when it is Word and Sacrament. 119

## CHAPTER II

### JOHN CALVIN AND THE AUGUSTINIAN HERITAGE

Like Luther, Calvin touches upon all the elements of traditional eucharistic doctrine. Like Luther, too, he proposes, by a return to the purer Gospel of Christian antiquity, to restore their rightful emphasis to certain of these elements that the papist innovators have obscured. Concretely, what he intends to do is to restate for his time the eucharistic doctrine of Augustine. First in this chapter, then, will come a résumé of Calvin's eucharistic doctrine as it is found in the 1559 edition of the Institutes, which presentation will stress Calvin's points of contact with the church father. After that, with the hope of avoiding the pitfall of mere "proof-texting," we shall consider briefly the arguments of Augustine's more substantial passages on the eucharist, that is, the various purposes he had in mind when he wrote and, in his writing, explicitly expressed. The chapter will conclude with some remarks on the changing fortunes of the term substance.

Before we look at the teaching of the 1559 Institutes we should first see why this work is the best basis for a comparison with Augustine.<sup>1</sup> Calvin, after all, wrote a great deal about the eucharist. Even before his conversion he had read in one of Luther's treatises that Oecolampadius and Zwingli thought the sacraments were "purely symbolic" signs--which, he said later, so displeased him that he put off reading

these "profane" books for a long time. In the first edition of his Institutes, that of 1536, he thus set out to play the role of mediator; apparently the profane books turned out to be not so bad after all, and apparently, too, some of Luther's remarks about the corporeal presence of Christ in the eucharist struck him as excessive. Calvin held for a virtual presence of Christ, and supported his position with quotations from Augustine.<sup>2</sup> Calvin's continued efforts at mediation between the Lutherans and the Swiss were crowned with a partial success in the Consensus Tigurinus with Bullinger, composed in 1549 and published in 1551--although the necessity of providing a united religious and political front against the renewed attacks of Charles V doubtless exerted some pressure toward doctrinal harmony. The Consensus, however, fell short of Calvin's wider aim, and in a sense even made it impossible of fulfillment, because it was the occasion of great displeasure among many Lutherans of a conservative bent.

A Hamburg preacher, Joachim Westphal, undertook to defend ubiquity and consubstantiation and attacked the Swiss, taking Zwingli, Bullinger, and Calvin to be the same, more or less, in their views. In 1555, Calvin replied with the Defensio sanae et orthodoxae doctrinae de Sacramentis, an article-by-article explanation of the Consensus. In that same year Westphal hit back with Adversus cuiusdam sacramentarii falsam criminationem justa defensionem, to which Calvin replied with a Secunda defensio in the year following. In this second defense, says Luchesius Smits, he "prend sous sa loupe" all the Augustine proof-texts that Westphal had brought forward and adds still more of his own.<sup>3</sup> The debate was

beginning to be a contest to see who was the better Augustinian. Naturally, Westphal struck back with an Epistola quo breviter respondit ad convicia Johannis Calvini, which he published in 1557 together with some (rather belligerent) confessions of faith from various Saxon churches, and, what is most important, with his Collectanea sententiarum Divi Aurelii Augustini episcopi Hipponensis de coena Domini. This new venture in proof-texting consisted of, first, the Augustine texts that could be read as favoring Westphal's position, and, secondly, those that Calvin had used, with a few hints on how to use them better.

Calvin fought the new attack right away, publishing in that same year his Ultima Admonitio ad Joachimum Westphalum. Calvin sets out to rescue Augustine and refute Westphal, following the latter step by step, and alluding to the former, says Smits, 336 times, 62 of them with explicit references.<sup>4</sup> Westphal kept on fighting, and Calvin replied again in the 1559 Institutes, IV, xvii, 20-34. Westphal was joined in 1560 by Tilemanus Hesshusius, against whom Calvin wrote a Dilucida explicatio sanae doctrinae de vera participatione carnis et sanguinis Christi, followed by a Ratio ineundae concordiae, si veritas extra contentionem quaeritur. Also in 1561 Calvin replied to the charges of Gabriel de Saconay, a priest of Lyons, and Georges Cassandre that he was destroying the unity of the Church; and in 1564 he wrote a confession of faith for the Emperor Maximilian, to influence him to aid the Protestant side in the civil war that had begun in France. All of Calvin's writings after the 1559 Institutes, however, merely draw upon the anti-Westphal polemic of that work (and we may note in passing that Calvin's sermons and

commentaries written during these years make little mention of Augustine).<sup>5</sup> Since, then, the last Latin edition of the Institutes was Calvin's last major discussion of the eucharist, and since it was directed against Westphal's trying to make a Lutheran of Augustine, it is this text that seems most worthy of examination.

Before going any further, though, it may be helpful to see in a general way how Calvin regarded the authority of Augustine in matters of doctrine. Smits writes that on essential questions Calvin feels fully in agreement with his mentor, who among the Fathers follows the biblical sources the most faithfully, and who, in gathering together the scriptural interpretations of his predecessors, best hands on what the ancient Church produced. To rely on this author is to have the support of the most scriptural, most evangelical authority of all antiquity. Smits continues--

Calvin shows a real preoccupation to cover himself with the authority of Augustine in the questions of predestination, sacraments, and original sin. His reasons for this are, first, the veneration which his adversaries, be they Catholic or reformed, felt for the bishop of Hippo, and then the fact that he himself had discovered in Augustine's writings the fundamental principle of the reformation, namely, the radical corruption of the human heart.<sup>6</sup>

Calvin, it seems, cannot say enough in praise of Augustine. Calvin's remarks on him may well be seen in the wider context of his reverence for Christian antiquity, as, for example, it finds expression in his remarks on councils:

Thus councils would come to have the majesty that is their due; yet in the meantime Scripture would stand out in the higher place, with everything subject to its standard. In this way, we willingly embrace and reverence as holy the early councils,

such as those of Nicea, Constantinople, Ephesus I, Chalcedon, and the like, which were concerned with refuting errors--in so far as they relate to the teachings of faith. For they contain nothing but the pure and genuine expositions of Scripture, which the holy fathers applied with spiritual prudence to crush the enemies of religion who had then arisen.<sup>7</sup>

He quotes Augustine in support of this view! Christian antiquity faithfully handed on the word of God, and of all antiquity, Augustine did this best. In his De aeterna Dei praedestinatione Calvin says that "Augustine is so fully on our side (adeo totus noster est) that if I had to write a confession of faith it suffice for me to put down a collection of passages from his writings."<sup>8</sup> In IV, xiv, 26, Augustine is cited as him "whom we quote often as the best and most reliable witness of all antiquity."<sup>9</sup> Very frequently Augustine is quoted in such a way that whoever wishes to argue with Calvin must take on Augustine, too, as when Calvin writes, in IV, xix, 15, "But if they reply that my definition is not a law that they must obey, let them hear Augustine, whom they pretend to consider sacrosanct."<sup>10</sup> Even though the African bishop comes in for an occasional reverent correction (even then, with some sort of excuse offered for his having nodded), Calvin feels indebted to him for immensely much.<sup>11</sup> He points out that it was Augustine who first gave him a grasp of a very substantial chunk of reformation theology: that God's love must be poured into our hearts to conquer their ineradicable selfishness. God, he says in II, viii, 50, "requires a marvelously tempered heart, and does not permit the tiniest pinprick to urge it against the law of love. Do you think my view lacks authority? It was Augustine who first opened the way for me to understand this commandment."<sup>12</sup>

And when it comes to the eucharist, says Smits, this pervasive dependence on Augustine takes the following form: Augustine is called upon to witness to four points, namely, (1) that the words of institution are to be read figuratively, (2) that unworthy reception of the sacrament profits nothing, (3) that Christ's natural body is only in heaven, and (4) that since both in the Old and in the New Testament faith bears on the same Christ, so, therefore, do the sacraments of both.<sup>13</sup> We are now in a better position to look at Calvin's eucharistic doctrine as it is given in chapters xiv and xvii of book IV of the 1559 Institutes.

Chapter xiv deals with the sacraments in general. These are, says Calvin, "another aid to our faith related to the preaching of the gospel."<sup>14</sup> They may be defined either as outward signs by which the Lord "seals on our consciences the promises of his good will toward us in order to sustain the weakness of our faith, and we in turn attest our piety toward him in the presence of the Lord and of his angels and before men"; or more simply, "testimonies of divine grace toward us, confirmed by outward signs, with mutual attestation of our piety toward him."<sup>15</sup> Whichever of these you choose, your choice will only reflect Augustine, who in his treatise on instructing the unlearned defined a sacrament as "a visible sign of a sacred thing" or "a visible form of an invisible grace."<sup>16</sup> Originally the term sacrament meant mystery, and Calvin correctly notes that it was largely Augustine who effected the change of meaning from sacramentum-secretum to sacramentum-signum, thus extending the term to include the visible manifestation of the sacred.<sup>17</sup> Sacraments are given us because of our weakness, our "bodiedness"--a

neo-Platonic touch, to be sure!--but we must remember, nevertheless, that the sacrament derives its value from the preaching of the gospel, from the word, to which it is a sort of appendix. Augustine's observations about baptismal water in his commentary on John are quoted as an appropriate confirmation. Calvin counters the objection that the word alone is enough by pointing out that the meaning of the word is clearer when it finds parallel expression in a sacrament, or as Augustine said, in a visible word.<sup>18</sup>

After these introductory observations, Calvin sets out to refute the "fanatics." Against their objection that the sacraments are not testimonies of divine grace because they can be received unworthily Calvin once again cites Augustine, to the effect that the sacraments are efficacious--or the word is efficacious in them--only when they are received with faith. The fact that men receive them unworthily does not prevent the sacraments from "objectively" witnessing Christ, so as to help men grow in faith.<sup>19</sup> But the real agent of such growth--and this point is very important--is the Spirit:

First, the Lord teaches and instructs us by his Word. Secondly, he confirms it by the sacraments. Finally, he illumines our minds by the light of the Holy Spirit and opens our hearts for the Word and sacraments to enter in, which would otherwise only strike our ears and appear before our eyes, but not at all affect us within.<sup>20</sup>

Of course, the sacraments do not have "some secret force or other perpetually sealed in them by which they are able to promote or confirm faith by themselves."<sup>21</sup> Rather, there is such a division

between Spirit and sacraments that the power to act rests with the former, and the ministry alone is left to the latter--a

ministry empty and trifling, apart from the action of the Spirit, but charged with great effect when the Spirit works within and manifests his power.

What sight does in our eyes for seeing light, and what hearing does in our ears for perceiving a voice, are analogous to the work of the Holy Spirit in our hearts, which is to conceive, sustain, nourish, and establish faith. . . . There is only this difference: that our ears and eyes have naturally received the faculty of hearing and seeing; but Christ does the same thing in our hearts by a special grace beyond the measure of nature.<sup>22</sup>

In this manner, by making explicit the role of the Spirit, does Calvin explain why unworthy reception is fruitless, and hence no argument against the sacramental economy of grace.

Calvin next takes on the opposite extreme, the contemporary theology of Rome, which apparently taught that worthy reception of the sacrament takes place if only no obstacle (that is, mortal sin) stands in the way. Only, then, let a man not be totally alienated from God; he need not have faith in God's word, he may be (psychologically speaking) religiously indifferent. The magic rite will do all that is needful to save him.<sup>23</sup>

Now, says Calvin, salvation, as he has shown earlier in the Institutes, comes precisely, only, by faith. "From this something else follows: assurance of salvation does not depend upon participation in the sacrament, as if justification consisted in it."<sup>24</sup> The sacraments can thus be received without justification's taking place, and simply because this is so, the current Roman theology of the sacraments is deceitful and dangerous.

Calvin immediately lines up a series of Augustine texts to prove this separability of sacrament and sanctification.<sup>25</sup> He quotes Augustine

to the effect that just as there can be invisible sanctification without a sign, so can there be visible signs without sanctification. Sometimes men put on Christ only to the extent of receiving the sacrament. The sign is one thing, after all, and the thing of which it is a sign, another; and although the thing, the truth, is ordinarily contained in the sign, still the two can be separated--and we should not say of one what belongs only to the other. Again, the sacrament is one thing, and the power of it another. Consequently, only in the elect do the sacraments effect what they represent, only in the elect do they give grace. The sacrament is thus sometimes received unto death, the thing never so. One must eat with the heart, not just press with the teeth. Of course, if you receive the sacraments carnally, they themselves do not cease to be spiritual; they are just not so for you. So you must lift your mind, always, as much as you can, above the sign (albeit through it) to the thing signified. Thus if it has been said that Moses and God sanctified, what happened is that Moses did the visible sign while God gave invisible grace through the Holy Spirit. Calvin sums up his argument thus:

We do not deny that God himself is present in his institutions by the very-present power of his Spirit. Nevertheless, that the administration of the sacraments which he has ordained may not be unfruitful and void, we declare that the inner grace of the Spirit, as distinct from the outward ministry, ought to be considered and pondered separately. God therefore truly executes whatever he promises and represents in signs; nor do the signs lack their own effect in proving their Author truthful and faithful. The only question here is whether God acts by his own intrinsic power (as they say) or resigns his office to outward symbols. But we contend that, whatever instruments he uses, these detract nothing from his original activity.<sup>26</sup>

Thus the Spirit is given a two-fold role: by his power he makes the water, bread, and wine bearers of that power, while at the same time

empowering the elect (as an aspect of their election) to receive what he will give them. As bearers of the power of the Spirit, as touched by his power, the sacramental elements become bearers of Jesus Christ, the Redeemer. We have here one of those wonderful theological points of intersection, where everything relates to everything else. The Spirit moves the elect to do the sacraments. He touches their sacraments so that they will be enriched by them, yet simultaneously touches the elect "anew" so that they will be receptive. The Spirit is the dynamic element here; what we can see of the elect and their rites are as so many leaves caught up by a gentle yet unhesitant wind.

Chapter xiv concludes with a little study of what we could call "sacramental phenomenology." Calvin begins by trying to make clear just what the Spirit does to the water, the bread, and the wine when he catches them up for his special purposes. In reference to the Tree of Life Calvin writes some lines that are extremely important for our purpose here, and for that reason they will be quoted in full:

And indeed the tree was previously a tree, the rainbow a rainbow. When they were inscribed by God's Word a new form was put upon them so they began to be what previously they were not. That no one may think these things said in vain, the rainbow even today is a witness to us of that covenant which the Lord made with Noah. As often as we look upon it, we read this promise of God in it, that the earth will never be destroyed by a flood. Therefore, if any philosophizer, to mock the simplicity of our faith, contends that such a variety of colors naturally arises from rays reflected upon a cloud opposite, let us admit it, but laugh at his stupidity in failing to recognize God as the lord and governor of nature, who according to his will uses all the elements to serve his glory. If he had imprinted such reminders upon the sun, stars, earth, stones, they would all be sacraments for us. Why are crude and coined silver not of the same value, though they are absolutely the same metal? The one is merely in the natural state; stamped with an official mark, it becomes a coin and

receives a new valuation. And cannot God mark with his Word the things he has created, that what were previously bare elements may become sacraments?<sup>27</sup>

What Calvin seems to be about is to make clear that faith-knowledge, the kind necessary to apprehend sacraments, is of quite another order than the experiential knowledge that the natural science of his time produced. For that matter, good philosophy confirms faith: the mocker is characterized as a "philosophizer." Now if one seeks a philosophical explanation of the Spirit's action, he may say that the elements, while remaining phenomenologically the same, receive the "impress" of a new form. This change, once again, is imperceptible; one has to be told about it by God's Word (which is the formational principle), although, once told, one can, if desired, venture a philosophical explanation. Since God's intent for created things is normative of their existence, the elements really are something different. Only why the change? The change, we see, was not at all capricious, but was to express the covenant, God's intent for mankind. We may thus safely say that the elements are truly something different because now they have been caught up into a higher purpose, now they have been, so to speak, headed in a new direction. Or more simply, because God has changed his mind about them! (Except, of course, that God knew he was going to do this all along.) The reason for making so much of this passage--allowing that we have not read too much into it--is that the absolutely determinative power of the Logos, ascent above sense-knowledge, movement from God outward, and movement back to God that find expression in it recall very strongly the speculations of neo-Platonism. And Calvin, we may note, left this passage

untouched from 1536 on. The Spirit is thus seen in a still deeper sense as that which alters reality, presides over becoming, in a word, enlivens the Calvinian religious world.

Using Augustine's statement in Against Faustus, xix, 11, to form a sort of context, Calvin next discusses the relationship of Old Testament sacraments to those of the New.<sup>28</sup> As a kind of corollary to his previous criticism of the scholastics, Calvin concludes that the sacraments of the two dispensations are basically equivalent. Since, as Augustine says, the side of Christ is the fountain of the sacraments, Calvin infers that "those ancient sacraments looked to the same purpose to which ours now tend: to direct and almost lead men by the hand to Christ, or rather, as images, to represent him and show him forth."<sup>29</sup> Since no promise has ever come from God to man except in Christ, these sacraments, too, must exhibit him, only as awaited, not already given and revealed. Calvin goes on to berate the miserable sophists for misreading Augustine, who, mirabile dictu! said exactly this, long ago. Passages from the treatise against Petilian and the commentaries on John and on the Psalms are brought forward to show "how faith remains while signs change."<sup>30</sup> Calvin's concern here with the Old Testament rites is by no means a gratuitous excursion into biblical theology. Everyone admitted that the former dispensation's rites were figurative; if Calvin wished to maintain, in the face of the sophists, that the New Testament rites also are figurative, it was up to him to make clear the relationship between the two and to find some basis of equivalence. This he did by pointing out that all God's promises to men, "all he has to say to them,"

is found in the Word, Jesus Christ.<sup>31</sup> But it is not Calvin's purpose at all to deny that the New Testament is the "brighter and clearer" fulfillment of God's plan.<sup>32</sup> And with this last batch of Augustine texts we come to the end of chapter xiv.

Chapters xv and xvi deal with baptism, so that it is chapter xvii that tells us of "The Sacred Supper of Christ, and What It Brings to Us."

Calvin begins, as usual, by setting up the theological context of his remarks:

God has received us, once for all, into his family, to hold us not only as servants but as sons. Therefore, to fulfill the duties of a most excellent Father concerned for his offspring, he undertakes also to nourish us throughout the course of our life. And not content with this alone, he has willed, by giving his pledge, to assure us of this continuing liberality. To this end, therefore, he has, through the hand of his only-begotten Son, given to his church another sacrament, that is, a spiritual banquet, wherein Christ attests himself to be the life-giving bread, upon which our souls feed unto true and blessed immortality.<sup>33</sup>

Since the knowledge of this high mystery is "very necessary," and since its greatness demands a careful explanation, Calvin will attend to it in the following manner. First (1-5) will come a sort of précis for the use of preachers. After this there will be a detailed theological examination of the eucharist, taking the form of refutations of the fanatics (5-11), of the papists (12-15), and of the Lutherans (16-31), together with a presentation of Calvin's own doctrine (32-34). Finally, there will be a series of pastoral-disciplinary considerations (35-50). The chapter will have two large blocs of Augustine quotations, one to refute the Lutherans' ubiquity doctrine (and consequently not without some bearing on the papists' transubstantiation), and the other (on

manducatio indignorum) to confirm Calvin's own teaching.

Calvin's initial summary carries on the theme of the introduction and centers on the meaning of the eucharistic symbols of bread and wine. Since our union in and with Christ is incomprehensible, it is shown to us in figures adapted to our small capacity.<sup>34</sup> The special fruit of this sacrament is assurance of that union, one of the results of which will be our inheritance of heaven. All in all, "those qualities of bread and wine are, according to such an analogy, excellently adapted to express those things" which are promised to us in Christ.<sup>35</sup> Really, though, the sacrament does not make Christ the bread of life: rather it reminds us that by his living, dying, and rising he is, pre-eminently, so to speak, the bread of life. His body is made bread chiefly by being given over for us, and only derivatively in the sacrament.<sup>36</sup>

Calvin moves on into a refutation of the fanatics. He points out that in the sacramental relationship there is a double occasion for error: one can slight either the sign or the mystery.<sup>37</sup> Against those who think belief is enough Calvin defends the instrumentality of Christ's flesh, quoting Augustine's observation that those who shed Christ's blood ended up drinking it.<sup>38</sup> He goes on to quote many Johannine passages, using the example of a fountain (so the flesh of Christ, pouring out life), and urging his readers to "rise much higher than I can lead them."<sup>39</sup> To round off his argument, he states that the sacred mystery of the Supper consists of two things: the promises, Christ with his death and resurrection, and the effects, including sanctification and eternal life. Now we cannot be partakers in one of these three, the

effects, unless we share in the other two, unless, that is, we share in Christ, unless we have "a true participation" in him. Indeed, the promises offer him to us only for this purpose.<sup>40</sup> Thus whenever the godly see symbols appointed by the Lord, they should "think and be persuaded that the truth of the thing signified is surely present there. For why should the Lord put in your hand the symbol of his body, except to assure you of a true participation in it?"<sup>41</sup>

Granted, then, that the bread and wine are to be retained, there are still ways of misunderstanding them, of tampering with them, "that superstition has brought in." Calvin must deal with "the craftsmen of the Roman court."<sup>42</sup> Some gross people thought that Christ is locally present in the symbols. Calvin replies that he is in heaven, and that the Spirit is our bond of union.<sup>43</sup> Against a more reasonable position, transubstantiation, he objects that the parity with baptism is lost, and lost, too, is the real sense of having the bread as a symbol. "For, to be perfectly consistent, the signification extends no farther than that we are fed by the form of Christ's flesh. . . . The nature of the Sacrament is therefore canceled, unless, in the mode of signifying, the earthly sign corresponds to the heavenly thing."<sup>44</sup> No real bread and real wine, no sacrament! Because the scholastics overlooked the fact that only faith can see a sacrament for what it is, they had to ground its reality outside faith, in a sort of cosmic miracle that brought Christ to earth. The truth of the matter is that God's Word, received by faith, objectively and creatively makes this otherwise inconsequential human washing or eating into a sign of Christ. And again, only faith can grasp God's Word,

or rather, be grasped by it.

For it is not possible for the human mind, leaping the infinite spaces, to reach beyond heaven itself to Christ. What nature denied to them they tried to correct by a more harmful remedy, so that by remaining on earth we may need no heavenly nearness to Christ. Here then is the necessity that compelled them to transmute Christ's body.<sup>45</sup>

But one can also, on the other hand, leave the symbols alone and tamper with the thing signified--which is what the Lutherans do. If they merely said that Christ is given with the bread and wine (for the truth is inseparable from the sign) Calvin would not mind so much. What he does not like is their saying that, for example, Christ is "under the bread," precisely because Christ is, corporeally, everywhere. Calvin finds gnosticism here, and to it he opposes the fact that Christ instituted the Supper before the resurrection. "We say that in this question there are two limits we dare not transgress: both Christ's heavenly glory and the integrality of his humanity must not be bound to the manner of being of the bread and wine."<sup>46</sup>

Calvin proceeds to attack the Lutherans on two fronts, namely, their interpretation of the words of institution and their understanding of the ascension. The words are metonymic, as are so many similar expressions in the bible:

For though the symbol differs in essence from the thing signified (in that the latter is spiritual and heavenly, while the former is physical and visible), still, because it not only symbolizes the thing that it has been consecrated to represent as a bare and empty token, but also truly exhibits it, why may its name not rightly belong to the thing?<sup>47</sup>

Conversely--

Not only is the name transferred from something higher to something lower, but, on the other hand, the name of the visible

sign [as was just pointed out] is also given to the thing signified.<sup>48</sup>

The celebrated passage in Augustine's ninety-eighth letter about the sacrament of Christ's body being quemadmodum Christ's body is quoted in support of this view, with the observation that Augustine says the same thing in Letter 169. Also quoted are similar passages from the Against Adimantius and the commentary of the Psalms.<sup>49</sup> Calvin concludes by insisting that he has not gone to the extreme of subjecting the text to a thorough-going rational critique, but rather that his opponents have gone to the opposite extreme of testing God's power. The question is not really what God could do, but what he actually did--and this the Spirit will make clear to the mind that diligently meditates.<sup>50</sup>

Calvin turns now to argue against the Lutheran understanding of the ascension. The literalness of the ascension story is, for him, beyond question.<sup>51</sup> This was Augustine's view, and "he is wholly and incontrovertibly on our side" (totum esse nostrum).<sup>52</sup> Smits gives a long list of Augustine quotations that Calvin immediately brings forward--both by explicit citation and verbal allusion.<sup>53</sup> Here there will be given simply a summary of the content of these passages.

Ascending and descending do not signify appearances but realities. Christ is thus among us now, not with his natural body, but by his majesty, power, and ineffable grace. That the eucharist can be called the body of Christ is balanced by the fact that it is also called the sacrament of the body. The sacrament does not really involve a miracle, though it is indeed holy. Bodies must have location in space if they are to exist as such at all, so that Christ is only in heaven in his humanity,

even if he is everywhere in his divinity. We may, in consequence of the mode of his presence among us, say we have him even in the sign of the cross. Thus he could truly say that he would be with us--by grace and power--to the end of the age. And after that, he will come again--bodily.

Calvin now states his own doctrine, which will be quoted in full:

For it is enough for us that, from the substance of his flesh Christ breathes life into our souls--indeed, pours forth his very life into us--even though Christ's flesh does not enter us.<sup>54</sup>

Yet a serious wrong is done to the Holy Spirit, unless we believe that it is through his incomprehensible power that we come to partake of Christ's flesh and blood. . . . They [the Lutherans] falsely boast that all we teach of spiritual eating is contrary, as they say, to true and real eating, seeing that we pay attention only to the manner, which with them is carnal, while they enclose Christ in bread. For us the manner is spiritual because the secret power of the Spirit is the bond of our union with Christ.

Their other objection is no truer: that we touch only upon the benefit or effect which believers receive from eating Christ's flesh. For, as we have previously stated, Christ himself is the matter of the Supper; and the effect follows from the fact that by the sacrifice of his death we are cleansed of sins, by his blood we are washed, and by his resurrection we are raised to the hope of heavenly life.<sup>55</sup>

Calvin, says Lindsay, "believed that the root thought in substance was not dimension in space, but power; . . . the presence of the substance of anything consists in the immediate application of that power."<sup>56</sup> For Calvin, then, receiving the eucharist is not primarily receiving a body; it is receiving the vital force or power, the very life, of a personality--which is, of course, really identical with that person. We may say that we receive what, radically, causes the body, and so, in a sense, pre-contains it, for as we read in I, xv, 6, "the soul dwells there as in a house; not only that it may animate all its parts and render its

organs fit and useful for their actions, but also that it may hold the first place in ruling man's life. . . ."57 We do, then, truly receive Christ's body and blood--precisely because we receive his life, his Person. Another, and very interesting, approach to the matter might be constructed from Calvin's statements that (1) the sole purpose of Christ's incarnation was our redemption<sup>58</sup> and that (2) Christ was anointed by the Spirit to carry out the task of our redemption.<sup>59</sup> If indeed this anointing is not regarded as subsequent to the incarnation, but rather an aspect of it, or even the very same thing, one might conclude that the Spirit is the "life" of the man Jesus. Such an approach would tally with the description of the Spirit, in I, xiii, 14, as he who is "transfusing into all things his energy, and breathing into them essence, life, and movement."<sup>60</sup> It would also fit well with the idea, in IV, xvii, 5, that the sacrament does not cause Christ to become the bread of life but assures us that he already is<sup>61</sup>--as well as with the often-expressed notion that it is the Spirit who makes it possible for us really to receive Christ.<sup>62</sup>

If this is not once again reading too much into Calvin, may we not conclude that receiving the Spirit is receiving the body and blood of Christ, and vice versa? (Which is not unlike the practice of "spiritual communion. . . .) May we not further conclude that the external rite does not so much initiate something as assure us of something that already is? It would seem that what is happening here is that Calvin is using a complicatedly interrelated skein of expressions to express a single reality, namely, the union of the believer with Christ, "which

plainly neither the mind is able to conceive nor the tongue to express"?<sup>63</sup>  
 At any rate, whatever further conclusions we may be able to derive, we can safely say that the sacramental symbols give us the Person and Life of Christ.

There is, however, another very notable side to Calvin's own doctrine that ought not be passed over, namely, his very frequent references to the ascension. R. S. Wallace states that for Calvin the ascension declared plainly that Christ is to be thought of as dwelling above the earth, and that in communion with him is made supernaturally to transcend the limits of earthly existence. "The ascension of Jesus is thus, for Calvin, decisive in illuminating the meaning of the sacraments, . . . in making him reject the doctrines of his opponents which caused men to 'stop short at the external sign' and thus 'stray from the right path of seeking Christ.'"<sup>64</sup> Once again, the importance of the matter, together with the fragmentary character of what Calvin has to say, makes it worthwhile to quote at length:

By using the word ascend he confirms the doctrine which I have lately explained; that He rose from the dead not for the purpose of remaining any longer on the earth but that He might enter into the heavenly life. There is great emphasis on the word ascend; for Christ stretches out His hand to His disciples that they may not seek their happiness anywhere else than in heaven; for where our treasure is, there must also our heart be. Now Christ declares that He ascends on high; and therefore we must ascend, if we do not wish to be separated from Him.<sup>65</sup>

We teach that if believers would find Christ in heaven, they must begin with the Word and the Sacraments. We turn their view to Baptism and the Supper that in this way they may rise to the full height of celestial glory.<sup>66</sup>

Our Lord in instituting the sacrament by no means surrounded us with impediments to confine us to the world. He rather set up ladders by which we might scale upwards to the heavens.<sup>67</sup>

For though he has taken his flesh away from us, and in the body has ascended to heaven, yet he sits at the right hand of the Father--that is, he reigns in the Father's power and majesty and glory. This Kingdom is neither bounded by location in space nor circumscribed by any limits. Thus Christ is not prevented from exerting his power wherever he pleases, in heaven and on earth. He shows his presence in power and strength, is always among his own people, and breathes his life upon them, and lives in them, sustaining them, strengthening quickening, keeping them unharmed, as if he were present in the body, the communion of which he bestows upon them by the power of his Spirit. In this manner, the body and blood of Christ are shown to us in the Sacrament.<sup>68</sup>

Yet the Lord himself willed us to withdraw not only our eyes but all our senses from the earth, forbidding the women to touch him until he had ascended to the Father. . . . There is no other reason but that he wishes to be sought there alone.<sup>69</sup>

But greatly mistaken are those who conceive no presence of flesh in the Supper unless it lies in the bread. For thus they leave nothing to the secret working of the Spirit, which unites Christ himself to us. . . . For since this mystery is heavenly, there is no need to draw Christ to earth that he may be joined to us.<sup>70</sup>

But, one naturally asks, where is heaven? In the Institutes, Calvin simply dismisses the question:

Shall we, therefore, someone will say, assign to Christ a definite region of heaven? But I reply with Augustine that this is a very prying and superfluous question; for us it is enough to believe that he is in heaven.<sup>71</sup>

Which, one is tempted to say, misses the mark a bit. Elsewhere, though, he has more to say:

When it is said that Christ is taken up into heaven, here is plainly noted a distance of place. . . . It is evident that the heaven whereunto Christ was received is opposite from the frame of the world; therefore it necessarily follows that if He be in heaven, He is beyond the world.<sup>72</sup>

Heaven we regard as the magnificent palace of God, far outstripping all this world's fabric,

A place higher than all the spheres,

Not that it is literally a place beyond the world, but we cannot speak of the Kingdom of God without using our ordinary language.<sup>73</sup>

That Christ has a three-dimensional body that is not in spatial relationship with other bodies is a rather difficult thing to grasp, but perhaps this is going too far. The point is simply that his mode of existence is "beyond the world," and that therefore our union with him is also beyond the world, ineffable. One may hazard the guess that Calvin's heaven is not so much "up there" as just "outside," and just for that reason we do not know "where" it is. We are like children who have never been outside our own yard.

The chief objection that Calvin has to answer is that the non-local means pretty much the same thing as the unreal. Thus the manducatio indignorum becomes a sort of test case. And to make his case Calvin turns to the Bishop of Hippo. Once again, the list of citations and allusions that Smits gives is a long one.<sup>74</sup> Augustine, in sum, says that the symbols are set forth for life to some and to some for death, but that the thing brings death to no one. Now Christ's body must be included on the "visible" side of the visible-invisible division, so what is contained in the symbol must be, not the grace of the Spirit, but Christ's body. To the evil nothing is given but the visible sign: Judas ate, not the bread which was the Lord, but the bread of the Lord. In the elect alone do the sacraments effect what they symbolize. Calvin observes that "there is no reason to lose faith in the promises of God, who does not stop the rain from falling from heaven, although rocks and stones do not receive the moisture of the rain."<sup>75</sup>

Calvin's response to the problem of unworthy reception is not at first blush what one would expect it to be. The Augustine texts he

presents seem to prove the very opposite of his point! One could say that he concedes as much to the Lutherans as he can, but this is not the point, either. It is rather that one who receives in the Lutheran manner, who willy-nilly takes the body-bread and the blood-wine, even if he does this, and yet has no faith, has done all in vain. Calvin goes beyond the Lutheran position to point out that even if you have the natural body of Christ in your mouth and yet lack faith, it can hardly be said, and then only in a most superficial sense, that you have received him. You have, indeed, put him off as sharply as possible! Such a thing is so far from what the Lord intended that it goes by another name--"receiving the sign." At the head of his quotations Calvin wrote--

Among ancient writers Augustine especially has affirmed this article of doctrine, that, by the unfaithfulness or ill will of men, nothing is taken away from the sacraments, nor is the grace which they symbolize nullified. Consequently it will be useful to prove how clearly from his words how ignorantly and wrongly those who cast Christ's body to dogs to eat apply his statement to the present case.<sup>76</sup>

In short, the Lutherans have been double-guessed; the texts that seemed most damaging to Calvin do not really bear on the question at all. To see Calvin's full position clearly one has only to recall what he said in chapter xiv about the separability of sign and sanctification: "What God has ordained remains firm and keeps its own nature, however men may vary. For since it is one thing to offer, another to receive, nothing prevents the symbol consecrated by the Lord's Word from being actually what it is called. . . ." <sup>77</sup>

In the end, though, says Calvin, speaking of the whole actio coelestis, "If anyone should ask me how this takes place, I shall not be

ashamed to confess that it is a secret too lofty for either my mind to comprehend or my words to declare. And to speak more plainly, I rather experience than understand it."<sup>78</sup>

Sections 35-50 of chapter xvii deal more with matters of pastoral concern. Augustine, however, is invoked in reference to the Sursum corda, to the sacrament's being a bond of love, to the duty of participating and the danger of doing so unworthily, and to the ancient practice of giving the cup to all.<sup>79</sup> Chapter xviii, on the whether the Lord's Supper is a sacrifice, is very brief. It will suffice to note that Calvin distinguishes two kinds of sacrifice: expiatory offerings for sin, and offerings of praise and thanksgiving.<sup>80</sup> To this latter kind belonged, for example, the Hebrew peace offerings. Sacrifices of the former sort led up to, and terminated in, the sacrifice of Calvary; sacrifices of this sort are now no longer offered, not even by Christ himself (for the force of his work is eternal).<sup>81</sup> The authority of Augustine is invoked for the statement, then, that the Supper is a memorial and a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving.<sup>82</sup> And with this observation our presentation of Calvin's eucharistic doctrine comes to an end.

Is Calvin's doctrine a faithful reflection of Augustine's? The writer's impression is that it is, but such impressions tend not to be very convincing to other people. Still, it is perplexing to discover that there is no ready methodological ploy here to get above the level of impressions. One writer notes that mysterium and sacramentum can be found, in various ways, in Augustine's writings a mere 2,279 times-- and even he is not sure whether he might have missed a case or two!<sup>83</sup>

At any rate, supposing that one went off on a proof-texting field day, the semantic "dispersion" of the texts is such that any effort at collation would result in a very considerable superstructure of reasoning upon the data, with the result of a very considerable danger of misconstruction. More vicious still would be the fact that the contexts of these texts would be more or less disregarded. Actually, many of the most celebrated proof-texts are mere allusions on Augustine's part, as when, in Against Adimantius, xii, 3, the matter under discussion is whether we can really be told to fear him who can destroy the body but not the soul, if, as the Old Testament says, the blood of an animal is its soul. Augustine does quite a bit of arguing before he adds, as a sort of afterthought, that maybe the blood is a sign, after the manner of the Lord's Supper.<sup>84</sup> Chance comparisons like this (especially by a man who wrote by dictating whenever he had some time to do so), where there is no apparent effort at precision, prove nothing.

There are, however, two ways in which we can make our problem more manageable. The first is to see whether there is in Calvin's presentation of the eucharist some central point about which all else revolves. Actually, there is such a point. If we recall the four controverted points that Smits feels lead Calvin back to Augustine, we find that each of these four points can be deduced from one same center. To begin with, there is no necessity of understanding the words of institution literally; a metonymic reading of them is quite enough. The important thing about them is that they are God's promise to do something on our behalf. Secondly, it is not necessary that Christ's body be anywhere

else but in heaven, at least in its natural state. Thirdly, it is not necessary that all who receive the sacramental symbols receive Christ in the fullest sense. Finally, it is not necessary that the New Testament sacraments differ essentially from the Old Testament ones, for God's promise is a constant reality. The single necessity that more than makes up for these four discarded ones is the necessity that the Spirit be poured out upon the elect. In other words, these four elements of Calvin's doctrine become necessary for him only as consequences of the role that he assigns to the Spirit. This, then, is the sought-for central point: that the Spirit (who is Christ's life) raises the elect to the plane of heavenly action, to the sphere of real being that is beyond the world.

The second way of bringing our problem into focus is to draw out the consequences of our concern with context in quoting Augustine. Let there be some context to be quoted! That is, we will concern ourselves only with sizable, chapter-sized statements from Augustine, not isolated sentences; and of these we will be concerned chiefly with those of latest date. If we were to try our hand at picking such chapters we should probably want to include the liturgical comments of letters 54, 55, and 138; as well as those of sermons 227, 272, and 229. We would also include the anti-Donatist expositions of chapters 25, 26, and 27 of the commentary on John, letter 98, and the treatise On Baptism. We would chiefly be concerned, however, with, first, as a sort of introduction, the early (389) dialogue De Magistro; secondly, as really the most important text, the book De Doctrina Christiana, completed in 427, and, finally, book X of the De Civitate Dei.<sup>85</sup>

The De Magistro is a conversation with Adeodatus on the uses and limitations of language, concluding with a consideration of Christ as the interior teacher. The De Doctrina Christiana develops the material of this earlier treatise more fully and places it into a cultural and sacramental context. It is, according to some, a blueprint for a Christian culture, precisely because it is a textbook of exegesis and preaching.<sup>86</sup> We may choose to regard sacraments as the meeting places of a culture with the transcultural and divine, or again, as the cultural "filters" of what is beyond the culture's apprehension.

"Omnis doctrina vel rerum est vel signorum, sed res per signa discuntur."<sup>87</sup> Here is the basic distinction upon which the whole work rests. Augustine continues his development by pointing out that only something that is not used for signifying something else can properly be termed a "thing." On the other hand, there are some things that are such that they are really signs of other things; that is, depending on one's point of view they are either things or signs. Finally, there are some signs whose whole use lies in signifying, as, for example, words. As a result, every sign is also a thing (for something that is not a thing is altogether nothing); but not every thing is also a sign.<sup>88</sup> Augustine concludes that "signum . . . est res, praeter speciem quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cognitionem venire."<sup>89</sup> Some of these signs are natural, and some conventional, and it is about the latter that Augustine is chiefly concerned. Most of the conventional signs are pure signs, or words, but there are also some verba visibilia, and even some "words" for the sense of taste, as when, at the last supper, the Lord

"sacramento corporis et sanguinis sui significavit quod voluit."<sup>90</sup> /

There is, then, only one thing that is not also a sign--God. Everything else is a thing and a sign at the same time. Practically, signs are things that lead us to what makes us happy; they are signs of God.<sup>91</sup> If it is the property of a sign to lead beyond itself, then all creatures do that. The pointing-value of a thing and its very being are identical. Thus God the Creator can endow some things with a double signification-value, or better, with a deeper stratum of meaning. Of the thing-sign which is the biblical text Augustine writes, "Man quid in divinis eloquiis largius et uberius potuit divinitus provideri, quam ut eadem verba pluribus intelligantur modis, quos alia non minus divina contestantia faciant approbari?"<sup>92</sup> Another case of such enrichment is that of the bread and wine in the eucharist. The important point, for our purpose, is that, very simply, by God's will things have meaningful being. The only miracle involved is the miracle of creation. Nothing except the divine creativity is needed to explain why the world, "praeter speciem quam ingerit sensibus," grows in meaning. Otherwise put, the miracle here is the miracle of exemplary causality, the most embarrassing kind of causality for the Aristotelian or positivist mind. In Augustine's theology, because the mind of God is so, the world is so--and there is an end to the matter!

There is a striking passage in the De Civitate Dei, X, vi, that suggests the heavenly exemplar of the Lord's Supper:

Since, therefore, true sacrifices are works of mercy done to ourselves or our neighbor and directed to God, and since works of mercy are performed that we may be freed from misery and, thereby, be happy, and since happiness is only found in that

Good of which it is said: "But it is good for me to adhere to my God," it follows that the whole of that redeemed city, that is, the congregation or communion of saints, is offered as a universal sacrifice to God through the High Priest, who, "taking the form of a servant," offered Himself in His passion for us that we might be the body of so glorious a Head.<sup>93</sup>

It will be recalled that Augustine is arguing that the angels do not want to receive worship from us (as some neo-Platonists held) but rather want us to worship God with them. "True sacrifice," therefore, is the kind that we can share with them, namely, the human deeds that we can refer to heaven, where our Priest (in the sense of the Epistle to the Hebrews) offers us with himself to the Father. Bernard Quinot comments that--

the expression "true sacrifice" is not for Augustine an etiquette designating one category of sacrifices among others. . . . Following the Epistle to the Hebrews as it shows how all things become in Christ solid realities, Augustine prefers to situate gestures, acts, and persons in their rapport with the total Truth.<sup>94</sup>

Now it is true that Augustine ends chapter vi thus:

Such is the sacrifice of Christians: "We, the many, are one body in Christ." This is the Sacrifice, as the faithful understand, which the Church continues to celebrate in the sacrament of the altar, in which it is clear to the Church that she herself is offered in the very offering she makes to God.<sup>95</sup>

But, as Ghislain Lafont warns--

In no way does Saint Augustine explain to us the precise link of charity with sacrifice: in no way does he isolate for explanation the sacrificial modality of that more global whole that is charity; in the same way, he does not say why the intention of charity ought to become incarnate in sacrificial acts, nor why and how these acts are caught up in the cultic act of Christ on Calvary and of the Church in the Eucharist. His perspective remains that of the "economy" of Christian sacrifice, not of its ontological structure made precise.

.....

So much, then, for the Augustinian "description" of sacrifice.

In the eyes of the Doctor of Hippo, true obedience to the divine precept Sacrificans diis eradicabitur, nisi Dominus is not other than participation, by a concrete theological charity, in the sacrifice of the Church offered by the unique Priest Jesus Christ, in union with the angels, who form thus with us a single and holy City of God.<sup>96</sup>

Summing up, then, we may say that (1) the reality of the objects of our experience depends on how they are creatively known and intended by God; that (2) God's Word tells us that the heavenly type (and therefore cause of the reality) of the Lord's Supper is the prayer of Christ in heaven; and that (3) charity is the means by which we both understand God's Word and are united to Christ's prayer. As Augustine notes in sermon Lxxvii, since the members of Christ have their Head in heaven, they may be said, in a certain sense, to be present there with him.<sup>97</sup> If one does not grasp signs by love, what one grasps is altogether nothing. The Augustinian perspective, then, is not really so much that God is present to us, but rather that we can be present to God in Jesus Christ.

"Augustine's highly personal and somewhat visionary point of view," concludes Frederik van der Meer's excellent description of it,

makes him see the cultus, even though he regards this as an essentially simple thing, as a vast allegory that continues in the style of Revelation--a Holy Writ way of looking at things that fits in admirably with the typological interpretation of Scripture and with the general neo-Platonic conception of the universe, but which the reality behind the means of grace in the New Testament can easily transcend. The actual sacraments, as we use the term, appear, in Augustine's writings, as a number of particularly holy and effective allegories of the process of salvation, but they do so in the company of a thousand others that are not sacraments at all, but mere signs and indications. All boundaries become blurred and the whole of creation is transformed into a mystical ladder into heaven which is erected within the narrow limits of a man's own soul.<sup>98</sup>

And Calvin? It is hard not to see the Swiss reformer as a faith-

ful disciple of the African saint. The eucharistic theology of both men displays the same absence of necessity. Once a man has meditated long enough, it seems, on the transcendence of the risen Christ, his sacramental theology will never be quite the same. As Jean de Saussure remarks, "God is master of these signs."<sup>99</sup> More precisely, the Augustinian and the Calvinian eucharistic doctrines have the same general "shape," the tendency to look heavenward, the impulse to regard the action of the eucharist as a participation in a celestial primum analogatum. Beyond this general similarity of formulation, we find in both theologians a certain taste for imprecision--on Augustine's part because, growing out of his concern for safeguarding divine transcendence, he wished to free the sacramental action from entanglements of church polity and from the collapse of classical civilization; and on Calvin's part, growing out of his concern for safeguarding the divine transcendence, because he wished to free the sacramental action from the entanglements self-righteous legalism and from the collapse of the medieval synthesis. Augustine introduces this imprecision by insisting on the Spirit's gift of Love; Calvin, by insisting on the giving of the Spirit of Love.

This is not, however, to overlook the fact that these two presentations differ; nevertheless, where all is "held from above," it is well-nigh impossible to assess the importance of these differences of presentation. To proclaim that one of these eucharistic theologies is better grounded in the Epistle to the Hebrews than the other, that one of them is a better reflection of the heavenly prototype, would be to proclaim as well that one had the beatific vision! Augustine, we may

suggest, concentrated more on the rites, on sacrifice; Calvin concentrated more on the divine power that makes them possible and meaningful. Augustine speaks more of what is external to believers, Calvin more of the internal. Still, both of them stress the heavenly sacrifice of Christ, or rather his sacrificial, prayerful presence there, with the consequent necessity of our "going to heaven" by the hidden power of the Spirit of Love. Augustine is a frank neo-Platonist, but yet, adds Jean Boisset, it takes a Platonic perspective to enable one really to see the unity of Calvin's teaching.<sup>100</sup> Allowing, then, for differences of articulation, for the fact that one man was as yet forging the tools of eucharistic doctrine and the other was trying to get rid of all but the necessary tools, we conclude that, precisely in terms of their common fundamental concern to view the eucharistic action as a participation in a heavenly prime analogate, there is a profound similarity between the doctrine of Calvin and that of Augustine.

But what about Trent? Do not its partisans claim Augustine as their spiritual ancestor? Of course--and quite rightly! The first step in the solution of this paradox is to take careful note of the intent of the fathers of Trent. We find that three times on September 21, 1551, and once again on October 9 of that year, they made it a matter of record that the intent of the Council was not to define philosophy or to decide questions still debated by Roman theologians. The terms of the final statement on the eucharist were purposely made so vague that neither the Franciscan nor the Dominicans were censured.<sup>101</sup> L. Godefroy writes in the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique that

in this word substance one should see only what common sense sees, namely, that uncapturable root of a totality that science cannot attain, that the senses cannot perceive, and, however, that reason tells us exists in all things as the radical, ultimate reason for phenomena and properties; in a word, reality in so far as it is distinguished from appearances.<sup>102</sup>

One could, of course, object that the above statement is itself a very notable piece of philosophizing! but at least one may say that the fathers of Trent did not want to choose among philosophical alternatives available at that time to Christian theologians. (And Calvin, too, was a Christian theologian. . .)

In their use of the term substance, however, the fathers did follow Thomas. At least in verbal formulae. Thomas' idea of substance was anything but universal at that time. For example, as early as the first half of the fourteenth century, Gilson notes, "Nicholas of Autrecourt . . . keeps only the name of substance, since he identifies it with the content of inner or outer experience; substance is all that which, and nothing but that which, we perceive."<sup>103</sup> The substance-accident distinction creates a tautology.

In this light it thus appears quite reasonable for Calvin to say, in "The Best Method of Obtaining Concord," that the easy way to settle doubts about his use of substance

seems to be to remove the gross imagination of the eating of the flesh as if it were similar to corporeal meat, which is received by the mouth and descends into the stomach. For when this absurdity is out of the way, there is no reason why we should deny that we are substantially fed on the flesh of Christ, because we are truly united into one body with him by faith, and so made one with him. Whence it follows that we are conjoined with him by a substantial fellowship, just as substantial vigor flows from the head to the members.<sup>104</sup>

Doubtless Thomas would agree with him in his abhorrence of "gross imagina-

tions." In fact, precisely this wish to stress the transcendent nature of Christ's presence seems to have been, for Thomas, the purpose of the transubstantiation doctrine in the first place.<sup>105</sup>

Both Calvin and latter-day Roman Catholics are at pains to show that Christ is really present in the eucharist in a special manner. The problem is how you define the real. Catholics are quite right in insisting that Augustine and they both hold that Christ is "really there" (although it is to be noted that, except in studies in the history of doctrine, they are viewing Augustine chiefly as a witness to tradition and not as an original philosophical theologian). On the other hand, as Calvin saw only too plainly, Augustine had a different way of defining the real--a way that, whatever its basic intent, was almost the opposite of what many renaissance Catholics held. In his Last Admonition to Westphal he said of the Lutherans something that could as well have been applied to many Catholics:

Such is the result of the material theology to which they remain so fixed, that from hatred to signs they take away all significance from the sacraments.<sup>106</sup>

For according to Westphal the reality of the body is nothing else than substantial swallowing.<sup>107</sup>

What does Augustine say? He teaches that the body of Christ is eaten sacramentally only, when it is not eaten in reality.<sup>108</sup>

The crux of the matter is that, given a sign known to be such, Augustine will say that the reality, the thing, is, by definition, the non-sign. The real and the sign are not radically to be identified; the opposite of this is an absurdity. The real is, of course, the heavenly neo-Platonic really real--not the empirical real of a later age. The

discussion becomes clouded only when the non-empirical becomes in some sense the unreal--at which point the Catholics must say with Bossuet (well acquainted as he was with the fathers and with Calvin) that the reformer speaks very, very well of the eucharist, except that

after having said that we are participants of the proper substance of Jesus Christ, he refuses to say that he is really and substantially present; as if participation were not of the same nature as presence, or as if one could ever receive the proper substance of something that is present only by its power.<sup>109</sup>

For the Bossuets among us the words of institution are thus "l'éternelle et inévitable confusion des défenseurs du sens figuré."<sup>110</sup>

It is sometimes said that after Trent some of the lyricism, some of the poetic joy in figures, went out of the Church of Rome. After the Enlightenment, one might add, something similar happened to the Reformed Churches. It may be that the only way out of the consequent misunderstanding and devaluation of symbolism is to emphasize, as did Franz Leenhardt, the new finality given to the symbols.<sup>111</sup> This emphasis on the new finality of the bread and wine is actually, it would seem, a contemporary restatement of something that both Augustine and Calvin held. It will suffice to recall Augustine's statement in the De Doctrina Christiana, quoted above, that God can enrich things with more than one meaning, as well as Calvin's remarks on Noah's rainbow. In conclusion, let us try to see how this emphasis is related to our three structural polarities of time, space, and subjective appropriation.

In terms of the polarity of time, eucharistic Augustinianism combines two assertions. First, what Christ did under Pontius Pilate is irrevocably past. On the other hand, Christ, in heaven, still carries

on the same activity he was engaged in under Pontius Pilate, namely, worshipful intercession on our behalf. It is never said in so many words, however, that this heavenly continuation of his earthly prayer is but one, unique act with it; rather, Christ is envisioned as continuing to perform a certain genre of acts. This kind of thinking, then, does not span the time-gap by positing a radical alteration in the nature and power of Christ's glorified humanity. In and through his humanity he simply continues what he did for us once, though, of course, the continuance takes the form of presenting to the Father, as glorified, what he did for us as suffering.

Augustinian symbolism is chiefly concerned with the polarity of space. It is concerned with space, that is, with regard to its literary expression, for what is really happening here is that spatial metaphors are consistently used to denote changes in formal metaphysical causality. Similarly, we may note, there is no need for a doctrine of transubstantiation or consubstantiation, for the required change in the bread and wine cannot take place at the level of the sign. What is needed is a new act of finalizing, and hence formalizing, divine causality, a new dispensation of the power of the Spirit. (Other things being equal--which, in fact, they are not--it would seem that one could argue with equal cogency for the necessity, as with Augustine, or against it, as with Calvin, of a special priesthood to mediate the action of the Spirit.) Because this is a "new" act, however, we must not be misled into thinking that temporal process is involved. It is not. Rather, this understanding of the eucharist is radically atemporal; the newness involved is the fragmentary

manifestation in history, for those who have faith, of the eternal/timelessness of the divine. Both in time and in space it is we who are conceived of as changing, changing anticipatorily into whatever kind of man the glorified Christ is. We are entertaining whatever kind of time and space (or the absence of these) he has. What happens to us thus remains something of an open question, for heaven is "beyond the world."

With regard to the polarity of subjective appropriation, the Augustinian position, particularly as it appears in Calvin, is carefully nuanced. Calvin would prefer to say that Christ offers himself in the eucharist, and does so in such a way that man's sinfulness cannot negate that offering. But man does not always, strictly speaking, receive him, does not always really receive him. This manner of speaking, it will be noted, coheres perfectly with the foregoing remarks on the new finality of the sacramental signs. In brief, he who does not perceive what the signs really are does not, because they are signs, really receive what they signify. While the reality of Christ's offering himself is forcefully stated, the emphasis clearly falls on the necessity of real, or spiritual, subjective appropriation. It is only faith, for Calvin, or love, for Augustine, that can be said to make the individual a participant in the heavenly liturgy, even though the heavenly Christ is present in the eucharist, transfusing heavenly power into the congregation of which that individual is (hypocritically) a member.

### CHAPTER III

#### CASEL, SCHILLEBEECKX, AND THE SUPRA-TEMPORAL CHRIST

It seems to be generally agreed that one of the most fruitful contributions to twentieth-century eucharistic thought has been that of the Rhenish benedictine Dom Odo Casel (1886-1948), though, of course, his views are far from representative of the eucharistic thought of the Roman Church generally. Nevertheless, he is a most intriguing figure to study. His work centers around what he termed the Mysteriengegenwart, the "mystery-presence" of Christ in the rites of the Christian Church. This presence could be discussed from many aspects, but in this chapter it will be examined in what is most essential to it, namely, the manner in which the redeeming action of Christ is related to time--how, in other words, the sacrifice offered under Pontius Pilate can be said to be present in the Christian liturgy. Unless this point can satisfactorily be dealt with, any discussion of Christ's action in our worship is left incomplete.

Fundamental to understanding Casel's work is the time-honored distinction between nature and operation, or in the case of an individual possessor of human nature, between person and operation. It may be said that Luther and Calvin were primarily concerned with the eucharistic presence of the person of Christ. Augustine, too, was concerned with the presence of the person of Christ, but, for him, the Christ who is present (or rather, in whom we are present to the Father) is the Christ

who is "operating"--interpellans--in heaven on our behalf. Nevertheless, the fact remains that all three of these theologians speak of the eucharist chiefly in spatial imagery; they are interested in bridging the gap between heaven and earth. Even when the reformers, in opposition to what they considered the latent Pelagianism of "Mass-piety," chose to emphasize the uniqueness of the historical Jesus' acts, their reason for doing so appears to have been the efficacy of his theandric obedience rather than the irreversibility of time.

Now such an approach is quite adequate--until it occurs to someone to subject the theandric nature of the redeemer's action to a closer examination, more precisely, to give closer attention to the totality of the redemptive process. It then becomes apparent, first, that we were redeemed not only by Jesus Christ's "bare" personhood but also by his operations, his acts. Secondly, the fact that these acts are not only divine but wholly human as well comes to the fore; and as Augustine saw so clearly, it is of the essence of human finitude to be wholly caught up in the flow of time, profoundly wounded with evanescence. The result of these reflections is that it becomes ridiculous to say simply that the eucharist is the symbol of Christ's presence: we must enquire "what he is doing" there in the bread and wine. It is beyond question that he is making available to us his heavenly prayer that is going on now, a prayer that truly makes him our bread of life. But is this all? The fact remains that the totality of what makes him the bread of life also embraces a complex of human actions many centuries past. What of the humanness of those deeds by which the redeemer acquired the right to

intercede for us now? Is it simply of no account--now?

Several answers have been given to this question. One, that was very popular, for example, in Restoration Anglican theology, is that Christ's human sacrifice then won for us a certain amount of heavenly credit that is available to us now in virtue of that past deed.<sup>1</sup> There is thus no need for a re-presentation of either Christ's person or his sacrificial act; the Father acts as Trust Officer. Another is the reformation view, which, as we have seen, regarded the eucharist as the manifestation to us, in the person of its doer, of a deed that has already been completed. The reformers argued that the Mass cannot possibly be a full-blown re-presentation of Calvary; there is simply no need for it, since the gap between 30 A.D. and our era is amply bridged by the continuing self-identity of Christ. Finally, there is nevertheless that part of the Augustinian eucharistic heritage that did not sit too well with the reformers, the sense, namely, that somehow or other Christ and the Christians of each succeeding era do offer sacrifice together in the eucharist. (Christians have felt a continuing need for Christ's and their own human agency in the eucharist, and we may note in passing that the critics of Mass-piety were never too successful in applying their theory of grace to the gratia Capitis. Be it Christ's or ours, humanity will have its rights!) We must enquire, then, in what sense the Mass represents those fragile but precious events of the first Holy Week, in what sense the Mass is "the sacrifice of the Church offered by the unique Priest Jesus Christ, in union with the angels, who thus form with us a single and holy City of God."

This chapter's discussion of the eucharist and time will begin with a collection of Dom Casel's writings translated under the title, The Mystery of Christian Worship.<sup>2</sup> Casel notes that in the synoptics the term mystery appears but once, in Mark 4:11, and in the Johannine literature not at all. Paul, though, makes much use of it. For him the content of the mystery is, first, the sacred design of salvation; it proceeds from God's agape and has creation as both a starting point and a goal. Secondly, the mystery of God is in Christ, the Logos of God who made himself visible for men's sake.

Mysterium means for us what it means to St Paul in his letters to the Colossians and Ephesians, the great fact that Christ is a hope of glory. The incarnation of God's Son, and his death on the cross, together with his passage into glory and exaltation which flow from it have fashioned the church, the body of Christ; it has but one life with that of the Son of God; he is the real life of the church.<sup>3</sup>

. . . And all of this is made ours through the Lord's Word and the mysteries--the sacraments in which the God-Man continuously conveys to us his theandric life.

There are, then, three levels of "mystery": the divine plan, the incarnate Word, and the ecclesial sacrament.

Now in our time Christians are trying to regain Paul's outlook. The theocentric attitude of mind was exercised, at least in a shadowy form, by the pre-Christian world, in its humble subjection to nature, which was of divine fashioning. In Christianity, of course, this view of things was brought to its climax. Still, in the course of the Christian centuries this humble and therefore exalted attitude was broken by what Casel calls "another fall," namely, the self-emancipation of humanity in the late middle ages and the renaissance, a self-emancipation that led to a self-

divinizing neo-paganism.<sup>4</sup> But, says Casel, our time has brought the fall of this rationalism and a new turning to mystery, for the humanization of religion has gone so far that there is really no religion left. "For this reason many doubted religion, which no longer held them with any inward grasp, did not bind them, was no longer something greater than they. Others, with more justification, have returned to a richer belief. They are seeking once more the ancient image of God in majesty and boundless greatness."<sup>5</sup>

Casel now turns to this shadowy prefiguration of the Christian mystery. The Christian mystery, while clearly witnessing the majesty and greatness of God in its content, actually flows organically from the pre-Christian religious experience of mankind, of all mankind, as regards its form.<sup>6</sup> "We see that the deeper Christian idea was in many ways better prepared for by Hellenism than by Judaism. It is unfortunate that modern theology is closer to this Jewish tradition with its simple transmission of knowledge; the true tradition resting on gnosis is an awakening of the mind which lives and experiences the truth."<sup>7</sup> The synoptics, then, reflect the Jewish understanding of tradition, and it thus to Paul (and to some extent, John) that we must look for the "true" idea of tradition, the kind of tradition that "has an essential relationship to the mysteries." In this latter outlook baptism and the eucharist are the means of handing on the truth, and in them religious truth is handed on and assimilated in living, ritual form.<sup>8</sup> The trouble with Casel, though, is that he never gets around to explaining just how this true and living paradosis works. What he does say on this matter is presented here:

The making present of the saving act in mystery takes place in a sacramental manner; the saving work then receives, in addition to its sacramental mode of being, a new, sacramental mode of being. This does not imply any change in the work; it remains what it was, yet in this new manner is made present to us, so that we enter into it and can make it our own. It is therefore complete nonsense to imagine that the mystery doctrine is that at Christmas Christ comes on the altar as a tiny child. What is meant is that the whole oikonomia, the whole design of salvation from the incarnation to the parousia which has not yet appeared in point of time, does take on a sacramental presence and therefore can be the subject of our co-participation in the most vivid way. In this way the Lord with his work is continually present in his church giving to it his life and healing.<sup>9</sup>

It is clear that the historical basis of the mystery of worship lies in the incarnation and sufferings of our Lord at a definite time and place. It is precisely the greatness of this mystery that it is not a myth, but an historic reality stands behind it. Yet the mystery does not stop at such an event; the true value of saving events is their meaning for religious life. It is just at Easter that we once more make the mystery our own; as the Lord once passed through his death in time to everlasting life with the Father, he takes us over with him. The cross of Christ is of course a part of history; but at the same time it is the end of history, because it sets us free from this world and takes us to the eternity of God.<sup>10</sup>

When we go with Christ in his way he becomes contemporary with us. He is neither past nor to come but present to us; he is always with us. And not only his person but also his saving act belongs to this present. There can be no deeper communion of living than that we should share the essential life and action of another.<sup>11</sup>

Here the master and the pupil are put wholly into the same point of time; both hang together on the same cross. They have become contemporaries in every detail. Yet from that it follows that Christ, although he is in glory with the Father, hangs on a cross for the Church, and not merely has hung there; that by the same necessity the resurrection is present just through the hanging, for Christ is ruler from the cross as well; his cross and resurrection are two aspects of the same thing.<sup>112</sup>

The Christian lives two lives in this world. By his body, which will die, he is bound to earth; with his Spirit he lives in the places beyond. The mystery of worship makes it possible for him to come away from this world and enter the world which is God's, the world of the divine presence. By the mysteries God takes us into his own life and so, even while on earth, we stand already in God's everlasting Today.<sup>13</sup>

Thus Odo Casel. It was felt that no paraphrase would do justice to a series of passages such as these, wherein one is reminded of Luther's attempt to explain the third mode of presence or Calvin's efforts to find the end of the rainbow and the address of heaven. Seriously, though, it is not without interest to note that much of what Luther and Calvin had in mind finds renewed expression in the above-quoted passages. "The true value of saving events is their meaning for religious life." At Easter the mystery is once more made present for us, for us, that is, if our participation in the symbols is not a manducatio impiorum. The person and acts of Christ, moreover, take on "a new, sacramental mode of being." By reason of our participation in sacraments, finally, we "enter the world . . . of the divine presence" and live "in the places beyond." The essential point, however, seems to be that "the whole design of salvation . . . does take on a sacramental presence and therefore can be the subject of our co-participation in the most vivid way"; and that by reason of this sacramental presence the single elements of the whole design become temporally co-terminous in some sense, so that the cross, the resurrection, and our sanctification are "aspects of the same thing."

Such an approach, obscure as it may be, is not without its attractions, of which Louis Bouyer lists four.<sup>14</sup> Casel's theory is a wonderful confirmation of the anima naturaliter christiana theme; all that was noblest in the cosmic religions of mankind is here expanded into Christianity. The Christian believer is put in intimate, immediate contact with his Lord. A new light is thrown on many sayings of the Fathers. And not least, we have here a doctrine that springs from the life of, we are told,

a truly holy man. Any yet, after the passage of several decades of theological criticism, Casel's work presents a curious paradox. As will appear from the observations to follow, whereas Casel's basic insight--that Christ is actively, contemporaneously, present in the mysteries of the Christian cult--has been sustained, the historical opinions on which he based his theory have been shown to be largely erroneous.

First of all, was Casel's understanding of the Hellenic mysteries themselves as correct or as relevant as it should have been? Casel thought that "we can distinguish three of these ancient mystery types. There is a myth, containing the story of a God's appearance on earth, which is lived out in a rite. This form is nearer to Christianity than the second, the cosmic mysteries." The third type, which he found in the tenth book of Apuleius, was a combination of the first two.<sup>15</sup>

As Bouyer points out, it was Casel's idea of writing an apology for Catholicism against the theories of writers such as Lietzmann, Bousset, Reitzenstein, and Loisy that got him into difficulty.<sup>16</sup> As so often happens in such cases, the would-be apology implicitly accepts its opponents' outlook. The "comparative" school, and with them Casel, were unwittingly reading much of what is Christian into the pagan mysteries. The result is that, after further study of these cults, Casel's position emerges as being more or less backwards. His basic weakness is that he tends to join myth and rite too closely, to consider a certain cult form simply as the enactment of its most current interpretation. The truth, apparently, was otherwise. The development of the ancient mysteries did not begin with the myth of a god's descent to earth; it began rather

with that which to Casel is a subsequent deformation. The mysteries were first the rites that men found necessary to ensure the continuance of fertility. When later invaders appeared on the scene, the mysteries became the means to "make things right" personally, to bring about a happy immortality. It was only later still that the stories of the death and resurrection of a god came into being. An interesting confirmation of this separability of myth and rite is the fact that, whereas interpretations of rites might be voiced quite freely in classical times, an irrelevant or incorrect performance of the rites themselves was regarded as a serious crime.

But, after all, is it really to the point to be concerned so much with the Hellenistic mysteries? Why not go deeper? Writing in a summary of Casel studies in the Révue thomiste, in 1957, J. Gaillard notes that

it is, at root, more interesting to compare our liturgy to the primitive forms of this [cosmic] religion than to its decadent ones, and above all to appeal to its psychological substructures, namely, to the "constants of the human imagination" that are called archetypes.<sup>17</sup>

Secondly, what of the historical relation between the pagan and the Christian mysteries? How did Paul and the Fathers understand the Christian cult? Research carried on since World War I, says Bouyer, "hardly permits us to entertain a serious doubt that the use St Paul makes of the word mystery, in the meaning and in the contexts where he employs it, refers decidedly to Judaism, to the books of Wisdom, and to the pseudo-apocalypses."<sup>18</sup> The mystery is a divine design, a secret, not a sacred ceremony. He who understands mysteries is wise, but then God alone is really wise, and therefore there is need of an apocalypse.

In the end, the cross is the revelation of God's wisdom, the solution to the problems of history.<sup>19</sup>

Turning to the pagan mysteries, Bouyer notes that they did not really contain a divine fact or any ideas about one in the fashion that Christianity does. Death--Paul's most important point--is not for them an integral part of the saving process. In the pagan mysteries life is not won by means of death; death is only an unavoidable calamity from which the nature god manages to be saved. The participators in the pagan mysteries, moreover, are not at all like the Mystical Body; they remain individuals and only that. They remain, too, enmeshed in history and its cycles, whereas for Christians history comes to an end.<sup>20</sup>

Moving from "interpretation" to the rites themselves, Bouyer reasons that if mystery means plan, and that if Christ the Word is the primary revelation of this plan, then the Christian rites must give, essentially, a kind of priority to the word. Mystery, of course, is not only word, in the sense that word is opposed to deed or being; but since the Christian mystery is essentially a matter of interpersonal love, it is only by beginning with word that we can comprehend what the mystery is all about.

Herein lies the profound difference between the celebration of the Christian mystery and the celebration of the pagan mysteries. The mysteries of the Graeco-Roman world may have contained a hieros logos, a sacred word, but it played a very minor part. It was a more or less optional addition to a rite whose primary implications were merely those of magic. But in the celebration of the Christian mystery, everything depends on God's Word and on our hearing it with faith. No magic can find place in the rites which are performed in the Christian mystery, for from beginning to end everything is ruled by the most free and most generous disclosure of God's heart to His children in His only Son.<sup>21</sup>

If, however, the pagan and Christian mysteries have less in common than Casel thought they did, what was the primary source of early Christian worship? Again Casel is in difficulty, this time over his understanding of Jewish worship in New Testament times. "It is agreed today," says Gaillard, "that one is to seek in the mosaic cult, above all in the Pasch, as well as in the usages proper to the messianic communities of the Judaism contemporary with the New Testament, the principal source of the liturgical forms of Christianity."<sup>22</sup> Bouyer concludes his study of Jewish worship in Liturgical Piety by stating that the Christian eucharist, not only as a whole, but in its details as well, developed from the Jewish eucharist. "For the antecedents of the sacrificial meal and of its inner significance, as well as of the synaxis of readings and prayers which lead up to it, are Jewish." And what is above all Jewish is "the element that connects the ritual meal with the proclamation of the Word--I mean the Eucharist strictly speaking."<sup>23</sup>

Gaillard draws attention to the way Stanislaus Lyonnet translates Romans 6:3-4 for the Bible de Jérusalem: "C'est dans la mort que nous avons été baptisés? Nous avons donc été ensevelis avec lui par le baptême, afin que, comme le Christ est ressuscité des morts par le gloire du Père, nous vivions nous aussi dans une vie nouvelle."<sup>24</sup> In the light of this translation, and apropos of Casel's understanding of Paul, he concludes that the fact, indeed, of a certain active presence of the mystery of Christ in the sacraments can be considered as deducible from the data of Scripture, but the precise mode of this active presence can be determined only by speculative theology--not, as Casel seemed inclined to think,

simply read off from the text.<sup>25</sup> The same, he adds, can be said of the data adduced by Casel from the Fathers.<sup>26</sup> On the same point, Bouyer notes that it was a couple of centuries before the Fathers used the term mysterium to speak of the Christian cult.<sup>27</sup>

After all this, one might wonder what is left of Casel's work! A great deal, really. Gaillard points out that although the greater part of his assertions call for discussion, his systematic needs revision, and his often excessively metaphorical formulae are not likely to remain in theological usage, still "the mystery-doctrine has drawn the attention of theologians to the essential value of the liturgical celebration of the mystery of Christ; it has renewed among Catholics the sense of the sacred economy of salvation and of the Church as a cultic community."<sup>28</sup>

Burkhard Neunhauser, himself a monk of Casel's own monastery of Maria Laach, offers what struck this writer as the best summary of all:

The complex of questions raised by Casel is wholly modern, and first made a point of controversy by the mysterium theology of Laach. The fathers did not expressly put these questions; we may not, then, expect open and direct answers to them in patristic data. But the question of how Christ's saving action, the economy, is present in the sacraments . . . does grow organically out of the fathers' teaching; today it takes express form.<sup>29</sup>

But to return to Casel's great preoccupation, is Christ actually present? And if so, what about the irreversibility of time? It would seem that there are two alternative answers: either the redeeming act of Christ that looks as though it is past is not really past at all--or at least is so only partially, or the redeeming act of Christ is simply repeated. Now this second alternative can be dismissed immediately on the basis of Hebrews 9:28, where we read of Christ's having been "offered once." If, on the other hand, the redeeming act of Christ is only

apparently past, we are left with the opinion of Casel and his school, an opinion that seems to contradict our whole understanding of time.

Actually, upon closer examination, this opinion is subtler. Casel does not say that the life of Christ is, in so far as it is history, historically present.<sup>30</sup> "It is precisely the greatness of this mystery," he says, "that it is not a myth, but that an historic reality stands behind it." Presumably, then, the historic reality and the present mystery are not simply to be identified. Thus, "the making present of the saving act in mystery takes place in a sacramental manner; the saving work then receives, in addition to its natural mode of being, a new, sacramental mode of being." Casel is saying, it seems, that Christ's saving act exists, or more precisely, existed, simultaneously in two dimensions, those, namely, of history (in the sense of his being phenomenally present to his Palestinian contemporaries) and of sacramental mystery. In 1966, of course, his act exists only in the dimension of mystery, but when he suffered under Pontius Pilate it was not as though Pilate were under an illusion. At that point in time the saving act of Christ existed in both dimensions. Casel insists that the gospel narrative is "not a myth"; rather, it is more than a myth, and therefore, a fortiori, whatever can be positively affirmed of a myth can with all the more reason be affirmed of it. It is important to understand this, for unless one realizes that Casel is using a rather unfamiliar category of duration, that of mythic "time," his whole theory looks rather far-fetched.

When is myth? It is not to be found on any calendar. Myth is "once upon a time," or--as in the liturgical reading of the gospel, "at

that time." Myth occurs, as Maritain points out, in a certain "functional state of the intelligence," that, namely, in which the imagination exercises a priority over reason, instead of just the opposite.<sup>31</sup> Once, upon the arrival of either civilization of a higher type (One is tempted to say, one capable of more sophisticated myths!) or adulthood, reason assumes its rightful place, myth is transposed into fairy-tale. But until then it reigns supreme. Mircea Eliade writes of the Mass:

The transubstantiation of bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ is different not only in quality from the profane succession from which it is detached like a space enclosed between the present and the future; not only is this sacred time linked with that of the Masses preceding and following it, but it can also be looked on as a continuation of all the Masses which have taken place from the moment when the mystery of transubstantiation was first established until the present moment. The profane succession, on the other hand, which flows between two Masses, not being transformed into sacred time, cannot have any connection with the hierophanic time of the rite: it runs parallel, so to speak, to sacred time which is thus revealed to us as a continuum which is interrupted by profane intervals in appearance only.<sup>32</sup>

Every myth recounts an event that took place "at that time" and becomes consequently a pattern for all the actions and situations later to repeat that event. Every ritual of man abolishes profane time and places man in a magico-religious time which really has no connection with succession but constitutes instead a kind of "eternal now."<sup>33</sup> Interestingly, in the light of the predominantly neo-Platonic orientation of the Fathers (and of their renaissance devotees), Eliade notes that

it could be said that this "primitive" ontology has a Platonic structure; and in that case Plato could be regarded as the outstanding philosopher of "primitive mentality," that is, as the thinker who succeeded in giving philosophic currency and validity to the modes of life and behavior of archaic humanity.<sup>34</sup>

Thus, if his categories of duration are properly understood, Casel's view becomes more comprehensible, even if he should have made reference to the

primitive rather than the Hellenistic myths and mysteries. It comes to this: that whatever exists in the sacramental mode of being really does not exist in time at all, at least in the sense that one ordinarily understands time, that is, as successive duration. What Casel appears to mean is simply that what exists in the sacramental mode does in fact continue to exist.

Various followers of Casel (Dom Feuling and Dom Warnach, for example) have suggested modifications of this position, but the basic pattern remains the same: the problem of the irreversibility of time is avoided by the introduction of a new category of duration that runs parallel to historical time, and simultaneously with it, if, indeed, it can be said to run at all.<sup>35</sup> Nevertheless, the same problem keeps recurring: if the onrush of time in the profane sense is transcended, its progression in a certain psychological sense is overlooked. Human self-consciousness has developed out of the primitive stage, and once certain questions about the nature of the empirical universe and the life of man in history have been raised, man cannot with satisfaction return to the patterns of thought and feeling of his primitive forbears. Where imagination rules, man "adheres en bloc to the symbol and the symbolized,"<sup>36</sup> but once that adherence has been probed with questioning and to some extent internally structured it is impossible for man to return to his previous "functional state." The reason is that an earlier synthesis always contains both the right and the wrong answers to the questions of a later period; in a sense, orthodoxy of any kind generates, in dialogue with human experience, both heresy and a new, chastened and refined, orthodoxy. What is perhaps the

most disconcerting aspect of the Casel theory is that it is precisely the Judeo-Christian emphasis on faith in a transcendent God and on the importance of historical succession that has led men to "the final abandonment of the paradise of archetypes and repetition."<sup>37</sup> Modern Christians, then, find it simply impossible to conceive how the life of Jesus, his human existence, that is, can exist in two dimensions; indeed, even Luther's speculations on the omnipresence of Christ were done only in reference to the risen Christ. Nowhere in his eucharistic treatises does the reformer so much as suggest, as does Casel, that Christ and the Christian contemporaneously "hang together on the same cross." Casel asks the reader to abandon the present "functional state of the intelligence," to view the life of the redeemer from a vantage point that was perhaps not even that of the redeemer's historical contemporaries, let alone that of twentieth-century man--and the reader balks. Gaillard objects that for contemporary man Casel's theory takes either the historical Christ or the Church or both quite out of time.<sup>38</sup> Calvin and Augustine, we may note, managed to get the Church out of time, but they did so by means of a rite that was itself very much within time; for them it was the rite that was bi-dimensional, not the pre-resurrection life of Christ.

Thus far, we have seen that one cannot really say that Christ's redemptive act is repeated in the Mass. Nor can we simply affirm that Christ's act is present without offering further explanation. The first solution of the problem runs contradictory to Scripture; the second runs contradictory to what we fancy is the cultivation of our sensibilities. It remains, then, to see whether Christ's act is partially past and par-

tially present, in the sense, that is, that some element of that act, the totality of which took place long ago, has been able to continue in existence even to the present.

In this latter vein, there has long been a kind of Catholic virtualism<sup>39</sup> which differs from the virtualism of Bullinger<sup>40</sup> and the Caroline divines<sup>41</sup> not only in its conception of the eucharistic presence (that is, in espousing transubstantiation) but also in its recognition of what one might call the "intimacy" of the causality exercised upon sacramental grace by Christ's humanity. Christ is regarded not merely as having purchased a certain quantum of benefits which can then be distributed by, presumably, the Father. Rather, it is Christ, the manifestation of the Father's love for man, who himself causes grace to be given precisely in and by his human dying and rising. Otherwise put, the virtus involved is not the power of that which Christ has won, nor only the power of his heavenly intercession now, but principally that of his earthly deed of winning us grace. On the other hand, the power in question is not really some attribute, or mode of being, of Christ's humanity that enables his humanity's operations to span the centuries; rather, the power of divinity does this, to which divine power Christ's humanity is a conjoined instrument. As a result, "on its own," Christ's humanity remains localized in Pilate's Palestine; behind the difference of formulation, then, we have here essentially the same thing as Casel's theory, except that time is transcended by a direct appeal to divine omnipotence, instead of by the introduction of the category of mythic duration. It is still a matter of there being two modes of being involved, but the duality is that, not of

mythic and successive duration, but simply of the hypostatic union. The problem of time, at any rate, is avoided and transcended, not answered.

St. Thomas, for example, writes that the principal efficient cause of our salvation is God. Because the humanity of Christ is the instrument of divinity, all the actiones and passiones of Christ operate instrumentally, and in this sense the passio causes our salvation.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, the resurrection of Christ is the efficient cause of our resurrection--by the power of God. "Quae quidem virtus praesentialiter attingit omnia loca et tempora. Et talis contactus virtualis sufficit ad rationem huius efficientiae."<sup>43</sup> The sacraments, finally, are "separated instruments," like a stick in one's hand, which is an instrument organically conjoined to one's person. Thus, in summary form, the principal efficient cause of grace is God, the humanity of Christ is a conjoined instrument, and the sacraments are separated instruments. "Et ideo oportet quod virtus salutifera derivatur a divinitate Christi per eius humanitatem in ipsa sacramenta."<sup>44</sup> What is to be noted here is that no form of secondary, human causality is brought forward to close the gap between the earthly existence of Christ and our sacraments; always, at that point in the explanation, the divine power intervenes. The upshot of it is the paradoxical position that Christ's humanity somehow remains a cause by reason of an energy which his humanity does not possess. Of course, everything again becomes clear if the effect of Christ's death and resurrection is regarded as what saves us; but one suspects that St. Thomas means more than this, by reason of consistent use of the present tense in saying that Christ's very death and resurrection are the cause.<sup>45</sup>

Two questions come to mind.<sup>46</sup> First, what is Christ doing now in his humanity? The suggestion of the monophysite Julian of Halicarnassus that, once his work on earth was accomplished, the second person of the Trinity laid aside his humanity is itself rather hard to lay aside.<sup>47</sup> The usual presentation of the glorified Christus Victor, allowing as it does a certain fidelity on his part to his human brothers, suggests nevertheless that he is a kind of celestial war veteran awaiting an eventual appointment to the judge's bench. Secondly, as we have already noted, time has not really been integrated into the explanation. It would rather seem that the concept of virtus divina is called on to do double duty. It is indisputable that the perfect, redemptive act of love of the man Jesus is possible only by the power of God; but is it equally necessary to affirm that, although the granting of grace through the instrumentality of the sacraments requires divine power at any time, this same divine power, apart from the usual divine concursus, is necessary to enable the humanity of Christ to span time? According to Thomas' explanation, Christ's historical actions are by the power of God enabled to touch praesentialiter all times and places. Granting that the element of power in such touching must proceed from the divine, would it still not be plausible to suggest that the presence, the contemporaneity, of Christ's human act of love for us might proceed simply from the inner dynamism of his humanity, assuming, of course, the more or less uniform continued existence of the separate spiritual substance after death? Radically, of course, the inner dynamism of Christ's humanity is his divine esse, but is it theologically consistent to assert that, although Christ's

humanity was used instrumentally up to his glorification, it is at the present moment retained, indeed, but retained without any instrumental function in the salvific process? Would it not be more likely to say that Christ, having once loyally loved us in his humanity, now--dynamically, in virtue of the vital "momentum" of the human psyche--continues thus to love us? This line of thinking, it seems, provides a sounder reason for the continuance of the incarnation and considerably clarifies the problem of time. In reference to what Thomas said, it comes to this: when Christ's resurrection is said to be a cause of grace, by "resurrection" is meant what one might call Christ's continuing "resurrection-glorification" to and at the right hand of the Father. Thus a certain ambiguity, if you will, in Thomas' text allows for a more congenial reading of it.

Nevertheless, it can be urged that the contemporary and risen Christ has a "spiritual body" and to that extent seems to be outside human time--our kind of human time, at least; and, moreover, that the actual historical deeds by which he saved us are not really, in all their concreteness, present now. Essaying a reply to these objections will provide an opportunity for rounding out our idea of the continuing human love of Christ as the ground of his sacramental contemporaneity.

We read in I Corinthians 15 that "Christ has been raised from the dead, the first fruits of those who have fallen asleep," and, regarding death and resurrection, that "what is sown is a physical body; it is raised a spiritual body."<sup>48</sup> What precisely is the nature of a spiritual body, however, we do not know. The term itself, taken strictly, seems

to be a mixed metaphor; taken in a less rigid sense, though, it suggests a solution to the problem of whether the humanity of the risen Christ is out of touch with time. A spiritual body could well be one in which "spirit" dominates in a way that it did not before. If this is the case, the faculties of the spirit, intellect and will, must exist in a certain state of plenitude which was denied them before. Whatever power of knowing and loving, then, that the Lord of glory had in his earthly existence has surely not been diminished. Scriptural data affords us no reason to think that Christ has become less human; the implication is rather that at the moment we are less human than Christ! Spatio-temporal progression is the canvas whereon we paint human dialogue, but we must remember that it also sets the bounds for that dialogue. Precisely because Christ is now, we like to think, somewhat freed from spatio-temporal limitations, and freed thus without any loss to his essential humanity, he is more able than ever to enter into dialogue with us, to share our life and be our "contemporary." For, after all, that is really what being a contemporary ordinarily means. . .

Christ's ability, then, to participate in our situation is not lessened by his being glorified, since biblical faith tells us that it is for our sake that this glorification takes place; we must remember, nevertheless, that even though the mode of duration of the glorified Christ is not incapable of entering into relation with our mode of duration, the fact remains that a special exercise of divine power is necessary to bridge what has been metaphorically referred to above as the "spatial" gap, to link causally the risen Christ and the bread and wine

by means of which he enters our situation. No human will, whatever its mode of duration, can be imagined as effecting that prodigy by its own, purely human resources. The point in question here is simply that of the continuance of Christ's humanity as a conjoined instrument, and the essential limitations of that humanity must, under pain of losing its instrumentality, be adhered to.

Secondly, though, even though Christ's human will remains active in our regard in his glorified state, is it not true that the totality of the human act by which he saved us has been broken, that what he did under Pontius Pilate is mostly--and irretrievably--lost? Can what remains of Calvary and the empty tomb be more than a shadowy recollection? Gaillard notes that several writers have recently attempted to prolong St. Thomas' thought into an answer for this question, among them being Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P., of the University of Nijmegen.<sup>49</sup> In his Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God, Schillebeeckx words his response in this manner:

The man Jesus is the existence of God himself (the Son) according to and in the mode of humanity. For person and nature are never extrinsic elements separate from one another. The God-man is one person. Since the sacrifice of the Cross and all the mysteries of the life of Christ are personal acts of God, they are eternally actual and enduring. God the Son himself is therefore present in these human acts in a manner that transcends time. For of course we cannot conceive of the presence of a mere act; presence in this kind of context is always the presence of the person who acts; a personal presence which renders itself actual here and now, and active in and through an act. Jesus' human act, being the act of the Son of God in his humanity, cannot, therefore, be expressed merely in terms of time, as though the person who is man were something quite extrinsic to the humanity of Christ. Precisely because the human acts of Christ are acts of God they share, in and according to humanity, in the mystery of God. Being radically the act of the eternal God, Jesus' human act of redemption, in

spite of its true historicity, cannot be merely something of the historical past. His human presence to his fellow men is permeated with his divine mode of being and of being present.<sup>50</sup>

It is apparent that Schillebeeckx, as he himself notes, improves, not on the doctrine of St. Thomas, but only on the formulation of it.<sup>51</sup> It is clearly the power of God that makes "Jesus' human act" contemporaneous with us. And, whether he intended it or not, Schillebeeckx' emphasis on the unity of person in the suffering Christ looks very like a simple extension backwards of Luther's doctrine on the risen Christ. The paradox of a humanity divinely extended beyond human dimensions is still with us. And so is the question of whether such a humanity is still recognizable as our humanity. What Schillebeeckx seems to overlook is the persistent fact that whether the person who acts has one nature, or, as in the case of Christ, two, he still acts, and acts only, in terms of nature. To perform divine acts "in the mode of humanity" means, if it means anything, that the divine agent acts within the limits imposed by integral humanity.

Following, he says, hints offered by Schillebeeckx, Gaillard suggests, on the other hand, a real, doctrinal extension of Thomas' approach.<sup>52</sup> One begins with these two elements of Thomas' psychology of Christ:

*Ad hunc finem beatitudinis homines reducuntur per Christi humanitatem. . . . Et ideo oportuit quod cognitio ipsa in Dei visione consistens excellentissime Christo homini conveniret: quia semper causam oportet esse potiore causato.*<sup>53</sup>

*Sicut autem in genere naturalium, aliquod totum componitur ex materia et forma, ut homo ex anima et corpore, qui est unum ens naturale, licet habeat multitudinem partium; ita etiam in actibus humanis, actus inferioris potentiae materialiter se habet ad actum superioris, in quantum inferior potentia agit in virtute superioris, moventis ipsam: sic enim et actus moventis primi formaliter se habet ad actum instrumenti. Unde patet quod imperium [voluntatis] et actus imperatus sunt unus actus humanus, sicut quoddam totum est unum, sed est secundum partes multa.*<sup>54</sup>

The basis of this approach is man's obvious ability to make what one might call "practical universals," his inclination, even, to view many and diverse moments of his activity under one formality, as, for example, "getting up in the morning." What Gaillard does is to apply this unifying force of human reflective consciousness to what must have been, and must continue to be, Christ's messianic consciousness. Whatever Christ's beatific vision may have been, it surely must have contained his awareness of the Father's purpose for him, an awareness which permeated all that he did and which he greeted with obedient love. It is this love, moreover, that really redeemed and redeems us; the sufferings of Christ, in relation to this inner love, are "merely" instruments. With this interiorization of our understanding of redemption, it becomes unnecessary to contrive to make present the bloodied cross and the empty tomb, or even the pain and joy that these occasioned. The unum necessarium is Christ's love, and once the presentiality of this love becomes conceptualizable, the cross, the tomb, and our liturgy can be understood as the (at root, separated) instruments of this love. It is thus that the key to the problem of time would seem to be a renewed understanding of the essential inner drama of our redemption: all but the human love of Christ is regarded as a temporally separable instrument.

It is hard to see why this God-given but none the less human love of Christ is not the "principle of the perennial element in Christ's action." For it is perennial! If the continuing human love of Christ is not "used" in explaining his presence to the liturgy, it must nevertheless be accounted for somehow. It can hardly be simply ignored, if,

quite plainly, human thoughts and desires, if they do not in the present life transcend time completely, surely transcend any particular moment of time by being continuable from moment to moment; and if, as is the case within the Augustinian-Thomist tradition, the immortality of the human soul is regarded as a permanent acquisition of philosophical theology. Granting that the "essential principle" of Jesus' acts is his divine esse, it seems easier to explain the continued instrumentality of his human nature than to show why it must be left aside. Gaillard concludes, then, that in the Mass "we have at once the actual presence of the transcendent element and the virtual presence of the transcendent element and the virtual presence of the total act."<sup>55</sup> If we understand the totality of redemption in Christ in the broadest sense, it becomes apparent that this totality is scattered throughout the whole span of man's life on earth; and because of the causal interrelatedness of all the elements of spatio-temporal progression, we can say that this totality is virtually present in each of its individual instances. Virtually present, then, but--except for what is going on exactly at this moment--actually past or future. What is always actually present is that other, narrower whole, the totality of the transcendently active human love of Christ. It is this love that makes one human act of the multitudo partium of the last supper, the cross, the empty tomb, and all the Masses that have ever been.

In conclusion we may say that, bearing in mind our objective of trying to "surround" the central mystery of the eucharist with complementary viewpoints, the function of this chapter has been to take care

of some unfinished business left by the theologians we studied in the first two chapters. Our era raises a question which was latent in theirs, that of the intrinsic meaning of human history. Augustine's De Civitate Dei, it is true, is a theology of history, but its basic perspective is that of the passage of the historical out of history into eternity. For better or worse, we would often rather hear of the intra-historical value of what goes on in our world. It is this desire that seems to have prompted both Dom Casel and his critics.

We have seen that Dom Casel's attempt to posit a mythic, para-historical dimension of historical happenings did not fare well among the critics. Still, the question he raised demanded an answer. A good answer, we have seen, is that which calls attention to the power of a single human act to perdure indefinitely--in this case, Christ's act of worshipful obedience begun under Pontius Pilate and perduring still. This answer, then, makes it very clear that, whatever be said of our metaphysical condition along Augustinian lines, it is by no means necessary to posit a radical change in either Christ or ourselves in order that, purely historically, Christ be our contemporary. In terms of the polarity of time (That of space, perhaps under the impact of modern physics, is simply not discussed, except as symbolizing divine causality.) neither our situation nor what we may presume to be Christ's need be profoundly reconceptualized; rather, the polarity of time is itself all but dissolved.

With regard to the polarity of subjective appropriation, however, this theory of the continuing act of Christ is curiously ambivalent.

What is its strength is also its weakness. When, in the place of an exhortation either to despair of historical man or to gaze heavenward, we are given the information that this eucharist here and now, this all-too-human rite, is also the continuing act of Christ, when we are told that, under pain of monophysism, this must necessarily be the case, we want to reply, "No, it cannot be; men are weak and foolish, but Christ has no part in their folly." We are tempted so to restructure our understanding of Christian existence that such a scandalous possibility is clearly and permanently excluded.

So long as the importance of the eucharistic symbols was seen to be simply their character as food and drink, so long as the fact that the symbolic eucharistic action as well as the action of Christ that it symbolizes are parts of human history lay in the background, eucharistic symbolism, as such, does not seem to have greatly tried anyone's faith. For Luther and Calvin, for example, quite simply, if one had faith the problem was solved. Once, however, the evolving historical consciousness of the Church begins to make clear that this tawdry-seeming eucharistic rite of here and now is not merely a mask for the Cosmic Bridegroom of the Church, not merely a humble analogate of his celestial banquet, but rather his very action--at this point the question of subjective appropriation becomes infinitely more excruciating. It is easier to believe in heaven than in earth.

Can faith in the Son of God's presence in the eucharist be reconciled with a valuing of the very historicity of the eucharist? Once again we are left with a most important piece of unfinished business--

for which we have reserved our fourth and final chapter. There we shall consider what is perhaps modern times' classic case of taking scandal at the Church and her Supper, that of Kierkegaard.

## CHAPTER IV

### KIERKEGAARD: THE KNIGHT OF HIDDEN INWARDNESS

On Wednesday, April 19, 1848, Søren Kierkegaard wrote in his journal:

My whole being is changed.  
My reserve and self-isolation is broken.  
I must speak.  
Lord, give thy grace.<sup>1</sup>

What had happened is that after years of suffering, after having been "brought to the last extremity" at the prospect of his sin, the Danish theologian was now able to affirm:

A hope had awakened in my soul that God may desire to resolve the fundamental misery of my being, that is to say, now I am in faith in the profoundest sense. . . . As poet and thinker I have represented all things in the medium of the imagination, myself living in resignation. Now life comes closer to me, or I am closer to myself, coming to myself.<sup>2</sup>

Precisely what took place during that Holy Week of 1848 we do not know, and very likely Kierkegaard himself did not at the time know much more than we. "I must never, at any moment, presume to say that there is no way out for God because I cannot see any."<sup>3</sup> All he could say was that he felt he had been forgiven and accepted by God, and now that the inner tensions of his personality were beginning to find resolution he not only could but had to speak his mind on the subject of Christian existence.

What he had to say is to be found in the few but forcefully written pieces he composed from the time of his forgiveness-experience till his

death in 1855: Training in Christianity and the "edifying discourse" that accompanies it, the Two Discourses at Communion on Fridays, Judge for Yourselves and For Self-Examination, the discourse "The Unchangeableness of God," and, finally, the collection of articles published under the title, Attack upon Christendom--together with his journals for these years.<sup>4</sup> The proximate aim of this chapter is to consider some of the views set forth in these works against the fuller background of the philosophy of religion set forth in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript of 1846, with the hope of attaining and evaluating a sort of Kierkegaardian theology of the eucharist--a theology beyond which, one is tempted to say, no further eucharistic theology is possible.

What happened, now that Kierkegaard felt free to write, no longer under pseudonyms, but in his own name, was that the cleavage in his writings between the ideal and now abstract Church of early Christianity and the empirical Church of the Danish Establishment became much more marked. And in his Attack Kierkegaard wrote, "I want honesty!"<sup>5</sup>

In 1851 he wrote in his journal that neither Church nor doctrine, really, was to be reformed. What was really needed was "the reformation of us all."<sup>6</sup> It was this need that he felt his existence expressed. Of course, ironically, no one else felt that Church and doctrine needed reforming, either. Kierkegaard realized that as long as he would use his cleverness, or profundity, or imagination in expressing Christian doctrine people would actually be quite pleased and would regard him as a serious Christian. But, on the contrary, "the moment I begin to express existentially what I say, and consequently to bring my Christianity into

reality, it is just as though I had exploded existence--the scandal ~~is~~ there at once."<sup>7</sup>

In Christ God offered to enter into relation with the human race. But the human race, instead of entering into relation with God, transformed Christianity into the doctrinal history of how God had entered into relation with the apostles.<sup>8</sup> This doctrine Christians repeat in a diluted form from generation to generation, using it the while as a mask behind which to do just as they please. The truth of the matter, however, stands fast: true "Christianity must begin anew with each generation," because it is a question of relating oneself absolutely with the absolute. A history of Christianity would be nonsense.<sup>9</sup> Christ's words, "Blessed is he who takes no offense in me," could mean, of course, that he is simply quite eccentric, that although he is God there is really no possibility of entering into relationship with him, and that one should make the best of this degrading, if easier, situation. But they do not mean this. They mean that one is to imitate Christ and to suffer in this world. The latter view is "clearly that of the New Testament and the early Church," whereas the former is "that of Protestantism in particular."<sup>10</sup> Foolish old Socrates doubted whether we are men at birth; Christians go two steps in the opposite direction! They imagine that to be not only a man but a Christian "is to be something historically concrete; . . . they have made such progress in nonsense that there is now meaning in every child's being practically born a Christian, and even in a definite denomination."<sup>11</sup>

This metamorphosis of primitive Christianity into a sacred story

or doctrine, further, generates not one but two series of abstractions. As already noted, Christian doctrine is abstract. To seek community with other men, however, on the basis of abstract doctrine is to involve oneself in additional abstractions, precisely those used to describe this pseudo-community. The God-relationship, in other words, can only be had with God. True "Christianity is so arranged that it is related to the individual, and it is in this that the immense ideality and effort of being a Christian consists, in being related to God as an individual, not protected by any abstraction, which, if you like, softens the blow."<sup>12</sup> Under the pretext of zeal for the things of God one can place an abstraction between himself and God:

Such an abstraction is the "church." Men have struck on the idea of turning it into a person, and by first speaking spiritually about it as a person, about its birth and the cause of its life, and so on, in the end grow accustomed to identifying the church with Christians--and there are no Christians in any other sense but this.

Then behind this abstraction the Christian makes holiday. . . . A million Christians more or less does not mean more than a sausage when pigs are being slaughtered.<sup>13</sup>

New Testament Christianity, then, has been flattened out into an easily assimilable abstraction, and what the empiric community of those who thus assimilate "Christianity" proclaims to be its bond of unity is itself a complex of abstractions. And this attempt to equate the abstract and historic with the real and inwardly present--this, says Kierkegaard, is comical.<sup>14</sup>

But a church, by definition, is not primarily a theological society but a community whose call and finality is to communal worship. If the time of worship is the church's most vital and characteristic time,

then quite naturally one would expect the worship of a comical church to be supremely comical. And this is just what Kierkegaard finds to be the case with the Danish State Church.

God is the object of worship? Well--

What then is God? He is the most comical being that ever lived; His Word is the most comical book that has ever come to light: to set heaven and earth in motion (as He does in His Word), so to threaten with hell, with eternal punishment . . . in order to attain what we understand by being Christians (and indeed we are Christians)--no, nothing so comical ever occurred!

The most spiritless divine worship, more stupid than anything that is or was found in paganism, more stupid than worshipping a stone, an ox, an insect, more stupid than all that is--to worship under the name of God . . . a twaddler.<sup>15</sup>

Another way of putting it is to say that the danger has gone out of divine worship. Worship has become an imitation, a counterfeit, a game. "Artists in dramatic costumes make their appearance in artistic buildings," and what do they do? They "play comedy."<sup>16</sup> The comedy, indeed, is complete: all are Christians, and everything is Christian, "and everything expresses the direct opposite of the Christianity of the New Testament."<sup>17</sup> In fact, the essential difference between the theater and the church is that the church tries in every way dishonestly to hide what it is. "The theater is a wag, really, a sort of witness to the truth, which gives the secret away. What the theater does openly the church does secretly."<sup>18</sup> When it comes right down to it--

Divine worship is in the direction of making a fool of God; and . . . its principal aim is to provide an occasion for family festivities, parties, a jolly evening, and a banquet which differs in this respect from other banquets, that this banquet (what a refinement!) has "also" a religious significance.<sup>19</sup>

And the sacrament of the Lord's Supper? Well, the clergy take

care not to enlighten the people about what the New Testament understands about this sacrament and about the obligations it imposes. They are too busy receiving sacrifices--that is, their incomes--to reflect that Christianity might require them to make sacrifices of themselves. The sacrament has become a mere ceremony, before and after which one lives in complete worldliness. It is forgotten that at the last supper he who from eternity had been consecrated to be the Sacrifice met for the last time before his death with his disciples, who, if they truly followed him, were themselves consecrated to death. Hence, "for all the festal solemnity, it is shudderingly true, what is said about his body and blood, about this blood covenant which has united the Sacrifice with his few faithful . . . blood-witnesses, as they surely were willing to be."<sup>20</sup>

But so much for Kierkegaard's broadside at the Establishment. It is much more important to see the understanding of sacraments that lay behind his critique of his co-religionists' attempt "in a delicate way . . . to treat God as a fool."<sup>21</sup> What bothered Kirkegaard was that the sacramental life of the Danish Church lacked subjectivity. It will be recalled in this connection how important this dimension of inward, affective acceptance--a truly personal grasp of something, not unlike Newman's "real assent"--was in the Kierkegaardian epistemology. Kierkegaard found the sacraments of his communion to be, for the most part, merely objective. In other words, as will be shown presently, he never denied their potential efficacy, never, for example, suggested that the body and blood of Christ are not truly present in the eucharist. As was stated above, he wanted to reform not doctrine but people, and above all, the leaders of the

people. "For however frivolous and sensual the populace may be," he wrote, "there is still too much good in the people for them to want to worship God in that way."<sup>22</sup>

Like that of so many of the theologians to follow him, then, Kierkegaard's whole effort was directed not toward discovering new virtualities in the doctrines handed on by tradition but rather toward attempting to close the gap between the Church of doctrine and the empirical Church. Heresy, it is true, had long been regarded as a sin against faith, and consequently as a sin against the love required within the faith-community, but it was quite a new step to reverse this order and suggest that failures in love and the consequent loss of understanding might make catholic and traditional doctrine pragmatically "heretical" and inefficacious. Kierkegaard seems to have set forth a new theological question--that of whether, or to what extent, the very Church of Christ, and not just the sophists of the court of Rome, can become existentially, virtually, heretical.<sup>23</sup> Perhaps this Kierkegaardian metamorphosis of heresy makes him a remote ancestor of the death-of-God theologians.

But to return to the question at hand, one can say that the merely objective sacrament caricatures both terms of the sacramental relationship, both God and man. It mocks God because God is sheer subjectivity, personality in the most eminent sense. God abhors "official solemnity." "The official is infinitely more loathsome to Him than it is to a woman when she discovers that a man is making love to her . . . out of a book of etiquette."<sup>24</sup>

Sacramental "objectivity" vitiates man's side of the relationship,

too. Perhaps the basic difficulty is that Christendom's "Christianity takes Christianity merely as a gift. That is why it makes so much ado about the sacraments (in the superstitious sense), and pretends to know the sacrament carries an obligation."<sup>25</sup> The gift that Christians think Christianity is, more precisely, is the gift of the assurance that one is counted among the elect. There is a sense, of course, in which this understanding of Christianity is perfectly correct, but this sense can be comprehended only by a man who, having in inwardness touched the roots of his selfhood, acknowledges his total guilt before God. When, on the other hand, he sees the gift of salvation coming to him outwardly--and only thus--he becomes comical. The reason for this is that the alleged objectivity of Christianity is incommensurable with his selfhood's religious concern. Where absolute religious certitude is sought where, epistemologically, only a relative "certainty" is possible, when it is sought in the books, history, and rites of the Christian community, there is, of course, no certitude at all, but only a cruelly comical deception. When it is said of baptism, for example,

that in this sacrament God does something to us, the idea is naturally only an illusion, in so far as it is by this means to keep dialectics away. The dialectical returns at once with the appropriation of this thought, its inward assimilation. Every genius, including the greatest that has ever lived, has to expend all his powers exclusively upon this matter of appropriation, the transformation of inwardness and its actualization in himself. But people wish to be rid of doubts once and for all. In the moment of temptation, therefore, faith does not lay hold of God, but is reduced to a belief that one has really been baptized. . . . Were it only a matter of say ten thousand dollars at stake, the case would scarcely be permitted to stand with the kind of certainty we all now have that we are baptized.<sup>26</sup>

It is essentially by reason of the place assigned to sacraments and the use made of them, Kierkegaard thinks, that Christianity has slipped

back into what he terms "Judaism." By means of purely objective rites the whole matter of a happy eternity has been settled once for all, and at that "in the easiest and cheapest manner possible," so that would-be Christians are free to do as they please in this life, too. Take, for instance, the Lord's Supper: "The sacrament of the Lord's Supper is used like the sacrificial offering in Judaism: everything is calculated to set one at rest--objectively and rapidly--in relation to the matter of eternity, and then we live out our lives enjoying existence, multiplying and filling the earth." Indeed, "Christianity is an association of men who by means of certain sacraments free themselves of the duty of loving God."<sup>27</sup>

The Church and its worship, then, are scandalous, comical. And yet--and what follows cannot be overlooked without the gravest injustice to Kierkegaard--there is another whole side to the Danish theologian's understanding of the sacraments, and especially of the eucharist. In his little book Christendom Revisited John Gates, recalling how Kierkegaard symbolized his return from irresponsibility by receiving Communion in the cathedral church of Our Lady, and how he kept up the practice till almost the end of his life, suggests that, "No one could regard the sacrament of the Lord's Supper with more genuine piety than this Lutheran layman."<sup>28</sup> Tragically, "on his deathbed he expressed an earnest desire for Communion, which, however, he would no longer accept at the hands of a priest of the State Church."<sup>29</sup>

Kierkegaard held a theological degree, and according to the practice of his time, was accredited to preach. His eucharistic doctrine--if

such an expression is not already a betrayal--seems to follow that of Luther--apart from his insistence on a sort of "works-righteousness" as a preparation for a truly "Lutheran" religious self-awareness; and it is to be found chiefly in his Discourses at Communion on Fridays, particularly the ones on Luke 22:15 and I Peter 4:8, written respectively in 1848 and 1851.<sup>30</sup> These discourses are rich in phenomenological descriptions of the experience of the Lord's Supper and deserve to be read as such, but if--by a kind of violence--a doctrinal scheme is to be distilled from them, the result is something like what follows:

The eucharistic action takes place within the wider context of God's effective promise of salvation, his Word. It can be said, therefore, that Christ's death is preached at the altar. But it is his death that is preached there; from the pulpit is preached his life. He died but once for the whole world's sin: his death is not repeated. The individual Christian, however, is not, historically speaking, a contemporary of Christ; he lives in his own time and place, and it is for his individual sake that the action of the altar is repeated.<sup>31</sup> Since, for Kierkegaard, "the whole of life is repetition," we see here how the divine economy figures forth this basic configuration of the Christian life, wherein one's old self is reaffirmed in holiness through the reception of new being in Christ.<sup>32</sup> One might say that in Kierkegaard's understanding of the frequent reception of the Supper there is a sacramental-dynamic restatement of Luther's simul justus et peccator. The purpose of this repetition is to give the individual Christian a pledge that Christ has died for him, that Christ gives himself to the Christian

as a shelter, as a covering for sin.<sup>33</sup>

It is important to see that Christ gives himself; "it is not some comforting thought He gives thee, it is not a doctrine He communicates to thee; no He gives thee Himself."<sup>34</sup> Or again--

From the minister of the Church thou hast received assurance of the gracious pardon of thy sins; at the altar thou dost receive the pledge of it. . . . In receiving the pledge thou dost receive Christ Himself; in and with the sensible sign He gives thee Himself as a covering for thy sins.<sup>35</sup>

And, Kierkegaard continues immediately, in a vein slightly reminiscent of Luther's ubiquity doctrine, "As He is the truth, thou dost not learn to know from Him what the truth is, to be left then to thine own devices, but thou dost remain in the truth only by remaining in Him."<sup>36</sup>

It is important, too, though, to note what Kierkegaard had to say about the res sacramenti and about the proper dispositions for going to the sacrament of the altar. Communion, for him, is an individual affair between Christ and the soul; it does not directly concern the community.

Hence the Lord's Supper is called Communion with Him: it is not merely in remembrance of Him, but it is the communion, the communion which thou shalt endeavor to maintain in thy daily life by more and more living thyself out of thyself and living thyself into Him, into His love who hides the multitude of thy sins.<sup>37</sup>

In "Communion with Him" a man is to live out of himself, and therefore Kierkegaard objects to quasi-magical sacraments and what he understands to be the Roman doctrine on works.<sup>38</sup> Men have no immediate relation to God, cannot give absolute expression to the absolute, and therefore "always require grace first of all," because even the most honest beginning is always an imperfection "compared with the ideal," and consequently "like a new sin."<sup>39</sup> Fitting preparation for Communion consists in a

"hearty longing" for the grace of deliverance from sin.<sup>40</sup> In 1852 Kierkegaard wrote in his journal:

Now if I think of wishing to go to communion: well, I admit that up to the present I have never succeeded in going worthily to communion. This I repent, grace is offered to me, this is grace from behind, in relation to what is already past.

But now I am to go to communion again--am I now worthy? dare I now say that I am worthy? And this might after all be demanded of me in thanksgiving for the grace I have received in the past.

There we have it! The sacrament promises and strengthens me in grace in order to use the sacrament. It cannot be otherwise, unless I have an immediate relation to God and he says to me: today at four o'clock you shall receive communion--for then I have no responsibility. . . .<sup>41</sup>

There are thus two distinct--and paradoxical--sides to the Kierkegaardian Lord's Supper. Or, perhaps, three. Kierkegaard firmly adheres to much of the orthodox Lutheran doctrine of the Supper (although he seems a bit too concerned over his preparation for communion to please Luther). At the same time, though, he lambasts the Danish Establishment that he experienced. And yet, on which side of the split is he himself, the preacher who asked:

Would it not stand in the most strident contradiction to the sacred account of how heartily the Institutor longed for this supper, would it not be the most terrible contradiction if it were possible that anyone out of habit, or because it was use and wont, or perhaps impelled by circumstances quite accidental, in short, if anyone were to come to Holy Communion without a hearty longing?<sup>42</sup>

If the last two texts quoted are to be taken seriously, what must one conclude about this man who so longed to receive the sacrament worthily but had to confess, three years before his death, that he had never done so? In being "responsible" for rejecting even his own experience, is he not

suggesting that the sin of the other members of the empirical Church is that they, too, do not reject their religious experience? But then are they not in fact rejecting the sacraments? If, in other words, it is the function of the Lord's Supper to be the pledge of the forgiveness of sins, is not the Supper rendered useless and vain if it serves but to add to one's sinfulness? To put it still another way, does not the rejection of experience imply in this case the rejection of the object of the experience? What defense can be made of supposedly salvific rites of which the efficacy never breaks out of potentiality? Must not, under rigorous examination, the sacramental economy be rejected as useless to a person intent on becoming truly religious, deceptive, in fact, and by its very nature ludicrous? If the sacrament does produce what it symbolizes in the recipient, of what use is it? Or, finally, to set this question in its most loaded form, does the fact that the Lord's Supper is comical really militate against its efficacy?

As both the terminal point of this enquiry into Kierkegaardian sacramental theology and the point of departure for an explanation of its ground in Kierkegaard's philosophy of religion, it is helpful to consider two aspects of his Christology. First, the God-man is a sign, a sign being understood as something that negates immediacy.<sup>43</sup> That something or someone would negate the results of sense perception implies that he or it has stimulated reflection, that is, that the sign is seen as being in fact a sign. What stimulates reflection in the case of Jesus of Nazareth is the miracle.<sup>44</sup> Reflection, however, discovers that this sign-person is a sign of contradiction, that he contains a contradiction

in his very constitution. "The contradiction, the greatest possible, is that between being God and being an individual man."<sup>45</sup> In consequence, "one must perceive that direct communication is an impossibility for the God-man, for being the sign of contradiction He cannot communicate Himself directly."<sup>46</sup> A further consequence is that it is precisely when the mode of being of this Communicator is left out of account that Christianity becomes direct, merely objective doctrine and practice.<sup>47</sup>

The second point, which is similarly a consequence of the unique being of Christ, is that "as the Paradox He is an extremely unhistorical person." "Christ is the absolute," "becoming a Christian in truth comes to mean to become contemporary with Christ," and "in relation to the absolute there is only one tense: the present."<sup>48</sup> By way of elucidation--

What really occurred (the past) . . . is not the real. It lacks the determinant which is the determinant of truth (as inwardness) and of all religiousness, the for thee. The past is not reality--for me; only the contemporary is reality for me. What thou dost live contemporaneous with is reality--for thee.

.....

And thus every man can be contemporary only with the age in which he lives--and then with one thing more: with Christ's life on earth; for Christ's life on earth, sacred history, stands for itself alone outside history. . . . Christ's life on earth is not a past event. . . . His earthly life possesses the eternal contemporaneousness.<sup>49</sup>

Still, it would seem that for Kierkegaard the humanity of Christ stands in a curious isolation. In its normal, everyday functioning it cannot be an index of the divine; it points beyond itself only by being distorted, albeit sublimely, in miraculous sayings and doings. There was nothing to be seen "but a lowly man, who, by signs and wonders and by affirming that He was God, continually posited the possibility of

offence." The perspective of the communicatio idiomatum, if not explicitly abandoned, is clearly secondary; the humanity of Christ is seen in isolation from his divinity. At the same time it is said to be radically extra-historical (although it is difficult--both in Luther and Kierkegaard--to see what an absolutized humanity would amount to); it is thus isolated from the rest of humankind. As a result of this twofold isolation, however, it is difficult to see any reason for positing it at all! As was the case with the sacraments, signs that cause nothing positive, an instrumentality that cannot but fail, cannot be taken seriously; Kierkegaard seems to be a sort of inverted monophysite. Or, ironically, Kierkegaard has himself returned to Judaism, for you do not need to be God incarnate to give prophetic witness to the transcendence of God. One is tempted to conclude that if the God of Christian worship is the most comical being that ever was, Paul spoke better than he knew when he preached the foolishness of the cross.

Revelation given implies that there exists someone by whom it can be received--someone with a characteristic mind-set. The roots of Kierkegaard's views on Christ, the primary sacrament, and on his ecclesiastical extensions in space and time may thus appropriately be sought in his philosophy of religion, which is to be found chiefly in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Of particular interest here are Kierkegaard's remarks on comedy and humor in pages 386-468 of the English translation of that work.<sup>50</sup> Although humor is not the most important element in Kierkegaard's outlook, nevertheless an analysis of his treatment of it reveals better than any other way, it would seem, the basis for his

attitude toward the Lord's Supper and the other forms of public worship that surround it.

The section of the Postscript cited above begins by saying that the religious task of man is to become contemporaneous with the absolute.<sup>51</sup> This is to be accomplished by man's breaking off his absolute relationships with the relativities in which he is immersed, which is to say, it is to be accomplished through suffering.<sup>52</sup> Simply because he is a man, however, because he cannot transform himself into the superhuman, no man can ever enter fully into absolute relatedness to the absolute-- but his task still remains repeatedly to try.<sup>53</sup> The forlornness of this attempt is the real cause of the suffering essential to religious growth, for while a man may in some measure succeed in dying away from the immediacy of sense perceptions and unreflective reactions to them,<sup>54</sup> he can never put behind him Luther's anfechtung, the temptation that comes from above, the awareness that he can never express in his being the basic thrust of his being.<sup>55</sup> Even the truly religious man, the saint

lies in the finite as a helpless child; he desires absolutely to hold fast to the conception [of the absolute God], and precisely this annihilates him; he desires to do all, and while he summons his will to the task, his impotence begins. . . . The absolute consciousness of God consumes him as the burning heat of the summer sun when it will not go down, the burning heat of the summer sun when it will not abate.<sup>56</sup>

It is the attitude that a man takes toward suffering, moreover, that determines his progress along the way to sainthood, toward becoming a "knight of hidden inwardness." The man who is immersed in sensuous immediacy regards suffering simply as a misfortune accidental to human life.<sup>57</sup> If he reflects, perhaps on account of misfortune, he sees his

finitude and advances to the point of becoming an ironist; he sees that the particularities of the finite can never be commensurable with "the infinite ethical requirement."<sup>58</sup> If he then accepts this insight, he becomes an ethicist, and the irony remains simply as his incognito. In other words, as far as anyone can see, the ethicist is just not interested absolutely in the finite; what cannot be seen is that, as a matter of fact, he is absolutely committed to the pursuit of perfection. The characteristic of this stage is that suffering is no longer merely tolerated; it is now used as a stepping-stone to a closer approximation to ideal humanity.<sup>59</sup> If the ethicist, however, comes to realize that suffering is universal, to intuit that it is part and parcel of human existence, he then becomes a humorist.<sup>60</sup> If, finally, the humorist moves forward to a decisive appropriation of the God-relationship and abandons the view that life in time could ever be the point of departure for something of eternal consequence, he finds himself in the final stage of true religiosity, and the humor remains as his incognito.<sup>61</sup> As was the case with the ironist, it is impossible to tell whether the humorist-on-the-outside is really committed to his vision or not, whether or not he is really religious. At any rate, suffering, which the religious man cannot transcend, signifies his relationship to the eternal happiness from which he is separated; it is a sort of spiritual thermometer that indicates, by one's reaction to it, one's spiritual temperature.<sup>62</sup>

But so much for suffering. The development of religiosity can just as well be discussed in terms of comedy, more precisely, in terms of the placement of the zone of the comic, and to this pursuit Kierke-

gaard devotes the second half of the chapter cited above.<sup>63</sup> For Kierkegaard, suffering and comedy are really but two sides of the same coin; the reason this is so lies in his definition of comedy.<sup>64</sup> Kierkegaard states that the comical is the painless contradiction. It is not, as Aristotle would have it, some contradictory thing, but rather the very "relationship of contradiction." The contradiction is painless because "the comic apprehension evokes the contradiction or makes it manifest by having in mind the way out."<sup>65</sup> If this is true, and on the other hand, if it is true that the real question of suffering is whether it is possible, "by a joy grounded in the consciousness that the suffering signifies the relationship [to eternal happiness], to get beyond the suffering,"<sup>66</sup> it thus becomes apparent why religious growth can be discussed in terms of comedy. The suffering is seen in terms of the way out.

Now the perception of the comical follows a constant pattern; the relationship of contradiction, it may be said, becomes visible only in retrospect, or assuming that one is moving in an upward direction, from the top down. Kierkegaard writes: "The lower can never make the higher comical, i.e., it cannot legitimately apprehend the higher as comical, and has not the power to make it comical. It is another thing that the lower, by being brought into comparison with the higher, may make the relationship ridiculous."<sup>67</sup> The reason for this is that the beholder of the comical firmly adheres to the norm with which he sees the comical in contradiction. Were he not to do so, he himself would become comical and so would everything else; and this is the same as saying that nothing would be comical, for without this "foothold in existence" all contradiction

would either vanish, or, with absurdity everywhere, the situation would become intolerable through the absence of a way out.

Briefly, in the immediate, ironical, and ethical stages comedy stands in the same relation to the individual as suffering.<sup>68</sup> Like pain, comedy comes to immediacy from the outside. (Indeed, a refinement of immediacy, or aestheticism, the detached contemplation of the philosopher, would make the comic the highest, most general category of objects. . . .)<sup>69</sup> For immediacy, comedy is everywhere--everywhere outside the beholder. For irony and ethics, however, the comic contradiction, like pain, is partially internalized. The zone of the comic relationship lies between the ironist or ethicist and other men, for these others do not see or value what the former do--and hence ludicrously misjudge them.<sup>70</sup>

In the humorist the internalization of comedy is complete; his very life is comical.<sup>71</sup> But this is as far as the parallelism of comedy and suffering can be carried, for in the final, religious, stage there is no more comedy, strictly speaking, but only suffering.<sup>72</sup> The religious man, it will be recalled, has come to and acquiesced in the realization that absolutely nothing he can do can express his absolute God-relationship. As a result, his own and others' taking note of his perceptible activity stands in a relationship of contradiction. Still, since his attention is turned chiefly toward God and not on his own doings, this vision of the comic will be, at best, fleeting.<sup>73</sup>

In this chapter the attempt has been made to trace Kierkegaard's theology of the eucharist from his criticism of the Establishment through his affirmation of orthodox Lutheran piety, through his understanding of

the hypostatic union, to, finally, his philosophy of religion. And relative to the eucharist, at least, the central affirmation of that philosophy is that true religiosity can never be comical; at most it only appears comical to an uncomprehending world. It must be stressed that the only thing the true knight of hidden inwardness finds comical about himself is the absolute disproportion between any "external" act of his and his inward passion, never this inwardness itself. "The religiosity which has humor as its incognito preserves its justification only by constantly keeping itself in religious passion with respect to the God-relationship, and hence it sees the comic aspect of humor only vanishingly."<sup>74</sup> The knight of hidden inwardness, after all, takes his hidden inwardness very seriously:

The religious individual discovers that what occupies him absolutely seems to occupy others very little, but he draws no conclusion from this; partly because he does not have the time, and partly because he cannot know for certain whether all these people may be knights of the hidden inwardness. He feels compelled by the environment to do what the dialectical process of producing inwardness demands of him, namely, to set up a screen between himself and men, in order to safeguard and ensure the inwardness of his God-relationship.

From this it does not follow that such a religious individual becomes inactive. On the contrary, he does not leave the world but remains in it, for this is precisely his incognito. But he transforms his outward activity into an inward manner, inwardly before God, by admitting that he can do nothing of himself, by severing every teleological relation to his activity in the outward direction and cutting off every resultant in the finite world, although he labors to the limit of his powers.<sup>75</sup>

"Eternity is too serious a place for laughter"; and what laughter there is in time was invented by the devil, for the poor human wretches that attain a measure of comic vision are much too exhausted and troubled

by this endeavor to laugh.<sup>76</sup>

The religiosity of hidden inwardness is eo ipso inaccessible to comic apprehension. The comical cannot be outside it, precisely because it is hidden inwardness and therefore cannot come into contradiction with anything. The sphere of contradiction which humor dominates, including as it does the highest range of the comical, is something that such religiosity has itself brought into consciousness, and it has it within itself as something lower. Thus it is absolutely secured against the comical, or is by means of the comical secured against the comical.<sup>77</sup>

The comical is excluded from the religious suffering, which is inaccessible to the comical because this suffering is precisely the consciousness of the contradiction, which is pathetically and tragically incorporated in the consciousness of the religious individual; precisely for this reason the comical is excluded.<sup>78</sup>

Apropos of worship--and of all life, really--the result of such inward passion is solitude.<sup>79</sup> All understanding between men is in terms of something abstracted from existence, something external and relative. But the introvert knight has "reflected himself out of every existential relativity." He is quite alone in that which is most characteristic of him. And yet--

it follows from this quite consistently that he will participate in the outward worship; for partly his impulse to do so will be like that of all other men, and partly, to abstain therefrom would be a worldly attempt negatively to call attention to himself; and finally, there is no third party here, at least not with the knowledge of the religious individual, since he naturally assumes that everyone of those present is there for his own sake and not to observe others.<sup>80</sup>

In the end, however, considering the radical inexpressibility of hidden inwardness, worship becomes inevitably comical--comical because in a sense, irrelevant. When it comes right down to it, worship just cannot be taken with the ultimate seriousness that lies beyond earthly vicissitudes.

The comic expression of worship is therefore just as reverent, religiously, as its pathetic expression. What lies at the root of both the comic and the tragic in this connection is the discrepancy, the contradiction between the infinite and the finite, the eternal and that which becomes.<sup>81</sup>

It can also be pointed out, by way of a final touch, that Kierkegaard knew pretty well where he was going in terms of the history of Christian doctrine. If "religiosity which essentially pretends to externality, essentially makes the external commensurable is comical," then Catholicism is comical, and would doubtless be better off if it could only see how comical it is.<sup>82</sup> And yet one detects in Kierkegaard a certain wistfulness for the Catholic Middle Ages. There was, he admits, a humor in the Middle Ages that was less unhealthy than the contemporary brand. The reason is that the medieval comic vision embraced a totality. Thus some modern humorists have become Catholics, he says, so as to find again "a community, a foot-hold, which they could not find within themselves." For "in the Middle Ages lyrical poetry had a whole objectivity of its own; it is not individual, it is man (Adam, i.e., humanity); every trait belongs to universal history, the expression of which is understood ideally."<sup>83</sup> If men subsequently sought to be freed from the external religious authority that created that objectivity, they have since paid a terrible price. Christian, your progress is your punishment as well:

As always, the punishment fits the sin. You shall be free! And then when you lie on your death-bed, perhaps in despair, and you would give everything for a man who had authority to reassure you--no, no my friend, now it is too late, you did not want to have authority, and therefore there is none.<sup>84</sup>

When, a little over a year after writing these lines, Kierkegaard himself lay on his death-bed, he seems not to have despaired. Nor did he receive

the eucharist from a priest of the State Church, though asked to do so. But then, a knight of hidden inwardness does not need sacraments.

Kierkegaard, who was a great man, has been dealt with rather cruelly here, intentionally so. As a counterbalance it is well to remember Maritain's genial distinction between a man's initial vision and the position to which he was led through his verbalization of it. Still, Kierkegaard said what he said: the eucharist is pragmatically undercut by the religious man's independence of the relativities of human existence. Now Kierkegaard is perfectly logical; if relativities can never become salvific any further discussion would be senseless. It would seem, however, that the Kierkegaardian rejection of the relative can be criticized on two grounds, one methodological and one properly dogmatic.

In a tiny essay on another knight--this one of manifest outwardness, particularly at the knees--Francis Thompson presents an extraordinarily shrewd insight into the nature of the comical.<sup>85</sup> The irony of Cervantes, he says, is refined and dangerous beyond, for example, that of Swift. Swift's irony has a "one-sided duplicity," that is, if you do not see the inner meaning of what he writes you cannot understand the piece at all. Cervantes you can understand; and you laugh--and your "derision is derided." Anyone who finds in Don Quixote an impeachment of idealism is no idealist, and Cervantes, by professing to agree with him, trips him into revealing himself.

At the deepest core of the strange and wonderful satire, in which the hidden mockery is so opposite to the seeming mockery, lies a sympathy even to tears with all height and heroism insulted and out of date, mad to the eyes of a purblind world; nay, a bitter confession that such nobility is indeed mad and phantasmal, in so much as it imputes its own grandness to a petty and clay-content society.<sup>86</sup>

But that is not all: "Life would go nigh to madness if there were not some honest laughter."<sup>87</sup> So Cervantes gives us Sancho, too.

Now Thompson does not develop these ideas further, but it does seem that an extremely important aspect of comedy is being hinted at here. It is what would be called the stickiness of comedy; or, to vary the image, it is as though the comical and its beholder were as two mirrors reflecting each other to infinity. In plainer language, once you have begun to laugh, you can no longer be sure who is the butt of the joke. Kierkegaard apparently forgot that "it takes one to know one"; advocate of God's transcendence that he was, in other words, he seems to have overlooked the traditional Platonic and Judeo-Christian doctrine of the oneness of God. God, it is said, does not know contradictions because he has no ground of comparison. What exists, exists because he knows it just so; what does not exist he does not know, precisely because he does not know it. Lacking nothing, he does not, as it were, step outside himself to see what improvements might be made; and within himself he knows, not evil and contradiction, but only the person or thing that we term evil or contradictory. Only in God is there a coincidentia oppositorum; only in a creature is there the possibility of knowing being as contradictory, for only a creature can know being without creating it. Kierkegaard's religious man would be more believable were he to realize that, precisely because he can see a comical disproportion between his religious quest and his religious acts, his religious quest must itself be comical. (And the way out is the simple acceptance of creaturehood!) All a man's thoughts, be he religious or not, are rooted, not in some ideal absolute, but in that grimy contingent God-relationship that is his very existence.

A confirmation of this line of reasoning is to be found in an admission that the very nature of Kierkegaardian hidden inwardness forces Kierkegaard to make, namely, that perfect hidden inwardness is so well hidden that it cannot be found. This radical divorce from external expression seems to present an insuperable epistemological difficulty, thereby reducing Kierkegaard's separation of comedy from religiosity to an unverifiable hypothesis. Our knight writes, ironically, perhaps, but none the less truly:

Whether there really exists or has existed such a religious person as above described, whether all are religious or no one is I do not propose to decide, nor would it be at all possible for me to decide. Even if I really were a skilled observer, I should get no further in relation to such a religious individual than to form a suspicion because of the humoristic--and as far as I am concerned, I am not religious.

I am unwilling, he continues, to commit myself

to the paralogism of inferring existence from the hypothetical, and much less to conclude from my hypothetical thinking that it is myself [that is, religious], by virtue of the identity of thought and being.<sup>88</sup>

Comical is the Christian community and comical its worship. (And willing or no, he who would object to this situation ends up rather comical, too!) To the question of whether comedy detracts from the efficacious presence of Christ in the eucharist Kierkegaard answered, Yes. But the Christian tradition would seem to voice a resounding, No!

In his delightful spoof on continental existentialism, The Centre of Hilarity, Michael Mason insists that the ground of evil and contradiction is seriousness, which seriousness is really comical.<sup>89</sup> He quotes a line from Chesterton (whom he champions against T. S. Eliot) to the effect that the devil fell "through force of gravity."<sup>90</sup> The idea that a creature,

utterly dependent on the Creator, could use its will to assert independence is perfectly absurd, and thus the devil's and man's fall begins with a perfectly good joke. Creaturehood, itself rather comical, is taken with ultimate seriousness.<sup>91</sup> In other words, "the shape of realism is determined by laughter."<sup>92</sup>

It may be the laughter of heavenly rejoicing in the creaturely condition. It may be the laughter of that earthly humor which glorifies man's dignity and rationality by reminding us that reality is in no way diminished by their fragility.<sup>93</sup>

The Christian dogma of redemption is seen in the same light as that of origins. Evil and creaturely seriousness are allowed to fasten their grip on the God-man and, "by a sort of divine judo," are made to provide the fullest proof of their absurdity.<sup>94</sup> Christ is not a contradiction but the perfect protagonist, the perfect bringer of vernal new being, beyond the contradiction of comedy and tragedy; he is what he signifies.<sup>95</sup> And, so is the eucharistic bread.

The first Christendom found our lost centre of gravity again when it made Calvary, and Calvary's perpetuation in the Mass, the axis of its cosmic dance; and in so doing it found, too, that the centre of gravity was even more fundamentally a centre of hilarity.<sup>96</sup>

For Mason, the whole point of symbolism is that it is, as the original Greek word suggests, a casting together of things that are apparently separate. Since comedy can be found wherever there is contradiction with a way out, it may well be said that the symbolic relation and the comic relation are one and the same. "It is wholly fitting that the root of the whole Christian faith and Church should be the redemptive sacrifice of Christ effectively symbolized in the breaking of bread."<sup>97</sup> This bread is, phenomenologically speaking, the same as any other bread,

but the word of faith says that it is "beyond itself," it is the body of Christ.

The symbol is what it signifies. Precisely because symbol and reality here coincide, the fundamental point about Christ's presence in the Host is that the Host should be eaten, not meditated on or conceptually analysed, but eaten.<sup>98</sup>

The idea of eating God is a rather un-Kierkegaardian thought. And yet the Church of the Middle Ages held and holds still that he who seems "a Charlie Chaplin among the gods" wishes precisely this.<sup>99</sup> Kierkegaard would have said that such a prank makes not religiosity but aesthetic experience, humor, the highest sphere of Christian experience. But it does not seem beyond belief that the knight of hidden inwardness got things exactly backwards. The traditional three stages of the inner life--the purgative, illuminative, and unitive ways--look suspiciously like Kierkegaard's immediacy, ethics, and religiosity in reverse order. At any rate, the melancholy Dane provides a salutary example to all who are tempted to separate doctrinal Word and empirical Sacrament, to sublimate the supra-spatial, supra-temporal Person of the risen Lord and the Spiritual radiance of his heavenly liturgy to the extent that they are literally out of this, our world. "Eat, drink, and be merry," quipped Thompson, "for tomorrow ye are men."<sup>100</sup> Kierkegaard, one suspects, would have taken him seriously.

In conclusion, then, we submit that Kierkegaard's theological thought does not really hang together. Presumably his thought on the eucharist was quite traditional, Lutheran, with regard to the polarities of space and time. Yet the position that he took relative to the polarity of subjective appropriation effectively negated his stand on the first two polarities. True, Kierkegaard would not have said that human weakness

can destroy Christ's objective presence in the eucharist; yet, practically, for him, human weakness did precisely that, in the sense that it made Christ's presence there irrelevant to his inward passion after religiosity. Kierkegaard's Christ must be an offense. One may perhaps see here the final, if somewhat surprising, development of Luther's implicit monophysism, but what one surely does not find here is Luther's bold faith, his insistence that the best preparation for the eucharist is the consciousness of sin coupled with great confidence in God--a confidence, one might add, that leaves room for the apprehension of the comical.

There is thus no turning back along the road of eucharistic theology. If one admits, with Luther, that Christ is present to us, he must seriously ask himself, with Augustine and Calvin, in what sense we are present to Christ. If his cultural consciousness takes an empirical turn, he must ask the question of transubstantiation, the question of the sense in which Christ is present to the eucharistic symbols, as well as the question of the sense in which the historical action of Christ is present to the historical, ecclesiastical action surrounding those symbols. If, precisely through the eucharist, Christ has indeed remained in history, has become an offense to purely human sensibilities, he must finally face the question of whether he can admit into his subjectivity such a Christ as that. If he cannot admit him, he will, as Mason suggests, have lost his true center of gravity, for there is no other Christ but him whose body and blood are the nourishment of sinners.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

As stated in the introduction, the intent of this essay has not been to assemble the antecedents to a conclusion, as if, for example, the eucharistic doctrine of Trent were to be defended against all comers, or that of Calvin were to be proved a more faithful mirroring of Augustine than that of Trent. Rather, what we set out to do and hope we have done is simply to inform and to illustrate, to clothe the bare bones of the three polarities of space, time, and subjective appropriation with the flesh of certain Christian theologians' presentation of them. It may have seemed to the reader, however, that in the attempt to present a more or less integral<sup>1</sup> eucharistic theology in terms of certain of its historical concretions we have swung to the opposite extreme, that, namely, of putting the official doctrine of the Roman communion on a par with that of three men whom most Roman Catholics regard as heretics. Is this the price of that sympathy spoken of in the introduction?

We do not think so; and in answer to this objection we submit the first of two concluding observations, concluding, it may be noted, not in the sense of comparing the theological positions we have discussed, but in the sense of an over-view of the whole of what has thus far been said.

Our first observation, then, bears on the fact that all the theo-

logians we have considered have agreed that the eucharistic bread and wine are truly the body and blood of Christ. They have all affirmed the fact of the basic eucharistic contemporaneity of Christ, however much they have disagreed as to the explanation of that fact. Now, it has also been our aim to draw attention to this separability of fact and explanation. More precisely, it has been our aim to illustrate that these differences of eucharistic explanation arise from different philosophical evaluations of the eucharistic fact, that the Father's unique eucharistic Word resonates differently in the various chambers of the house of philosophy.

It is in this light that we examine the Tridentine fathers' paradoxical affirmation that they did not intend to define philosophy. The paradox is, of course, that no matter what they said, their statements would be philosophically analyzable and, above all, fully meaningful only within a certain linguistic context. (We cannot conceive, for example, how transubstantiation, taken as eucharistic explanation, could mean much of anything to a freshly-baptized Bushman.) A likely solution to the paradox would seem to be that the Tridentine fathers intended both to witness the fact of the eucharist in terms of the popular philosophy of their linguistic world and to ban faulty applications of that popular philosophy. We submit, then, that they spoke, as anyone must, but one philosophical language at a time and, by their own admission, did not attempt to do epistemology. We have thus, here as elsewhere, maintained the separability of the fact designated and the manner of its designation; at no time have we overlooked the possibility that a fact may, in a given context, absolutely demand the acceptance of a certain, single mode of explanation.<sup>2</sup>

It must not be overlooked, however, that the fathers of Trent were not merely setting up semantic rules for religious language, but actually professing their scripturally-rooted faith in the realities designated by their language. Quite plainly, their intention was to keep themselves from being bound to language, even if, equally plainly, they had to use some vaguely philosophical-sounding language to do so. The only bondage that mattered to them was bondage to the realities of faith; they were concerned more with proclaiming the great deeds of God than with furnishing philosophical categories for them, and to interpret their pronouncements as simply one more effort at eucharistic theological explanation is seriously to misconstrue their intention. The fathers of Trent explained the eucharist truly in terms of their linguistic world; whether theirs is fundamentally the only linguistic world there is, or whether Luther's and Calvin's, for example, are justifiably somewhat different, we are content to leave an open question.

Is, then, the fundamental presupposition of this essay a kind of philosophical relativism? By no means! It is simply the recognition that, in virtue of the incarnation, the Word of God becomes the word of man, the fragmented, variegated word of man. It is a confession of confidence in the gratia capitis, in the ability of the Spirit to bring all men, even philosophers, to the sacred banquet. It is a fond vision of complementarity-in-community, of a holy table where something would be wanting to the sufferings of Christ were it not for the anxious converse of redeemed intellect. Complementarity, then, not relativism! We submit that the teaching of Luther and Calvin and even Kierkegaard can enrich

the faith of Trent. No matter how a table is set, no one can sit in all the places at once; and no table looks quite the same from every place, not even the Lord's. Catholics may insist on sitting in the first place, but it would not hurt them to recall how in the Lord's parable the unseated guest was merely asked to move over a little, not sent home from the party.

Though a scandal to some, this separability of fact and explanation may be a blessing in disguise. For Kierkegaard, whatever his peculiarities, was no fool. The people do want and deserve something better than official Christianity, and if they do not get it they are perhaps not entirely to blame if Christ's presence in the eucharist ceases to be an effective presence, thereby ceasing, for them, to be a fully true presence. For presence, as we have noted, seems to involve some sort of reciprocity. Even though the odd new doctrines and liturgies cropping up in public and private can often be dismissed as dilettantism, one wonders to what extent they are symptomatic of a more general, unexpressed malaise. One wonders to what extent the essentially pre-Kantian formulation of the classical eucharistic theologies we have studied has made them religiously unavailable to many in our time. One may raise a good Kierkegaardian question about the effect on eucharistic doctrine and practice of what the Second Vatican Council calls the "imbalance between an intellect which is modern in practical matters and a theoretical system of thought which can neither master the sum total of its ideas, nor arrange them adequately into a synthesis."<sup>3</sup>

To be sure, we are not suggesting that in the twentieth century

ontology has become a futile gesture; before us stand the splendid achievements of Maritain, Whitehead, and others. And we are most emphatically not suggesting that Peter's faith has failed his latter-day brethren, that Tridentine doctrine has in some occult way become less true as such than it was for Pius V and Bellarmine. What we are suggesting is that the past has not had the last word on the eucharist and that the words of the past may be less true for many contemporary Christians in the secondary sense that these words are not known to these Christians and perhaps never can effectively become known to them. Basically what we are suggesting is that, as the eucharistic action of the risen Christ is the very source of dynamic, apostolic intellectuality,<sup>4</sup> the aforementioned separability of eucharistic fact and eucharistic explanation deserves to be made an integral element of further eucharistic explanation. It is this very separability, it would seem, that makes the continued catechetical quest of renewed eucharistic experience a live option. The servant who buried his money acted as if the relativities of human history were a secret to no one but the Master!

Our second concluding observation is that, as the foregoing chapters illustrate, eucharistic theology is what one might call a derived theology. In its structure, that is, it is not without some similarity to, say, the question of limbo. Because theologians affirmed both the universal salvific will of God and the universal necessity of baptism they had to conclude that there must be a limbo. Even though the eucharist is a much more important matter, the fact remains that eucharistic theology never answers its own questions. Instead, as we have seen,

eucharistic theology always ends in a discussion of the risen Christ. / What a theologian says about the eucharist turns out to be a deduction from what he says about the Lord of Glory.

Luther's Christ is effectively, though not locally, present everywhere in the cosmic process. As a result, Scripture and the Holy Spirit can direct us to look for him in the eucharistic bread and wine. In a complementary tension with this view, Calvin's Christ is "beyond the world," but he is also the sender of the Spirit in power. As a result he can send the Spirit on the persons and rites of the Christian community to raise them, effectively if imperceptibly, to his plane of existence. The Catholic Christ can well be thought of as continuing to offer human worship to the Father. As a result, the eucharistic action goes on both in time and beyond time. In a complementary tension with this latter view, and unfortunately, Kierkegaard's Christ, so transcends the human as to transcend human tomfoolery, but had Kierkegaard seen that there is no reason why the symbolic relation cannot also be a comic relation, he might have been more inclined, as a result, to seek the risen Christ in the Church of fallen man. Whether the eucharistic question is debated in terms of space, time, or subjective appropriation, the more basic question seems always to be that of to what extent the risen Christ is truly involved with or contemporary to our fluid and failing existence. Eucharistic theology is the theology of the risen Christ, in the last analysis, for in the absence of a more direct mode of encounter, the eucharistic action is simply that succession of instants in the cosmic process where the Spirit has directed Christians to seek their Lord. Eucharistic theology is nothing else than the neces-

sarily symbolic discussion of the relationship of the risen Christ to the process from which he has risen. Under the inspiration of the Spirit, a simple family meal of bread and wine becomes, so to speak, the test-case of the refulgence of the Lord of Glory on that lowliness whence he has ascended.

Over half a century ago, in a book that, by reason of its singular emphasis on the existential, salvific character of dogma, was greatly misunderstood, Edouard LeRoy maintained that the basic meaning of the resurrection is that the risen Christ is to be regarded precisely as our contemporary.<sup>5</sup> (And contemporaneity, as we have noted, is not quite the same thing as simultaneous duration.) According to LeRoy, possessing a body means being capable of practical activity. The risen Christ, then,

is first of all universally active in creation, in the sense that the entire functioning of nature becomes in him consciousness and liberty, or in the Johannine manner of speaking, life and light. But this is not all. He acts visibly by the Church, which is literally his body and whose life and history are his deeds among us. And he acts mysteriously by the eucharist, which makes him once more live here below in us, our body becoming in very truth his body and our action his action.<sup>6</sup>

We mention LeRoy because he appears to have been one of the first in our century to have said what many have since repeated. We mention him, too, because his conception of the unity of mental life let him see that the primarily "practical" character of the Church's proclamation of faith is in no sense endangered by the inevitable evanescence of philosophical doctrines. One might not agree with LeRoy that dogmas are Bergsonian schémas dynamiques, but the fact remains that he is one of the few theologians of our time who--in our opinion, at least--have been able to deal convincingly with the separability noted above.<sup>7</sup> Perhaps the time is not

ripe for renewed enquiry into what the mystery of resurrection-eucharist is in itself. Until more work has been done, as, indeed, the man-oriented nature of apostolic action seems to demand, on the meaning and function of dogmatic theology generally, let it suffice for us, as it surely may, to confess with the fathers of Vatican II that "Christ is always present in His Church, especially in her liturgical celebrations," that in the Church's "celebrating the eucharist . . . the victory and triumph of His death are again made present," and that "in the earthly liturgy we take part in a foretaste of that heavenly liturgy which is celebrated in the holy city of Jerusalem toward which we journey as pilgrims, where Christ is sitting at the right hand of God, a minister of the holies and of the true tabernacle."<sup>8</sup>

## NOTES

### Introduction

<sup>1</sup>Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, tr. D. F. Swenson and H. V. Hong (Princeton Univ., 1962), p. 131.

<sup>2</sup>R. S. V.

<sup>3</sup>Paul de Lagarde, Deutsche Schriften (Göttingen, 1892), p. 60, quoted by Karl Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, tr. D. E. Green (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), pp. 374-75.

### Chapter I

<sup>1</sup>My historical summary of the first two periods of Luther's doctrine follows Carl Wisløff, The Gift of Communion, tr. J. M. Shaw (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1964), esp. pp. 9-20.

<sup>2</sup>D. Martin Luthers Werke, ed. J. K. F. Knaake et al. (Weimar: Bohlau, 1883 ff.), Vol. III, p. 17.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 280. Wisløff's translation.

<sup>4</sup>Wisløff, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>5</sup>Luthers Werke, Vol. LVI, p. 141. Wisløff's translation.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., Vol. LVII, p. 217. My translation.

<sup>7</sup>Wisløff, op. cit., p. 16.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 16-17.

<sup>9</sup>For this third period see Hermann Sasse, This Is My Body (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1959).

<sup>10</sup>Luther, "The Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ--Against the Fanatics," tr. F. C. Ahrens, Luther's Works: American Edition, Vol. XXXVI, p. 355. All Luther quotations in this chapter are, unless otherwise noted, taken from this edition of Luther's works, published, beginning in 1955, by Concordia, St. Louis, and Muhlenberg, Philadelphia, edited by J. Pelikan and H. T. Lehmann. Hereafter abbreviated LW, followed by the volume number.

- 11"Letter to the Christians of Strassburg," tr. C. Bergendorf,  
LW XL, p. 68.
- 12"Against the Heavenly Prophets," tr. B. Erling and C. Bergendorf,  
LW XL, p. 167.
- 13"The Misuse of the Mass," tr. F. C. Ahrens, LW XXXVI, p. 185.
- 14"The Adoration of the Sacrament," tr. A. R. Wentz, LW XXXVI,  
p. 279.
- 15Ibid., p. 281.
- 16"The Babylonian Captivity of the Church," tr. A. T. W. Stein-  
häuser, rev. F. C. Ahrens and A. R. Wentz, LW XXXVI, p. 37.
- 17"Adoration," LW XXVI, p. 282.
- 18"Tha These Words of Christ, 'This Is My Body,' etc., Still  
Stand Firm against the Fanatics," tr. R. H. Fischer, LW XXXVII, p. 32.
- 19"Confession concerning Christ's Supper," tr. R. H. Fischer, LW  
XXXVII, p. 367.
- 20"Against the Fanatics," LW XXXVI, p. 338.
- 21"Against the Heavenly Prophets," LW XL, pp. 54 ff.
- 22Ibid., p. 161.
- 23Ibid., p. 165.
- 24Ibid., p. 198.
- 25"Adoration," LW XXXVI, p. 280.
- 26"Confession," LW XXXVII, pp. 182 ff.
- 27Ibid., p. 172.
- 28Ibid., p. 173.
- 29Ibid., pp. 177 ff.
- 30Ibid., p. 253.
- 31Ibid., p. 254.
- 32Ibid., p. 255.

- <sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 231.
- <sup>34</sup>"Adoration," LW XXXVI, p. 283.
- <sup>35</sup>"Confession," LW XXXVII, p. 274.
- <sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 255.
- <sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 195.
- <sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 275.
- <sup>39</sup>"That These Words," LW XXXVII, pp. 109-10.
- <sup>40</sup>"Misuse," LW XXXVI, p. 288.
- <sup>41</sup>"That These Words," LW XXXVII, pp. 81 ff.
- <sup>42</sup>Ibid., pp. 78-79.
- <sup>43</sup>"Captivity," LW XXXVI, p. 19.
- <sup>44</sup>"That These Words," LW XXXVII, pp. 87, 88, 89.
- <sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 87.
- <sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 99.
- <sup>47</sup>"The Blessed Sacrament of the Holy and True Body of Christ, and the Brotherhoods," tr. J. J. Schindel, rev. E. T. Bachmann, LW XXXV, p. 49.
- <sup>48</sup>Ibid., pp. 50 ff.
- <sup>49</sup>"Captivity," LW XXXVI, p. 57.
- <sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 56.
- <sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 42.
- <sup>52</sup>"The Blessed Sacrament," LW XXXV, p. 64. Editors' note.
- <sup>53</sup>"A Treatise on the New Testament, that is, the Holy Mass," tr. J. J. Schindel, rev. E. T. Bachmann, LW XXXV, p. 82.
- <sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 84.
- <sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 85.
- <sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 84.

- 57 Ibid., p. 86.
- 58 "Against the Fanatics," LW XXXVI, p. 352.
- 59 "That These Words," LW XXXVII, p. 139.
- 60 "Treatise," LW XXXV, p. 87.
- 61 "Confession," LW XXXVII, p. 366.
- 62 "Treatise," LW XXXV, p. 86.
- 63 Ibid.
- 64 "That These Words," LW XXXVII, p. 94.
- 65 "The Blessed Sacrament," LW XXXV, p. 66.
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 Ibid., p. 58.
- 68 "Treatise," LW XXXV, p. 86.
- 69 Ibid., p. 85.
- 70 Ibid., p. 104.
- 71 Ibid., p. 82.
- 72 Ibid.
- 73 "Misuse," LW XXXVI, p. 168.
- 74 "Treatise," LW XXXV, p. 105.
- 75 "Receiving Both Kinds in the Sacrament," tr. A. R. Wentz, LW XXXVI, p. 263.
- 76 "Treatise," LW XXXV, p. 79.
- 77 Ibid., p. 81.
- 78 "Captivity," LW XXXVI, p. 43.
- 79 "Confession," LW XXXVII, p. 188.
- 80 "Captivity," LW XXXVI, p. 49.
- 81 "Misuse," LW XXXVI, p. 169.

- 82 "Treatise," LW XXXV, p. 101.
- 83 "Misuse," LW XXXVI, pp. 137 ff.
- 84 Ibid., p. 173.
- 85 "Captivity," LW XXXVI, p. 48.
- 86 "Misuse," loc. cit.
- 87 "Treatise," LW XXXV, p. 93.
- 88 Wisløff, op. cit., pp. 69 ff.
- 89 "The Blessed Sacrament," LW XXXV, pp. 60 ff.
- 90 Ibid., p. 63.
- 91 Ibid.
- 92 "Captivity," LW XXXVI, pp. 28-35.
- 93 "Confession," LW XXXVII, pp. 294-303.
- 94 Ibid., pp. 194-235.
- 95 "Captivity," LW XXXVI, p. 28.
- 96 Ibid., p. 30.
- 97 Ibid., pp. 20 ff.
- 98 Ibid., pp. 28 ff.
- 99 "Confession," LW XXXVII, p. 301.
- 100 Ibid., p. 303.
- 101 "That These Words," LW XXXVII, p. 57.
- 102 "Confession," LW XXXVII, pp. 229 ff.
- 103 Ibid., pp. 214-18.
- 104 Ibid., p. 215.
- 105 Ibid.
- 106 Ibid., pp. 222-23.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., p. 216.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid., p. 223.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid., pp. 212-14.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid., p. 212.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid., p. 222.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid., pp. 218-19.

<sup>113</sup>"That These Words," LW XXXVII, p. 69; "Against the Fanatics," LW XXXVI, pp. 342-43.

<sup>114</sup>"Confession," LW XXXVII, p. 223.

<sup>115</sup>"That These Words," loc. cit.

<sup>116</sup>"Confession," LW XXXVII, p. 338.

<sup>117</sup>Ibid., p. 292.

<sup>118</sup>"Against the Heavenly Prophets," LW XL, p. 207.

<sup>119</sup>Regin Prenter, The Word and the Spirit, tr. H. E. Kaasa (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1965).

## Chapter II

<sup>1</sup>My presentation here follows Luchsius Smits, S. Augustin dans l'oeuvre de Jean Calvin (Assen: van Gorcum, 1957), Vol. I, pp. 85 ff.; Francois Wendel, Calvin: The Origins and Development of His Religious Thought, tr. P. Mairet (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 102-104, 312-18, 329-55; and Alexander Barclay, The Protestant Doctrine of the Lord's Supper (Glasgow: Wylie, 1920), pp. 117 ff.

<sup>2</sup>Smits, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 85.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 88-89.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 90.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 93-94.

<sup>6</sup>Smits, "L'autorité de S. Augustin dans l'Institution chrétienne de Jean Calvin," Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique, 1950, p. 687.

<sup>7</sup>John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. J. T. McNeill, tr. F. L. Battles, Library of Christian Classics, Vol. XX-XXI in

continuous pagination (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960), pp. 1171-72. All Calvin references, unless otherwise noted, are to the Institutes in this edition, abbreviated ICR.

<sup>8</sup>Corpus Reformatorum: Joannis Calvini Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia, ed. W. Baum et al. (Brunswick: Schwetschke, 1863 ff.), Vol. VIII, p. 266. Smits, "L'autorité," p. 677, gives a list of similar passages. My translation.

<sup>9</sup>ICR, p. 1303.

<sup>10</sup>ICR, p. 1463.

<sup>11</sup>Smits, "L'autorité," p. 682, says that Calvin was convinced of his conformity with Augustine. Augustine excused: ICR, pp. 143-44, 357-58, 826.

<sup>12</sup>ICR, p. 414.

<sup>13</sup>Smits, S. Augustin, Vol. I, p. 94.

<sup>14</sup>ICR, p. 1276.

<sup>15</sup>ICR, p. 1277.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>ICR, p. 1278.

<sup>18</sup>ICR, pp. 1278-81.

<sup>19</sup>ICR, p. 1282.

<sup>20</sup>ICR, p. 1284.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>ICR, pp. 1284-85.

<sup>23</sup>ICR, p. 1289.

<sup>24</sup>ICR, p. 1290.

<sup>25</sup>They are listed by the editor (following Smits) in the notes on pp. 1290-94, in ICR.

<sup>26</sup>ICR, p. 1293.

<sup>27</sup>ICR, pp. 1294-95.

<sup>28</sup>Augustine states that all religious groupings have rites, ICR, p. 1295.

<sup>29</sup>ICR, p. 1296.

<sup>30</sup>Listed in the notes, ICR, pp. 1298, 1302, 1303.

<sup>31</sup>ICR, pp. 1299-1303.

<sup>32</sup>ICR, p. 1303.

<sup>33</sup>ICR, pp. 1359-1360.

<sup>34</sup>ICR, p. 1361.

<sup>35</sup>ICR, p. 1363.

<sup>36</sup>ICR, p. 1364.

<sup>37</sup>ICR, pp. 1364-65.

<sup>38</sup>ICR, p. 1366.

<sup>39</sup>ICR, p. 1367.

<sup>40</sup>ICR, pp. 1371-72.

<sup>41</sup>ICR, p. 1371.

<sup>42</sup>ICR, p. 1372.

<sup>43</sup>ICR, p. 1373.

<sup>44</sup>ICR, p. 1376.

<sup>45</sup>ICR, p. 1377.

<sup>46</sup>ICR, pp. 1379-82.

<sup>47</sup>ICR, p. 1385.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>ICR, p. 1386n.

<sup>50</sup>ICR, pp. 1390-92.

<sup>51</sup>ICR, p. 1393.

<sup>52</sup>ICR, pp. 1393-96.

<sup>53</sup>ICR, p. 1396n.

<sup>54</sup>ICR, p. 1404.

<sup>55</sup>ICR, pp. 1405-06.

<sup>56</sup>T. M. Lindsay, quoted by Barclay, op. cit., p. 208.

<sup>57</sup>ICR, p. 192.

<sup>58</sup>ICR, pp. 467-68.

<sup>59</sup>ICR, p. 496.

<sup>60</sup>ICR, p. 138.

<sup>61</sup>ICR, p. 1364.

<sup>62</sup>E.g., ICR, p. 1370.

<sup>63</sup>ICR, p. 1403.

<sup>64</sup>Ronald S. Wallace, Calvin's Doctrine of the Word and Sacrament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957), p. 228.

<sup>65</sup>Corp. Ref., Vol. XLVII, p. 435. Tr. given in Wallace, op. cit., p. 228.

<sup>66</sup>Corp. Ref., Vol. IX, p. 84. See Wallace, ibid.

<sup>67</sup>Corp. Ref., Vol. IX, p. 22. See Wallace, ibid.

<sup>68</sup>ICR, p. 1381.

<sup>69</sup>ICR, p. 1400.

<sup>70</sup>ICR, p. 1403.

<sup>71</sup>ICR, p. 1394.

<sup>72</sup>Corp. Ref., Vol. XLVIII, p. 13. Tr. given in Wallace, op. cit., pp. 204-05.

<sup>73</sup>Corp. Ref., Vol. IX, p. 79; Vol. LI, p. 195; ibid. See Wallace, ibid.

<sup>74</sup>See ICR, p. 1410n.

<sup>75</sup>ICR, p. 1411.

<sup>76</sup>ICR, p. 1408.

<sup>77</sup>ICR, pp. 1291-22.

<sup>78</sup>ICR, p. 1403.

<sup>79</sup>ICR, pp. 1412, 1415, 1417, 1423, and 1427.

<sup>80</sup>ICR, p. 1441.

<sup>81</sup>ICR, pp. 1441-42.

<sup>82</sup>Various texts are listed in the notes, ICR, pp. 1438-39.

<sup>83</sup>Ch. Couturier, "Sacramentum et mysterium dans l'oeuvre de S. Augustin," Etudes augustiniennes, ed. H. Rondet (Paris: Aubier, 1953), pp. 161-332.

<sup>84</sup>Contra Adimantium, Six traités anti-manicheens, Benedictine edn., Oeuvres de S. Augustin, Vol. XVII (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1961), p. 270.

<sup>85</sup>For letters 54, 55, 98, and 138, see Migne, Patrologia Latina, Vol. XXXIII, respectively, col. 199-204, 204-223, 359-364, and 525-535. For sermons 227, 229, and 272, see P.L., Vol. XXXVIII, col. 1099-1101, 1103, and 1246-1248. For nn. 25-27 of the commentary on John, P.L., Vol. XXXV, col. 1596-1621. See also De Batismo Libri VII, Traités antidonatistes II, ed. M. Fetschenig, Oeuvres de S. Augustin, Vol. XXIX (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964); De Magistro, Dialogues Philosophes III: De l'âme à Dieu, Benedictine edn., Oeuvres, Vol. VI (1941), pp. 7-121; De Doctrina Christiana, Le magistère chrétien, Benedictine edn., Oeuvres, Vol. XI (1949), pp. 150-541; and La cité de Dieu, 4th edn. of B. Dombart and A. Kalb, Oeuvres, Vol. XXXIII-XXXVII (1959-60).

<sup>86</sup>H. I. Marrou, S. Augustin et la fin de la culture antique (Paris: de Boccard, 1938), pp. 239 ff.

<sup>87</sup>Magistère, p. 182 (I, 2).

<sup>88</sup>Ibid.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., p. 238 (II, 2).

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p. 242 (II, 4).

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., pp. 182-84 (I, 2-4).

<sup>92</sup>Ibid., p. 390 (III, 27).

<sup>93</sup>The City of God, tr. G. G. Walsh et al. (New York: Doubleday (Anchor), 1958), p. 193.

<sup>94</sup>Bernard Quinot, "L'influence de l'épître aux Hébreux dans la notion augustinienne du vrai sacrifice," Revue des études augustinienes, 1962, p. 166.

<sup>95</sup>City, p. 194.

<sup>96</sup>Ghislain Lafont, O.S.B., "La sacrifice de la cité de Dieu," Recherches de science religieuse, 1965, pp. 218-19.

<sup>97</sup>See P.L., Vol. XXXVIII, col. 475. The point is that even though Christ alone has as yet ascended, he is nonetheless the head. . .

<sup>98</sup>F. van der Meer, Augustine the Bishop, tr. B. Battershaw and G. R. Lamb (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 304.

<sup>99</sup>Jean de Saussure, "La notion reformée des sacrements," Bulletin de la société de l'histoire du protestantisme français, 1935, p. 250.

<sup>100</sup>Jean Boisset, Sagesse et sainteté dans la pensée de Jean Calvin (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1959), p. 272.

<sup>101</sup>L. Godefroy, "Eucharistie," Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, Vol. V, col. 1348-1350.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid., col. 1349.

<sup>103</sup>Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1955), pp. 508-09.

<sup>104</sup>Calvin, Tracts and Treatises on the Doctrine and Worship of the Church, tr. H. Beveridge (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1958), p. 577.

<sup>105</sup>See Henry Chavannes, "La présence réelle chez S. Thomas et chez Calvin," Verbum Caro, 1959, pp. 163-68.

<sup>106</sup>Calvin, Tracts, p. 414.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., p. 378.

<sup>108</sup>Ibid., p. 374.

<sup>109</sup>J. B. Bossuet, Histoire des variations des églises protestantes (Paris: Charpentier, 1844), p. 408 (Bk. IX, no. 57).

<sup>110</sup>Ibid., p. 415 (no. 67). In a letter (Corp. Ref., Vol. V, p. 208) to Vitus Theodorus, October 25, 1543, Melancthon put the matter as clearly as anyone ever has: "Miror, tot seculis homines doctos non cogitasse discrimen inter agens liberum et rem animatam. Christus tanquam agens liberum adest actioni institutae; post actionem non vult esse inclusus pani, non vult ibi se alligatum esse." Despite his somewhat illogical application

of this distinction to the continuing presence of Christ to the continued "action" of the eucharistic species on the faithful after a Mass is over, Melancthon's point is really the key to the whole question of substance here. In short, a substance can be considered not only as a thing, but as a person!

<sup>111</sup>Franz Leenhardt, Le sacrement de la Sainte Cène (Paris: Delachaux et Niestlé, 1948); see esp. pp. 108-18.

### Chapter III

<sup>1</sup>See, for example, Daniel Waterland's classic treatise, A Review of the Doctrine of the Eucharist as Laid Down in Scripture and Antiquity, The Works of the Rev. Daniel Waterland, D.D. (Oxford Univ., 3rd edn., 1856), Vol. IV, pp. 459-802.

<sup>2</sup>Odo Casel, O.S.B., The Mystery of Christian Worship, ed. Burkhard Neunheuser, O.S.B. (London: Darton, Longman and Todd; 1962). "This is a translation of the fourth German edition of Das Christliche Kultmysterium and of other writings of Dom Oda Casel which appeared with it in 1960, published by Verlag Friedrich Pustet." The sources of these other writings are given on p. iv.

<sup>3</sup>Mystery, pp. 99-100.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 60-62.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 188.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 154.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 150.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 154.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 155.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 142-43.

<sup>14</sup>Louis Bouyer, Liturgical Piety (Univ. of Notre Dame, 1955), pp. 87-89.

<sup>15</sup>Casel, op. cit., pp. 109-110.

- <sup>16</sup>Bouyer, op. cit., pp. 86-87, 90.
- <sup>17</sup>Jean Gaillard, O.S.B., "La théologie des mystères," Revue thomiste, 1957, p. 519. My translation.
- <sup>18</sup>Bouyer, The Paschal Mystery, tr. Sr. M. Benoît (Chicago: Regnery, 1950), pp. 321 ff.
- <sup>19</sup>Bouyer, Liturgical Piety, p. 97.
- <sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 98.
- <sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 108-09.
- <sup>22</sup>Gaillard, op. cit., p. 523. My translation.
- <sup>23</sup>Bouyer, op. cit., p. 126.
- <sup>24</sup>La Sainte Bible (Paris: Edn. du Cerf, 1961), p. 1498.
- <sup>25</sup>Gaillard, op. cit., pp. 524-25.
- <sup>26</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>27</sup>Bouyer, The Paschal Mystery, p. 323.
- <sup>28</sup>Gaillard, op. cit., p. 551. My translation.
- <sup>29</sup>Burkhard Neunheuser, O.S.B., "The Mystery Presence: Dom Odo Casel and the Latest Research," Downside Review, 1958, p. 273.
- <sup>30</sup>Bouyer, Liturgical Piety, p. 88. Neunheuser, op. cit., p. 266.
- <sup>31</sup>Jacques Maritain, "Sign and Symbol," Redeeming the Time, tr. H. L. Binsse (London: Bles, 1943), p. 200.
- <sup>32</sup>Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, tr. R. Sheed (Cleveland: World (Meridian), 1963), p. 391. My italics.
- <sup>33</sup>Ibid., pp. 429-30.
- <sup>34</sup>Eliade, Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return, tr. W. R. Trask (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), p. 34.
- <sup>35</sup>Gaillard, op. cit., pp. 535-36.
- <sup>36</sup>Maritain, op. cit., p. 202.
- <sup>37</sup>Eliade, op. cit., p. 162.

<sup>38</sup>Gaillard, op. cit., p. 536.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., pp. 538 ff.

<sup>40</sup>B. A. Gerrish, "Is There a Reformed Doctrine of the Lord's Supper?" ms.

<sup>41</sup>See Horton Davies, Worship and Theology in England from Watt and Wesley to Maurice (Princeton Univ., 1961); C. W. Dugmore, Eucharistic Doctrine in England from Hooker to Waterland (London: S.P.C.K., 1942); and H. R. McAdoo, The Spirit of Anglicanism (London: Black, 1965).

<sup>42</sup>St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ed. P. Caramello (Turin: Marietti, 1952-56), III, 48, 6.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., III, 56, 1, 3.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., III, 62, 5.

<sup>45</sup>Gaillard, op. cit., p. 538.

<sup>46</sup>The ideas put forward as a conclusion to this chapter are drawn largely from Bernard J. Cooke, S.J., Christian Sacraments and Christian Personality (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston; 1965), which appeared after this chapter was written, but with which the writer was acquainted in the form of class lectures. See esp. pp. 129-133.

<sup>47</sup>E. Schillebeeckx, O.P., Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God, tr. P. Barrett, O.P., et al. (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), p. 58.

<sup>48</sup>R.S.V.

<sup>49</sup>Gaillard, op. cit., p. 540. See above, note no. 47.

<sup>50</sup>Schillebeeckx, op. cit., p. 57.

<sup>51</sup>Gaillard, ibid.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., pp. 540 ff.

<sup>53</sup>Aquinas, op. cit., III, 9, 2.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., I-II, 17, 4.

<sup>55</sup>Gaillard, op. cit., p. 541. My translation.

Chapter IV

<sup>1</sup>The Journals of Kierkegaard, ed. and tr. A. Dru (New York: Oxford Univ., 1938), p. 235.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 240.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>The English translations of these works are as follows: Training in Christianity and An Edifying Discourse, tr. W. Lowrie (New York: Oxford Univ., 1941); For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves! together with Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays and The Unchangeableness of God, tr. W. Lowrie (New York: Oxford Univ., 1941); Attack upon "Christendom", tr. W. Lowrie (Princeton Univ., 1944); Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments, tr. D. F. Swenson and W. Lowrie (Princeton Univ., 1941); the edition of the Journals mentioned in note no. 2; and The Last Years: Journals 1853-1855, ed. and tr. R. G. Smith (New York: Harper and Row, 1965). All subsequent references are to these editions.

<sup>5</sup>Attack, p. 39.

<sup>6</sup>Journals, p. 428.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 343.

<sup>8</sup>Last Years, p. 143.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 33-34.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 282-83.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 297.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Postscript, pp. 42-43.

<sup>15</sup>Attack, p. 110.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 121.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 227.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 197.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 217.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 207.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 217.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 84.

<sup>23</sup>See Karl Rahner, S.J., "A New Form of Heresy," Nature and Grace, tr. Dinah Wharton (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1964), pp. 64-80.

<sup>24</sup>Kierkegaard, op. cit., p. 153.

<sup>25</sup>Last Years, p. 337.

<sup>26</sup>Postscript, p. 44n.

<sup>27</sup>Last Years, p. 177.

<sup>28</sup>J. A. Gates, Christendom Revisited (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963), p. 104.

<sup>29</sup>Régis Jolivet, Introduction to Kierkegaard, tr. W. H. Barber (London: Muller, 1950), p. 38.

<sup>30</sup>The discourse on Luke 22:15 is to be found in Christian Discourses, tr. W. Lowrie (New York: Oxford Univ., 1948), pp. 259-68; that on I Peter 4:7 is in For Self-Examination, pp. 18-25.

<sup>31</sup>For Self-Examination, p. 23.

<sup>32</sup>The Prayers of Kierkegaard, ed. and with an introduction by Perry D. Lefevre (Univ. of Chicago, 1956), pp. 174 ff.

<sup>33</sup>For Self Examination, ibid.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., pp. 24-25.

<sup>38</sup>Last Years, pp. 316-17.

<sup>39</sup>Journals, p. 488.

<sup>40</sup>Christian Discourses, p. 268.

<sup>41</sup>Journals, ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Christian Discourses, p. 260.

<sup>43</sup>Training, pp. 124-27.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 69.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 125.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 126.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 127.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., pp. 67-68.

<sup>50</sup>See note no. 5. Actually, the section to be discussed is best seen as a continuing, if highly repetitive, "meditation" on the same stock of themes. The following references are thus simply to various exemplifications of these themes.

<sup>51</sup>Postscript, p. 386.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., pp. 386-88.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 388.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 412.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 410.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 433.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., pp. 388, 398.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., pp. 448-51.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., pp. 390-91.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., pp. 400, 451.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., pp. 450-52.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 406.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., pp. 447-68.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., pp. 459-462n.

- 65 Ibid., pp. 462-63.
- 66 Ibid., p. 404.
- 67 Ibid., p. 463.
- 68 Ibid., pp. 463-65.
- 69 Ibid., pp. 258-59; see also pp. 242, 533.
- 70 Ibid., p. 451.
- 71 Ibid., p. 465.
- 72 Ibid., pp. 412-13, 431-32, 465-68.
- 73 Ibid., pp. 412-13.
- 74 Ibid., p. 465; see also p. 493.
- 75 Ibid., p. 452.
- 76 Journals, pp. 271-72.
- 77 Postscript, p. 465.
- 78 Ibid., p. 432.
- 79 Ibid., pp. 454-55.
- 80 Ibid., p. 456.
- 81 Ibid., pp. 82-83.
- 82 Ibid., pp. 465-68.
- 83 Journals, pp. 47, 71.
- 84 Last Years, p. 116.
- 85 The Works of Francis Thompson (New York: Scribner's, 1913),  
Vol. III, pp. 93-96.
- 86 Ibid., pp. 94-95.
- 87 Ibid., p. 95.
- 88 Postscript, p. 457.

<sup>89</sup>Michael Mason, The Centre of Hilarity (London: Sheed and Ward, 1957); see esp. ch. vi, "Joy at War," pp. 189-223.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p. 190.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., p. 191.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., pp. 191-92.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., p. 203.

<sup>95</sup>Ibid., p. 195.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid., pp. 202-03.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid., p. 204.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., p. 205.

<sup>99</sup>Ibid., p. 210.

<sup>101</sup>Thompson, "Moestitiae Encomium," Works, Vol. III, p. 111.

## Chapter V

<sup>1</sup>The thorny question of the minister of the eucharist was felt to lie slightly outside the problematic of this essay, as is also the case, to be sure, with matters of ritual. An enquiry into the extent to which the faith of the entire community is instrumental in the bestowal of sacred orders might lead to a surprising "rehabilitation" of Protestant theologies of the ministry. Conversely, chains of episcopal succession are, to say the least, verifiable only with difficulty. We do not worry, these days, about this matter, but had the last two popes bought the papacy we might begin to!

<sup>2</sup>The only alternative to the suggestion advanced here seems to be to insist that dogmas must mean absolutely the same to absolutely everyone. But then, if they are so self-evident, there is hardly any reason for them. At any rate, really proving such an assertion would be a stupendous task, if, indeed, it were possible at all.

<sup>3</sup>"Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World," The Sixteen Documents of Vatican II, N.C.W.C. text (Boston: St. Paul. Edn., 1965), pp. 520-21.

<sup>4</sup>Cooke, op. cit., pp. 162-63.

<sup>5</sup>Edouard LeRoy, Dogme et critique (Paris: Bloud, 1907), p. 255. Perhaps because of superficial similarities with the works of Loisy and Tyrrell (who cannot compare with LeRoy in either intellectual stature or fidelity to the teaching Church), Dogme et critique was placed on the Index. See also LeRoy's last discussion of the subject, Introduction à l'étude du problème religieuse (Paris: Aubier, 1944). LeRoy was a good friend and to some extent the philosophical mentor of Teilhard de Chardin. See Madeleine Barthélemy-Madaule, Bergson et Teilhard de Chardin (Paris: du Seuil, 1963), pp. 655-59.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 245. Just as the eucharist cannot really be understood apart from the mystery of the risen Christ, it can also be said, though to a more limited degree, that the mystery of the resurrection, along with other Christian mysteries, cannot be understood apart from that densest moment of traditio which the eucharistic experience is. For a very interesting discussion of this point in patristic writers see Daniel Waterland's pastoral letter (He was archdeacon of Middlesex.) of 1736, "The Doctrinal Use of the Christian Sacraments," Works, Vol. V, pp. 105-19.

<sup>7</sup>Even Karl Rahner's excellent articles in "Sakramentenlehre," Schriften zur Theologie (Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1962), Vol. IV, pp. 275-397, do not seem to be saying more about the relatedness of word, sign, and cause than any sensitive student of Platonism is aware of. That something is and causes what it means should not be surprising if meaning, paradoxically for the Aristotelian mind, be taken as the ground of being and causality in all things but the Absolute. "Transubstantiation" could probably be shown to be simply a somewhat clumsy medieval attempt to articulate a commonplace of Platonism in Aristotelian categories; Augustine felt no need, apparently, for such a doctrine. But none of this detracts from the value of Rahner's articles.

<sup>8</sup>"Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy," The Sixteen Documents of Vatican II, pp. 18-19.

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