Companion Material to Historical Analysis in:

*The Political Construction of Corporate Interests: Cooperation and the Evolution of the Good Society*

by Cathie Jo Martin and Duane Swank

**Codebook for Historical Dataset**

**HISTORICAL ANCILLARY MATERIAL: DATA AND SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS FOR CHAPTERS 2 THROUGH 6**
Political Institutions, Collective Organizations, and Economic Structure: A Historical Political Economy Data Base. Duane Swank and Cathie Jo Martin

See Data Source References at end of code book for full citations that are not given in variable description.

Data Set Structure and Sources:

Notes: Cases: analytic framework is national decades. Time Coverage: 1870 to 1950s (or first decade of democracy); for measures related to organization of employers, macro-corporatism, sector coordination, actual measurement point is 1900, 1914, 1925, 1938, 1955 (and beginning of the decade if variable starts earlier - for instance, 1870). For measures of causal variables, variable is average of the five preceding years.

Countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland (very incomplete for some data), Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US.

Main analytical data set: histpolecon decadedata.xls

STAT Commands for main equations in Table 2.4, Cathie Jo Martin and Duane Swank, The Political Construction of Business Interests (Cambridge, 2012).

xtpcse employerorg unionden fedunitary elsyst lnarea coordiv openness lngdppc dec1900 dec1910 dec1920 if decade < 1950, hetonly pairwise;

xtpcse corporatism fedunitary elsyst lnarea coordiv cleavage openness lngdppc dec1900 dec1910 dec1920 if decade < 1950, hetonly pairwise;

xtpcse entcoord fedunitary elsyst elfedun lnarea coordiv cleavage openness lngdppc dec1900 dec1910 dec1920 if decade < 1950, hetonly pairwise;

where variables are defined in text of book and below and dec1900 to dec1920 are decade dummy variables.

Variables:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
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<td>COID</td>
<td>1 for Australia, 2 for Austria, 3 for Belgium, 4 for Canada, 5 for Denmark, 6 for Finland, 7 for France, 8 for West Germany, 9 for Ireland, 10 for Italy, 12 for Netherlands, 13 for New Zealand, 14 for Norway, 15 for Sweden, 16 for Switzerland, 17 for the United Kingdom, 18 for the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year/Decade</td>
<td>Decade, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1950 (The first decade varies by nation depending on democratization.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDCRAFT</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable for the presence of industrial versus craft unions (1.00 industry; 0.00 craft. Source Thomas Cusack, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice, “Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Institutions.” Paper presented at the 2004 APSA Annual Meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKILLS</td>
<td>Dichotomous variable for the presence (1.00) or absence (0.00) of a high skills export sector. Source Thomas Cusack, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice, “Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Institutions.” Paper presented at the 2004 APSA Annual Meetings.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Studies 12 (1): 3-27. Formula: \(1/\sum p_i^2\), where \(p\) is the proportion of seats for \(i\) party in which \(p\) is the proportion of seats of the \(i\)-th party.

**DISPROP**

**Disproportionality of the electoral system**

Data on elections from Mackie and Rose (1974)


Formula \(G= \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum (v_i - s_i)^2}\), where \(v_i\) is the vote share of the \(i\)-th party and \(s_i\) is the seat share of \(i\)-th party.

**ELSYST**

**Electoral system**

-data developed from the narrative on the development of party systems in each country in Mackie and Rose (1974): ‘0’ = SMDP; ‘2’ = PR; ‘1’ = semi-proportional

**FEDERALISM**

**Geographical concentration of decision making**

Original coding from Polity III; ‘1’ = unitary system; ‘2’ = intermediate; ‘3’ = federal system.

(Note: as no system was coded “intermediate” for 1900s-1930s, unitary coded “0” and federal systems “1.” Also, questionable Polity III scores are addressed by checking country-specific sources; a few recodings occur such as pre-1970s Belgium being recoded as unitary.)


**BIUNICAM**

**Bicameral/ Unicameral**

0’ = bicameral legislature; ‘1’ = unicameral legislature

Source: Mackie and Rose (1974)

**PRESPARL**

**Presidential/ parliamentary**

‘0’ = presidential; ‘1’ = semi-presidential; ‘2’ = parliamentary

Source: Mackie and Rose (1974)

**CGREVGGREV**

The Central Government revenues as percentage of the total general government revenues

Source:

- for the US:

- for New Zealand: Statistics New Zealand (Excel file data on historical fiscal series).


**POPULATION** = the population of each country expressed in thousands of inhabitants

**AREA** = the area surface in thousands square miles.
Sources:

**EMPAGR** = the proportion of people employed in agriculture expressed as a percentage of the total number of the employed.

**EMPMIN** = the proportion of people employed in mining and other extractive activities expressed as a percentage of the total number of the employed.

**EMPMAN** = the proportion of people employed in the manufacturing industry expressed as a percentage of the total number of the employed.

**EMPCON** = the proportion of people employed in construction expressed as a percentage of the total number of the employed.

**EMPCOMM** = the proportion of people employed in commerce and finance expressed as a percentage of the total number of the employed.

**EMPTRANS** = the proportion of people employed in transport and communication expressed as a percentage of the total number of the employed.
**EMPSERV** = the proportion of people employed in services expressed as a percentage of the total number of the employed.  
Sources for columns 10-16:  

**EXP** = the level of merchandise exports expressed in 1990 Geary Khamis Dollars (thousands)  
Sources:  
-Maddison (1992)  
- country-specific sources

**GDP in thousands 1990 Geary Khamis Dollars.**  
Source: Maddison (1992)

**GDPAGR** = the percentage of total GDP coming from the agricultural sector

**GDPMAN** = the percentage of total GDP coming from manufacturing, mining and construction

**GDPT&C** = the percentage of total GDP coming from transport and communications

**GDPCOMM** = the percentage of total GDP coming from commerce  
Sources:  
-for Australia and New Zealand: Mitchell (1998a)  
-for Canada and the US: Mitchell (1998b)  

**EMSCOP**  
Existence and scope (i.e., density) of national peak association of employers for circa 1900, 1914, 1925, 1938, and 1955. Coding scale: 1.00 = none or minimum, 2.00 = moderate, 3.00 = high (where coding is done in .5 increments). Source: for 1900-1938, Colin Crouch, *Industrial Relations and European State Traditions*. New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendun, 1993.; multi-country surveys of employers and industrial relations history (e.g., John Windmuller and Alan Gladstone, eds., *Employers Associations and Industrial Relations*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); and country-specific sources. For 1955, the previous sources are augmented with data from Golden, Wallerstein and Lange (no date), Traxler et al and Hicks and Kenworthy (1998).
**EMPOW**
Degree of power (e.g., control of strike/lockout calls, support funds; bargaining strategy) of national peak association of employers for circa 1900, 1914, 1925, 1938, and 1955. Coding scale: 1.00 = none or minimum, 2.00 = moderate, 3.00 = high (where coding is done in .5 increments). Source: for 1900-1938, Colin Crouch, *Industrial Relations and European State Traditions*. New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon, 1993.; multi-country surveys of employers and industrial relations history (e.g., John Windmuller and Alan Gladstone, eds., Employers Associations and Industrial Relations, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); and country-specific sources. For 1955, the previous sources are augmented with data from Golden, Wallerstein and Lange (no date), Traxler et al and Hicks and Kenworthy (1998).

**EMASN**
Degree of integration of national peak association of employers in national policy process for circa 1900, 1914, 1925, 1938, and 1955. Coding scale: 1.00 = none or minimum, 2.00 = moderate, 3.00 = high (where coding is done in .5 increments). Source: for 1900-1938, Colin Crouch, *Industrial Relations and European State Traditions*. New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon, 1993.; multi-country surveys of employers and industrial relations history (e.g., John Windmuller and Alan Gladstone, eds., Employers Associations and Industrial Relations, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); and country-specific sources. For 1955, the previous sources are augmented with data from Golden, Wallerstein and Lange (no date), Traxler et al and Hicks and Kenworthy (1998).

**CBARG**
Centralization of collective bargaining between unions and employers circa 1900, 1914, 1925, 1938, and 1955. Coding scale: 1.00 = none or minimum, 2.00 = moderate, 3.00 = high (where coding is done in .5 increments). Source: for 1900-1938, Colin Crouch, *Industrial Relations and European State Traditions*. New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon, 1993.; multi-country surveys of employers and industrial relations history (e.g., John Windmuller and Alan Gladstone, eds., Employers Associations and Industrial Relations, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); and country-specific sources. For 1955, the previous sources are augmented with data from Golden, Wallerstein and Lange (no date), Traxler et al and Hicks and Kenworthy (1998).

**UNCENT**
Powers (e.g., strike funds, appointment of officials in constituent unions, strategy) of national peak association of labor for circa 1900, 1914, 1925, 1938, and 1955. Coding scale: 1.00 = none or minimum, 2.00 = moderate, 3.00 = high (where coding is done in .5 increments). Source: for 1900-1938, Colin Crouch, *Industrial Relations and European State Traditions*. New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon, 1993.; multi-country surveys of employers and industrial relations history (e.g., John Windmuller and Alan Gladstone, eds., Employers Associations and Industrial Relations, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); and country-specific sources.
For 1955, the previous sources are augmented with data from Golden, Wallerstein and Lange (no date), Traxler et al and Hicks and Kenworthy (1998).

**EMCOOD**
Degree of coordination/cooperation in areas of economic activity by enterprises: purchaser-supplier relations; investor-production linkages, miscellaneous cooperative activities in R&D, export marketing and so forth; and labor-management relations for circa 1955. (1900-1938 missing - see below on variable EMASNCP.) Coding scale: 1.00 = none or minimum, 2.00=moderate, 3.00 =high (where coding is done in .5 increments). Source: for 1955, Hicks and Kenworthy (1998).

**PUBSECTOR**
General government spending as percentage of GDP (sources same as revenue variables above).

**SUFFRAGE**
First year of male universal suffrage


**CLEAVAGE** Estimate of number of non-economic (i.e., religious, socio-cultural (ethnic-linguistic), urban-rural dimensions) cleavages based on above variables, on data on issue cleavages in Lijphart *Patterns of Democracy* 1999, and country specific sources. (For each dimension, 0 = weak or non-existent; .5 = moderate, 1= strong.)
L1EMPORG Lag (one decade) of the core employers’ organization variable (sum of EMSCOP, EMPOW, and EMPASN above).

RURALCOOP Dichotomous variable for the presence of rural cooperatives (1.00 yes; 0.00 no). Source Thomas Cusack, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice, “Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Institutions.” Paper presented at the 2004 APSA Annual Meetings.

FINPRODL Ordinal scale of finance-producer linkages based on (1) reliance by industry on bank loans vs securities markets and (2) detailed economic histories of financial systems that assess degree of long-term bank-industry linkages and coordination.

1 = industrial sector investment finance exhibits relatively strong reliance on securities, or mix of securities, retained profits and non-bank finance; bank finance focused on short-term credit for commercial operations of industry; banks do not, to any significant extent, hold securities; long-term formal and informal relationships between banks and industrial customers limited

2 = some bank finance of long-term investment of industry (e.g., some universal banks within banking); banks underwrite and hold securities of industrial customers to moderate extent; security markets of moderate importance

3 = fully developed universal banking: strong long-term interlocks between banks and industry; banks underwrite and extensively hold securities; banks make investment loans to industry and otherwise provide long-term finance as well as provide short-term commercial credit to industrial customers.

[Quantitative indicators of bank lending versus security markets for the 1900-1930s period are available for nine of 16 nations from Goldsmith (1985): Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. Additional data on stock market capitalization and bank lending for most historic country decades points are from Rajan and Zingales (2003), national statistical yearbooks, and/or country studies (see below).

Core sources for decade-by-decade assessment of finance-producer linkages:

Australia: Butlin (1987); Forster (1964).
Finland: Lindgren (1997).
Italy: De Rosa (1997); Toniola (1995); Vasta and Baccini (1997).
New Zealand: Hawke (1985)
Sweden: Larsson (1991; 1995); Lindgren (1997); Sjerstedt (2003); Ottoson (1992;1994);
Marmafelt (1994)
Switzerland: Cassis (1995a;1995b)
UK/Britain: Capie (1995); Newton (2003); Ross (1995)
United States: Chernov (1990); Vitols (2001); White (1986; 2000)

**EMASNCP**  Employers’ cooperation to provide collective business goods (skills/training systems, export marketing strategy and related, coordination for industrial development and competitiveness). Ordinal scale: 1 = little of no coordination among employers for collective business goods; 2=moderate coordination (e.g., cooperation for skills, development, competitiveness within one sector; cooperation in primarily one area such as skills/training); 3=relative extensive cooperation among employers in two or more areas in multiple economic sectors.

Sources: for 1900-1938, Crouch (1993) and European country-specific sources cited therein (see especially Appendix A); multi-country surveys of employers, especially Windmuller and Gladstone (1984); and additional country-specific studies of the political economy of economic development in non-European cases: Australia (e.g., Maddock and McClean 1987; Forster 1964; 1970); Canada (e.g., Coleman 1986; Marr and Patterson 1980); New Zealand (e.g., Hawke 1985; Mabbitt 1995); United States (e.g., contributions to Engerman and Gallman 2000).

**LFINPRODL** Lag one decade of FINPRODL. (See above for variable description.)

**LEMASNCP** Lag one decade of EMASNCP. (See above for variable description.)

**LUNIONDEN** Lag one decade of UNIONDEN. (See above for variable description.)

**LCBARG** Lag one decade of CBARG. (See above for variable description.)

**LUNCENT** Lag one decade of UNCENT. (See above for variable description.)

**LGCORPORATISM** Decade lags for macrocorporatism index where mean and standard deviation for each component - employers’ organization, union power (union density and centralization) and collective bargaining centralization is computed with all core 36 decades of analysis and one earlier decade per country.

**LGENTCOORD** Decade lags for enterprise coordination index where mean and standard deviation for each component - finance-producer relations and enterprise cooperation for collective business goods - is
computed with all core 36 decades of analysis and one earlier
decade per country.

Miscellaneous additional variables added during analysis (as documented in text for articles and
book)

**Data Set Additional References.**


Dieter Ziegler, eds., *Banking, Trade and Industry: Europe, America, and Asia from the Thirteenth to the Twentieth Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
HISTORICAL ANCILLARY MATERIAL

CONTENTS

   OVERVIEW

   VARIABLE CHARACTERISTICS, DESCRIPTIONS AND DATA SOURCES

   SUPPLEMENTAL QUANTITATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

OVERVIEW

   In the following pages, we provide complete variable descriptions, measurement details, information on data sources, and supplementary material that augments historical quantitative analysis presented in Chapter 2. For data source references, we provide a bibliography, below, for those sources not otherwise reported in the main reference section of the book.
### Ancillary Table 1. Descriptive Information on Principal Variables Used in Chapter 2

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<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
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<td>Employer Organization-Elements of Coordination</td>
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<td>Employer Org.</td>
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<td>Centralized Bargaining</td>
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<td>Finance-Producer Linkages</td>
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<td>Employer Cooperation for Collective Goods</td>
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<td>Principal Causal Factors:</td>
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<td>Federalism</td>
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<td>Proportionality</td>
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<td>Union Density</td>
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<td>Share of GDP in Manufacturing</td>
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<td>Cleavages</td>
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<td>Traditions of Coordination</td>
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<td>Area(log)</td>
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<td>Openness</td>
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<td>GDP pc (log)</td>
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### Ancillary Table 2. Correlations Among Principal Variables

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</table>
(1) Level of Employers’ Organization
(2) Macrorporatism
(3) Enterprise Coordination
(4) Federalism
(5) Proportionality
(6) Union Density
(7) Cleavages
(8) Traditions Coordination
(9) Area(log)
(10) Openness
(11) GDP pc (log)
Variables Part I: Politics, Labor and Industrial Relations, and Economic Needs/Structure

POLITICS: Electoral-Party System and State Structure Variables (Unless otherwise noted, data on elections, votes and seats, parties, suffrage and state structures are from Thomas Mackie and Richard Rose (1974), The International Almanac of Electoral History. New York: The Free Press.)

Disproportionality of the electoral system. We follow Gallager (1991) and measure disproportionality as: the square root of $\frac{1}{2} \sum (v_i - s_i)^2$, where $v_i$ is the vote share of the $i$-th party and $s_i$ is the seat share of $i$-th party.

Multipartism: Dichotomous variable where 1.0 indicates multiparty election period (three or more effective parties); otherwise 0.0. Number of parties computed using the formula developed by Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera in ‘Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to Western Europe’, Comparative Political Studies 12 (1): 3-27. Formula: $1/\sum p_i^2$, where $p$ is the proportion of seats for the i-th party.

Proportionality of Electoral system. Data developed from the narrative on the development of party systems in each country in Mackie and Rose: ‘0’= SMDP; ‘2’= PR; ‘1’ =semi-proportional

Bicameral/ Unicameral. 0’=bicameral legislature; ‘1’=unicameral legislature.

Presidential/ parliamentary. ‘0’ =presidential; ‘1’= semi-presidential; ‘2’= parliamentary system.

Time Since Suffrage. Date for the country year minus date of effective universal male suffrage.

Federalism-Dispersion.’1’= federal system; ‘0’= unitary system; ‘.5’= semi-federal. Source: recoded from Jaggers, Keith and Ted Robert Gurr. 1996. POLITY III: Regime Change and Political Authority, 1800-1994. 2nd ICPSR version (Study #6695).

Federalism: “1” federal, “0” unitary: Source: Polity III as noted above and country-specific sources for ambiguous or distorted scoring in Polity III.


 References for data sources in this section that are otherwise used in the text (and, hence, in the book’s bibliography) are cited by author-date method below.
Non-Class Cleavages. We use two measures: First, we follow Boix (1999), and use a composite index of Taylor-Hudson religious and ethno-linguistic fragmentation. Second, we use a count of non-economic cleavages at the turn of the century (religious, ethno-linguistic/cultural, urban-rural). Source: Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Lijphart (1999), and country specific sources.

Traditions of Coordination. Index of sum of dichotomous variables for the presence or absence of guilds, rural cooperatives, industrial versus craft unions, and a skills-based export sector. Source Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice (2007)


Variables Part II: Employers Organization and Measures of National and Sector Coordination.

**Employers’ Scope.** Existence and scope (i.e., density) of national peak association of employers for circa 1900, 1914, 1925, 1938, and 1955. Coding scale: 1.00 = none or minimum, 2.00=moderate, 3.00 =high (where coding is done in .5 increments). Sources: for 1900-1938, Crouch (1993) and European country-specific sources cited therein; multi-country surveys of employers, especially Windmuller and Gladstone (1984); and additional country-specific studies of the political economy of economic development in non-European cases: Australia (e.g., Maddock and McClean 1987; Forster 1964; 1970); Canada (e.g., Coleman 1986; Marr and Patterson 1980); New Zealand (e.g., Hawke 1985; Mabbitt 1995); United States (e.g., contributions to Engerman and Gallman 2000).

**Employers’ Peak Powers.** Degree of power (e.g., control of strike/lockout calls, support funds; bargaining strategy) of national peak association of employers for circa 1900, 1914, 1925, 1938, and 1955. Coding scale: 1.00 = none or minimum, 2.00=moderate, 3.00 =high (where coding is done in .5 increments). Sources: for 1900-1938, Crouch (1993) and European country-specific sources cited therein; multi-country surveys of employers, especially Windmuller and Gladstone (1984); and additional country-specific studies of the political economy of economic development in non-European cases: Australia (e.g., Maddock and McClean 1987; Forster 1964; 1970); Canada (e.g., Coleman 1986; Marr and Patterson 1980); New Zealand (e.g., Hawke 1985; Mabbitt 1995); United States (e.g., contributions to Engerman and Gallman 2000).

**Employers’ Peak Association Policy Integration.** Degree of integration of national peak association of employers in national policy process for circa 1900, 1914, 1925, 1938, and 1955. Coding scale: 1.00 = none or minimum, 2.00=moderate, 3.00 =high (where coding is done in .5 increments). Sources: for 1900-1938, Crouch (1993) and European country-specific sources cited therein; multi-country surveys of employers, especially Windmuller and Gladstone (1984); and additional country-specific studies of the political economy of economic development in non-European cases: Australia (e.g., Maddock and McClean 1987; Forster 1964; 1970); Canada (e.g., Coleman 1986; Marr and Patterson 1980); New Zealand (e.g., Hawke 1985; Mabbitt 1995); United States (e.g., contributions to Engerman and Gallman 2000).

**Centralization of Bargaining.** Centralization of collective bargaining between unions and employers circa 1900, 1914, 1925, 1938, and 1955. Coding scale: 1.00 = none or minimum, 2.00=moderate, 3.00 =high (where coding is done in .5 increments). Source: for 1900-1938, Colin Crouch, *Industrial Relations and European State Traditions*. New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon, 1993.; multi-country surveys of employers and industrial relations history (e.g., John Windmuller and Alan Gladstone, eds., *Employers Associations and Industrial Relations*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); and country-specific sources.
**Union Centralization.** Powers (e.g., strike funds, appointment of officials in constituent unions, strategy) of national peak association of labor for circa 1900, 1914, 1925, 1938, and 1955. Coding scale: 1.00 = none or minimum, 2.00 = moderate, 3.00 = high (where coding is done in .5 increments). Source: for 1900-1938, Colin Crouch, *Industrial Relations and European State Traditions.* New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon, 1993.; multi-country surveys of employers and industrial relations history (e.g., John Windmuller and Alan Gladstone, eds., *Employers Associations and Industrial Relations,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); and country-specific sources.

**Employers' Organization for Collective Goods.** Employers' cooperation to provide collective business goods (skills/training systems, export marketing strategy and related, coordination for industrial development and competitiveness). Ordinal scale: 1 = little or no coordination among employers for collective business goods; 2 = moderate coordination (e.g., cooperation for skills, development, competitiveness within one sector; cooperation in primarily one area such as skills/training); 3 = relative extensive cooperation among employers in two or more areas of collective goods in several economic sectors.

Sources: for 1900-1938, Crouch (1993) and European country-specific sources cited therein; multi-country surveys of employers, especially Windmuller and Gladstone (1984); and additional country-specific studies of the political economy of economic development in non-European cases: Australia (e.g., Maddock and McClean 1987; Forster 1964; 1970); Canada (e.g., Coleman 1986; Marr and Patterson 1980); New Zealand (e.g., Hawke 1985; Mabbitt 1995); United States (e.g., contributions to Engerman and Gallman 2000).

**Finance Producer Relations.** Ordinal scale of finance-producer linkages based on (1) reliance by industry on bank loans vs securities markets and (2) detailed economic histories of financial systems that assess degree of long-term bank-industry linkages and coordination.

1 = industrial sector investment finance exhibits relatively strong reliance on securities, or mix of securities, retained profits and non-bank finance; bank finance focused on short-term credit for commercial operations of industry; banks do not, to any significant extent, hold securities; long-term formal and informal relationships between banks and industrial customers limited

2 = some bank finance of long-term investment of industry (e.g., some universal banks within banking); banks underwrite and hold securities of industrial customers to moderate extent; security markets of moderate importance

3 = fully developed universal banking: strong long-term interlocks between banks and industry; banks underwrite and extensively hold securities; banks make investment loans to industry and otherwise provide long-term finance as well as provide short-term commercial credit to industrial customers.
Quantitative indicators of bank lending versus security markets for the 1900-1930s period are available for nine of 16 nations from Goldsmith (1985): Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. Additional data on stock market capitalization and bank lending for most historic country decades points are from Rajan and Zingales (2003), national statistical yearbooks, and/or country studies (see below).

Core sources for decade-by-decade assessment of finance-producer linkages:

Australia: Butlin (1987); Forster (1964).
Canada: Drummond (1986); Marr and Patterson (1980); Raynauld (1967); Sweeney (1997).
Finland: Lindgren (1997).
Italy: De Rosa (1997); Toniola (1995); Vasta and Baccini (1997).
New Zealand: Hawke (1985)
Switzerland: Cassis (1995; 1997)
UK/Britain: Capie (1995); Newton (2003); Ross (1995)
United States: Chernow (1990); Vitols (2001); White (1986; 2000)

Data Source References.


SUPPLEMENTAL HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

We provide, below, full results of our tests of hypotheses on causes of employers’ organization, macro-corporatism, and sector coordination introduced in Chapter 2. The principal information offered here consists of tests of hypotheses with a number of alternative conceptualizations and measurements of causal forces. First, we substitute measures (defined above) of disproportionality and multipartism for our ordinal measure of proportionality of the electoral system. We also explicitly test for the impacts on coordination of percentage of economic output in manufacturing, and we separately test the impacts of non-class cleavages and traditions of coordination. We present all these tests for each dimension of coordination in Ancillary Tables 3 through 5 below.

We also explore the impacts on coordination of some additional alternative measures that we do not formally report due to null findings. For instance, we measure state centralization by the percentage of total general revenues collected by the central government. With regard to features of industrialization, we also measure the sectoral dispersion of economic activity (as an alternative to the measure of area) through the index of qualitative variation, or $1 - \sum p_i^2$, where $p$ is the proportion of employment in each $i$ sector: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, communications, transportation and services. (Firm size may also reflect the level of industrialization; however, comparable data on firm size do not exit for our sample.) These and other alternative measures were insignificant or incorrectly signed in models presented below or in Chapter 2.
We also alter a couple of key measures across dimensions of coordination – employers’ organization, macro-corporatism, and sector coordination. First, our original analysis of employers’ organizations used the mean of standard Taylor-Hudson indices of religious and ethnolinguistic fragmentation; this measure varies from 0.0 to 1.0. Here, we report the original analysis for employers’ organization but, for new analyses of macro-corporatism and sectoral cooperation, we use an analytically more appropriate, statistically stronger, and more robust measure of the total number of non-class cleavages (see variable descriptions). Utilization the new non-class cleavage measure for employer association analyses does not alter the reported results (beyond a typically significant negative effect of cleavages with less frequently significant federalism effects).

Second, we also might note that we use the Polity III database coding of degree of concentration/dispersion of authority as our measure of unitary versus federal systems in our aforementioned original analysis of employers’ organization. Here, for the new analyses of macro-corporatism and sectoral coordination, we use a recoding of this variable where certain arguably distorted scores are corrected (e.g., the scoring of pre-WWII Belgium as dispersed or de facto federal).

In addition, as we briefly mentioned in the text of the book, the causal roles of several other political factors might be assessed. First, Water Korpi, Alexander Hicks, and Harold Wilensky suggest that communitarian and state corporatist traditions, advanced through government participation by confessional parties as well as collectivism and cooperative modes of political exchange fostered by Left party government participation,

\[ \text{\cite*{Martin and Swank 2008.}} \]
may be influential determinants of the development of non-market coordination. Second, the timing of suffrage might matter, in that early suffrage reportedly creates a division of work between left parties and unions, with parties addressing broad political rights and unions managing workplace conflicts. Similarly, without political struggle over basic political rights driving societal organization, business associations might afford to be ill-organized. Third, the number of veto points may matter in that veto points increase the size of the majorities necessary to pass legislation and politicians might reach out to corporate supporters. Overall, we find no support for the timing-of-suffrage and veto points hypotheses. Nor do we find that historically early confessional or left party government participation is associated with 1900-to-1930s employers organization or macro-corporatism; we do find marginally significant effects of confessional and left party government on sectoral coordination. But, these effects or not robust and are small in magnitude.

We now present the full table results as well as an additional section that provides evidence on the robustness of our final models reported in Chapter 2.

\[\text{References:}\]

3 Korpi 2006; Hicks no date; Wilensky 2002.

4 Shefter 1986.

5 Huber, Regan and Stephens 1993.
Ancillary Table 3. The Underpinnings of Employers’ Organization, 1900’s-1930’s in 16 Nations.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>IV</th>
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<th>VI</th>
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All models are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares with panel correct standard errors. Cases are 36 country decades for the 16 nations defined in the text. Each model includes time period dummies for 1900’s, 1910’s, and the 1920’s.
* probability < .10
** probability < .05
*** probability < .01
Ancillary Table 4. The Determinants of Macro-Corporatist Coordination 1900's-1930's in 16 Nations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
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<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
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<td>Proportionality of Electoral System</td>
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<td>1.0371*** (.1865)</td>
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<td>-.3885** (.2312)</td>
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</table>

All models are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares with panel correct standard errors. Cases are 36 country decades for the 16 nations defined in the text. Each model includes time period dummies for 1900's, 1910's, and the 1920's.

* probability < .10  
** probability < .05  
*** probability < .01
Ancillary Table 5. The Underpinnings of Sector Coordination, 1900's-1930's in 16 Nations.

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</table>

All models are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares with panel correct standard errors. Cases are 36 country decades for the 16 nations defined in the text. Each model includes time period dummies for 1900's, 1910's, and the 1920's.

* probability < .10
** probability < .05
*** probability < .01
Robustness Tests

In addition, we assessed the robustness of our results to exclusions of nations and of decades. To do so, we compute “jackknifed” estimates in which we delete one nation \((i)\) or decade \((t)\) at a time. For the nation-based tests, for instance, we estimate 16 15-country equations. The mean of these 16 new coefficients becomes the jackknifed coefficient for the variable and the standard deviation of these 16 15-country estimates becomes the standard error. Comparable jackknifed estimates are computed to evaluate the effect of particular decades.

Ancillary Table 6. Final Models of Pre–WWII Sector Coordination

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<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
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<th>Sector Coordination Jackknife-(i)’s</th>
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<td>Federalism × Proportional</td>
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<td>(.1513)</td>
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<td>.0585***</td>
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<td>Non-Class Cleavages</td>
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<td>.7001***</td>
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<td>(.0689)</td>
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<td>(Log) Area</td>
<td>.2531</td>
<td>.2436</td>
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<td>(.1083)</td>
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<td>(Log) Per Capita GDP</td>
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<td>1.8384*</td>
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The models report jackknifed coefficients and standard errors as defined in the text, above.  
* probability < .10  ** probability < .05  *** probability < .01