

THE SEMINAR IN PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL KINDS
INVITES ALL TO A DISCUSSION (VIA SKYPE) WITH

INGO BRIGANDT

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

SPECIES PLURALISM DOES NOT IMPLY SPECIES ELIMINATIVISM

5:30 PM | MONDAY, 12 NOV 2018

MARQUETTE HALL 102

THE DISCUSSION WILL CENTER ON
BRIGANDT, INGO (2003).
SPECIES PLURALISM DOES NOT IMPLY SPECIES ELIMINATIVISM.
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 70(5), 1305-1316.

Abstract: Marc Ereshefsky argues that pluralism about species suggests that the species concept is not theoretically useful. It is to be abandoned in favor of several concrete species concepts that denote real categories. While accepting species pluralism, the present paper rejects eliminativism about the species category. Based on the idea that the species concept is a so-called investigative kind concept, it is argued that the species concept is important and that it is possible to make sense of a general species concept despite the existence of different concrete species concepts.



PLEASE RSVP BY EMAILING CORINNE.BLOCH-MULLINS@MARQUETTE.EDU