SOCIAL CHANGE:

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

by

Jane C. Carlson

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School, Marquette University, in
Partial Fulfillment of the Re-
quirements for the Degree
of Master of Arts

Milwaukee, Wisconsin
May, 1978

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

This thesis developed out of a personal concern for the relation between theory and practice in everyday life, and the effects of changing conditions and events upon the formation of social identity and social policy in the modern world. Given the expansion of scientific knowledge and the thematization of 'crisis' in this decade, what are the sources of legitimation and 'truth' so crucial to the reproduction of the social life-world?

These and similar questions have been raised through the recent reformulation of the sociology of knowledge (P. Berger and T. Luckmann, 1976) and the linguistic reformulation of the philosophical assumptions of historical materialism (Jurgen Habermas, 1975). The contemporary orientation of critical or 'reflexive' sociology has brought the theory/practice problematic to the heart of its concerns.

The relation between theory and practice is re-examined in this thesis through a historical survey of sociological theories of change. Shifts in conceptions of change, interpretations of the past and future, prescribed beliefs and rules for living are examined in relation to shifts in particular policy-orientations regarding conditions and events in the natural and social worlds. The survey proceeds through an investigation of the evolutionary, cyclical, and conflict models of change.

The thesis concludes with questions raised by the critical realignment of theory and practice in Jurgen Habermas' theory of social evolution. This theory constitutes a new orientation toward the study of change, and a practical hypothesis as to the continued reproduction of

the social world through democratic will-formation. This hypothesis is coupled with Northrup Frye's (1971) orientation toward a democratic organization of institutions and thoughts or community and communication, that is life-supporting.

I would like to thank Professors David Buckholdt and Gale Miller for their continued support and encouragement. They have been generous with both their time and their interest, which contributed greatly to the organization and completion of this work. I would also like to thank Shelley Buckholdt for typing this thesis, and for her patience and understanding during the more difficult moments of completing this work. I owe very special thanks to my parents for their continued support and interest throughout the entire development of these thoughts, and to Father Thomas Faase, S.J., who has been especially inspiring as both thesis director and friend, and without whose constant interest and enthusiasm these ideas would not have matured as they have.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

A substantial amount of concern for adequate explanation of changes occurring in the natural and social life-worlds has been expressed ever since the appearance of early cosmogonies in the thirteenth century B.C. These cosmogonies, or theories about the generation of the universe and its 'ordering principles,' have been conceived differently over time. Their explanations move from the realms of myth and religion to those of philosophy, and the natural and social sciences. The process of verifying and legitimating explanations of change has also moved from appeals to the transcendent and mystic, to that of the scientific 'proof' of measurable, empirical 'facts' of life in the everyday world. No less important to the development of explanations about change is the variation in interests guiding the investigation of these phenomena. Once desired simple interpretations have given way to interests in prediction, and in control over changes in the natural and social life-worlds.

One thing has remained constant throughout history, however, and that is the concern for adequate explanation of events in the natural and social life-worlds.

A critical analysis of the sociology of social change must concern itself with these developments in knowledge, interests, and processes of verification and legitimation insofar as these represent processes of change, as well as with the relation of these to changes in the natural and social life-worlds.

The major assumption of this thesis is that fundamental conceptions of change remain central to social identity and social concern in the form of interpretations of the past and future, and through the prescription of rules for living in the present, respectively. Social identity is here conceptualized as a feeling of societal membership that derives from interpretations of the past and future. Social concern refers to the collective concern for the rules for proper living, their origin, and their legitimation. Fundamental conceptions of change are central to social identity and social concern because they provide answers to the two questions most important to societal members: 'Who are we?' and 'How shall we live?' These questions represent the interpretive and prescriptive elements of identity and concern, respectively, and are embedded in fundamental conceptions of change.

No matter what the realm of thought, manner of verification, or type of interest guiding the study of change in the natural and social life-worlds, these interpretive and prescriptive aspects of identity and concern remain of central importance to societies throughout their life-time.

This centrality of conceptions of change to social identity and social concern may be illustrated by reference to periods of transition, or crisis, when identity and/or prescribed rules for living are most prone to threat of question or doubt: It is precisely during such times that interpretations of the past and future ('Who are we?') and prescriptions for proper living ('How shall we live?') arise with renewed concern and a sense of urgency, and are either re-affirmed or reformulated.

Reinterpretation of the past and future and re-evaluation of rules for living transpire in the form of theory and policy, respectively. Often times such revisions necessitate, or may be the result of the reformulation of fundamental conceptions of change, in which reformulation sociology has played a considerable part.

This assumption that fundamental conceptions of change remain central to social identity and social concern offers a rather different understanding of (1) the development of sociological conceptions of change, and (2) the nature of the relationship between these and social conditions. Given the accumulation of knowledge about change, new methods of verification, and new interests guiding the study of change, there have been varied attempts to synthesize and/or categorize and evaluate theories of change, primarily in effort to elucidate the amount of scientific 'progress' in this area of concern. There are three primary methods for the categorization and evaluation of sociological theories of change. A discussion of these methods will clarify the orientation and approach used here, insofar as we are concerned not only with the development of conceptions and models of change, but with presenting an adequate approach to the study of changes in the natural and social life-worlds as well.

Review of the Literature

We will consider the following three methods for categorizing theories of change which are based upon the evaluative criteria of (1) therapeutic value or utility; (2) validity or testability; (3) scope: J. A. Ponsioen(1969), R. P. Appelbaum (1970), and P. Sorokin (1947) have been selected as representatives of these respective

categorization schemes. As we shall see, their collective criteria enhances the approach to a critical study of the sociology of social change.

1. Therapeutic Value

One method for the categorization and evaluation of theories of change is that which relies upon the criterion of utility or 'therapeutic value' theories of change may offer. J. A. Ponsioen (1969) is representative of this approach. For Ponsioen, science is a function of life, necessarily involved in making value-judgements insofar as it seeks relevant causes, problems, and solutions to societal concerns through the study of change.

> Theorists who study social change should accept the idea that the work of the sociologist is to prepare the ground for social therapy... (1969:9.)

Ponsioen goes on to point out, however, that not enough sociologists have called their theories a diagnosis, as did Mannheim. R. Friedrichs similarly refers to the elements of valuation and commitment on the part of the sociologist in his discussion of the priestly and prophetic postures in sociology, and the 'original sin' of subjective valuation:

> Where one is forced to part company with the priestly mode in sociology is in its assumption that the sociologist <u>as</u> sociologist can and/or should maintain a neutral posture vis-a-vis the values of the larger cultural context of which it is a part. The sociologist <u>qua</u> sociologist has never, even at the height of his doctrinaire rejection of the valuational process, actually ignored those values in the decisions he made <u>qua</u> sociologist. (1970:137-138.)

In a similar context of thought, Ponsioen points out the numerous

attempts, conscious or otherwise, to construct mental and institutional 'barriers' against the threat of critique and change. Preferable to this, he tells us, is the idea that thoughts and institutions be geared toward 'democratic adaptability.' With this posture, Ponsioen surveys theories of change according to the way in which change is identified or located within societies, and the degree to which different types of theories can then account for the process or movement of change within a society:

1. Identification of the whole process of change with industrialization or urbanization (which is only part of the process);

2. Identification of 'forces' which make society 'move' (e.g., theories about leadership; creative elites; power groups);

3. Explanation of social change by use of new and specific concepts (e.g., acculturation; assimilation; equilibrium);

4. Analysis of changing societies as comprehensive wholes (theories about stages or life-cycles; evolution theories; use of polar-types).

Accordingly, theories descriptive of life-cycles and stages of growth would be deemed less fruitful or 'therapeutic' than those which identify sources and problems of change by way of specific concepts and typologies.

2. Validity and Testability

A second method for categorizing and evaluating theories of change is one that uses validity and testability of theories as criterion. R. P. Appelbaum (1970) is exemplary here. According to Appelbaum, all theories of change should deal with the observable and measurable 'facts' of the magnitude of change, time-span of change, and effects of

change upon the unit studied. He then poses four questions by which to assess the value of different theories of change:

1. How is society conceived as 'holding together?'
2. What are the implications of this conceptualization for change in society?
3. How well does the theory fit the facts?
4. How testable is the theory?

As follows this reasoning, cyclical, 'rise and fall,' and most equilibrium theories are least valuable in terms of their testability, or least valid in terms of measurable, empirical 'facts' of change.

3. Scope

A third method for categorizing and evaluating theories of change is one that primarily considers the capacity of theories to account for changes in the process of knowledge over time. P. S. Sorokin (1947;1951) is probably the most fitting example of this approach insofar as he focuses on theories and models which deal with growth/decline processes in knowledge and in cultures generally. Although he pays particular attention to models descriptive of life-cycles and/or phases of civilizations, which, by the criteria of testability and therapeutic value would seem least valuable, Sorokin and others using this approach have been able to analyze and sometimes predict changes occurring, for example, in artistic cultural expressions, which are often times indicative or reflective of other changes in the natural and social life-worlds.

The three methods discussed above, focusing on criteria of (1) utility, (2) validity, and (3) scope, do not exhaust the list of

approaches to the study of theories of change. They do, however, represent three areas of primary interest to anyone considering the development of conceptions and models of change, and the relation of these to events in the natural and social life-worlds. Treated as separate criteria for categorization of theories of change, however, each of the three methods leads to a less adequate understanding of not only sources, processes, and consequences of change, but also developments in the theories themselves. For example, none of the above methods can by themselves account for change in guiding interests, verification processes, and in bases of knowledge or realms of thought -- all of which changes have caused major reformulations in both theories and policies regarding events in the natural and social life-worlds. Taken together, on the other hand, these three approaches lead to a more comprehensive orientation to the study of change. For example, Ponsioen's interest in the therapeutic value or utility of theories of change, and his posture toward 'democratic adaptability' immediately raises the issue of the way in which changing social interests affect the study of change. Appelbaum's concern for the testability and validity of theories, the 'fit' between theory and measurable 'facts' of change, calls to our attention a concern for verification processes in the explanation of changes. In addition to this, his interest in the way society is conceived as 'holding together' and the 'implications' of such conceptualization for change points to the notion of a relation between the legitimation of conceptions and models and the occurrence/nonoccurrence of certain events in a society. Last, Sorokin's interest in (a) changes in the process of knowledge and (b) changes in cultural expressions points directly to our previous discussion of (a) changes in

the bases of knowledge, as from myth and religion to philosophy and physical science, and (b) cultural expressions of identity and concern, often indicative of basic conceptions of order and change, and of instances of transition, change, or crises in the natural and social life-worlds. The following illustrates the interrelation of these particular areas of consideration:



The relation between interpretations and prescriptions, or between the legitimation of interpretations and corresponding interests guiding the study of change pinpoints a critical area of concern in the study of (1) the development of theories of change, and (2) the relation of these to occurrences in the natural and social life-worlds, which brings us to the thesis problem.

Statement of the Problem

Based on the assumption that (a) fundamental conceptions of change remain central to social identity and social concern in the form of interpretations of the past and future and the prescription of rules for living in the present, (b) and that these conceptions are therefore indicative of social conditions in general and policies regarding change

in particular, it is necessary to understand the historical relation between (a) developments in conceptions of change central to identity and concern, and (b) developments in social conditions according to policies regarding change in the natural and social life-worlds.

Methodology

An understanding of the historical relation between (a) developments in conceptions of change central to social identity and concern, and (b) developments in social conditions according to particular policies regarding change in the natural and social life-worlds will be sought through a study of some sociological theories of change based on the following areas of concern: (1) interpretation of the past and future; (2) dominant interest; and (3) prescription or policy-orientation. Based on the literature and these concerns, it is possible to identify three major models of change: evolutionary (linear), cyclical, and conflict. Our survey of sociological theories of change will be conducted within these three model-types.

Background to the Thesis Problem

Vico has been cited as a cornerstone of sociological thought due to his early interest in the development of civilizations from oral, or preliterate, to literate cultures (Sorokin, 1951; Frye, 1971). Vico suggested the existence of a 'poetic impulse' recurring throughout the development of civilizations, and tried to trace its expression through a study of the history of Law. According to Vico, this 'poetic impulse' received first expression in the form of stories or 'true fables' which accounted for something central to a society's social structure, religion, and history. Such stories acquired cannonical importance

and concretized in the form of mythologies.

Northrop Frye (1971) has also studied the development of civilizations from oral to writing cultures. Following Vico's suggestion of a recurring 'poetic impulse,' Frye offers an analysis of the origin of social attitude, and the development of social concerns and social conditions over time. In particular, Frye is interested in the development of certain 'mental habits' peculiar to oral, and to writing cultures, and has analyzed the progression of dominant social concerns, their modes of expression, and their relation to developments in the natural and social life-worlds.

Specifically, Frye discussed the origin of social attitude in terms of what he has called man's 'motive for metaphor' (1957). Simply stated, this motive for metaphor refers to man's desire to identify and associate himself with his surroundings. Metaphor is the archaic mode of expressing subject and object at once. The cosmogonies mentioned earlier, and all mythologies are metaphorical expressions of the relation between subject (self) and object (surroundings): they articulate the social form of human nature with the natural order.

The motive for metaphor, or the desire to identify and associate self with surroundings, is rooted in man's sociality, and may be understood as an attempt to establish a feeling of 'closure'; i.e., a feeling of being at one with the environment (P. Berger and T. Luckmann, 1967:51-52). Due to social and physical survival exigencies, early societies experience an over-riding anxiousness or anxiety for this sense of closure. In Frye's terms these are the anxiety of continuity and the anxiety of coherence. Myth, and other metaphorical expressions

of the relation between man and his environment establish feelings of continuity and coherence. Specifically, interpretations of the past and future which are based upon fundamental conceptions of origin, order, and change, provide the sense of continuity. Similarly, the corresponding prescription of rules for proper living in the present provide the sense of social coherence: All societal members are bound by common thoughts (interpretations) and acts (prescriptions).

It might be noted that oral cultures are not unique in this anxiety for continuity and coherence: Modern societies, also largely dependent upon oral communication media, experience similar anxieties, and demand adequate interpretations and prescriptions regarding their 'place' and 'purpose' in the world.

In short, myth serves the function of religio: the binding together of a community in common thoughts and acts, thus providing members with a sense of continuity (interpretation of identity) and coherence (prescribed concerns).

Two further points about oral cultures should be made at this time. First, myths are transmitted by way of poetry or continuous verse. Poetry is at this point in time largely improvisational, giving it strong ties with magic, which tells us something of the way its interpretive and prescriptive content is legitimated. Second, continuous verse is largely made up of parables and commandments of the 'Go thou, and do likewise' sort -- one way of distributing interpretations and prescriptions in easily remembered statements. In addition to its integrating function, then, myth also serves to instruct: myths inform members of all that a society most concerns them to know. It is in this context that Frye refers to these early mythologies (and their

modern off-springs) as a 'myth of concern.' Furthermore, these are 'total' myths of concern: not only are explanations of past and future and of prescribed rules for living posited within a single over-arching myth, but so also are the legitimations for these 'given' within the same mythological framework.

For cultures bound by a total myth of concern, all notions of 'truth' and 'reality' are revealed by social vision, are solidified within myth, and are reinforced through common interpretations of identity and common, prescribed behaviors. These, then, constitute the primary 'mental habits' of oral cultures.

Jurgen Habermas (1973) has made similar reference to total or 'undifferentiated myths' and elaborates somewhat on the mental habits or 'learning capacities' of early cultures. For Habermas, an undifferentiated myth means the lack of a distinction between theoretical questions regarding the 'truth' of statements (interpretations) and practical questions regarding correct norms for behavior (prescriptions). In magical and animistic world-views, the two are completely undifferentiated; in more fully developed mythologies, theoretic and practical knowledge may be somewhat differentiated, but co-exist within a single over-arching mythological framework. According to Habermas, it is not until the appearance of philosophy that theoretical and practical knowledge are effectively differentiated with respect to life-practice. This parallels Frye's assertion that the interpretation of identity and the prescription of rules for living are given within a single or 'total' myth of concern. Simply put, 'who' we are and 'what' we do are essentially one and the same thing.

In sum, a total myth of concern is an undifferentiated system of belief and action that refers us primarily to two things. First, it means the use of metaphor to express and establish a relation between man and his surroundings: it means the articulation of the social form of human nature with the natural order, based on some conception of origin, order and change in the universe. Second, it means the formulation of an identity, through interpretations of past and future, and the formulation of social concerns, by way of the prescription of rules for proper living. In this sense conceptions of origin and change remain fundamental to identity and concern in the form of interpretation and prescription. The further development of cultures and such total myths means not only the further development of conceptions of change, but also the development of identity and concerns, and thus developments in conditions and policies regarding events in the natural and social life-worlds.

Frye discusses the continued development of culture in terms of the emergence of new mental habits. Writing cultures are counting and measuring cultures as well, and this means new responses to the order of nature and events in the universe, or new ways of understanding and expressing a relationship between the natural and social life-worlds. As Frye points out, for one example, Stonehenge is one of the most socially concerned responses possible to the order of nature: it is a monument built upon some fundamental conception of origin, order and change, which articulates the social form of human nature with the natural order.

The appearance of writing means the formulation of new expressions

of the relation between man and his surroundings. In addition, writing refers us to the importance of documentation: written works exercise a democratizing force upon societies in that they provide a basis for 'objective' comparison and verification of interpretations and prescriptions. Explanation and legitimation have moved from the 'magical' and improvisational 'Some men say...' to the documentary 'It is written...' providing a new 'reality accent' for expressions of identity and concern, or interpretations and prescriptions.

It should be noted that along with writing and the development of new mental habits a 'total' myth of concern ceases to exist as such; rather, religion becomes the myth of 'ultimate' concern, in Tillich's sense, and is surrounded by new 'branches' of social concern, such as politics and economy.

The appearance of philosophical speculation in particular points to the way in which new mental habits and areas of social concern arise. Philosophical speculation gives rise not only to new expressions of the relation between man and his surroundings, but new conceptions of origin, order and change as well. Specifically, through the theoretical isolation of subject matter, philosophy constitutes a new approach to notions of 'truth' and 'reality.' Frye calls this approach the 'truth of correspondence': "the alignment of a structure of words or numbers with a body of external phenomena" (1971:44). The mental habits of a truth of correspondence are those of objectivity, suspension of judgement, tolerance of opinions, such as those that may dissent from a traditional myth of concern, and respect for the individual. Most important here is the notion that a truth of correspondence relies

upon self-validating criteria, rather than upon the traditional formulae of myths of concern, for verification.

These mental habits of a truth of correspondence become social habits as well, and to the extent that they articulate socially critical attitudes, they constitute what Frye has called a 'myth of freedom.' Myths of concern, exhibiting a conservative emphasis on social attitude, cannot by themselves always clearly distinguish between reality and appearance; a myth of freedom, constituting the liberal, socially critical side of attitudes of concern, points out such gaps between the real and ideal, etc., with the help of its ally, the truth of correspondence.

In sum, the new mental habits of a writing culture include new approaches to notions of 'truth' and 'reality', new conceptions of origin, order and change, and new ways of interpreting and expressing the relation between the natural and social worlds. There also exists a new self-validating process of verification via the truth of correspondence, along with the emergence of socially critical attitudes or a 'myth of freedom.'

Habermas also refers to the importance of philosophical speculation to the mental habits or 'learning capacities' of writing cultures. Especially important here is the transition from non-reflexive (or pre-scientific) to reflexive learning, and the manner in which particular sectors of life are admitted to or excluded from theoretical discourse. As noted above, according to Habermas, animistic and magical world-views do not differentiate between theoretical questions regarding the 'truth' of statements (interpretations), and practical questions

regarding correct norms for behavior (prescriptions). At that time, reflexive learning has not yet taken place; all learning takes place in action contexts. It was also pointed out that with more fully developed mythologies, theoretical and practical questions are differentiated, but co-exist within a total mythological framework. That is to say, the interpretive framework and the norms regarding life-practice are differentiated, but co-exist to the extent that empirical knowledge (secular knowledge) regarding instrumental action (labor) is assimilated into an interpretive framework regarding communicative action (interaction) based upon notions of truth and reality. Answers to questions regarding the interpretation of identity and the prescription of norms for proper behavior as well as those for labor are all 'given' within a total myth of concern.

Similar to Frye's analysis, Habermas goes on to say that with the rise of philosophy and the theoretical isolation of subject matter, a new situation develops influencing the learning capacity of societies, and thus the development of the natural and social worlds. Specifically, the appearance of philosophy means that certain traditional elements of myth are freed for theoretic discourse; i.e., for discussion as to the 'truth' of statements concerning interpretations and prescriptions. The sphere of instrumental action or social labor, however, does not yet undergo such theoretical consideration. The result is a dominant focus on or concern for the sphere of communicative action -- ethics, morals, and politics -- as they apply to the interpretation of identity and the prescription of norms. It is not until the rise of modern science that the sphere of instrumental action is admitted to

theory and reflexive learning, the result being the emergence of technology as a new, dominant myth of social concern. This transition between dominant concerns, or prevailing myths of social concern is aided by developments in classical philosophy, whereby practical questions regarding the interpretation of identity and the prescription of norms are no longer deemed worthy of theoretical discourse; rather, philosophical positivism tends toward the logical separation of theoretical and practical questions, devaluing the latter as 'no longer susceptible of truth' (1975: 16).

What Habermas is basically talking about here is the alternation of dominant concerns, and the way in which these undergo theoretical consideration according to particular notions of truth and reality and verification processes, thereby affecting the further development of the natural and social life-worlds. This parallels Frye's discussion of newly emerging myths of concern and freedom, and the truth of correspondence as a new, self-validating verification process for the determination of interpretations, prescriptions, and concerns in general as they become problematic or in need of re-affirmation.

What Frye and Habermas have both focused on in their discussion of the development of civilizations is the relationship between developments in knowledge or learning capacities, and developments in the natural and social life-worlds. Central to this relationship is the consideration of (a) the base of knowledge or realm of thought (e.g. religion; philosophy; science), (b) the manner of approaching and verifying notions of truth and reality pertaining to conditions and events in the natural and social worlds, and (c) the alternation of

interests, concerns, or 'myths' throughout history which influence, in turn, the way in which the natural and social life-worlds are further developed.

We might briefly clarify this theme of alternating concerns and processes of verification by citing one important moment in this process, and its consequence for the development of policy-orientations pertaining to the development of the natural and social life-worlds.

First, it should be made clear that a 'conservative' myth of concern and a 'liberalizing' myth of freedom co-exist in a symbiotic relation under 'normal' conditions; that is, they peacefully co-exist to the extent that both attitudes are capable of being articulated within given social structures, interpretive frameworks, and norms for proper behavior. Frye points out the way in which Communist societies, for example, must supress, rather than come to terms with, any emerging myths of freedom insofar as they represent socially critical attitudes competing with a total, over-arching myth of concern. This is a 'closed' total myth of concern: it posits an 'either/or' interpretive framework for life-practice. According to Frye, democracies offer the potential for balanced co-existence between myths of freedom and concern, this co-existence constituting an organization of thought and institutions that is life-supporting: it offers a 'both and' framework which, in contrast to the 'either/or' situation, also supports continued growth of both the natural and social worlds. Habermas also explicitly points out the necessity for rational (by which he means democratic) communication in order to approach both interpretive questions of 'truth' and 'reality' and practical questions concerning

correct norms for behavior. Underlying both of their discussions is the implicit theme that the order of community and the order of communication are linked, as appearance and reality.

There have, of course, been numerous moments throughout history where rival myths of concern and freedom have struggled desperately. The 'Reformation' and the 'Romantic Revolution' following it comprise a major example, closely tied up with the emergence of new, sociologically-informed interpretations and prescriptions. In this instance, the medieval church constitutes the dominant (and traditionally 'total') myth of concern, telling societal members all they need to know of the past and the future, and legitimizing all prescriptions for correct norms and proper living, accordingly. The myth of freedom here is of course the Reformation thought pattern. The truth of correspondence, of crucial importance to this moment of alternation, turns toward science rather than the traditional dogma of the church for verification and legitimation of notions of 'truth' and 'reality.' The Reformation attitude, allied with philosophical and scientific interest in the 'here and now' thus gains adherents and prestige, becoming a competing myth of concern.

Following the Reformation, a major transition results, crucial to subsequent formulations of theory and policy regarding the development of the natural and social life-worlds. The myth of concern takes on a new attitude, aided by philosophical positivism, appealing to scientific reason for verification. The myth of freedom retreats from a socially critical attitude to one of reminiscence late in the Romantic movement. From this point on, science gains greater prestige

as a dominant (some have called it 'total') myth of concern in itself, offering new explanations of origin and change, new interpretations of past and future, and thus new prescriptions for living in the present, all of which are verified by its own unique standards and methods. The Romantic attitude attempts to recover its revolutionary myth of freedom periodically, but does so mainly by proclaiming rules for the way societal members should have lived, and idealizing the past only.

The recent emergence of critical sociology may be understood in this context as one of several such attempts throughout history to realign a critically interpretive myth of freedom with a traditionally prescriptive myth of concern, science. It is an attempt to critique and realign interpretation, or theory, with prescriptions, or policy, regarding conditions and events in the natural and social life-worlds. We shall investigate this situation and potential alteration of concerns through our survey comparing sociological theories of change. We shall be looking at the way in which dominant myths of concern and freedom have 'changed hands' over time, interpreting and prescribing identities and behaviors, appealing to different bodies of thought and pictures of origin and change.

Underlying all myths of concern and freedom, then, are basic conceptions of and attitudes toward change, out of which interpretations and prescriptions, and conditions and policies are formulated in the name of some historical 'concern' or another. What is of particular interest here in our survey is the way in which various conceptions of change have given way to various concerns and vice-versa, and the interpretations accompanying these conceptions which influence the

formulation of policies regarding change. More precisely, we want to survey sociological theories that deal exactly with the matter of change in order to understand the relation between (1) developments in conceptions of change and (2) developments in particular policies toward change, based on the assumption that conceptions and policies as such are central to social identity and social concern, in the form of interpretations and prescriptions.

Summary

The foregoing discussion attempted to outline and explain the basis of our assumed interrelation between (1) conceptions of origin and change, (2) the interpretation of identity and the prescription of norms, (3) and social conditions according to policies regarding events in the natural and social life-worlds. This interrelationship may be diagramatically stated as:



First, the centrality of conceptions of change to societies was explained: based upon some fundamental conception of origin, order and change, interpretations of past and future and prescribed rules for living are formulated, offering societal members an established sense

of continuity (identity) and coherence (common concern).

Second, the idea of a total and undifferentiated 'myth of concern' was suggested to explain the facts that (1) interpretations and prescriptions, based on conceptions of origin, order and change, constitute 'all a society most concerns its members to know,' and (2) that interpretations and prescriptions, or social identity and social concerns, are not only explained but also legitimated within a single over-arching mythology.

Third, it was pointed out that as cultures continue to develop, a process of differentiation occurs (in the Parsonian sense), making religion the myth of 'ultimate' concern, surrounded by new branches of social concern, such as politics and economy. This process was explained with reference to the importance of philosophical speculation and the theoretical isolation of particular subjects of concern for reconsideration: the learning capacities of a culture are expanded through reflexive learning, and new areas of concern with new verification processes and standards are developed. This over-all process was referred to as the development of a 'truth of correspondence,' wherein a structure of words or numbers are aligned with some body of external phenomena, such that 'truth' and 'reality' are now 'studied' rather than 'given', and are revealed by nature rather than only through social vision. Furthermore, we noted that the specific mental habits of a truth of correspondence include those of objectivity, suspension of judgement, respect for the individual, and the tolerance of new opinion. The expression of these mental habits as social attitudes constitutes the 'myth of freedom' -- the socially critical and liberal side of social concern.

Fourth, the theme of alternation was introduced to explain the way in which dominant myths have changed throughout history, offering different interpretations or theories and prescriptions or policies over time. The different 'moments' of alternation point to changes in basic conceptions of origin, order and change, and thus to changes in the formulation of theories and policies dealing with conditions and events in the natural and social life-worlds. We cited one such moment in this historical process of alternating conceptions and concerns as being the reformulation which took place during the Reformation and Romantic movements.

Last, it was suggested that the emergence of critical sociology constitutes the most recent of such moments of alternation to the extent that it is an attempt to realign interpretations and theories with prescriptions and policies: It constitutes a major moment in the historical relation between theory and practice.

We may proceed at this point to the survey of sociological models of change in order to exemplify and 'ground' this idea of alternating concerns and policies, and to elucidate the nature of the relation between particular conceptions of change and corresponding policy-orientations, again, based on the assumption that these remain central to societies in the form of interpretations (Who are we?) and prescriptions (How shall we live?), and therefore also remain central to the continued development of both the natural and the social life-worlds.

CHAPTER TWO

SOCIOLOGICAL CONCEPTIONS OF CHANGE

In his discussion of the 'invisibility of scientific revolutions' Kuhn (1962) warns the scientific community against the temptation to write history backwards:

> For reasons that are both obvious and highly functional, science textbooks refer...only to that part of the work of past scientists that can easily be viewed as contributions to the statement and solution of the text's paradigm problem.
>
> (1972:138.)

Others have similarly warned against the danger of reconstructing history by using even such terms as 'Reformation' and 'Restoration' to describe periods of transition in the history of ideas.

Kuhn's point is that we easily tend to (mis-)construct history, presenting piece-meal discovered facts and theories that cumulatively 'fit' some prominent paradigm or world-view. Rather, the historical process is more that theories emerge "together with the facts they fit from a revolutionary reformulation of the preceding scientific tradition" (1962:141).

In the context of our survey of sociological theories of change, we will want to avoid giving the impression that there has been some series of discoveries and inventions that have accumulated to automatically result in some present or popular model of change. On the contrary, we are concerned with periods of transition and 'crisis' in Kuhn's sense; the presence of unexpected events and anomalies, the 'shifts in vision' that take place along with the transformation of experiences as they are linked to new paradigms. Such periods of

crisis and shifts of vision have already been alluded to here by way of the 'rival' myths of concern and freedom, and by suggesting the central importance of fundamental conceptions of change to social identity and social concern, especially in terms of subsequent policy formations. The notion of crisis vis-a-vis reformulation of conceptions and policies has in fact generated the major part of this study, though this is a slightly broader use of the term than used by Kuhn. Very generally, Sorokin (1951), among others (Friedrichs, 1970; Gouldner, 1970), has indicated that the appearance of themes or theories about crises is concurrent with (a) conditions of change and (b) critiques of social policy and social conditions in general. This assumed concurrence of events is basically in agreement with the idea stated in the introduction that, it is exactly during such times of transition or crisis that questions regarding interpretations and prescriptions arise with renewed concern and are reformulated or re-affirmed. In this context of thought we will refer to shifts in the classic models of change, which means also, of course, shifts in fundamental conceptions of origin, order and change. On the other hand, however, we must keep in mind that there has been a rather continuous 'flow' of social and scientific concern accruing around that task of providing adequate explanation of events and conditions in the natural and social life-worlds.

Last, we will also want to keep in mind here the basic notion that fundamental conceptions of change are bound up with attitudes toward, and legitimations of change: "whether one assumes change...as the basic reality has important practical as well as theoretical

consequences" (Lauer, 1977:21), for the continued development of the natural and social worlds.

Keeping these points of reference in mind, we may outline the major sociological models of change: evolutionary, cyclical, and conflict.

PART ONE: THE BASIC MODELS OF CHANGE

A. Evolutionary Model

The classical evolutionary theories were largly dominated by the notions of perfection and progress in describing and predicting change. The basic assumption of these theories is that all societies pass through a set sequence of stages on the way to some final stage or goal state. The dual conceptions of the inevitable unilinear direction of change and the perfection of the human race constitute the optimistic attitude and policy-orientation here, although ideas of progress, direction and order received varying degrees of emphasis:

> Once it is proposed that order is the natural outcome of an evolutionary process, ideas of direction, progress, and perfectibility follow swiftly.
>
> (R. C. Lewontin, 1968:204.)

Active intervention in events or the planning of change is unnecessary for the most part since evolution is inevitable and 'the good society' shall be attained. The dominant concern here lies not so much with interpretation or control as with the prediction of changes, as with simple to complex social formations.

The evolutionary model has also undergone a number of revisions and elaborations, although the policy-orientation has remained essentially

as described above. This particular direction of change has been described by way of polarities and ideal types (Tonnies, Durkheim, Spencer), multilinear models (Julian Steward), and elaborations on the classic model, such as 'general' and 'specific' evolution (Sahlins and Service). Theories such as the cultural lag theory (Ogburn) are also based on the assumption of one general direction and one basic source or impetus for change. Last, functionalism has been categorized by some as the modern off-spring of the classic evlutionary model with primary reference to the notions of 'differentiation' and 'adaptation.' Here, too, the orientation remains largely optimistic though without encouraging planned intervention, in pursuit of 'the good society.'

The major characteristics of the classical evolutionary models may be summarized as follows:

Model-type:	Interpretation of past and future:	Dominant social concern:	Prescription and policy-orientation:
Evolutionary	Liberal optimism	Prediction	Inevitable perfection; negation of planned change.

B. Cyclical Model

Cyclical models provide us with perhaps one of the best illustrations of the way in which basic conceptions of change are central to the interpretation of identity and the corresponding prescription of rules for proper living. Although various cyclic models were popular during the late 1800's, this model dominated ancient Greek and Roman thinking in the form of the total mythology discussed earlier.

The basic assumption of the cyclical model of change is that a certain course of events will be endlessly repeated, exactly or approximately. Sorokin points out the way in which the cyclical model was thought to be the master-pattern of change in early cultures, and was applied to all sectors of both the natural and social life-worlds:

> The whole history of the world as well as of mankind was thought of as an endless recurrence of either identical or essentially similar cycles...Any change in direction has been repeated an infinite number of times in the past and will recur an infinite number of times in the future.
>
> (Sorokin, 1947:676).

Sorokin mentions the Babylonian, Hindu and Persian cyclical conceptions as examples, along with the majority of Greek, Roman and Medieval thinkers. The Chinese eternal rhythm of the Yin and the Yang is another example, where world history is given neither a beginning or an end, and all change is fixed and predictable, since "all movement serves in the end only to bring the process back to its starting point" (Lauer, 1977:29). While Lauer points out that the Chinese once neglected the present for the love of antiquity or some 'golden age' gone by, Sorokin and others have pointed out that, in addition, there is a basic fatalism inherent in most cyclical models. This results in a policy orientation that tends to negate purposive intervention in natural or social affairs for the planning of change. This interpretive and prescriptive content is subtly expressed in Ecclestiastes:

> The thing that hath been it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing under the sun.

Prediction is not a dominant concern or interest in this context, since all cycles of birth, death and generation are endlessly repeated, exactly

or approximately. Nor is there dominant concern for control over change, since time itself is an endless series of cycles. The area of concern falls to the proper interpretation of events within the total movement of the universe and in the natural and social life-worlds.

The 19th century version of this model of change offers a somewhat refined definition of relatively cyclical patterns of change, but, with few exceptions, retains the pessimistic orientation in terms of policies negating planned change in the natural and social worlds. The cyclical models of this period that do carry an optimistic attitude toward the future do so in terms of the notions of perfectability and the return of man to some Garden of Eden, and are strongly tied to the Judeo-Christian myth of concern. We will discuss these particular theories at a later point, but mention here that their rejection was primarily due to the basic objection that these models, like the earlier ones, proclaim an 'eternally' cyclical process of change.

We may summarize the major characteristics of this model as follows:

Model-type:	Interpretation of past and future:	Dominant social concern:	Prescription and policy-orientation:
Cyclical	Fatalistic	Interpretation	Negation of intervention for planned change.

C. Conflict Model

The conflict theory of social change dates back as early as the

writing of Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406). Here the idea of class struggles was already posited as the inevitable factor in the evolution of civilizations. This basic model was applied to the interpretation of social and political events a century later (Machiavelli), and thematized again with reference to the basic 'nature' of man and the inevitability of conflict due to his insatiable thirst for power (Hobbes). With the neo-classical interest in the accurate writing of history, and with the emergence of the anti-religion enthusiasts, concern turns away from the passive and optimistic acceptance of a linear direction of set changes, and also rejects the corresponding negation of intervention. There is, instead, growing interest in the social and environmental determinants of behavior and the choice of man to rationally create desired change, controlling their present and future. In opposition to the optimistic predictions and policy-orientation of the classical evolutionary models, then, is the model of a series of violent struggles, culminating in major revolution and attainment of the desired goal state. This movement of concern from liberal prediction to critical intervention and control is summed in the basic policy-orientation of conflict theory: the conflict model of social change since Marx supports an activist interpretation for planned change, retaining the optimistic view of evolutionary theories that the desired end state shall be attained. The thematization of 'crises' is prominent here, as well as the critique of policy. The emphasis is upon the responsibility of man not merely to record history, but to change it. The major characteristics of this model may be summed as follows:

Model-type:	Interpretation of past and future:	Dominant social concern:	Prescription and policy-orientation:
Conflict	Critical	Change	Active intervention in planned change.

There are numerous important connections between these three basic model-types and corresponding developments in political theory, philosophy, and the physical sciences. As is obvious, there is not only the carry-over of fundamental concepts and interpretive frameworks, but also influences upon processes for verifying and legitimating predictions and prescriptions.

Less obvious, however, is the way in which these model-types identify sources of change, or presume to control processes of change. There is a thematic link here between particular model-types, the interpretation of sources of change, and subsequent policies and prescriptions regarding conditions in the natural and social life-worlds. For example, given a supernatural source of change or divine laws controlling change, the prescription for living and the policy-orientation are largely fatalistic and do not encourage intervention. At the other extreme are those models which point to man himself as the creator and instigator of change, and which subsequently prescribe an optimistic attitude for active intervention. In addition, theories pointing out trends of change, or those describing catastrophic and critical changes will carry crucially different attitudes toward the timing and the importance of policies toward change.

In this context of thought we will examine representative theories of the basic model-types in more detail along the dimensions of interpretation, interest, and policy-orientation.

PART TWO: SOCIOLOGICAL MODELS OF CHANGE

A. Evolutionary Models

The development of civilizations has been discussed in terms of the emergence of new 'mental habits' (Frye) and new 'learning capacities' (Habermas). Philosophical speculation was said to be important to these developments for two reasons in particular. First, it allowed for the theoretical isolation of subject matter, selectively bringing new areas of concern and life practice into the context of reflexive learning processes. Second, the traditional formula of 'truth' posited in total myth begins to give way to the formulation of 'truth' as 'truth as correspondence' through the alignment of a body of words or numbers with some external phenomena. This was pointed out as being a new process of verification and, with writing, a process of documentation as well. Last, the attitudes accompanying these developments were said to be those of objectivity, suspension of judgement, respect for the individual, and tolerance of opinion. To the extent that these attitudes exert a liberalizing force on social thought, they constitute a myth of freedom, competing with the myth of concern for the status of interpretive and prescriptive authority. The severence of ties between theology and philosophy accents these attitudes. As Lauer (1977:54) points out, since the development of philosophy as an

autonomous discipline, "the history of the social world has been regarded as governed by the history of the human mind". This has important consequences for the development of new ideas about origin, order and change -- the most obvious of which may be the rejection of traditional conceptions of the divine origin and nature of human society. Concurrent with this attitude is a concern for the proper understanding and interpretation of history 'as a whole.' Both themes will become clear as we survey theories of change, as will the increasing concern for man's own part in the construction and maintenance of past and future societies.

I. Liberal, Romantic and Conservative Myths of History: Contract, Purpose, and Natural Law

The social contractualist rejection of divine will and revealed law as explanation of the origin and nature of society opened up the question of the possibility of social order, and the reasons for its possible continuance. The interest here lies not only with history and the 'pre-civilized' state of man, but also with the behavior of men within contemporary social orders.

The notion that man voluntarily enters into a social contract on the basis of rational judgement is a revolutionary reinterpretation of traditional conceptions of the divine origin of society. Furthermore, it exposes the notion that society is a human creation, to be altered or disposed of as reason dictates. The natural right of self-preservation dominates human thought and action, and it is on the basis of this right that man 'surrenders' himself to government and, through reasonable judgement, keeps this contract or covenant. In opposition to theories

of original sin and innate evil, then, natural man is seen as reasonable and good. The task for philosophy thus lies in discovering the natural laws which guide the external environment, and arranging the social world in accordance with them.

These ideas are the beginning of an important change in the conception of future societies: tending away from earlier theological conceptions of inevitable perfection are new ideas about the laws of history and stages of future development. As we shall see, the Romantic interpretation of the Enlightenment places greater emphasis on the processes of history than on the goals of its perfection. Specifically, the Romantic concern comes to be that of 'man as we know him' rather than 'man as he ought to be' (Rousseau), and the 'end' is no longer his perfection or the rise of imaginary utopias, but the building of real societies that can service the needs and wants of men (Machiavelli). Later still, we will find that the theme of perfection and destiny rise again under different theorists, with different ideas in mind as to the preferred 'end state'.

The second major theme mentioned was the concern for understanding the course of history 'as a whole.' To return momentarily to Vico, the ultimate question becomes: What is the meaning (Purpose) of history? And what 'laws' govern its development and change? These questions were inspired by:

> the belief that history presents problems beyond those that occupy the attention of ordinary historians, whose activities....fail to satisfy the demand for an intellectually or morally acceptable conception of the course of history 'as a whole.'
>
> (P. Gardiner, 1968:428-29.)

The connection between a concern for history and the earlier mentioned concern for social identity lies in this demand for intellectually and morally adequate explanations of the 'purpose' of history. It becomes clear that man must not only take the responsibility for accurately recording history, but must also offer an acceptable interpretation of its meaning vis-a-vis the present and future of mankind.

This renewed concern for social identity and the purpose or morality of history led to the search for 'universally valid' principles explaining the development of societies and the principles of human nature. As we have thus far seen, such 'universal laws' have been grounded in religious, metaphysical, and empirical interpretations. The focus now is increasingly upon that which is most directly available to experience and reason, and is guided by the notion that:

> there is an underlying structure or theme waiting to be discovered, in terms of which this apparently arbitrary sequence can be seen to be ultimately meaningful or intelligible.
> (P. Gardiner, 1968:429.)

This search for the purpose of history and meaning of the present is grounded increasingly in a faith in the power of knowledge. Again, social history is seen to be guided by the history of the human mind. It is in this context that conceptions of 'general will' (Rousseau), 'collective choice' (Condorcet), 'public will' (Toennies) and 'consensus' (Comte) are thematized, along with 'universal laws' and/or typologies depicting the stages of man's social and intellectual growth.

With Hume there is a kind of synthesis or maturing of these thought trends, especially with regard to his 'natural history.' The doctrine of naturalism proclaims that all phenomena occurring in the world of

nature can be explained in terms of cause-effect sequences, and that this explanation can be applied as well to social phenomena. We notice in this, first, the explanatory connection made between the natural and social worlds, and second, the explicit methodological emphasis in studying social phenomena: mental and social phenomena are removed from the sphere of the supernatural and placed in the world of nature, and are studied the same as are physical events. In addition, Hume pointed out the importance of studying history in order to understand human experience. His 'natural history' is an attempt to frame historical laws of behavior and transformations of behavior via the 'principles of human nature.' Rather than studying unique historical events, as did traditional historiography, Hume tends toward historical generalizations.

In particular, Hume was concerned with understanding different areas of behavior in relation to changing circumstances. He posits three 'motives' explaining, for example, the causes of labor: the desire for consumption pleasures (gain), the desire for action or interesting activity, and the desire for 'liveliness.' The desires for gain and action, then, constitute the desire for success in the 'economic game.' (E. Rotowein, 1968:548). From here he considers the consequences of economic growth on individual behaviors and passions, emphasizing the stimulus effect this may have for individual workers as well as for other, competitive countries. Hume invokes the utilitarian ethic to morally justify a commercial and industrial society: the cause for labor (i.e., desires) become ends whose attainment are furthered by the development of industry (E. Rotowein,

1968:548). The value lies in striving for self-fulfillment, and here Hume places great importance on 'action' as the response to challenges. The development of economy stimulates the development of the intellectual, cultural, moral and political life of the society. This analysis is a statement of the argument for a liberal social order (E. Rotowein, 1968:550). It is also the beginning of an important distinction to be made between civil society and the 'natural' order, and between variation in behavior and changing circumstance.

Condillac similarly thematized the idea of utility, emphasizing the notion that man apprehends the consequences of alternative actions and decides rationally upon the prefereable ones. Condorcet takes the argument for liberal social order further with his ideology of social progress and economic liberalism. Reform, and faith in the power of rational knowledge are the key ideas here: historical development coincides with the 'light of reason' (G. Granger, 1968:214). Furthermore, the 'truths' of moral and political science may be understood to be as equally certain as those within the physical sciences. Condorcet's social mathematics-method in particular emphasizes this idea, and it led him to the analysis of voting behavior, which he saw as representing true opinion rather than compromise, and called 'collective choice.' In this he had great influence upon Comte, as shall become clear.

With Jeremey Bentham, we have once again the statement for utilitarianism and liberalism in the formula "the greatest happiness of the greatest number of human beings." Bentham's interest in the principles of morals and legislation (1789) led him to a rather

dichotomous view of social behavior, and an ethics of 'enlightened self-interest.' Pleasures, especially the most intense and longest-lasting, are the only good, and pain the only evil.

Von Herder is most important to this era of thought as he noticeably shifts the historical interpretation of the Enlightenment to a Romantic one: 'development' is emphasized more than 'progress', with an eye to the series of developments and processes rather than the 'goals.' Also included in his philosophy is the belief in some fundamental historical law of the constant expansion of relations, decrease of war, injustice, ignorance, etc., and progressive unification of the human race into a single society (Sorokin, 1947:452). With Hegel, then, he emphasizes the notion of a historical trend consisting of ever-increasing freedom. Growth in justice, reason, and morality coincide with this increased freedom.

De Maistre represents equal concern for morality and law, but is at the opposite end of this range of orientations in his insistence upon the divine origin of society: it does not derive from agreement, but is divine in origin and a product of nature. Furthermore, society creates the individual, and not vice versa. With Burke and de Bonald, this constitutes the conservative reaction to the French revolution; an idealistic organicism and social conservativism (Martindale, 1960: 62). Society emerges as an organic growth, not out of contract or reason. Further, tradition is more important than reason. All changes must come from within, as organic changes, rather than through violence or by means of some external source. Thus, the natural order, with its hierarchies and organismic transformations, is not to be improved upon: 'progress' is a dangerous word.

This form of idealistic organicism is the counterpart to the liberal and reformist theories discussed earlier. Basic to both orientations, however, is the attempt to understand social phenomena the same way that physical phenomena are understood. In addition to this, there is a common emphasis upon the function of religion in society: it is seen as the source of stability (Burke, de Maistre, de Bonald), or, as a source of over-powering authority and hindrance to the development of reason (Voltaire, Hume). Deism represents, in this sense, the penetration of rationalism into the inner-most sphere of human thought (Martindale, 1960:32). The idea that reason is capable of mastering the world is slowly applied to all spheres of social life; religion, ethics, history, law, philosophy and politics. The major point for the rationalists is that both individual and social life can be interpreted, as well as regulated, by way of self-evident principles directly available to reason.

Emphasizing the power of reason and the idea of collective choice and morality lead to increasing interest in the 'laws' of history and the relation between the individual and society. Hegel's assertion that mind is the core of reality and that change is an act of thought epitomizes these ideas.

For Hegel, the state is the embodiment of rationality, as distinguished from and opposite to the daily conflicts and material interests that constitute civil society. In this, Hegel recovers the theme of Hobbes, "counterposing the rational universality of the whole to the particular desires and strivings of individuals" (G. Lichtheim, 1968:342). He also differs from the social contractualists, however, in regarding

the state as an end in itself and not the 'guardian' of civil society or of the body politic -- "which does not know what it wants" (G. Lichtheim, 1968:342). Hegel did, however, critique the traditional theory of natural law:

> His influence on European (notably German) thinking thus ran counter to the gradual acceptance of liberal doctrines throughout the nineteenth century ...The test of sovereignty is war, which discloses the truth that nations are not subordinate to law but operate in a Hobbesian 'state of nature.' War is necessary and may even be regarded as beneficial, since it is the test of a people's willingness to maintain its freedom and independence. It also makes it possible to achieve a degree of social integration which civil society cannot secure.
> (G. Lichtheim, 1968:342.)

Closer to our concerns is Hegel's conception of history as the self-creation of man (idealist dialectic), and the idea that it is the practical activity of men in society that constitutes the prime force of the historical process (materialist dialectic). Marx, of course, thematized both of these ideas, while repudiating Hegel's political doctrine of the state.

The notion of universal and immutable laws of history undergoes some reconsideration, then, as attention is focused upon the power of man to create and recreate self, surroundings, and circumstance, aided by the powers of faith and reason.

II. Order and Progress: Social Crisis and Competing Concerns

Hegel, Simon, and Comte represent a rather dualistic attitude toward change, embracing parts of both the liberal and conservative doctrines discussed thus far. Their ideas were part of the humanitarian trend in philosophy, but also part of the politically progressive

thought pattern that developed subsequent to the French revolution. Simon and Comte both believed in the making of a new society with the 'working class' as its 'producers,' though they opposed economic liberalism. Specifically, Simon supported industrialism and looked forward to the creation of a perfect meritocracy; Comte wanted to develop a secular system of morals, understanding society to be a system of 'common moral values.' This emphasis upon the inherent moral system in society articulates a new concern for, and discovery of, the normative character of social behavior (Rene Konig, 1968:201).

> Comte asserted the relativism of moral ideas -- that they vary with different cultures and social systems -- in opposition to the notion that norms are rooted in divine relation or in a general order, separate from social life and untouched by it.
>
> (Rene Konig, 1968:201.)

The secular morals Comte envisioned were of a mystical, humanitarian kind, and his belief in this type of spiritual order separated him from Simon and Marx's revolutionary demands for the new society. His concept of 'consensus' in social processes, again, brings him more in line with the conservativists of his time. This is not to understate, however, his interpretation of the past and of the subsequent reforms necessary to the present:

> Comte's sociology was developed essentially as a scientific remedy for the long-lasting social, political, and cultural crisis in Europe...What remained of the prerevolutionary system was being destroyed by the incessant and insoluble controversy between ordre and progres.
>
> (Rene Konig, 1968:201.)

It is not difficult to see a competition of 'myths' here -- a conservative concern for order versus the liberalizing myth of freedom for progress.

In addition, the notion of a 'scientific remedy' for crises in the social world reminds us of our discussion of new myths emerging to compete for an authoritative status as regards interpretations and prescriptions for the social life-world. There are also the organicist and positivist views in competition here, as the latter came to be associated with an endorsement of 'scientism.' The emphasis, though, for Comte, was on the necessity of a total moral and intellectual reform, this considered prerequisite to social reform.

> Indeed, reformist intentions rather than rational analysis are so basic to his entire philosophy that he came very near to Marx's statement that "the philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways, the point is to change it" (Theses on Freuerbach, 1845). In fact, 'praxis' was as important a goal to Comte as it was to Marx, the only difference between them being that Comte tried to combine this approach with the Cartesian heritage whereas Marx, in distrust of reason, destroyed the very foundation of philosophical reason and replaced it by revolutionary action directe.
>
> (Rene Konig, 1968:204.)

In this context we can see Comte's attempt at synthesis as the attempt to align a reformist theory of progress with a more conservative attitude toward order. Furthermore, Comte departs from the prevailing Enlightenment idea that the answers to social problems lay in the elements of 'human nature.' The social world, rather, should be looked upon as something that accumulates across many generations.

> Just as language is created by individual men speaking, but nevertheless develops a vocabulary and a grammer that no one man ever does much to modify, society remains and unfolds by laws of its own, while individual men come and go. Comte thus hit on the concept of society as cumulative culture, as we would now put it.
>
> (Collins and Makowsky, 1972:28.)

In the context of this 'cumulative culture,' we can understand his model of the historical process. All branches of knowledge pass through three theoretical (and methodological) stages, from the theological, to the metaphysical, and the scientific or positivistic. Perhaps one of the most intriguing aspects of this order of development is the way Comte outlines areas of man's interest over time. Man is first most concerned with those things farthest from his own humanity, and explains phenomena theologically via animism, spirits and gods. Less remote topics are later studied in the context of physics and astronomy, where explanations are metaphysical, or of abstract philosophical speculation. The last stage of knowledge is positive, with explanations based upon observation, experiment, and comparison. This is the area of biology and sociology, where society -- that area closest to man -- is the object of study.

The idea of positivistic philosophy as 'remedy' to European crises thus becomes clear when seen as being immediately 'concerned' with the social life-world and its reform. The metaphysical stage of history is necessary as a sort of 'negative' stage wherein criticism and destruction of traditional conceptions prevail. A 'revolutionary restlessness' is therefore also prerequisite to intellectual development. In the positivistic stage, all subjects are susceptable to investigation by observation and experimentation. Most important to Comte, then, was:

> the systematization of the social background of human history into one body of knowledge, in preparation for a practical approach to social reform based on a lasting order, the theoretical and moral principles of which he

> saw in the development of a new science, sociology.
>
> (Collins and Makowsky, 1972:28.)

Central to Comte's understanding of social order are the ideas of Rousseau's 'general will' and Condorcet's 'collective choice.' The philosophical assumption that society is an organism united by moral consensus is central to his study of structure or 'statical' sociology. The assumption of progress through change constitues the 'dynamic' aspect of sociology, where each phase is the necessary precondition for the following stage. Specifically, mankind is to facilitate change by way of reason and faith, and, in discovering the 'laws' of change, there is finally the rational basis for facilitating progress (Lauer, 1977:51).

Progress and change are thus equated in Comte's scheme, where both occur through the exercise of reason and faith.

> It is only through the more and more marked influence of the reason over the general conduct of Man and of society, that the gradual march of our race has attained that regularity and preserving continuity which distinguish it so radically from the desultory and barren expression of even the highest of the animal orders, which share, and with enhanced strength, the appetites, the passions, and even the primary sentiments of man.
>
> (1958:461.)

Comte was also interested in understanding the rate of progress, and in this he posited three primary factors. First, is what he called ennui: given the hierarchy of human needs, there is a cumulative progression of satisfactorily meeting needs and exercising higher faculties, thus accelerating progress:

> Man, like other animals, can not be happy without a sufficient exercise of all his faculties, intense and persistant in proportion to the intrinsic activity of each faculty.
>
> (1958:54.)

Second, the duration of human life is an element affecting the rate of change. To the extent that age means conservativism, and youth innovation, there is "an optimum length of human life for an optimum rate of progress; and any increase or decrease in average life span will affect that rate to some degree" (1958:54). The third factor affecting the rate of change is the demographic factor, concerning the natural increase of populations, where 'increase' refers to population density. Greater density means greater concentration of individuals in a given space, and thus the emergence of new and different needs and problems. These are seen to generate new means of progress and order:

> by neutralizing physical inequalities, and affording a growing ascendancy to those intellectual and moral forces which are suppressed among a scanty population.
>
> (1958:55.)

Last, it should be mentioned that both the content of sociological knowledge and the role of the sociologist are crucial to developing the future of man. Sociological knowledge must be used to further social progress, and the sociologist is the vehicle for educating societal members of this knowledge, thus facilitating progress toward the new order. Besides positing the inevitability of change, Comte also insisted that its direction is important to subsequent formulations of evolutionary theory.

III. Reformulations in Identity and Concern: Progress and Perfection

In the models of both Comte and Spencer, change and progress are treated as one, and one aspect of human development that has a distinctly moral interpretation. As Lewontin makes clear, however, the extent to which perfection is equated with change, and the inevitability of certain stages with progress, is one important feature distinguishing the several evolutionary theories from one another. This 'moral' quality of explanations of change is also important to our discussion of the relation between interpretations and policy-orientations, for it is just such 'moral overtones' as 'progress' and 'perfection' that guide the formulation of laws and stages of development, such as those of Comte. As Lewontin puts it:

> It is not always easy to differentiate evolutionist doctrines of simple direction from those with an element of progress. I distinguish them by the moral, or better, moralistic tone of progressivism...
> (Lewontin, 1968:205.)

Although Spencer, for example, cautions against such moralistic tones in defining progress, he nevertheless equates change with progress, and tells us that all change, in whatever direction, is progressive -- specifically, from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous.

Lewontin makes a second point regarding evolutionary theories of change which is also relevant to our understanding of the relation between interpretations, identity, and explanations of events:

> Men reason by analogy from the condition of their lives to the condition of the universe....
> (Lewontin, 1968:205.)

and the eighteenth century was, of course, a period of intellectual

and industrial change. Change became the rule rather than the exception during this period, and, furthermore, is seen to be unidirectional and good. Especially for those still rising within the bourgeois revolution, there is a 'vested interest' -- a matter of social identity and social concern -- in maintaining a unilinear principle of change, whereby the old is replaced by the new. Bentham's formula referred to earlier of the 'greatest happiness for the greatest number' is expressive of this conception of change and of the liberal optimism that accompanied it. Equally important was Spencer's formula for endorsing change and progress, used as a justification for the laissez-faire practices in the late eighteen hundreds.

Spencer's model, like Comte's, is based on the organismic analogy, including the various stages through which societies must pass in the process of their development. Spencer takes several further steps in describing the principles of growth, however. In the first place, the progress of knowledge is not necessarily the primary factor and indicator of change. Change is also due to the principle of evolutionary selection -- the 'survival of the fittest' formula. Second, Spencer did not believe that society has a consciousness centered in one place, as did Comte. He also rejected the view of society as a moral unit. According to Collins and Makowsky (1972:69), Spencer wanted to show above all that societies develop structures that "culminate in the invisible hand of the market, whereby individuals are given a maximum of freedom and yet contribute to the best functioning of the whole." It is in this context that Spencer's evolutionism has been called a moral justification for laissez-faire practices.

As has been pointed out above, the connection between notions of change and progress by Spencer is important to our discussion of the relation between conceptions of change and policy-orientations. Although Spencer warns against a normative definition of change, he expressed a moralistic tone by equating change with progress. Change, for Spencer, is "a beneficient necessity."

Spencer's single principle of all (i.e., from cosmic to social) evolution is summed as: "Matter begins as a homogeneous mass of simple particles and gradually becomes organized as the particles come together to form heterogeneous parts in a complex whole" (Collins and Makowsky, 1972:69). The immutable law of change, then, is progression from the simple and unorganized, to the complex and organized. Central to this conceptualization of change is the guiding notion of 'adaptation'. Evolution is a process of continuous (from lower to higher forms) adaptation to the environment.

Spencer used this formula to explain the development of social structure. With Comte, he recognizes that increasing size or density of a population brings with it a differentiation of needs and structures. In primitive societies, or 'structureless tribes,' there emerges, first, a regulative system. This is the State which, analogous to the nervous system in organisms, deals with the external environment and provides protection against other societies. Later, a sustaining system is developed -- a system of economic production which supports the regulative system. Last, an exchange and distribution system is developed. This refers to the communication and transportation system of a society. Spencer's analysis continues to say that as societies

grow, each of these three sectors are subdivided, becoming more complex. As regards the growth of knowledge, man outgrows religion, and society outgrows this form of control over man. Man's 'mental capacities' are therefore seen to 'progress' along with the development of society: "Man becomes less emotional and more rational; ideas become more definite; lore is replaced by scientific knowledge; customs are replaced by laws (Collins and Makowsky, 1972:72)."

Using England as the prime example of industrial society, Spencer posits two contrasting types of societies in accordance with the above scheme of structural development. The first of these is military society, where the regulative system (the State) dominates the sustaining system (production). The State is autocratic, warlike, and religious. Furthermore, cooperation is compulsory and enforced by the State (Collins and Makowsky, 1972:70). In contrast to this is the second type, industrial society. The regulative system in industrial society exists for the 'benefit' of the people, rather than the reverse. This society is seen as 'peaceful' and 'republican;' cooperation is voluntary, by way of the market (Collins and Makowsky, 1972:70).

As regards the development of new structures:

> There can be no true conception of a structure without a true conception of its function. To understand how an organization originated and developed, it is requisite to understand the need subserved at the outset and afterwards.
>
> (1925, Vol. 3:3.)

In his Principles of Sociology, then, Spencer traces the specialization of functions, the differentiation of structures accompanying this, and

these together as they characterize cultural evolution.

Spencer was also one of the first to state that cultural change is explained best in terms of sociocultural forces, rather than as the result of the actions of unique, important men: "Society is a growth and not a manufacture."

Most important, despite both the mechanistic and moralistic overtones of Spencer's theory of change, and the identification of change with progress, it should be noted that Spencer was not the strict unilinear evolutionist as were those preceding him. Rather, he admitted to the inevitable regression of societies, should they fail to conform to his model of increasing differentiation and integration:

> Like other kinds of progress, social progress is not linear but divergent and re-divergent. Each differentiated product gives origin to a new set of differentiated products.
> (1925, Vol. 3:331.)

In addition, progress is also part of a pattern of responses to particular problems posited by both the social and natural worlds.

Spencer's theory of sociology can be summed as follows:

> There can be no complete acceptance of sociology as a science, so long as the belief in a social order not conforming to natural law, survives.
> (1873:360.)

Consequently, he held the deterministic view that causation operates in human behavior the same as it does in the sphere of nature. Spencer was also important in establishing the comparative view of history to be employed by those following him.

> The only history that is of practical value, is what may be called Descriptive History.

> And the highest office which the historian can discharge, is that of so narrating the lives of nations, as to furnish the materials for a Comparative Sociology; and for the subsequent determination of the ultimate laws to which social phenomena conform.
> (1854-59:69-70.)

IV. The Moral Constitution of Society: Progress and Reform

The liberal doctrines of evolutionism and reform mentioned thus far were received in America by William Graham Sumner. Important here is the increasing attention paid to evolution on a smaller scale -- the changes in social behaviors and social situations. Sumner's analysis of 'folkways' and 'mores' revealed not only the force of these upon societal members, but also their relativity vis-a-vis changing historical situations: natural selection is now the only accepted universal law of change or evolution.

Coincidental to Sumner's investigation of norms, customs, folkways and mores was the increasing attention focused on the moral constitution of the cities. Not only were many social reformist groups organized as a result, but the 'social problems' context of thought also took root in the American universities. As Sumner pointed out at the time, both contexts of thought were for the most part fruitless in instigating change: they were ignorant of the historical forces behind customary behaviors and the process of politics and bargaining for power -- they merely described the 'bad environment' and expected reform by way of rehabilitation (Collins and Makowsky, 1972:74).

Meanwhile, other approaches were being made to the study of social changes. The focus remains for the most part on the moral, institutional, and structural constitution of growing cities, but

the orientation, as we shall see, tends to become increasingly pessimistic as regards the fixed stages of lineal evolution.

Henry Sumner Maine traced the development of societies by studying changes in conceptions of and attitudes toward law, and the status of relationships between individuals and groups of individuals. Societies 'progress' in a unilinear form from a situation where relations are based on status, to one where relations are based upon contract. The former are patriarchal relations; power is absolute (rather than differentiated according to roles), and the individual's position and opportunities in life are relegated according to family status. The latter situation, where relations are based upon contracts, comes about as the state replaces the family as primary object of loyalty. Maine uses the development of Roman law to exemplify the continuum of stages between the status and contractual situations. Societies thus pass through the following stages:



This progression from status to contract is applied to all relationships within the social order:

> All the forms of Status...were derived from, and to some extent are still coloured by, the powers and privileges anciently residing in the family...we may say that the movement of the progressive Societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract. (1907:174.)

Furthermore, all institutions, like law, undergo a process of progressive

functional specialization. This structural specialization is concommitant with specialization in the conceptions and terminologies which relate to them.

Maine's description of specialization and differentiation is very similar to that used by Parsons. His development of the polar types of societies (Status/Contract) as origin and destination with a continuum of intermediate stages also anticipates modernization theories, and Parsons' pattern variables (1951). Two other resulting influences are those of Linton's description of ascribed/achieved status, and Toennies's polar types of social formations. Especially important here was Maine's interest in the relation between types of relations and mental attitudes toward status and contractual agreements over time.

With Toennies (1858-1936) we notice, once again, this concern for the moral constitution of developing societies. Toennies is particularly important in this respect as his theory of social order and philosophy of history constitute a synthesis of the thoughts discussed thus far on the origin and development of societies. In particular, Toennies brings the Romantic and historical model of organismic society together with the rationalist model of contractual society. This synthesis was achieved by his 'voluntaristic' approach to the nature of social relations.

Toennies conceived of social interaction and social groupings as 'social entities' which were created by human thought and willing. There are two types of human willing: natural will (Wessensille) and rational will (Kurwille), which correspond to or may be seen to determine

the nature of two types of social order. The concept of natural will derives from Schopenhauer and Wundt, and represents that form of willing which established society. Rational will, which comes from Hobbes and the rationalist doctrine of natural law, refers to the existence of purposive social relations and the political commonwealth. There are two distinct types of social order, then, that are the 'objects' of the two kinds of willing: The Gemeinschaft or community is the object of natural will; the Gesellschaft of modern society is the object of rational will. Although these are ideal types, and social orders only approximate the dichotomy, the nature of social relations, rules for conduct, and 'collective will' are also seen to change, characterized by the predominance of one form of willing or the other. Developments in norms and laws are one instance of the manifestation of these types of willing. Toennies points to three levels of law, different for each type of willing and social order:

	Gemeinschaft (natural will)	Gesellschaft (rational will)
level 1	custom	convention
level 2	customary law	statute law
level 3	religiously-sanctioned ethics	national ethics sanctioned by public opinion

Central to this theme are the notions of 'collective will' and 'public opinion.' Collective will aims at the realization and preservation of social values, and is manifest in rules for conduct and norms, as described above, which the individual holds to be binding (R. Herberle,

1968:100). Public opinion also contains an element of will and is normative in character: the public opinion of a total society is the opinion concerned with public affairs that claims to be the only true and correct opinion (R. Herberle, 1968:100).

> Toennies conceived of Wessenwille as having degrees of rationality, which correspond, as he acknowledged, to Max Weber's affectual, traditional, and value-rational orientations of social action; Kurwille, in turn, corresponds to Weber's purposive-rational orientation of social action.
>
> (R. Herberle, 1968:100.)

Insofar as change from the Gemeinschaft to the Gesellschaft order is concerned, Toennies describes the stages of this transition with some pessimism.

In the Gemeinschaft, the individuals of a family are bound together by a principle of time -- "the sequence of past and future generations". As the Gesellschaft develops, the principle of space is bound up with the former in villages and towns, but comes to dominate as urbanization occurs. These principles of time and space are connected with what we referred to earlier as the process of forming social identity, and Toennies discusses this changing aspect of social life and identity in terms of growing individuality and 'self-determination.' Within the Gemeinschaft order:

> The substance of the body social and the social will consists of concord, folkways, mores, and religion...each individual receives his share from this common center, which is manifest in his own sphere, i.e., in his sentiment, in his mind and heart, and in his conscience as well as in his environment, his possessions, his activities...It is in this center that the individual's strength is rooted...
>
> (1957:223.)

In contrast to this, then, is the independent, self-determined individual of the modern situation:

> under certain conditions and in some relations, man appears as a free agent (person) in his self-determined activities, and has to be conceived of as an independent person. The substance of common spirit has become so weak or the link connecting him with the others warn so thin that it has to be excluded from consideration...no common understanding and no time-bound custom or belief creates a common bond.
>
> (1957:223.)

For Toennies, this makes war inevitable due to the unrestricted freedom of individuals persuing their own self-interests and self-determined activities. Individuals remain isolated and are hostile toward one another. Different from the Gemeinschaft situation, then, where folklife and culture are embodied in and represented by the state, is the Gesellschaft, where:

> peace and commerce are maintained through conventions and underlying fear. The state protects this civilization through legislation and politics. To a certain extent, science and public opinion, attempting to conceive it as necessary and eternal, glorify it as progress toward perfection.

There are three types of men who facilitate this transition in their work and in their Kurwillig-orientation: the economic, the political, and the scientific man. The transition, from one social order to the others is primarily due to increasing commerce, the rise of the modern state, and the progress of science.

Last, Toennies points out the changes in intellectual life as a consequence of the other transitions in social relations, will, identity, and order.

> Previously, all was centered around the belief in invisible beings, spirits and gods; now it is focused on the insight into visible nature. Religion, which is rooted in folklife...must cede supremacy to science, which derives from and corresponds to consciousness. Such consciousness is a product of learning and culture and, therefore, remote from people... Science receives its moral meaning only from an observation of the laws of social life, which leads it to derive rules for an arbitrary and reasonable order of social organization. The intellectual attitude of the individual becomes gradually less and less influenced by religion and more and more influenced by science...
>
> (1957:223.)

Toennies was hopeful about attaining an ultimate socialist, and possibly world-wide, political order that could have the attributes of the Gemeinschaft and be based upon rational ethics. However, his linear conception of evolution and the movement from natural organic relations to the mechanical structure of modern society carries negative overtones concerning the 'loss of community'.

V. Instrumental Progress and Normative Pathology: The Problems of Integration

Concern for the normative or moral constitution of changing societies continues to be the focus, if not the starting point, for many of the nineteenth and twentieth century evolutionists. The comparison of 'primitive' and 'modern' societies continues to be made, based on elaborations of the several dichotomous ideal types developed by Hobbes, Hegel, Maine and Toennies. In addition, the idea of the value of law as a key to social analysis pervades social theory. From Hobbes to Maine, Sumner and Toennies, the study of contract, law, consensus and public will dominate evolutionary theories. Like many of the prominent

social theorists we have discussed thus far, Durkheim approaches the study of changing societies in this same line of thought, synthesizing previously different, if not competing schools of thought. In particular, Durkheim brings together the empiricist-utilitarian concern for social behavior and relations with the German idealists' concern for collective will or spirit.

Specifically, Durkheim was directly influenced by Rousseau's conceptions of 'will' and 'democratic individualism,' and developed his own theory of social solidarity which avoided the economic as well as the political context in which it was used by those before him. He also shared the notions of natural law and natural rights popular at the time, though he developed the Lockean end of this theme in a different manner: social integration is possible as people are 'born free' into society, without Hobbes's coercive sovereign, or Locke's 'natural identification of interests' (Parsons, 1968:313). It is in this area of concern that Durkheim develops his ideas of solidarity and social action.

The first aspect of Durkheim's analysis of society is the substantive aspect. In The Division of Labor, he considers Spencer's notion of contractual relations, wherein the market figures prominently. According to Durkheim, if society were not controlled by something other than only the pursuit of self-interests, it would dissolve into Hobbes's 'state of nature,' with complete break-down of order. Second, Durkheim considers Spencer's non-contractual elements of contract: these agreements are always subject to generalized norms and are not open for negotiation. Rather, they evolve over time and therefore

exist prior to the formation of any such agreements. Thus, the notion of 'precontractual' solidarity. Durkheim also discusses these as they exist in more fully developed societies, where they become part of formal law subject to legal sanction by public authority. These laws constitute the definition of interests in terms of which contracts are entered into, the way in which such interests may legitimately be pursued, and the consequence of contracts upon the interests of those not directly involved. On the one hand, then, the 'institution of contract' is considered primarily part of the legal system. On the other hand, there also exist social structures underlying the norms established by political authority. It is in this latter context that Durkheim develops the idea of organic solidarity in order to show the integrative capacity inherent in societies characterized by structural differentiation and a diversity of interests.

The 'conscience collective' was conceived as underlying organic solidarity; it is a 'system of beliefs and sentiments' held in common by all societal members which defines their mutual relations. This was, as we mentioned, derived in part from Rousseau's 'general will' and from Comte's 'consensus.' Durkheim took this idea further, however, by pointing out that solidarity and collective conscience are 'given,' as <u>variable</u> entities. In this there is reason to distinguish between kinds of solidarity -- the organic and mechanical types. Organic solidarity is "the analytical type characterized by the structural differentiation of the division of labor"; mechanical solidarity is characterized by "uniformity and lack of differentiation." "From this distinction, Durkheim built both historical and comparative dimensions

into his sociological analysis" (Bellah, 1959).

In his early writings, the development of organic solidarity seemed to suggest the loss of collective conscience, or the commonness of beliefs and sentiments. His later writing solves the problem somewhat by pointing out that shared beliefs are a constant feature of all societies, no matter what level of differentiation they have attained. Parsons clarifies this point:

> In the case of mechanical solidarity, these values are not clearly differentiated from the norms through which they are implemented, but in the organic case the norms come to have independent salience. In the relatively less differentiated social systems characterized by mechanical solidarity, common, in some sense uniform, sentiments tend to be implemented directly in collective action, while in the case of organic solidarity the common element lies at a more general level, and must be implemented in relation to different functions in the system through norms that are not identical for different sections of the collectivity.
>
> (Parsons, 1968:314.)

Durkheim fits these generalizations within the Cartesian frame of reference in his analysis of social action. The individual is conceived as an actor in society oriented to the environment in which he acts (he also represents the philosopher-scientist, observing and interpreting the 'facts' of the external world). Durkheim emphasizes the importance of considering the 'social milieu' of actors as their relevant environment. This social milieu is the 'reality sui generis' (as opposed to the idea that the physical environment has its own unique reality), and should be studied as such, in its own right. As Parsons points out, the central task here is defining the properties of this category of reality.

First, Durkheim considers the social milieu from the scientist's point of view, as a factual or empirical reality. The actor's point of view must also be considered, however, and it is in this way that Durkheim describes society as having a given reality -- exteriority -- from the viewpoint of members, but also regulating -- constraining -- their actions. This parallels his earlier study of law as being both an indicator of the structure of society, and a normative component of society -- the beliefs and sentiments of the collective conscience.

Second, Durkheim points out that the scientific observer cannot in this sense be considered a member of society, as are the actors who are oriented to their relevant environment. The essential criterion, Durkheim finds, is that the members internalize the normative elements of culture and social structure; it becomes part of the personality, rather than remaining an outer environment of 'social facts,' as he had earlier thought. Durkheim explains that, through the internalization of values and norms, there exists a 'moral authority' which constrains the individual; simultaneously, there is an element of exteriority, as that which has been internalized remains objectively extended beyond the individual actor -- it is the 'givenness' of empirical existence.

In The Division of Labor, Durkheim rejects the traditional utilitarian claim that increases in the division of labor and progress in economy automatically results in greater happiness. There is instead a rise in suicide rates. In his study of the types of suicide, Durkheim echoes Rousseau's comment upon the paradox of the human situation -- that one should be destined or forced to be free, and

that this freedom may become too much to bear.

The connection made between the evolution of societies and the analysis of actors in society lies in Durkheim's treatment of the definition of reality from the actor's point of view. On the one hand, the cognitive context of the actor's situation refers us to the problem of information-getting and analysis on the part of the individual. On the other hand, and to the extent that reality is a human artifact and is normative for the actor, there is the problem of a proper 'definition of the situation,' as Thomas put it. The key to understanding social behavior, then, lies in the sphere of expectations, and the definitiveness of these. The following shows the problem involved in moving from interaction with the physical world to the realm of social interaction:

	Definitions of Actor Expectations:
physical world:	The situation is most easily defined in terms of actor goals and technical procedures.
social world:	Success is a function of the degree to which an actor can 'make sense' of the situation and his efforts to expend resources; interplay between actor motivation and normative claims.

The social environment of one actor is the other actors. From this context of thought we understand the conception of 'anomie' as a particular state of the society which causes a class of actors to regard the exertion of resources for success meaningless, because there is the lack of a clear definition of what is available to them (Parsons, 1968: 316-317). It is a 'pathology' of the collective normative system, rather than of the instrumental system (ability, skills -- capacity

and means). Along with egoisme, anomie constitues one area of prime concern on the part of Durkheim for modern societies. Egoisme refers to the extreme in institutionalized individualism, and alienation: the alienated person is under such great stress to establish his independence from pressures to conform that he is soon unable to accept the essential normative conditions of the system which is organized for and of individual freedom (Parsons, 1968:317).

Durkheim agreed with Spencer that increasing moral density is critical in determining the nature of social relations. As density increases, mechanical solidarity ceases to be adequate as the sole integrating mechanism of society. Ideas that remain common to an increasing number of people become more and more abstract. In addition, there is greater opportunity for deviant behavior to go unpunished, thus resulting in a gradual breakdown in norms. Last, as resources become more scarce, a division of labor becomes necessary in order to efficiently exploit those scarce resources. Increasingly, organic solidarity comes to replace greater portions of social life. However, organic solidarity is not in itself sufficient to integrate modern societies either: there arise numerous points of societal stress. First, organic society as cooperative society develops to the extent that the individual personally becomes stronger. This means an increase in the individuality of men. Concurrently, however, the highly differentiated units in society remained connected only by way of common enterprise and restitutive laws, to regulate that enterprise. The state, as it replaces old forms of social organization, is as "intrusive as it is impotent"; the situation is reflected in pathologies emerging

in modern relations. Due to the lack of a larger collectivity to identify with, man falls into anomie, or extreme egoism.

Durkheim was hopeful of changes in the future, especially within occupations. In this sphere, as he fairly well predicted, a possible 'remedy' for integrative problems might be found:

> The only decentralization which would make possible the multiplication of the centers of communal life without weakening national unity is what might be called occupational decentralization.
>
> (1954:390.)

The occupational associations must, then, all acquire some form of moral individuality and influence over their members and within society as a whole.

On the level of cultural integration, Durkheim points out that society and culture become more and more differentiated as compared to the primitive systems, where all cultural life was simultaneously religious and social. From the originally religious matrix of society and culture, there develops a 'secular' element, at both the social and cultural levels. Problems of integration are thus also problems of knowledge. In this context of the development of secular elements in culture, however, Durkheim was not ready to admit the total disappearance of religion, as did Marx and Spencer. Rather, every society, no matter what the stage of development, requires some 'functional equivalent' of religion.

To the extent that he posited a direction of change, he was essentially in agreement with the model of the linear evolutionists, although he did not carry their same liberal optimism to quite the same extent.

> Although he was immersed in an intellectual context that reveled in the progress of the human race, Durkheim's own conclusions fell in with the minority who had misgivings if not dispair about the future of humanity. He pointed to the suicide rate as one indicator of the crisis of modern civilization, that is, as evidence of the lack of integration of society. Moreover, he noted that neither kinship nor religion could be an integrating force for man in the modern era and he would not accept the state as a substitute for these older means.
>
> (Lauer, 1977:62-63.)

His one hope for the integration and moral individuality of occupations was not realized in his own time; the future, therefore, was at best precarious (Lauer, 1977:62-63). Put simply, Durkheim thought that perhaps there was an inverse relation between the continued growth of culture and human happiness (Lauer, 1977:62-63). This is a question and possibility that the cyclical theorists will also consider. Collins and Makowsky summarize the intellectual and moral dilemma:

> The optimistic predictions of Comte and Spencer of continual progress in industrial society had not come true. But Durkheim could not accept the Marxist idea that the modern industrial division of labor is inherently contradictory and self-destructive or the conservative idea that we must return to the old order of religion and authority. Durkheim was a bourgeois liberal ...a modernist and nationalist...The purpose of sociology was to explain how to make modern society work.
>
> (1972:81-82.)

VI. Disenchantment with Linear Evolution: The Rationalization of Western Society

Max Weber (1864-1920) represents a rather important orientation toward the study of change and its affects upon various sectors of society in his attitude toward the utilitarian, historical, and

evolutionary schools of thought. His nomonalist position in social science, the assumption that there are no universal essences in society, is the key to his critique of these schools of thought and to the development of his theory of action.

First, against the Marxist insistence that social scientific truths are contingent upon history, Weber insisted upon a 'value free' social science, by way of separating personal evaluations brought to a subject matter from scientific judgement about the actors studied. Second, and closely related, is his criticism of the utilitarians for making exactly this mistake of confusing personal evaluations and concepts with those individuals studied: the equation of utility with goodness results in the 'hedonistic caluculation' of individual actors. Third, Weber legitimated the scientific approach for historical theory by emphasizing the necessity for typological concepts in historical analysis. As against the evolutionary theories before him, Weber insisted that individual action be the unit of sociological analysis:

> Against the view that men's actions have an unintended significance, variously derived from (or imputed to) an Absolute Spirit, the necessities embodied in the organization of production, or the struggle for survival, Weber developed his concepts in terms of the meaning (Sinn) that individuals attribute to their actions in society.
>
> (R. Bendix, 1968:494.)

Meaning as such is an important aspect of man's behavior in society, and should be seen at the individual as well as the social dimension:

> ...in 'action' is included all human behavior when and insofar as...by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes into account the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course.
>
> (Weber, 1922.)

Weber's analysis of the meaning of human action focused on three levels in particular: (1) the process of group formation based on material interests; (2) the process of group formation based on feelings of affinity (feelings of what is right and proper); (3) social relations based on the exercise of authority. In this last context of thought, Weber offers a reinterpretation of the relation between state and society: on the one hand, there are groups based on affinity, as defined above, and on the other, there are those groups based on hierarchical organization and shared beliefs in legitimate authority.

Weber's analysis of change derives from this analysis of social action. The different types of social action classified above are related to the different bases of authority in any social order: rational, traditional, or charismatic. Changes in types of authority and leadership lead to an understanding of changes in types of societies. Ponsioen very generally outlines this connection as follows:

> Weber connects the Gemeinschaft of Toennies with traditional authority, the Bund... /emotional crowd/...of Schmalenbach with Charismatic authority, and the Gesellschaft of Toennies with rational authority.
> (Ponsioen, 1969:98-99.)

Weber's analysis of change may be seen in part as focusing on the oscillation of these three kinds of authority. Traditional authority refers to the 'who' and 'how' of rulers: the ruler is 'sacrosanct' as traditional so long as he is himself ruled by tradition, and his function is to maintain, explain, and if necessary expand tradition to apply to new situations. Rational authority refers not to the person but to the function of his office as the source of authority. Last,

charismatic authority refers to the discipleship relationship based upon the belief in the extraordinary qualities of a leader not bound by either tradition or established order: It is a relationship between followers and leader constituting the dynamic form of authority in Weber's scheme. Its occurrence is uncommon except under the following two conditions: (1) a situation in which one value becomes dominant, as often happens in periods of war, crisis, revolution, or liberation; (2) a situation in which society is dominated by one group that believes in this type of authority (Ponsioen, 1969:99). Charismatic authority tends to originate outside traditional structures, is revolutionary, is not concerned with everyday routine, and is a creative force of change. Weber describes the process of its transformation into a permanent social structure:

> for charisma to be transformed into a permanent routine structure, it is necessary that its anti-economic character be altered. It must be adapted to some form of fiscal organization to provide for the needs of the group and hence to economic conditions necessary for raising taxes and contributions...As soon as control over large masses of people exists, it gives way to the forces of everyday routine. (Weber, 1964:369-370.)

To the extent that it is itself subject to routinization and, later, the legitimacy problems of other types of authority, it articulates the partially cyclical development of societies. Ponsioen describes the process:

> A dynamic theory is involved in this study of authority and legitimacy that can be formulated as follows: real innovation in society originates in charismatic authority which in itself has the tendency to develop into a legal, rational authority and even into routine. Charismatic authority...comes about from the

> mutual challenge of genius and social opportunity, if not as a gift of God. By itself it is opposed to formalities and economy... But it faces two problems: its succession because charisma cannot simply be transferred, and the fastening of its associates who often prefer greater security. Both successors... and associates tend to institutionalize the rule through establishing bureaucracy, and to look for advantages, profits or other rewards. Both bureaucracy and economy have a tendency towards routine...This means that the process of innovation has come to an end, and that society has definitely changed. (1969:114.)

Related to his analysis of the process and consequence of charismatic authority is the relation between ideas and change. Charismatic authority, for example, rules by psychological means, where the views, aims, and interests of the new leader are imposed upon society. Ideologies are thus easily influenced to the extent that ideas of the ruler are made legitimate by the belief of the people in him, rather than by adhering to tradition or legal norms. In the same context, it is when the charismatic leader identifies himself with the peoples' values and interests that charismatic authority promotes rapid change (1969:100).

Weber's analysis of the role of ideas in history offers a different interpretation of the historical process: cultural development is a linear process of increasing rationalization, through growing consistency and coherence. It is during the creative and revolutionary charismatic periods described above that the two modes of cyclical and linear development are seemingly connected:

> Though Weber never fully relates these two themes, he intimates that the social structure 'catches up' with cultural development under the impact of the charismatic periods; at these

> points, the social structure is opened up to reorganization by ever-more 'rationalized' cultural systems. The role of Calvin and other great reformers in introducing a 'Protestant ethic' is a prime illustration.
>
> (Etzioni, 1973:5.)

As concerns this notion of linear cultural development via increasing rationalization, Weber was especially concerned with its effect in the economic sphere and consequent manifestation in the Western enterprise. Capitalism is, in this context, identified as a 'fateful force,' "the pursuit of profit by means of continuous, rational, capitalistic enterprise." It is coincidental with the growing inner consistency and coherence in culture endemic to the increases of rationalization. It is in this description of the West that Weber alluded to the 'disenchantment of the world':

> Weber took from the poet Schiller a phrase that is usually translated as 'the disenchantment of the world.' The German, in fact, means something more precise: The driving out of magic from things...the world of reason is a world in which men lose their manifold natures in the special division of labor, devoting themselves to unambiguously defined tasks. Weber's life was a struggle against such a destiny -- the destiny of the bureaucrat...It is, he wrote, 'the dictatorship of the officials, not of the proletariat, that is marching on.' He did not love this fact.
>
> (Macrae, 1974:97.)

Rationalization was seen to penetrate all areas of life, and yet rational-legal authority is seen as an unstable kind of authority, vulnerable to both traditionalism and charismatic movements. The continued oscillation between the three types of authority was predicted, along with the continued tendency toward increasing rationalization.

The description of modern capitalism leaves Weber somewhat in the

company of those pessimists immediately before and after him, analyzing the make-up of modern social order and modern social action in depth, negating the necessity for a program for change or remedy:

> No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and old ideals, or, if neither, mechanized perfection, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance. For of the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: 'Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nobility imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved.
>
> (Weber, 1958:182.)

VII. Four Requisites for Reviving Liberal Optimism: Talcott Parsons

Parsons began his instruction in the sphere of economics. He replaced Sorokin's orientation toward a cyclical theory of evolution with his department of Human Relations at Harvard, thereby bringing a new range of concerns and orientations to American sociology. In the organicist tradition, Parsons continued the analytical focus upon social structure and the problem of integration and mutual contribution of parts to the working of the whole. In fact, the study of structure is, according to Parsons, prior to the study of processes and change (1966:111).

Parsons describes structure in his definition of a 'system' as two or more interacting units, embedded in a particular environing situation. The social system, as a particular kind of system, refers to a group of individuals interacting to maximize self-gratification within the particular definitive framework of their cultural environment. Parsons defines a social system as the:

> plurality of individual actors interacting with each other in a situation which has at least a physical or environmental aspect, actors who are motivated in terms of a tendency to the 'optimization of gratification' and whose relation to their situations, including each other, is defined and mediated in terms of a system of culturally structured and shared symbols. (1951:5-6.)

The social system is thus defined in terms of its boundaries, normative patterns, and units. Furthermore, the social system and all its units or sub-systems are analyzed in terms of four functions requisite to the system's survival. These functions apply to all systems of action: nature, personality, society, and culture:

system of action:	function:
Behavioral Organism	Adaptation
Personality	Goal Attainment
Social System	Integration
Culture	Latency

Within the social system, the four functions are associated with the following four sub-systems and structural categories which are involved in fulfilling the requisite functions:

sub-system:	function:	structural category:
Economy	Adaptation	Role
Polity	Goal Attainment	Collectivities
Law	Integration	Norms
Family	Latency	Values

Together, the four functional requisites or imperatives refer us to the processes by which self-regulating systems confront and resolve exigencies or problems arising from their respective environments. Adaptation refers to the process of gaining requisite resources necessary for adequate response to environmental demands. Goal attainment refers to the 'mobilization of resources' which involves the element of decision-making in the effort to attain desired ends. Integration refers to the regulation of sub-systems so that they operate together in a harmonious manner, with consistent coherence and solidarity. Latency refers to the maintenance of the system's pattern of values and the management of resources and tensions.

There are two crucial points in the AGIL pattern of imperatives that should be pointed out with reference to the functioning of the overall system. First, norms regulate the processes by which patterned value commitments are implemented; they define and govern relationships and are therefore crucial to system integration. Second, the values which contribute to the pattern maintenance of the system do so by orienting the system and sub-systems toward a desired state. Cultural values are also least susceptible to change. Their transformation, therefore, would mean a transformation of goal values, and thus, of the entire system. The cultural values are in this sense crucial to the maintenance of system boundaries as well as to overall system integration. The environments of each system, their boundaries, and their mutual contribution to the whole are thus all contingent upon the successful resolution of exigencies and the fulfillment of the four functional imperatives.

The interrelatedness of sub-systems and their environments can be more clearly understood in terms of Parsons's cybernetic hierarchy of informational and energic controls (Turner, 1974:42):



The above hierarchy of informational controls and energic conditions delineates the processes of exchange between action components. All interchanges between these deal with 'generalized media of exchange,' which are symbolic modes of informational communication. Each mode of communication or type of media is determined by the functional requisites, as follows:

media:		function:
money	⟷	adaptive
power	⟷	goal attainment
influence	⟷	integration
commitment	⟷	latency

According to Turner, it is within the development of this media-exchange scheme that Parsons envisions a way to classify the locus of change within self-regulating systems:

> What Parsons visualizes is that the information-energic interchanges among action systems provide the potential for change within or between action systems. One source of change may be excesses in either information or energy in the exchange among action systems, which in turn, alter the informational or energic outputs across systems and within any system. For example, excesses of motivation (energy) would have consequences for the enactment of roles, and perhaps ultimately for the reorganization of these roles, of the normative structure, and eventually of cultural value orientations. Another source of change comes from an insufficient supply of either energy or information, again, causing external and internal readjustments in the structure of action systems. For example, value (informational) conflict would cause normative conflict (or anomic), which, in turn, would have consequences for the personality and organismic systems. Thus, inherent in the cybernetic hierarchy of control are concepts that point to the sources of both stasis and change.
>
> (Turner, 1974:43-44.)

It is important to point out here Parsons's distinction between process and change: change refers to "a particular type of process that involves alteration in social structures" (Lauer, 1977:79). There are also two kinds of dynamic problems within systems: (1) the problem of processes of equilibrium; (2) the problem of structural change. The first refers to the assumed 'givenness' of cultural values (their constancy); the second refers to processes involving adjustments within a system. There is also the combined problem involving structural change of sub-systems, but not of the overall system. This is the process of differentiation, which can best be understood in terms of Parsons's paradigm of evolutionary change.

The paradigm of evolutionary change designates four processes taking place within evolving systems: differentiation, adaptive upgrading, coordination of structural units, and generalized inclusion. Understanding

these four processes simultaneously allows one to delineate factors which may inhibit the movement of a system toward enhanced adaptive capacity. Parsons describes the first process of differentiation as occurring when:

> A unit, sub-system, or category of units or sub-systems having a single, relatively well-developed place in the society divides into units or sub-systems (usually two) which differ in both structure and functional significance for the wider system.
>
> (1966:22.)

In the case of primitive social systems, differentiation occurs at the level of general action as the cultural and societal systems are increasingly separated. Religion offers the most conspicuous instance of this separability, as 'greater distance' emerges between the gods and the human condition (1966:24). Differentiation occurs between the personality and society resulting in the greater degree of individual autonomy, and between the organism and the society as technology and economic processes become further developed. Parsons goes on to explain that this differentiation process at the level of action systems stimulates similar differentiation processes at the level of the societal system. The most important of these is the differentiation of the cultural system from the other sub-systems as they establish themselves as 'secular' spheres within the society. A second indicator of this process of development is the differentiation of polity from the societal community through the development of an autonomous legal system. The former focuses on the selection, ordering, and attainment of goals, while the latter is concerned with social integration and the maintenance of solidarity. A last aspect of this process is the differentiation of

the economy from the polity and technology, and from those elements of kinship which contribute to the pattern maintenance function of the system. The development of the market and money institutions constitutes the transition to modern society. Coincidental to these processes of structural differentiation is the differentation of norms, and the specification of a common value pattern appropriate to the newly differentiated situations.

The second evolutionary process mentioned is that of adaptive upgrading. As has been pointed out, given the cybernetic nature of societies, differentiation occurs along functional lines, thus contributing to the enhancement of the overall adaptive capacity of the system:

> each newly differentiated sub-structure...must have increased adaptive capacity for performing its primary function, as compared to the performance of that function in the previous, more diffuse structure.
>
> (1966:22.)

There are two problems in particular, however, that arise with increased differentiation. These are the problems of integration and authority or legitimation, and refer us to the third and fourth processes of coordinating structural units, and general inclusion. First, new sub-structures must be legitimately differentiated from previous structures and coordinated with them, and within the overall system. This takes place through the production of an authority system not based upon previous, diffuse units and their ascriptive sources of authority. Rather, previously excluded groups that have developed legitimate capacities to contribute to the functioning of the system are now included as generalized resources. Second, the value system of the society becomes generalized so that the general pattern of

values establishes the desirability of an overall general type of social system: the value pattern of the society "is couched at a higher level of generality in order to legitimize the wider variety of goals and functions of its sub-units" (1966:23). Through this process, the values of any one collectivity, role, or norm-complex are adjusted and oriented toward the value pattern of the overall system. The more generalized the value patterns, the more flexible the sources of cultural legitimation, and the more autonomous the sub-systems, then, the greater the chance for innovation and transformation to new stages of development.

Last, Parsons points out the possible resistance to these processes through 'fundamentalism,' and the possible acceleration of evolutionary processes through 'fundamental breakthroughs', which may persist long after the society of origin has vanished.

The overall evolutionary process is thus a movement in the direction of enhanced adaptive capacities; this takes place through the four processes outlined above, and results in the more efficient fulfillment of functional requisites for system survival, and thus in a more stable overall system. The analysis of one system in particular by Neal Smelser which follows will illuminate the way in which the Parsonian scheme can be applied to designate the developmental processes of adaptive upgrading.

Smelser's application of the Parsonian framework allows for explanation of short-term adjustments and long-run changes. In his study of the Industrial Revolution (1959) the focus of change is upon the roles in the social system; their 'disappearance, re-creation, and

reorganization' (1959:14).

Like Parsons, Smelser identifies structural differentiation as one of the important changes in a growing system. Differentiation is understood in the context of Parsons's four functional requisites, and refers us to a sequence of seven stages here. Lauer outlines these steps of change:

1. Dissatisfaction deriving from the failure to achieve goals satisfactorily and from the awareness of the possibility of change;

2. Psychic disturbances, taking the form of a variety of emotional reactions and aspirations which are, however, inappropriate in terms of resolving the problems;

3. A more rational use of the energy expended in step 2 in an effort to realize the implications of the existing value system;

4. A brain-storming stage, in which ideas are generated in profusion without anyone's being responsible for their implementation or consequences;

5. An effort to specify the particular ideas and institutional patterns to be implemented;

6. The implementation of change by individuals or groups, with their performance subjected to sanctions in accord with the existing systems of values;

7. The 'routinization' of acceptable changes.

The different stages are not considered inevitable or irreversable by Smelser; regression to any earlier stage is possible under certain conditions. Certain other stages may also persist, or fail to lead to the next stage of development. His application of this framework to industry results in the following functional dimensions of industry (Lauer, 1977:87):

function:	sub-system:
Adaptive	Procurement of capital facilities
Goal Attainment	Control of production
Integrative	Control of industrial organization
Latency	Technical production

The informational and energic hierarchy is implicit here, and each sub-system may be analyzed as a system in itself. Change transpires here through the process of differentiation in each of the above sub-systems. Smelser's analysis points out, for example, the rise of dissatisfaction and disturbance within the family due to the reorganization of roles, which correspond to steps 1 and 2 above. The employment of police action, for example, to cope with these disturbances corresponds to step 3. The remaining steps are all seen to correspond to factory legislation which helped bring the family system of the working classes into the new, differentiated social structure. That values remained constant is, for Smelser, one fact of differentiation that helped legitimate the transition. In contrast to this are theories such as those of Ogburn and Veblen, who point to the discrepancy between traditional values and innovation, resulting in maladjustment.

VIII. Innovation and Adjustment: A Theory of Cultural Lag

William Ogburn (1886-1959) considers two processes similar to those of Parsons -- adjustment and innovation -- and comes up with an opposing statement as to the efficiency of cumulating 'higher-order' developments. Specifically, wherever rates of change differentially affect various parts of culture, there is a condition of cultural lag, "and the consequent adjustment is less satisfactory than that

which obtained originally" (Lauer, 1977:154). The assumption that all sectors of society change concurrently or even in the same direction due to informational hierarchies, for example, does not apply here as Durkheim and Parsons promoted the idea. The focus, rather, is on the 'maladjustments' resulting from differential processes of change.

Ogburn defines social adjustment according to two types: the adjustment between different parts of culture, and the adjustment between man and culture. Problems of adjustment are manifest in different kinds of social behavior, such as crime. The 'cultural lag' leading to such maladjustment is determined by discovery or invention in one sector of culture which causes that sector to change more than different sectors of that same culture. Numerous examples emerge when one considers the different rates of development in technology and certain cultural values, for example, the 'lag' between invention of birth control techniques and the denial of these by religious doctrine. For Ogburn, material culture, or material invention is the major source of change and progress. He posits three other factors contributing to social and cultural change.

The process of 'accumulation' refers to the situation in which a larger number of new elements are added to a culture than are old ones dropped from it. 'Diffusion' refers to the more general distribution of new elements over all sectors of culture. 'Adjustment' refers to problems that arise due to the interdependence of all sectors of a culture.

According to Ogburn, the non-material aspects of culture are what must adjust to material innovation. Any gaps between the material and

nonmaterial spheres represent potential social problem areas. Technology is the major mechanism of change and, as Ogburn makes clear, it may easily create as many problems as it does solutions to social problems. That technological innovation and the application of technology to increasing sectors of cultural life is still seen as the impetus for change defines a new understanding of the future development of modern societies. The view of technology as the core factor in change has led to theories encouraging the use of technicians as leaders in the development of society. The debate over the positive and negative results of technology continues among the ecologists, the unemployed, the 'back to nature' movement, etc., and is one example of exactly what Ogburn meant by his theory of a cultural lag.

IX. Multilinear, General and Specific Evolution

In the early 1900's the theory of evolution was more concretely established in biology than it had been in any other field throughout its history, and it came to be so established through the empirical investigation of what proved to be the faulty generalizations of the nineteenth-century unilinear evolutionists. As we have seen, these nineteenth century theorists based their models on a unilinear theory which assumed (1) cultural evolution is everywhere the same, (2) follows universal principles, and (3) therefore all cultures progress toward the 'goal state' of nineteenth century European civilization. The universe was designed for the production and perfection of man and civilization. We have already seen the major influence between the social, biological, and economic theories of linear change, and the elaborations, objections, and modifications which resulted. As Julian

Steward has pointed out (1956), their undoing was the basic tenet that progress (in the direction of European civilization) was the principle guiding all human development. This principle, as we have seen, was also rejected by the cyclical theorists, and came basically from the biological theorists who traced the progress of human development in a linear direction from simple to complex, 'higher order' forms of civilization. The notion that the universe has any design for man's inevitable progression -- biologically or culturally -- was highly debated by the early 1900's. Empirical investigation of various cultures, in fact, disproved the unilinear evolutionary assumptions above. The discovery that customs spread among different peoples was itself proof that societies do not evolve independently of one another or along a single line of development.

Steward explains that as the unilinear theory was discarded, there was no alternative hypothesis to replace it. Rather, the emphasis within cultural anthropology was on the collection of facts and methods for classifying those facts. Different civilizations were classified comparatively according to facts characterizing their respective 'culture contents.' The assumption here was that cultural patterns are formed on the basis of some ethos, value system, or world view, thus constituting the culture content of different groups. We have seen similar use made of this approach by the cyclical theorists. As Steward points out, however, the problem was that no explanation was provided as to the origin or process of evolution of the different societies.

There are two positions taken recently by evolutionary theorists

in effort to resolve this problem. First, biological evolutionists assume that because man has a 'purpose' and makes plans, he may therefore exercise conscious control over the process of cultural evolution (G. Gaylord Simpson). The other position is a deterministic approach toward cultural evolution which claims that cultures develop according to their own laws (Leslie A. White). The two positions are clearly important in different respects: the former is correct in its description of man's potential and capacity; the latter is correct in describing the origins of particular cultures. As Steward explains, on the one hand, men do have biological bases for making rational solutions, and the different, specific features of cultures may result from the application of reason. At the same time, because circumstances differ (e.g., environmental),those rational solutions will necessarily take different forms. In short, the accumulation of facts makes clear that cultures do not evolve in a unilinear fashion, but progress along a number of lines. In this context Steward proposed the notion of 'multilinear evolution' which is:

> an affirmation that significant cross-cultural regularities exist but a denial that such regulations must pertain to all societies.
> (Steward, 1955:5.)

Specifically, human evolution is not only a matter of biology, but of the "interaction of man's physical and cultural characteristics, each influencing the other" (Etzioni, 1964:137). One major implication of Darwinism, that man was at some point totally without culture, is resolved in this context, as the physical and cultural characteristics of man's development evolved together in a mutual relationship.

Another assumption dissolved by Steward's theory is that of the early cyclical theorists, namely that one must study civilizations as a whole in order to understand the processes and stages of their development:

> it is futile and misleading to attempt to discuss evolutionary transformations of whole cultures. Although all components of a culture -- economics, technology,society, humanistic features, language, and others -- may be described in their interrelatedness as they characterize a society at any given point in time, these components change, or evolve in different ways.
>
> (Etzioni, 1964:138.)

This lies in the same context of thought as Ogburn's theory of cultural lag. Steward gives the example of the difference between technological control over the physical universe, and the stylistic features of art: the former evolves cumulatively, while the latter develops according to its own rationale. Furthermore, socio-political and economic systems are seen to evolve through a series of transformations only partly related to the other components of culture (Etzioni, 1964:139).

Sahlins and Service analyze the evolutionary process in the same general context of a multilinear theory of development. Rejecting unilinear theories of the successive 'stages' of development, the authors point out that evolution occurs not only across the several lines of cultures,but that it proceeds as a dual process of adaptation and progression. The distinction between the two is important here, as it forms the basis of their model of evolution while simultaneously providing grounds to reject the traditional equation ofchange with progress which we came across so frequently in earlier theories.

In both the biological and cultural spheres, human evolution

moves simultaneously in two directions:

> On one side, it creates diversity through adaptive modifications: new forms differentiate from old. On the other side, evolution generates progress: higher forms arise from, and surpass, lower. The first of these directions is Specific Evolution, and the second, General Evolution.
> (Sahlins and Service, 1960:12-13.)

Specific and general evolution are thus two aspects of the same total process of change. They furthermore represent two contexts from which to analyze given events: any change in culture can be viewed either from the standpoint of adaptation or from the viewpoint of overall progress. Both biological and cultural forms undergo these processes of change.

The specific evolution of cultures takes place through adaptive specialization, in which process 'advance' is the normal concomitant, relative to surrounding circumstances:

> In the context of specific evolution 'advance' means that by adaptive modification the population is enabled to maintain or better itself in the face of a threat induced by a changing environment or that it is enabled to exploit the same environment more effectively than before.
> (Sahlins and Service, 1960:14.)

This is similar to Toynbee's theory of challenge and response in that adaptive improvements are relative to adaptive problems. The notion of adaptive specialization is derived from Herbert Spencer, who pointed out that social progress is divergent and redivergent, rather than unalterably unilinear.

According to Sahlins and Service, culture is man's means of adaptation: it "provides the technology for appropriating nature's energy and putting it to service, as well as the social and ideological

means of implementing the process" (Sahlins and Service, 1960:24). Therefore, as survival or adaptive problems change, so will the particular culture. Certain 'culture traits' constitute the raw materials of a culture which are adapted or oriented to the environment: if this adaptation occurs through the synthesis of traits within a culture, invention has taken place; if traits are made available from the outside to aid in adaptation, the process is one of diffusion or acculturation. Each new trait created through any of these processes for the purpose of adaptation is considered an 'advance' in the sense described above. The study of the emergence of specific traits or features through adaptation originated in Steward's theory of multilinear evolution.

General cultural evolution refers to the "successive emergence of new levels of all-around development" (Sahlins and Service, 1960:28). It does not necessarily mean, however, a historically continuous, phylogenetic process. Rather, it refers to higher forms of life regardless of particular sequences or lines of descent in the process of adaptive modification. The study of general evolution would thus require removing the unit of interest from its historical lineage and grouping it according to types which represent the levels of all-around progress evolution has brought forth. The difference between the two aspects of evolution and the way they must be studied can be clarified by analogy. The authors describe the dual process of adaptation and progression in terms of a climbing vine. Each new branch of the line represents a major divergence through time; smaller branches represent diversification of major lineages. The 'height'

of the vine would represent the levels of its general development over time; the branching out would refer to specific changes through adaptive specialization. The authors summarize the difference between the two aspects of evolution as follows:

> General cultural evolution...is passage from less to greater energy transformation, lower to higher levels of integration, and less to greater adaptability. Specific evolution is the phylogenetic, ramifying, historic passage of culture along its many lines, the adaptive modification of particular cultures.
> (Sahlins and Service, 1960:38.)

Last, the authors discuss the modern debate between evolutionary theorists over the distinction between 'history' and 'evolution.' Like Steward, the authors point out the nineteenth century tendency of cultural evolutionists to study general progress only. The method was to determine stages of development and give examples by comparison to contemporaneous cultures. The twentieth-century tendency, on the other hand, has been to study specific evolution only. The authors contend that the enthusiasm over this perspective was in part a reaction against the nineteenth century tradition, and in part due to the particularistic and historical orientation of the twentieth century theorists. Steward's theory of multilinear evolution is a case in point, especially with the emphasis upon cross-cultural regularities and the emergence of specialized features or specific cultural traits. Both Kroeber and Steward are of an orientation which suggests that evolution <u>is</u> the historic process. Evolutionary development is historical, and evolutionary theorists are concerned with historical reconstruction. Leslie White represents the opposite side of the debate, claiming that history is a unique sequence of events located

in time and space, while evolution is the progression of forms, without reference to time or space. The evolutionary process is therefore not concerned with unique events or a specific sequence of particular events, but with the sequence of events as a general process. Those who follow Steward's point of view, then, emphasize specific evolution, while those following White tend to emphasize general evolution. The authors contend that their model of specific and general evolution as dual aspects of the same total process resolves the debate:

> The historic development of particular cultural forms is specific evolution, phylogenetic transformation through adaptation...The progression of classes of forms, or in other words, the succession of culture through stages of overall progress, is general evolution. (1960:43.)

B. Cyclical Theories of Change

I. The Dangers of the Western Myth: Social Concern and Social Decline

We have pointed out the growing tendency toward a rather pessimistic attitude regarding the future of modern societies. From Rousseau's idea of men being forced to freedom and Nietzche's nihilism to Durkheim's fear for solidarity and Simmel's rejection of the laws of history as fiction, there is increasing pessimism, but continued concern for the meaning of history and direction of the future. The cyclic, 'rise and fall,' and life-cycle theories all capture both these moods, and occupy one very important era of thought within modern sociology. Insofar as these theories are later rejected for their lack of empirical evidence, there is much captured in the way of understanding the movement of sociocultural forces throughout history. The focus on the constitution of modern societies is still very much a dominant concern here,

as in understanding the relationship of individuals to society in past, present, and future systems. This period of thought is a romanticizing of the past and a critique of the present. Overall, these theories are an insightful and synthetic overview of the historical process and a caution about the future. The social concern for 'who we are' and 'how we should live' is as central to these theorists as it was to the moralists and naturalists more than one hundred years earlier. The question of a 'goal' toward which mankind is moving is still debated -- seemingly, an adequate interpretation of the past is still lacking and still requisite to understanding the meaning of the present and future.

Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) represents a new type of evolutionism which emerged after the war, along with the rejected belief in indefinite human progress. Since Spencer's organismic theory of society and his fundamental law of the dynamics of all evolution, it was typical to speak of societies by way of organismic analogy, and to consider the phases and stages of civilizations as they progress, regress, or disappear. Spengler's Decline of the West (1926) is essentially a theory of the inevitable processes of progression and regression. He applies the organistic analogy to all parts of culture -- birth, adolescence, maturity, decay and death. In this he is the modern counterpart to Spencer's belief in progress.

For Spengler, "cultures are the organisms, and world history is their collective biography." The parallel between a culture's life-cycle and that of the human organism extends even to the fixed duration of generations as well. All the stages of cultural growth and decay have definite time periods: (1) the period of political, intellectual,

and artistic 'becoming' lasts 50 years; (2) the 'manhood' of culture lasts 300 years; (3) the entire life-cycle of a culture lasts a millenium. Furthermore, all cultures are morphologically the same in this respect: all religious, political, economic, scientific and artistic creations surface, fulfill themselves, and die contemporaneously in all cultures. The following passage from The Decline of the West describes the growth and decline processes:

> Every culture passes through the age-phases of the individual man. Each has its childhood, youth, manhood and old age. It is a young and trembling soul, heavy with misgivings, that reveals itself in the morning of Romanesque and Gothic...Childhood speaks to us also -- and in the same tones -- out of early Christian (which is really Arabian) arts...The more nearly a culture approaches the noon civilization of its being, the more verile, austere, controlled, intense the form-language it has secured for itself; the more assured the sense of its own powers, the clearer its lineaments...At last, in the grey dawn of civilization, the fire in the soul dies down. The dwindling powers rise to one more half-successful effort of creation and produce the classicism that is common to all dying cultures. The soul sinks once again and in Romanticism looks piteously back to its childhood; then finally, weary, reluctant, cold, it loses its desire to be and, as in imperial Rome, wishes itself out of the over-long daylight and back in the darkness of protomysticism, in the womb of the mother, in the grave...

The basic form of Spengler's philosophy is like that of Danilevsky, and like him, Spengler discovers that the modern western method of dividing history into the Ancient-Medieval-Modern eras from the standpoint of the west is not only inadequate, but meaningless. It is a scheme whose:

> simple rectilinear progression and meaningless proportions become more and more prepostorous with each century...The natural scientist freed himself from this illusion of a relative distance long ago; the historian remains its victim.
>
> (Sorokin, 1950:72.)

In contrast, Spengler sets up a 'Copernican viewpoint' of history, which viewpoint allows the west no privileged position in evaluating the attained stages of other 'high cultures.'

The philosophical pressupposition of Spengler's Copernican view of history is a dualistic vision of reality ('existence,' or 'cosmic energy'): there exists the World-as-Nature and the World-as-History. Nature is the image ('shape') in which man interprets the impressions of his senses; History is the image he creates in order to understand the world in relation to his own life. These two aspects of existence and 'world images' lead to different methods of cognition, and two different types of consciousness and science, the natural scientific and the historical. The following indicates the difference between these in the realm of science (Sorokin, 1950:76):

Historical 'physiognomic'	Naturalistic 'systematic'
based upon the immediate, instinctive apprehension of the living potentiality (life and soul) through the method of living into the object as opposed to dissecting it.	based upon observation and dissection of the (dead) thing become from outside, never living into the object, and identifying the cognizing subject with the cognized object.
organic logic and instinctive dream; cannot be taught; means of imputing it are analogy, picture, symbol.	is learned, and one can be trained in it; means of imputing it are concept; causal formula, law, scheme.
means of understanding living forms is analogy.	means of identifying dead forms is mathematical law.
inward necessity of Destiny. Constructive action becoming Destiny.	mechanical timeless necessity of ever-repeated cause and effect.

Spengler's point in this can be clarified somewhat by looking at his attitude toward the method of Darwinism in trying to understand history:

> At present...we look in vain for any treatment of history that is entirely free from the methods of Darwinism -- that is, of systematic natural science based on causality. A physiognomic that is precise, clear, and sure of itself and its limits has never yet arisen, and it can only arise through the discoveries of method we have yet to make. Herein lies the great problem set for the twentieth century to solve -- to explore carefully the inner structure of the organic units in and through which world history fulfills itself...

A 'history of human progress' suppresses our understanding of culture, the history of which is the actualizing of all its inner possibilities. The fulfillment of culture is equivalent to the 'end.' In this, Spengler is rejecting the linear view of history for his 'Copernican' view that cultures are 'aimless' in their many creations, transformations, and self-expressions. There is no 'aging' of mankind as a whole, nor is there any 'plan' of history.

> Mankind has no aim, no idea, no plan...Mankind is a zoological expression, or an empty word... I see, in place of that empty figment one linear history...The drama of a number of mighty cultures...; each having its own idea, its own passion, its own life, will and feeling, its own death...Here the Cultures, peoples, languages, truths, gods...movements, bloom and age...but there is no aging of 'mankind.'
>
> (Sorokin, 1950:77.)

In identifying the stages of culture as those of the age stages of man, Spengler describes a stage of 'culture' as a stage of struggle and 'becoming'; the stage of 'civilization' as the destiny of culture and

the conclusion, 'the thing become.' The following allows us to compare the stage of culture or 'becoming' with the stage of civilization or 'thing become,' with special attention to a civilization's last efforts for revival (Sorokin, 1950:77):

Primary characteristics of 'culture' and 'civilization' stages:

Culture phase	Civilization phase
(childhood, youth and noon)	
home; race; blood group; fatherland	cosmopolitanism and the megalopolis
religion of the heart	scientific irreligion or abstract dead metaphysics
reverence and tradition; respect for age	cold matter of factness
country and nation	international society
earned rights	natural rights
real (living) values	abstract value and money
folk	mass
motherhood	sex
inward direction of the cultural man	imperialistic expansion; urbanization; internationalization; outward direction of man's energy
quality and unity	cult of bigness; class struggle; lust for power

Spengler (1926) summarizes these differences as follows:

> In this late stage several imitative attempts to revive the values, patterns, and spirit of the earlier phase of culture appear, but all remain fruitless. In the stage of Culture all struggles...are the actualization of an idea into a historical fact. In the stage of Civilization all that remains is the struggle for mere power, for animal advantage as such. A civilization can last for hundreds and thousands of years in a petrified state...

Spengler's analysis further points out that each culture will have its own 'prime symbol' which determines all the essential characteristics of a given culture. A culture's science, philosophy, arts, beliefs, ways of acting and mentality will be determined equally by some 'prime symbol.' As Sorokin has pointed out, this aspect of Spengler's understanding of culture and history is more important in the work of Wissensoziologie or the sociology of knowledge. Generally speaking, there will be as many prime symbols -- as many religions, philosophies, psychologies, etc. -- as there are cultures. Spengler then goes on to explain in detail the different prime symbols that have existed for the great cultures, and the consequent 'personality' that develops in all areas of culture, from philosophy to architecture. Each culture, then, shapes its own destiny, and gives its own meaning and style to all social phenomena.

As Sorokin tells us, Spengler's entire work is a systematic demonstration of the cultural determination of all mental productions. And since all cultures and their prime symbols differ, there can be no one universally identical or universally accepted philosophy, religion, science, belief, or value. Spengler also discovers in his analysis of cultures that the classical period of cultures possessed no memory or history: "The past and the future are drowned in the present." Western cultures are uniquely 'historical' with their indefinite projection into both the past and the future.

> The mechanical clock invented by the West -- the dread symbol of the flow of time -- and countless clocks on our towers chiming night and day, are the most marvelous expressions of the historical world-feeling of Western man. We men of the Western culture have

> this exceptional historical sense and the 'world history' we construct is our world picture and not all mankind's.
> (Sorokin, 1950:83.)

In addition to the uniqueness of different cultural historical views, there are also unique systems of morals and ethics: "each culture has its own standards, the validity of which begins and ends with it" (Spengler, 1926:341). For example, the specifically western ethics are those of 'will,' the moral imperative, the 'thou shall' of the claim to power. All such ideas change along with the forms of social organization, in the same direction, and at the same time.

As for the contemporary western world, it is in the late stage of 'civilization' -- declining. Money and democracy destroy themselves from within. Government becomes that of the prime party -- that of money and mind, the liberal, the megalopitan. The stage to follow will be one of the dictatorial individual rather than the party program. The western world cities are full of contradictions. The source of their destruction, thus, lies within. Sorokin describes Spengler's orientation toward the present and future of western society:

> We are the observers and actors in the last act of a great culture's tragedy...The mechanization of the world has entered a phase of highly dangerous over-tension. All organic things are dying...It begins to contradict even its own economic practice.
> (Sorokin, 1950:103.)

There are momentary revivals in religion and philosophy -- a second religiosity may begin. But the flight from the machine has already begun, as the machine technics begins to destroy itself. For Spengler, we will find one day that our technology lies in fragments:

> forgotten, our railways and steamships dead as the Roman roads and Chinese wall...The history of the megalopolitan machine technics is fast drawing to its inevitable close. It will be eaten up from within, like the grand forms of any and every culture.
> (Spengler, 1926:Vol. II:103.)

These, then, constitute the major characteristics of the new evolutionism following World War I. In comparison to the reaction of social theorists after the French and Russian Revolutions, there is no optimism here about making modern society work. The analytical focus on sociocultural developments have been essentially the same, especially with regard to government, law, morals, and the problems of alienation and segmentation due to advancing technology, and corresponding changes in social and occupational organizations. The theories of change following Spengler's Decline of the West are for the most part very similar, both in their orientation toward the future and in the comparative historical method. Together, they represent the social concern for the near-total scientific myth of the West, and pessimistically identify with an age of decline and self-destruction.

II. Rediscovering Historical Meaning: Challenge and Response

In Arnold J. Toynbee's search for general laws explaining the internal dynamics of cultures, we are given the feeling once more that there is some underlying pattern and meaning in history. He thus arrives at several different conclusions than those of Spengler, though the overall orientation regarding the future of mankind remains the same.

Toynbee's model of change is based upon the theory of 'challenge and response.' Generally speaking, a first 'challenge' comes from the natural world environment, and the strength or weakness of this

challenge determines the response, or lack of response, that comes from the population challenged. According to Toynbee, the 'average' challenge causes the development of a creative minority, whose response to the challenge allows the group to break away from their static, unchanging condition. Like Spengler, Toynbee assumes that civilizations pass through the phases of birth, growth, disorganization and breakdown. Also similar to Spengler's theory is the idea that, during periods of disorganization, a civilization embodies a chance for the growth of a new culture. If there is no response to a given challenge during such periods, however, the civilization breaks down, and the potentially new culture never appears.

Toynbee also points out several normal sources of conflict within civilizations: (1) conflict arising from the expansion of units or organizing patterns; (2) conflict arising from a loss of creativity within the minority; (3) seniority of traditionalistic, but unsatisfactory responses; (4) invasion (Ponsioen, 1969:82). Toynbee uses the empirical approach to investigate the life-cycle of twenty-one civilizations, describing normal challenges and responses and the 'wrong' responses that have been made. The overall process of challenge and response is a cyclical movement. However, Toynbee also finds indications of a linear movement in his cultural generations theory: the dying off of any civilization may result in the birth of a new one. Furthermore, religion constitutes the progressive factor in the growth of civilizations: it is born within a suppressed inner proletariat of the civilization as it looks for a better way of life, and grows from an anthromorphism to an increasingly spiritualistic form -- from

particularism to universalism (Ponsioen, 1969:82). As far as a 'goal' toward which humanity is moving may be concerned, the overall cyclical movement is described as the movement of wheels, without knowing which direction the car is moving. Ponsioen clarifies these two views concerning cyclical movement and linear direction:

> ...his description of cyclical movements of civilizations is much more empirical than his 'synthesis' of a linear movement through all civilizations. The latter is based upon the philosophical assumption that mankind is basically a historical identity and that its history has meaning.
>
> (1969:84.)

As concerns the West in particular, Toynbee sees the essential 'challenge' as that coming from other countries who employ our techniques and may use them against us. The 'proper' response coming from the West would be in the nature of a creative answer within the polity: the West should respond by making a world federalism. In the area of religion, the response should be that of achieving a higher form of religion: Christianity needs to be 'enriched' by the philosophies of Buddhism, Islam and Hinduism.

There are three principle forces of change in Toynbee's theory. The first of these is the 'creative minority' or elite, who may through their responses become a dominant majority. The second of the forces is the 'inner proletariat,' and the third is the 'outer proletariat.' The assumption here is that, so long as the creative minority comes up with a response that is understandable and provocative for the masses, as well as being theoretically 'right,' the rest of the population or inner proletariat will then follow their lead.

The notion of an 'inner proletariat' comes from Marx and refers to the idea that a non-creative minority may maintain its elite status by force, exploiting the masses for its own support and benefit. The 'outer proletariat' refers to those who are not of one's own civilization -- usually of a 'lower' culture. Important to Toynbee's theory of the evolution of civilizations is his decision as to what constitutes continued growth. For example, geographic expansion does not mean the growth of a civilization -- it is even associated with the civilization's retardation and disintegration. Technological progress and mastery over the natural world environment does not mean growth either: "there is no correlation between progress in technique and progress in civilization" (1934-1939:173-174). Rather, growth involves the 'withdrawal and return' of a creative elite in the process of new responses to greater challenges. A culture may also grow in terms of its 'self-determination' and 'self-articulation', and with the simplification of its techniques. The civilization grows as a unity: there is no struggle between the creative minority and the inner proletariat, but a solidary body from which dominant potentialities emerge, different for each civilization. The entire growth of a civilization depends upon continuous successful responses to given challenges.

The disintegration and breakdown phases are distinguished by the lack of appropriate responses to new challenges. In the growth phase, both challenges and responses constantly vary, so long as proper responses are always made. In the disintegration or disorganization phase, however, the attempted responses vary while the challenge

remains the same, unanswered and unremoved (Ponsioen, 1969:117): "The author's verdict is that civilizations perish through suicide but not through murder." Toynbee cites three specific causes of breakdown: (1) failure on the part of the minority's creative power; (2) a withdrawal on the part of the majority; (3) a consequent loss of social unity in the society as a whole. More specifically, Toynbee draws the overall picture in the following manner:

> When in the history of any society a Creative Minority degenerates into a mere Dominant Minority which attempts to retain by force a position which it has ceased to merit, this fatal change in the character of the ruling element provokes, on the other hand, a succession of Proletariat (the majority) which no longer spontaneously admires or freely imitates the ruling element, and which revolts against being reduced to the status of an unwilling 'underdog.' This Proletariat, when it asserts itself, is divided from the outset into two distinct parts. There is an 'Internal Proletariat' and...an "External Proletariat' of barbarians...who now violently resist incorporation. And thus the breakdown of a civilization gives rise to a class-war within the body social of a society which was neither divided against itself by hard-and-fast divisions nor sundered from its neighbors by unbridgible gulfs so long as it was in growth.
>
> (1934, Vol. IV:6.)

The creative minority is 'intoxicated by victory' from successful responses, and begins to lose its charismatic attraction. Consequently, it must use force in order to control the internal and external Proletariat. It creates a Universal State, engaging in war in effort to save itself and the civilization. The internal Proletariat recedes, and may create some form of a universal church as its own constitution and creed. According to Toynbee, whereas the Universal State will inevitably destroy itself, the Universal Church of the inner Proletariat

will remain and become the 'bridge' and 'foundation' of a new civilization.

Toynbee also points out four personality types which are prominent in the phase of disintegration: the Archaist, the Futurist (Saviors by Sword), the Stoic, and transfigured religious saviors. The latter type appears to be the only way to improve the situation, by transferring goals and values to the Kingdom of God. In this there is a chance for the emergence of a new civilization, which then constitutes the first step in the process of moving from the 'City of Man' to the 'City of God,' the ultimate point for man and his civilization. In Toynbee's words:

> The music that the rhythm of Yin and Yang beats out is the song of creation...Creation would not be creative if it did not swallow up in itself all things in Heaven and Earth, including its own antithesis.
> (1934, Vol. VI:234.)

The analysis of the twenty-one civilizations is tested by known empirical facts, and this is a major contribution to historical analysis. The historical process is seen as a progressive realization of God, the movement of religion being linear and continuously upward or 'Heavenly-word'; the movement of civilizations is cyclical and recurring in the challenge-response process -- movement toward heaven made via the cycles of birth and death. Overall, there is a meaningful consistency characterizing the unity of growing civilizations.

The declining phase has three sub-phases: (1) breakdown; (2) disintegration; (3) dissolution. As with Spengler's theory, the disintegration phase may last for centuries. The destiny of most civilizations, however, is a final dissolution and the Western society

has all the symbols of breakdown and disintegration.

III. The Crisis of Our Age: Illusions of Truth

Pitirim Sorokin (1889-1968) covered as wide a range of time and human history as did Toynbee and Spengler, and envoked a similar comparative historical approach, grounded on empirical evidence of previous and present sociocultural systems. Sorokin's analysis of the historical process is somewhat more precise than those cyclical theories before him, if only because his analytical scheme is more thorough and systematization of cultural-types and their component parts is more consistent. Like Toynbee and Spengler, Sorokin finds a cyclical pattern in the variations of the historical process.

Sorokin's method for analyzing sociocultural systems is logico-meaningful; it:

> invokes the discovery of some central principle around which a system is organized and which gives meaning to each of the elements of the system, thereby integrating them into the whole.
>
> (Lauer, 1977:42.)

Using this method, Sorokin identifies three sociocultural systems, called 'supersystems': ideational, sensate, and idealistic. Each of these types of supersystems refers to a dominating principle which characterizes the essential elements of that system. The primary aspects of a culture -- its system of truth, religion, art, ethics, law, philosophy, and family organization -- are then qualitatively and quantitatively examined with respect to the dominant principle. Qualitatively, the above aspects would be examined in accordance with the degree to which they show the principle of idealistic, ideational

or sensate culture. Quantitatively, the same aspects would be examined in terms of the rate of occurrence one of the principles was evidenced for a given time period. Lauer provides an example:

> For example, the percentage of thinkers who held to an ethics of happiness and those who advocated an 'absolute' ethics (such as the moral commandments of religion) was computed for each century, and was found to vary from certain periods in which all thinkers held to an absolute ethics to periods in which the distribution was nearly even. (1977:42.)

Sorokin defines a 'great culture' as one which exhibits a "unity or individuality whose parts are permeated by the same fundamental principle and articulate the same basic value" (1941:17). As with many of the evolutionist theories since Durkheim, the principle of integration is very much connected to the idea of a growing and creative culture.

The three supersystems with their dominating principles may be defined in this manner:

system:	principle:	emphasis:
Ideational	principle of God as true reality and value	spiritual and nonmaterial
Sensate	principle that the sensory world is the true reality and value	materialistic and hedonistic
Idealistic	reality and value are partially sensory and partially suprasensory	balanced emphasis, usually with ideational slightly dominant over sensate principles

In the ideational cultures, individual needs are perceived as being spiritual, and liberty means an inward freedom, based on the control of desires. Truth here is revealed, and is apprehended by mystic

experiences, intuition, or direct revelation. The focus in art is upon the "supersensory Kingdom of God" and is symbolic and religiously oriented. In contrast to this is the sensate culture, where individual needs are physical, and are focused around attempts to gratify the senses. Liberty in this context refers to the individual liberty to do whatever one wants, and freedom means freedom from external constraints. Truth is gained by way of the senses: if a statement cannot be verified by the senses, it cannot be held as true. The focus of art here is upon the empirical world, and aims at providing sensual gratification. The idealistic system usually emerges during times of transition, from the ideational to the sensate systems.

Sorokin points out that no total homogeneity is possible in any empirical culture, but the most important or dominant aspects of a culture may be examined with regard to the dominating principle and the degree of integration inherent in order to discover its state or stage of development. Furthermore, although the historical process is seen to consist of an oscillation between these system types, the return to a sensate system, for example, does not mean regression to the same material and ideational content of some previous sensate culture. Neither is there a linear pattern to history; cycles of these cultural patterns characterize the historical process: "History is an oscillation between opposing cultural forms such as materialism-idealism (Lauer, 1977:44).

Sorokin identifies three major components of empirical socio-cultural systems: a system of meanings based on the dominant principle, vehicles which 'objectify' those meanings, and human agents who actualize

or realize the system of meanings through the media of vehicles. For example, the United States Constitution constitutes a system of meanings; documents, ceremonies and particular buildings are the vehicles of these meanings; particular people in certain roles are the human agents who actualize the meaning of the Constitution by way of certain vehicles (Lauer, 1977:44).

There are two aspects to consider when speaking of the growth and decline of sociocultural systems. The first of these is the system's qualitative growth. In this context, any or all of the above components -- meanings, vehicles, agents -- are improved upon. For example, our legal system would more closely approximate equality for societal members, and lawyers would conform to higher ethical standards (Lauer, 1977:44). The second aspect to consider is quantitative growth: a quantitative increase in the vehicles and/or agents of the system. For example, the legal system would be expanded to include a greater number of courts and lawyers, and with a greater number of laws. For Sorokin, it is a "movement toward the optimum integration of the system." However, the relation between these two kinds of growth varies. In early stages of development, both may proceed together; in later stages of development, they may move independently of one another or inversely. Sorokin makes clear that:

> ...a fairly uniform symptom of disintegration in any great supersystem of culture is the substitution of quantitative colossalism for a sublime quality; of glittering externality for inner value; of a show for a substance. So it was in the past, and so it is in the present.
>
> (1941:252.)

Cultures decline, then, along with increased emphasis upon quantity. A system will die when its meanings deteriorate, and although the life-time of any system varies, most are finite. All systems, then, pass through the stages of growth and decline.

Sorokin describes the change of a system vis-a-vis its relation to the component parts with a series of propositions, as Lauer has outlined:

> First, in a closely integrated system, the change will occur as a whole; all parts will change together. Second, if the system is not closely integrated, change may occur in some subsystems without occurring in others; only significant change in the more important parts of the system will effect change throughout so that the entire culture will experience change. Third, if a culture is merely a grouping of congeries, any part may change without affecting any other part. Fourth, if the culture is composed of the 'co-existence' of a number of systems and congeries, the culture will change differently in its varied parts; namely all the important parts will change together, while the congeries will change independently of each other.
>
> (Lauer, 1977:45.)

Again, change of, or within a system is related to the extent of integration within that system.

Sorokin also posits three primary mechanisms of change: (1) change as the result of factors external to the sociocultural system (e.g., for a change in family organization, one may look to economic or demographic factors); (2) change due to factors internal to the system; (3) change due to both internal and external factors (Lauer, 1977:46). As Lauer points out, Sorokin favors the principle of imminence as depicting the primary source of change. This principle basically states that it is

in the nature of the system to change: any sociocultural system that exists and is active in some sense is thereby changing. In addition, any change may be introduced by the three components; meaning, vehicle, agent.

In one sense, Sorokin gives man a very passive role as a source of change. In our contemporary sensate society, where crises already exist, men are instrumentalities or puppets, "subject to impersonal forces rather than manipulating their own destiny." He further points out the repetition of mistakes and crises throughout history: men seem to learn hardly anything at all. On the other hand, in The Crisis of Our Age, Sorokin's appeal is explicitly to men; that they should recognize the state of the present crisis and change their present situation by reordering their values and mentality. With Spengler, Sorokin sees the West in a stage of decline: it is an 'over ripe' sensate culture. The near future is predicted to consist of the degeneration of values, proliferation of force and fraud, the loss of freedom, growth of tyranny, deterioration of family and loss of creativity (1957:775-777). Nevertheless, Sorokin explicitly appeals to men to make the necessary transition to an idealistic or ideational system as quickly and painlessly as possible. The prerequisite is the reorientation of values, mentality, and conduct in the idealistic or ideational mode. This being the only 'remedy' for our sensate culture, Sorokin outlines the necessary steps of this transition: crisis; ordeal; catharsis; charisma; resurrection. The catharsis consists of the transference of allegiance from sensate to idealistic or ideational values, given the realization of the crisis situation

in the first two steps. Charisma refers to a constructive stage, where values become absolute and universal, and emphasis is upon such things as duty and altruistic relations. The last step of resurrection refers to the new period of creativity setting in, once a stable order has been established.

In his discussion of our present crisis situation, Sorokin gives close analysis of the different systems of truth for each of the sociocultural systems. Our 'crisis' is seemingly rooted in our system of truth:

> Its first fallacy is the illusion that there can be only one valid system of truth -- that of the senses...Its second fallacy is the belief that in the course of time there has been a steady linear trend in the direction of sensory truth at the expense of faith and of dialectical and speculative reasoning... (1941:103-104.)

Again, speaking of the social sciences, Sorokin's criticism is the same, and questions our contemporary orientation toward and efficiency in effecting changes for the future:

> The practical failure of the decadent empiricism of contemporary culture is demonstrated by our increasing inability to control mankind and the course of the sociocultural process...The more economists have tampered with economic conditions, the worse they have become; the more political scientists have reformed the governments, the more are governments in need of reform; the more sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, and lawyers have tampered with the family, the more the family has disintegrated; the more 'scientific' solutions are offered for crime, the more numerous become the crimes, and so on. Despite all the natural and social sciences at our disposal, we are unable either to control the sociocultural process or to avoid the historical catastrophes.

The critique is equally as pessimistic and socially concerned as were

Spengler's and Toynbee's, and follows the same line of reasoning as did theirs -- pointing out the necessity for a change in values and questioning the system of truth. The task at hand is one of transformation, and Sorokin describes the only way in which this will happen:

> Our remedy demands a complete change of the contemporary mentality, a fundamental transformation of our system of values, and the profoundest modification of our conduct toward other men, cultural values, and the world at large.
>
> (1941:321.)

C. Conflict Theories of Change

1. The Natural and Social Origins of Conflict

Our survey of the various theories of change has shown among other things that all societies require at least some realistic awareness of the potential sources and consequences of change and conflict in order to survive, if not progress. A brief review of the way in which the idea of conflict has been incorporated into several of the earlier evolutionary theories will help us to understand the attitude toward change and conflict in modern theories.

The idea of conflict as a 'fact' of the natural and social world is found as early as the writings of Heraclitus in Classical Greece. The notion proposed here is that conflict is the 'law' of the visible universe; everything is in the process of transformation into its opposite. This conception of the universality of conflicting opposites underwent several transitions and re-interpretations throughout history, but, as we shall see, it rises again in the nineteenth century to explain not only the process of history but the social processes

of modern societies as well.

Epicurus (342?-270 B.C.) united the sophist equation of 'might and right' with the atomists' conception of structure and Heraclitus' notion of universal and eternal change. According to Epicurus, man is a savage in his natural state. The movement toward civilization is therefore a struggle with nature, and following this is an interhuman struggle. It is only through fear of punishment that man is deterred from harmful acts.

Polybius (c. 205-125 B.C.) provides the first full interpretation of change in this perspective in his analysis of forms of government. First, weak men are moved to live with the strongest in order to survive, and this constitutes the origin of community living. The first form of community is that of monarchy, based on power relations. Out of a felt obligation to keep peace, kingship arises as a second form of social order, based upon the first notions of justice and legitimate authority. When this felt need for justice becomes relaxed somewhat or forgotten, kingship is replaced by tyranny. As this form of social order is in turn corrupted, it is overthrown by an aristocracy. As the 'sense of mission' to recover justice is forgotten, the aristocracy also becomes corrupt and is in turn overthrown by a democracy. Last, as liberty and equality come to be taken for granted, and conspiracies develop, a monarchy is needed once again to restore law and order. Each type of order is thus replaced through a process of conflict. This doctrine of conflict and model of the successive stages of social order were incorporated into the Roman doctrines by Lucretius and Horace, in part as a justification for Roman expansionist

policies.

In contradiction with medieval world views and the doctrines of Christianity, the conflict model was abandoned, with the exception of its popularity in the Arab world. We pointed out the conflict theory of Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) earlier with reference to the way in which weaker groups are forceably overtaken by stronger groups exhibiting greater solidarity. According to Khaldun, society originated out of the necessity for survival, but as soon as men come together there is the further necessity to restrain them from their 'animal propensities' for aggression and oppression. This restraint necessarily emerges in the form of a single leader, the sovereignty:

> The State is...to society as form is to matter, for the form by its nature preserves the matter and, as the philosophers have shown, the two are inseparable.
>
> (Martindale, 1960:133.)

This conception of the State and of basic human nature was later employed by Machiavelli (1469-1527), and by the rationalists in their theory of social contract. For Machiavelli, "Men are bad and ever ready to display their viscious nature, wherever they find occasion for it"(1946:134). The desire for conquest is natural. When the population increases and men come into closer contact with one another, men elect one leader in order to protect themselves from each other, and whom they promise to obey. Like Polybius and Khaldun, Machiavelli points out that once the sovereignty becomes non-elective or corrupt in any way, the succession of governments takes place from prince to tyrant, to aristocracy, democracy and to anarchy once more.

Jean Bodin (1530-1596) continued the study of sovereign power as the essence of society, and the crucial place of conflict in forming

a 'stable' social structure through the continuous process of dissolution and reorganization. Revolutions are seen in this context as changes in the location of authority. Bodin further pointed out that in every association of men, the subjection of some men to others has always existed.

We have already seen the role that conflict is given in the establishment and maintenance of social order by the rationalists. Hobbes' empirical conception of knowledge led him to the principles of desire or appetite and aversion to explain human behavior. Deliberation is the alteration in individuals between desire and aversion, and the last act of either one leading to action is called will. On the basis of these principles of human nature, Hobbes approaches the question of the possibility of social order. All natural relations are based upon competition, distrust, and struggle. The natural state is thus one of war, and the natural right of man is the right to do anything for self-preservation. The state thus originates out of the need for self-preservation, and the contract of sovereignty is one of obedience to justice.

This rationalist foundation of conflict theory is shifted to an empirical foundation by Hume (1711-1776). Force and public opinion are the main factors involved in government, and legitimate authority is the critical phenomenon of the state, resting basically on force. According to Hume, man is born into a family, and by necessity and natural inclination, sustains it; man establishes political society in order to establish justice, without which there is neither safety nor peace. The evolution to a peaceful political order, however, was

slow:

> In all governments, there is a perpetual intestine struggle, open or secret, between authority and liberty; and neither of them can ever absolutely prevail in the contrast. A great sacrifice of liberty must necessarily be made in every government; yet the authority, which confines liberty, can never, and perhaps ought never, in any constitution, to become quite entire and uncontrollable.
> (Martindale, 1960:140.)

A combination of force and consent are thus operative in social structures.

With Adam Furguson (1723-1816) and Turgot (1727-1781) there is a similar development of these central ideas in conflict theory. Furguson saw conflict as a genuine benefit and necessary to progress, but doubted that peace was the goal of society. Conflict is seemingly too deeply rooted for this:

> he who has never struggled with his fellow creatures is a stranger to half the sentiments of mankind.
> (Martindale, 1960:140.)

For Turgot, the human mind is everywhere the same, and conflict and war serve to 'liquidate' the fixed behaviors brought about by education and religion, so that societies don't have to remain at a static, lower level of development.

With the physiocrats, the political orientation of conflict theory begins to shift toward the sphere of the economy. Here, natural and social orders are still associated: there is a natural order in society that man can rationally analyze and control. Adam Smith formulated three major propositions which were to serve as the foundation of classical economics theory. First, the source of value in society is

labor. Second, in order to achieve maximum productivity, there should be free economic competition. Third, the sphere of government control should therefore be limited, since the natural forces of social behavior will reconcile the requirements of individuals and groups of individuals.

Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) expanded this economic theory, but with a rather different orientation or attitude toward the effects of conflict upon progress. Conflict in the form of competition is seen as positive to the extent that it produces values; to the extent that people are struggling for scarce values, however, such competition is negative. Competition becomes competition for survival: there is a tendency in all animated life to increase beyond the nourishment available to it. In contrast to the optimism of the rationalists, Malthus insists we consider the consequences of such conflict in economic behavior for the standard of living, the condition of labor, and the conduct in society. All reformist theories are of no help unless they begin by considering this population and competition problem from this perspective, as an inevitable law of human nature.

The biological support for conflict theory is provided by Darwin who, ironically, used Malthus' pessimistic predictions to describe the benefits of struggle, conflict and war at the biological level. These processes and benefits were paralleled at the level of society later by way of social Darwinism.

As we have seen, the majority of evolutionary theorists following Darwin and Spencer were more highly concerned with conservative solutions to the problems of war and industrialization than with the idea of

reform. Conflict occupies a secondary place within the evolutionary process. As the focus turned increasingly toward the moral constitution and social structure of industrializing oscities, however, there was greater concern with the inner sources of tension and breakdown. Problems of moral and social integration, loss of community, increased individualism, and anomie came to be major threats rising from the contradictions between the old society and the new. As we have also found, pessimism increases with the study of these contradictory phenomena, and, aside from most cyclical theories, is accompanied by a reformist or activist orientation based upon new conceptions of conflict and linear change. The Marxist theory of change can be seen in this light as one that does touch upon this problem of the relation between individuals and industrial society, but which also makes conflict the source and impetus of the 'fact' of change.

II. Dialectical Materialism: The Conflict of Opposites

The connection between 'natural laws' of the external environment and 'universally valid principles' of human nature has been pointed out by many theorists discussed thus far, where the aim was either to 'explain' social phenomena and changes vis-a-vis the natural world order, or to place the social world into accordance with it. The basic assumptions of the Marxian model carries the analysis somewhat further.

First, the dialectical method taken from Hegel asserts the connection between contradiction and process in historical development. The central fact of existence is the unity and conflict of opposites, in the natural and social life-worlds. For example, united within the

social world are the two contradictory or opposite elements, the forces and the relations of production. This conflict is, then, the impetus for change in the social world. Engels summarizes this characteristic of both the natural and social worlds by defining dialectics as "the science of the general laws of motion and development of Nature, human society, and thought" (1939:155). The three laws of dialectics are (1) the unity and conflict of opposites, (2) the change of quantity into quality, (3) the negation of the negation (Lauer, 1977:65). The change of quantity into quality means that, at a certain point, quantitative variations become qualitative variations. For example, the formation of some new power within society refers to a transformation from the total quantity of individual powers to a qualitatively different form of power. Lauer gives an example of the law of the negation of the negation at the societal level in terms of the development of different forms of economic structure:

> The Capitalist order is the negation of the feudal order; and the socialist order negates the capitalist order -- it is the negation of the negation.
>
> (Lauer, 1977:65.)

All natural and social phenomena, then, follow these three basic laws in the process of their development.

The second assumption of this theory is that of the materialistic basis of social order and social change. Marx explains the meaning of this materialism as the basis of social order in the following way:

> In the social production in which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The totality

> of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society -- the real foundation, on which legal and political superstructures arise and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond. The mode of production of material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual process of life.
>
> (1956:51.)

There are several important connections here with previous theories concerning the nature of civil society and the process of its change. In the first place, the 'civil society' studied by earlier theorists as political society is here understood in terms of its materialistic basis: its 'anatomy' is to be studied in the context of political economy. Furthermore, neither the political relations nor forms of state are to be understood in terms of the progress of human mind, as has so often been declared. Rather, forms of state, relations and progress are understood in terms of the material conditions of life. This is an important synthesis of previous concerns as well as a revolutionary revision of their interpretation. Again:

> The mode of production of material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.
>
> (1956:51.)

When, at a certain point of their development, the forces of production and the property relations of a society come into conflict, the revolutionary change in the economic foundation thus causes pervasive changes in the entire superstructure. There exists, then, the material transformation of economic productions, and a transformation of the ideological forms of society. It is within the latter transformation

that men become conscious of conflict, and here, too, that the conflict will be fought. When analyzing such changes, however, the social scientist does not base conclusions or judgements upon this consciousness, but on the (contradictions of) material life which produced it. Furthermore, the material conditions for the transformation of society must exist prior to the conscious involvement in or fight against contradictions in society. In other words, the productive forces must be producing the material conditions for the 'solution' of contradictions or antagonisms: the problem cannot arise unless the solution is in the making -- "mankind always sets itself only such problems as it can solve" (1956:52). The central point of focus and the major point of influence on following theories lies in this insistence that study deal with the real people, their activities, and their living conditions, rather than with description and speculation. Marx and Engels reconstructed an interpretation of the past and future based on these dialectic and materialist assumptions, and in doing so they focused upon and directly influenced our earlier-mentioned sphere of social indentity.

The Marxian interpretation of history begins with the distinction between the infra- and superstructures of a society. The infrastructure is the economic structure; the superstructure consists of the ideology, law, polity, family and religion of a social order. The latter emerges from out of the infrastructure, or material base and foundation of the society: the principles, ideas, and categories of life are created to conform with social relations determined by the economic structure. Thus, analysis of the social world should proceed along a structural line, although economic structure and material

conditions are not the determining factor conditioning the social life-world: different elements of the superstructure, in addition, "exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form" (Engels, 1890). As Lauer puts it, the infrastructure is the framework upon which various elements of the superstructure exert influence (1977:66).

Change, as we have pointed out, is the consequence of contradictions between forces of production and property relations (relations of production). The forces of production become destructive after a certain point of development in their contradiction to the relations of production. In Engel's context of thought, this refers to the problem of capitalist societies being unable to 'absorb' their own production due to the private appropriation of production. The contradiction is, then, between productivity and the distribution of products. The conflict is at the core of the social process: contradiction is integral to social development, each society thus carrying the 'seeds of its own destruction.' These contradictions are made manifest at the level of class conflict: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles."

Society is increasingly divided by the antagonisms of two opposing classes, the ruled and the ruling. Marx's analysis of the conditions, consciousness and historical activities of both classes is yet another contribution to the reinterpretation of the social life-world and the processes of its future development. Marx approaches the opposition of classes and the revolutionary outcome of opposition in terms of the notion of 'human emancipation' -- the "restoration of the human

world and of human relationships to man himself" (Marx, 1843). Revolution as such, and particularly social revolution, has a universal element in that it is a "human protest against an inhuman life." Marx's analysis of the opposing classes is the center point in his dynamics of revolution.

Private property and proletariat are antimonies. The former is the 'positive' side of this antimony, forced to maintain itself and its opposite, the proletariat. The proletariat is the 'negative' side of the antimony, and is forced to work for its abolition and the abolition of those conditions which make it proletariat -- private property. According to Marx, both classes express the same human alientation. A major difference between the classes is that the ruling class is satisfied with their established position, and "recognizes this self-alienation as its own power and thus has the appearance of a human existence" (Bottomore, 1964:231). The proletariat, on the other hand, sees its own 'impotence' and the reality of an 'inhuman situation' in this alientation. It revolts against degradation, and is forced to this revolt because of the contradiction between its humanity and a situation negating its humanity.

> Within the framework of alientation, therefore, the property owners are the conservative and the proletarians the destructive party. (Bottomore, 1964:231.)

Because the property owners are producing the proletariat, conscious of their degradation, they are thus producing their own destruction, unconsciously, and against their will. The proletariat, in trying to abolish itself, "carries out the sentence which private property, by creating the proletariat, passes upon itself" (Bottomore, 1964:232).

The triumph, however, does not lie with proletarian victory alone: it must abolish its opposite as well as itself in order to achieve victory.

Marx gives two primary reasons why the proletariat must 'emancipate' himself. First, in the modern conditions of society, where even the appearance of humanity is taken away, man has lost himself. Second, he has developed a theoretical consciousness of this loss of humanity, and is forced, by practical necessity, to revolt against this loss. He can only become emancipated, however, by destroying his own conditions of life as well as all inhuman conditions in his present society. Thus is what it must accomplish, throughout history, and in accordance with nature:

> Its aim and its historical activity are ordained for it, in a tangible and irrevocable way, by its own situation as well as by the whole organization of present-day civil society.
>
> (Bottomore, 1964:233.)

In speaking of this emancipation, Marx puts special emphasis upon the political emancipation that occurs in the transition from feudal society. Political revolution is in this context the revolution of 'civil society': all forms of life in feudal society are elements of political life, and thus determine the relation of the individual to the state. This is a political relation -- one of exclusion from the other elements in society. The vital functions and conditions of civil society are all political. With political revolution, however, all the private affairs of the state become affairs of general concern; all that was expressive of the separation of the people from the community life is abolished. In short, the political character of

civil society is abolished. The "political spirit" is liberated from its connection with civil life, and forms out of this a community sphere, or "the general sphere" of the people. "Public affairs as such become the general affairs of each individual, and political functions become general functions" (Bottomore, 1964:233).

The liberation of the political spirit was accompanied, however, by the establishment of the materialism of civil society. Man is not liberated from religion, or from property, or from business: he receives the liberty to acquire, own, and engage in these things. Put differently, "The political revolution dissolves civil society into its elements without revolutionalizing these elements themselves or subjecting them to criticism" (Bottomore, 1964:235). The problem lies in the fact that political revolution:

> regards civil society, the sphere of human needs, of labor, of private interest and of civil law, as the basis of its own existence, as a self-subsisting condition and thus as its natural basis.
>
> (Bottomore, 1964:235.)

In this context, man is seen merely as egoistic man; man in his true nature -- political man -- is seen in the abstract, as citizen. As Rousseau put it, man's 'proper powers' are taken from him in exchange for 'foreign powers' for a communal and moral existence as a part of something greater than himself, and from which he must derive his life and being. Emancipation, then, would mean the "restoration of the human world and of human relationships to man himself" (Bottomore, 1964: 236). The individual must "absorb into himself" the status of citizen and moral member of society; he must recognize and organize his own powers as a social being, without separating this power as political power. Only in this way can full emancipation be achieved, otherwise

leaving man to confuse political problems with social ones, distorting their aims and their interests.

The worker may be excluded from a social life by his own labor. This social life "is life itself" -- the physical and cultural life, morality, enjoyment, etc. -- and very different from political life. "Human life is the true social life of man" (Ibid.: 237). The industrial revolt, then, is the revolt against exclusion from this social life and, though more limited in reaction, has universal significance in that it is a protest against the inhuman life.

> Every revolution breaks up the old society; to this extent it is social. Every revolution overthrows the existing ruling power; to this extent it is political.
>
> (Bottomore, 1964:238.)

Revolution is 'a political act,' however, and is necessary to the development of socialism. As Marx goes on to say, once this activity is organized and comes to have a 'purpose' of its own, it no longer has this 'political covering.' Furthermore, the emancipation of the oppressed class through revolution necessarily means the formation of a new society. The working class itself is considered the greatest productive force in creating this society, through revolution. The condition for its emancipation is the abolition of all previous antagonism and contradictions, the dissolution of all classes. Nor will there be any political power in the new society, as this is the 'expression' of antagonism in civil society. Furthermore, men shall not build the new society out of 'the fruits of the earth,' but by producing the material conditions for the new society. This, then, is their destiny.

Lastly, Marx asks:

> Is it astonishing, moreover, that a society founded on the opposition of classes, should end in a brutal contradiction, in a hand to hand struggle, as its last act?
> (Bottomore, 1964:239.)

Where there are no more classes or class antagonisms, "Social ecolution will cease to involve political revolution" (Bottomore, 1964:240). Until that point, and under specified conditions, the dialectic materialist method envisions a clear linear movement or process of history in a world of contradictory forces.

Unlike the cyclic and evolutionary theories, Marx places the source and impetus for change in the hands of the people. His humanistic view of the future and his view of the task of philosophy -- to make history, not merely interpret it -- coincide with an optimistic and activist orientation toward change.

> The Marxist theory of change is not a mere adventure of the mind; it is a directive to action, a tool whereby men can seize control of the historical process in order to gain their freedom.
> (Lauer, 1977:70.)

III. Class Conflict and Modern Society: The Coercicion Theory of Social Change

Dialectical conflict theory has been continued in the Marxist tradition by Ralf Dahrendorf. Dahrendorf envisions society as having two sides or 'faces' -- consensus, and conflict, but insists that the consensus side has occupied the attention of social theorists for too long as a utopian image of social order. Thus, against the 'static' vision of society he sees implied by the Parsonian scheme, and in contrast to Simmel's organicist theory of the positive, integrative

effects of conflict in modern society, Dahrendorf proposes a supplementary model with which to escape the utopian vision and understand the factual world and its problems of order. Dahrendorf presents the historical dilemma as follows:

> There is one large and distinguished school of thought according to which social order results from a general agreement of values, a consensus omnium, or volunte generale which outweighs all possible or actual differences of opinion and interest. There is another equally distinguished school of thought which holds that coherence and order in society are founded on force and constraint, on the domination of some and the subjugation of others...For the utopian, differences of interest are subordinated to agreements of value, and for the Rationalists these agreements are but a thin, and as such ineffective, coating of the primary reality of differences that have to be precariously reconciled by constraint.
>
> (1959:157.)

As Dahrendorf goes on to point out, the contemporary versions of these two perspectives in sociology are the integration and coercion theories of society. Each views social organization and structures differently, and thus social change and social processes are viewed differently as well:

> the integration theory of society, conceives of social structure in terms of a functionally integrated system held in equilibrium by certain patterned and recurrent processes...the coercion theory of society, views social structure as a form of organization held together by force and constraint and reaching continuously beyond itself in the sense of producing within itself the forces that maintain it as an unending process of change.
>
> (1959:159.)

Given this distinction, Dahrendorf points out the tendency in sociological analysis to emphasize either (1) the normative elements of

social actions and processes whereby motives are structured normatively to ensure stability, as in the Parsonian framework, or, (2) the 'substratum' of social actions conditioning interests productive of conflict, and the institutional aspects of social structure, as did Marx (1959:159-60). The major objection to the former is that, given the focus on processes of maintenance, one tends to overlook the fact that stability, integration, functional coordination, and consensus are only 'relatively' generalized, which leaves a sphere of social reality open to processes productive of conflict and instability. Dahrendorf thus claims the necessity of understanding both 'faces' of society:

> we cannot conceive of society unless we realize the dialectics of stability and change, integration and conflict, function and motive force, consensus and coercion.
>
> (1959:163.)

One of Dahrendorf's preliminary questions is, therefore, how can there be a general point of view that synthesizes the unresolved dialectics of integration and coercion? Insofar as he examines conflict groups in industrial society, however, Dahrendorf sees the viewpoint of the 'coercive nature of society' more helpful in explaining problems of social order.

The basic tenets of Dahrendorf's coercion theory are these (1959: 162):

1. Every society is at every point subject to the process of change; social change is ubiquitous.

2. Every society displays at every point dissensus and conflict; social conflict is ubiquitous.

3. Every element in a society renders a contribution to its disintegration and change.

4. Every society is based on the coercion of some of its members by others.

From the point of view of coercion theory, it is 'enforced constraint' that makes social organizations cohere. This means the differential distribution of power and authority. One of Dahrendorf's central theses consists in the assumption that "this differential distribution of authority invariably becomes the determining factor of systematic social conflicts of a type that is germaine to class conflicts" (1959:165). The structural origin of conflict, then, must be sought at the level of roles; specifically, those roles endowed with expectations of domination or subjugation. The first step of his analysis thus consists of the identification of all such roles and the distribution of power and authority among them.

Power is used here in the Weberian sense: the "probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will despite resistence;" authority means "the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons" (1959:166). Power is therefore bound up with the personality of individuals, and authority with the positions or roles. Authority, as legitimate relation of domination and subjugation, is legitimate power.

In studying conflict groups, Dahrendorf is primarily concerned with the authority relations obtaining in imperatively coordinated associations (ICA's) which generate conflicts. Imperative coordination is seen as a type of social relation that is present in every possible

social organization, since authority is a universal element of social structure. Dahrendorf specifies this approach here as follows:

> Within the frame of reference of this model, (1) the distribution of authority in associations is the ultimate 'cause' of the formation of conflict groups, and (2), being dichotomous, it is, in any given association, the cause of the formation of two, and only two, conflict groups.
>
> (1959:172-3.)

Differential authority positions means the existence of different interests that conflict in substance and direction. Such interests constitute the 'orientation' of role incumbants, and are structurally generated, 'objective' interests in either maintaining or modifying the status quo, depending upon the role orientation. Simply put, these are 'role interests.'

With Weber, Dahrendorf sees legitimate authority as precarious authority. Conflict may thus be generated over the legitimacy of authority relations:

> In every association, the interests of the ruling group are the values that constitute the ideology of the legitimacy of its rule, whereas the interests of the subjected group constitute a threat to this ideology and the social relations it covers.
>
> (1959:172-3.)

Important here is Dahrendorf's specification of 'latent' and 'manifest' role interests. The former are under-currents of an individual's behavior, and are predetermined by his role. Under specified conditions, these interests may become manifest interests; psychological realities, where the emotion, will, and desire of the individual are directed toward some goal (1959:178). According to Dahrendorf, the content of these interests may be determined by the context of social conditions,

and always constitute a formation of the issues of structurally generated conflict. (In comparison to Marxist theory, a 'false consciousness' arises only when manifest interests are incongruent with the latent interests underlying them; otherwise, manifest interests in this context constitute the Marxian 'class consciousness'.)

Describing the formation of conflict groups, Dahrendorf distinguishes between (1) quasi-groups, with no recognizable structure but common behaviors or interests which could lead them to define themselves as a group, and (2) interest groups, which have a structure, a program or goal, and a personnel of members. It is the latter group, recruited from the larger quasi-groups, that are the real agents of group conflict:

> The specific difference of the quasi-groups and interest groups with which we are concerned in this study accrues from their origin in the authority structure of associations or, to put it differently, from the formal characteristic of their underlying (latent or manifest) interests as interests related to the legitimacy of relations of domination and subjection. (1959:182.)

Dahrendorf's analysis of the genesis of interest groups thus centers around their function in social conflict as "units of manifest interests which can be explained in terms of latent role interests and their aggregation in quasi-groups" (Ibid.:182).

As for the actual formation of conflict groups, Dahrendorf is especially interested in delineating the empirical conditions in which the organization of interest groups fails to take place, even in the presence of the requisite conditions within any ICA. Dahrendorf first designates the ideal conditions of conflict group formation:

> In every imperatively coordinated association two quasi-groups united by common latent interests can be distinguished. Their orientations of interests are determined by possession of or exclusion from authority. From these quasi-groups, interest groups are recruited, the articulate programs of which defend or attack the legitimacy of existing authority structures. In any given association, two such groups are in conflict.
>
> (1959:184.)

At the level of empirical analysis, where various intervening variables may be encountered, Dahrendorf goes on to specify the structural conditions of the organization of conflict groups.

First, are the technical conditions of organization: "Without a charter, certain norms, a personnel, and certain material requisites, interest groups cannot be formed, even if it is justified to assume that quasi-groups exist" (1959:185). Especially important are the concepts of charter and personnel. With the latter, for example, the availability of 'founders' is crucial to the actual organization of conflict groups by leaders.

Second are the political conditions of organization. Dahrendorf refers here to the 'political permissability' of organization as an intervening requisite. Where a plurality of conflicting parties is not permitted, no interest group formation will occur, even if all other preconditions exist.

Third, Dahrendorf points to the social conditions of organization, which includes the condition of communication between members of quasi-groups. As Dahrendorf suggests, this condition is generally 'given' in mordern industrial societies, as compared to the situation in which Marx emphasized the necessity of communication channels to group

formation.

There are two conditions under which the formation of interest groups is unlikely. The first of these is when the ICA is just newly emerging, and the second is when there is the absence of leaders and ideologies.

Last, Dahrendorf addresses the question of conflict and structural change. As he points out, analyses have traditionally taken place here on two 'levels': the 'normative' or ideological level, and the factual or institutional level. As he further points out, processes on either level due to the organization of interest groups may constitute change. More precisely:

> For coercion theory, changes of the personnel of authority roles are merely formal or instrumental aspects of changes of structure on both the normative and instrumental levels. (1959:232.)

There are three specific modes of structure change: (1) total exchange of personnel (revolutionary); (2) partial exchange of personnel (evolutionary); and (3) no exchange, in which case intended changes are inaugurated without members of subjugated groups penetrating the dominant positions. The second mode of exchange is the one most frequently occurring throughout the history of conflict group formation. In general, however, the more intense the conflict, the more radical will be the changes which follow, and the more violent the struggle, the more suddenly will those changes take place.

IV. Dialectics, Revolution and Political Conduct: Planning for Freedom

Karl Mannheim's approach to social change is largely linear insofar as it deals with the movement of societies through a sequence of

developmental stages: the traditional, competitive, and planned stages of social order. In the tradition of the French sociologists, Mannheim was concerned with the social origins of categories of thought, and with the range of variation in the thought systems of people from different moral, structural, and cognitive orientations. Within the German historicist tradition, Mannheim was influenced by the felt need for a dynamic conception of knowledge (Engels), an activist interpretation of the dialectic relation between theory and practice (Marx), the role of knowledge in changing human action from the realm of 'necessity' to that of 'freedom' (Marx), and the place of group conflict in initiating reflection (Marx) (Merton, 1957:490). Mannheim's work in the area of the sociology of knowledge encompassed a wide range of methodological and epistemological questions, and provided several ideal types by which to understand the historical development and determination of knowledge.

Through his analysis of the concept of ideology, Mannheim arrived at several basic conceptions of Wissenssoziologie, which traditionally has been primarily concerned with the problem of the objectivity of knowledge. The categories of 'particular' and 'total' conceptions of ideology are developed on the basis of this problem. First, the 'particular conception' of ideology assumes that one's adversary shares a common criteria of validity, and that there is a possibility of non-ideological thinking in the opponent's thought system. It is a study at the level of a 'psychology of interests.' The 'total conception' of ideology assumes that the opponent's thoughts are inevitably ideological, because the form and content of all those

thoughts are bound up with the opponent's life-situation. It refers to the study of 'correspondence' between social settings and systems of thought, and attempts to discover the integrated system of thought of a group implicit in the judgement of its members (Merton, 1957:490).

Corresponding to the particular and total conceptions are two 'currents' of historical development, and the transition from the particular to the total conception means the problem of the development of false consciousness:

> the problem of how such a thing as...the totally distorted mind which falsifies everything... could ever have arisen.
>
> (Merton, 1957:492.)

Mannheim shifts the emphasis here to the realm of the social rather than the psychological in his effort to delineate the political and economic conditioners of knowledge, and to take the study of knowledge out of this realm of determination. His general formulation of the conception of ideology thus becomes characterized by the thought that all groups' thoughts (including one's own) are regarded as wholly determined by their social position.

Mannheim takes this one step further to point out that even a group's historical 'time-sense' will be conditioned by social position and interests or aspirations. The Anabaptist chiliasm, for example, stresses the importance of the immediate present, due to their oppressed status and the revolutionary atmosphere of expectation. The bourgeoning middle class, by contrast, emphasizes the idea of an indeterminate future which will experience the realization of ethical norms through progressive enlightenment. This is the liberal-humanitarian historical time-sense, which we have already come across within the context of

our survey of policy-orientations and interpretations of the past and future. Mannheim describes the conservative time-sense as one that emphasizes the past as leading to and validating the already existing state of society. Last, the socialist-communist conception distinguishes between an indeterminate and a remote future, emphasizing that the present embraces not only the past but also the tendencies of the future (Merton, 1957:496).

These formulations are somewhat similar to our discussion of policy-orientations with respect to the various interpretations of past, present and future and the attitude toward change which accompanies these. Mannheim further defines the relation between thought systems, social structures, and attitudes toward change as follows:

> An organically integrated group conceives of history as a continuous movement toward the realization of its ends; socially uprooted and loosely integrated groups espouse an ahistorical intuitionism which stresses the fortuitous and imponderable. The well-adjusted conservative morality is averse to historical theorizing since the social order...is viewed as natural and proper, rather than problematical. Conservatives turn to defensive philosophical and historical reflections concerning the world and their place in it only when the status quo is questioned...Moreover, conservatism tends to view history in terms of morphological categories which stress the unique character of historical configurations, whereas advocates of change adopt an analytical approach in order to arrive at elements which may be recombined... into new social structures. The first view stresses the inherent stability of the social structure as it is; the second emphasizes the changeability and instability by abstracting the components of this structure and rearranging them anew.
>
> (Merton, 1957:495.)

The notion that revolution or crisis leads to new ideas and perspectives is important to Mannheim's understanding of the development of knowledge in societies. The process of social competition or conflict which initiates the formulation of new perspectives is not solely political or economic, in the strict Marxian sense, but refers also to intellectual expressions of struggling power groups and inter-generational conflicts within societies. Like Marx, Mannheim sees this process of change as including three stages within the dialectical relation of theory to practice: (1) theory is a function of reality; (2) theory leads to a certain kind of action; (3) action changes the reality or, if it fails in this, forces revision of the previous theory. Mannheim continues to explain the development of a 'science of political conduct' in terms of the relation between theory and practice, and delineates five historical currents corresponding to the following five interpretations of a science of political conduct: (1) bureaucratic conservativism; (2) conservative historicism; (3) liberal-democratic; (4) socialist-communist; and (5) Fascism. For example, bureaucratic conservativism refers to the tendency to treat all political problems as administrative problems:

> The juristic administrative mentality constructs only closed static systems of thought, and is always faced with the paradoxical task of having to incorporate into its system new laws, which arise out of the unsystematized interaction of living forces as if they were only a further elaboration of the original system.
> (Mannheim, 1936:119.)

There is a failure here to treat political problems on their own ground, and an attitude toward revolution which sees the 'living expression of social forces' merely as an unruly factor in an otherwise orderly

system. In contrast to this is the fascist interpretation of political conduct, with its ahistorical insistence upon retaining the existing social order, merely substituting one ruling group for another within already existing class arrangements. There is no understanding of historical process in this context: history is seen in terms of unrelated, isolated events, and the existence of revolution or crises and conflicting interests means only the opportunity for one to stimulate active minorities and seize power. The contemporary situation of modern culture is characterized by "the tendency to include as much as possible in the realm of the rational, and to bring it under administrative control -- and, on the other hand, to reduce the 'irrational' elements to the vanishing point" (Mannheim, 1936:114).

As was pointed out earlier, Mannheim sees revolution in the Marxian sense as the initiative for the development of new ideas and perspectives: revolution is the anticipation and intention of provoking a 'breach' in the rationalized structures of society, and its 'purpose' prevents rationality from ever becoming absolute (Mannheim, 1936:132). It involves the process of 'becoming,' as Spengler also put it. That area of behavior which involves this 'becoming,' as distinguished from that which has already become, designates the real realm of a relation between theory and practice and the area to which a science of conduct applies. It is the area of predominantly non-rationalized, 'creative activity'; the true area of political conduct.

Last, Mannheim was very much concerned with the problems of modern mass society, and in this context formulated his version of a directive for action; the 'planning for freedom' formula for change. He saw

man as having progressed through stages of horde, competition, and superindividual solidarity. The stages correspond somewhat to Durkheim's mechanical-organic solidarity process, and the latter stage represents the present situation. The problem which arises here is that man is trying to live in this new stage according to rules of the previous stage of competition. On the contrary, mass society requires an increase in self-consciousness which will increase individual responsibility in the context of a highly interdependent social situation. Compounding this problem is that of the decomposition of the traditional elite. First, the traditional cultural elite is seen as becoming obsolete by virtue of the mi-dle class tendency toward materialistic satisfaction and compensatory gains, rather than following the directives of the elite. Second, a class of technicians 'absorbs' the elite due to their occupational prestige and economic status, thus becoming an elite group themselves.

These situations left Mannheim with the conviction that in order to ensure the continued development of modern mass societies, social engineering of a type would have to become the necessary ingredient. The type of engineering he had in mind was a system of planned cultural education for freedom, where 'freedom' refers to the capacity for planned social relationships and 'free zones' within planned social structures. In sum, what is necessary to modern society is the conscientious "extension and deepening of newly won insights and... careful advances in the direction of control" (1936:108).

In sum, Mannheim's designation of rationalized structures and the surrounding sphere of an irrational matrix in modern social order

is central to his understanding of the necessity for a science of political conduct; it designates the sphere of truly political conduct within conflicting social and emotional forces, where theory and practice must come together in the process of 'becoming,' distinguished from that area of conduct guided by rational and administrative rules for procedure. The extent to which unorganized activity (free competition and dominance by force) is connected with the sphere of emotional reaction delineates an area of behavior that is 'creative activity' or truly political conduct. Within this realm of behavior, then, Mannheim finds the place for theory and practice. The question becomes: What knowledge is possible concerning this realm of social life and the conduct which occurs in it? (1936:116) As has been pointed out, the contemporary orientation is that which tries to extend the sphere of rationality and administrative control and decrease the sphere of 'irrationality.' Mannheim saw this orientation as part of the obstacle to the development of theory and practice, or the science of political conduct. As we shall see, it also becomes an obstacle to the reproduction of the social life-world. It is in this context that Mannheim defines the stage of modern society as necessarily a planned stage, and insists that we move with newly won insights in the direction of advanced controls.

Summary

Our survey of sociological theories of change has pointed out the major features of the three model-types according to their respective interpretations of the past and future, major interests guiding the study of change, and policy-orientations toward change in the natural

and social worlds. We have further pointed out the way in which particular interpretations, interests, and policy-orientations are interrelated with particular conceptions of origin, order and change, and the development of these conceptions over time. The major characteristics of the three model-types may be summarized in the following table:

Model-Type:	Interpretation of Past & Future:	Dominant Interest:	Policy-Orientation:
Evolutionary (linear)	Liberal Optimism	Prediction	Negation of Planned Change; Inevitable Perfection
Cyclical	Fatalism	Interpretation	Negation of Planned Change
Conflict	Critical	Change	Active Intervention for Planned Change

Chapter Three will consist of a detailed analysis of the process of alternation introduced by Frye and Habermas as it relates to the shifts in interpretations, interests, and policy-orientations vis-a-vis the development of the modern myths of concern and freedom. We will illustrate the alternation of these myths with respect to developments in science in general and in sociological theories of change in particular by referring to the major theories of change discussed in our survey.

CHAPTER THREE

ALTERNATING MYTHS

When man studies nature or the objective environment, he tends to do so in the logical language of fact, reason, description and verification. When he studies the world of civilization, the social world rooted in a conception of nature, he does so in the mythical language of anxiety and belief, desire and construction. This second type of language is always rooted in some conception of the ideal form of civilization. As our survey has shown, the older models of change associated this ideal form with some remote past, or timeless period before history. In the modern models, the ideal is associated with the future, as the world we should like to live in. Those theorists most interested in mastery over the natural environment speak primarily in the logical language of fact and reason: the language of the myth of concern. Those theorists that focus on the study or reform of the social world tend to speak in the language of anxiety, belief, desire and construction: the language of the myth of freedom.

Our survey has revealed a wide range of attitudes toward the past and future, various conceptions of the ideal type of civilization, and an alternation of interests between mastery over the natural world and reform of the social world. In order to understand the connection between these model-types and policy-orientations, it is necessary to consider them in terms of this alternation of myths and their respective attitudes toward the past and the future.

The development of theories of change considered in terms of this alternation between myths of freedom and concern adds a temporal

dimension to our survey. It compares attitudes, interests, policy-orientations and model-types over time. In this respect, we must bear in mind the developmental nature and unique characteristics of the myths of concern and freedom themselves.

In this chapter we will (1) briefly outline the developmental sequence of the myth of concern, the truth of correspondence, and the myth of freedom to their modern forms, and (2) illustrate the modern formulation and alternation of these myths vis-a-vis the theories and model-types in our survey.

As we have seen, the myth of concern begins as a total or 'closed' myth. It represents unquestioned belief and cares little for reason or evidence. 'Truth' for a total myth of concern is the truth of social vision, or revealed truth. The myth of concern is the voice of established social authority, and exercises a conservative influence upon social attitudes.

'Truth' as truth of correspondence emerged as new 'branches' of concern were differentiated through philosophical speculation. In contrast to 'revealed' truth, the truth of correspondence refers to the alignment of a body of words or numbers with some structure of external phenomena. The standards of truth for the truth of correspondence are objectivity, suspension of judgement, respect for the individual and the tolerance of opinion.

The social expression of these standards of the truth of correspondence constitutes the myth of freedom. It is a socially critical attitude which points out the gaps between the real and ideal, etc., inherent in all closed myths of concern. The myth of freedom thus

exerts a liberalizing force upon the myth of concern by calling the standards of the truth of correspondence to its attention.

As these new standards of truth are articulated by the myth of freedom in the form of socially critical attitudes, their importance becomes felt by the myth of concern, which must then expand its principles and beliefs in order to come to terms with this other side of the mind's sense of reality. It is imperative that the criteria of objectivity, suspension of judgement, and so forth, be dealt with by the myth of concern in order for it to maintain its status as interpretive and prescriptive social authority. This overall expansion process of the myth of concern may be understood as its inner encyclopaedic drive -- that drive to synthesize thoughts within a single framework of valid principles, with "a solidly established body of facts and laws as its foundation and the premises of belief and hope as its superstructure"(Frye, 1971:58). This encyclopaedic drive within the myth of concern recurs throughout every generation of ideas; the Thomistic synthesis of faith and knowledge constitutes the very earliest of such attempts at synthesis.

Once concern has expanded its principles and beliefs by (a) recognizing the criticisms of the myth of freedom and (b) by appealing to the criteria of the truth of correspondence, or the standards of scientific reason, it is re-established as the interpretive and prescriptive voice of social authority. As we shall see in this chapter, it is precisely in this manner that the modern myth of concern -- science and technology -- emerges and expands its principles by appealing to the standards of scientific reason to become the

established voice of social authority, speaking the logical language of fact and reason. Thereafter, the myth of freedom rises periodically in tension against the myth of concern, speaking the language of anxiety and belief, desire and construction as that socially critical attitude culminating either in revolution, or a romanticization of past ideals.

We may now turn to the major theories of change to illustrate the formulation of the modern myths of concern and freedom and their alternation over time, and the relation of these processes to the emergence of new interests, attitudes, policies, and models of change.

A. The Making of Modern Myths

Our survey of the early evolutionary theories revealed a new orientation toward the past and future, and a new conception of the ideal type of human society. This new orientation marks the first step in the making of the modern myths. There were two important factors operating in this departure from the 'closed' doctrine of medieval concern. The first of these was the separation of philosophy from the 'ultimate' concern of theology. The second was the development of interest in discovering the 'purpose' of history as a whole.

Thomas Hobbes and the social contract theorists were the first to express this new orientation by rejecting the ideas of divine will and revealed law as adequate explanations of the origin and nature of human society. The rationalist rejection of this medieval myth of concern led to questioning the very possibility of social order. In this questioning, there is evidence of that anxiety for social coherence apparent in all emerging myths of concern; i.e., evidence of a concern

for the proper rules for living in society. The rationalist response to this anxiety was based upon the premise that society originated in social contract and that social order is based upon the rational pursuit of natural rights. The autonomous expansion of philosophy is also apparent in this question of the possibility of social order and social coherence: its task is to discover those universal laws governing the natural world and to organize the social world in accordance with them. In this we have the beginnings of a new myth of concern.

The second feature of this reorientation process consists of the development of interest in the 'purpose' of history as a whole. As we have seen from our survey, Vico, Voltaire, Von Herder and Hegel express this romantic interpretation of the enlightenment ideas by emphasizing the importance of understanding the historical process in order to understand the meaning of the present and future. The anxiety for continuity basic to all growing myths of freedom is apparent in this search for historical purpose; i.e., the anxiety for adequate interpretation of the past and future in answer to the question, 'Who are we?' The reinterpretation of social identity is therefore also bound up in this search for the meaning and purpose of history: man is no longer seen as innately evil, but as reasonable and good, pursuing his natural rights in a rational manner. In this we have the beginnings of a new myth of freedom.

Both these rationalist and romantic themes are contained within David Hume's natural history and theory of the principles of human nature (1739-40). In an important sense, the rational theory of natural law constitutes one of the few historical moments of alignment between theory and practice: the employment of a utilitarian ethic

for the promotion of a liberal social order is consistent with the interpretation of history as a process of continuous enlightenment and of the future as one of inevitable perfection. But as we shall see, this alignment is soon altered by the development of new interests and attitudes, new conceptions of the ideal type of civilization and the means of its attainment.

Further development in economic and utilitarian theories creates an important and different re-alignment of concerns and interests. This development is crucial to the further transformation and concretization of the modern myths of concern and freedom as we know them today. On the one hand, there is the statement for reform in the liberal utilitarian theories of Condorcet and Condillac: reform through the advance of rational knowledge is the key to the perfection of human society (G. Granger, 1968:214). Combined with an interest in understanding the 'purpose' of history, this emphasis upon reform and the re-creation of society is representative of an emerging myth of freedom where the focus is on the reproduction of the social world. On the other hand, there is the conservative resistance to the ideas of change and reform in the idealistic organicist theories of de Maistre and de Bonald: the key to the perfection of human society lies in the maintenance of tradition and adherence to past wisdom rather than the advance of knowledge; the natural order is not to be improved upon (D. Martindale, 1969:62). These ideas are representative of the conservative myth of concern as the voice of the pre-revolutionary social establishment.

As we shall see, these early formulations of the myth of concern

(conservativism) and freedom (liberal reform) exchange their inner characteristics within positivism: the myth of concern begins its appeal to the criteria of the truth of correspondence by appealing to the standards of scientific reason; the myth of freedom retreats from its status as the progressive voice of reform and change. We can see this exchange of interests between the myths of concern and freedom in their direct relation to the development of science in the theories of Comte and Spencer. Science emerges as the new myth of concern supported by social authority, and the myth of freedom loses its interpretive and prescriptive authority for reform until recovered later by Marx in the Romantic Movement. It is important to keep in mind, however, the basic elements of both myths as formulated by these early theorists. Freedom refers always to a historical awareness and consequent emphasis upon the realization of human ideals and historical purpose in the reproduction of the social world. The myth of freedom is expressed in the language of belief and anxiety, desire and construction. Concern refers always to the established voice of social authority and, as of the mid-eighteenth century, to the insistence upon truth as truth of correspondence, or adherence to the standards of scientific reason. With these characteristics in mind, we may now consider the temporary synthesis of these two myths by Comte, and the subsequent expansion and final transformation of the modern myth of concern through Spencer.

B. A Temporary Synthesis and The Expansion of Concern

After the French Revolution, the voice of social authority remained rather precariously the pre-revolutionary voice of conservativism (e.g.,

de Maistre; de Bonald). In contrast, the myth of freedom at this point in time expresses that urge toward the creation of a new society (e.g., Condillac; Condorcet). The Comtean synthesis of order and progress is in this sense a synthesis of these conservative and liberal myths. Both the historical awareness and the reformist tendencies integral to a myth of freedom are present in Comte's model of evolution, as are the more conservative elements of spiritual consensus and normative order (Rene Konig, 1968:201), characteristic of a myth of concern.

As we have already seen, however, the progressive aspect of positivism is associated with 'scientism,' and the primary concern of the new science is to make industrial society 'work.' In this context, the primary interest is directed toward the successful production of the natural world through the advance of industry. What began as the urge for the creation of a new society within the myth of freedom has become a primary interest in industrialization within the expanding myth of concern. As Comte put it, there was finally a 'rational' basis for progress (Lauer, 1977:51).

Spencer takes this rising myth of concern to its final step with the equation of progress and perfection. The myth of concern is here identified with the rational exploitation of the natural world as the unalterable course of man's perfection.

The interpretive and prescriptive authority of science as the dominant myth of concern increasingly shapes the political, economic, and moral spheres of civil society as it directs itself toward enhanced production of the natural world. Concern defines itself by what it

includes in its principles for progress, and by what it excludes from its belief in inevitable perfection. It is in this sense that the liberal theories with their equation of progress and perfection offer man a new social identity: mankind will evolve according to the principles of natural selection and will perfect itself in accordance with the goals of the industrial state.

As has already been pointed out, this new liberal optimism owes its liberal quality to its focus upon the future ideal and its decreasing concern for history; the optimism rises from the moral overtones of equating progress and perfection.

We can summarize the overall characteristics of the liberal evolutionary theories according to their dominant myth, their attitude toward the past and future, their major interest and subsequent policy-orientation.

Model-Type:	Interpretation of the Past & Future:	Dominant Myth:	Major Interest:	Policy-Orientation:
Evolutionary (linear)	Liberal Optimism (lack of concern for history)	Concern (production of the natural environment)	Prediction	Negation of planned change; inevitable perfection

C. The Anxiety for Freedom

As we have thus far seen, the general liberalizing tendency of evolutionary theories has been their focus upon the unalterable progression towards a future ideal and mastery over the natural environment, with a relative lack of concern for history and the growth of the social life-world, by comparison. We have also seen that where attention is increasingly drawn to the moral constitution of changing societies,

there has been a rise in pessimism and a general reminiscence of the past, or increased historical consciousness. These latter tendencies point to a revival of the myth of freedom, and it is this myth that increasingly characterizes the general orientation of the nineteenth-century evolutionary theorists.

Concern for the moral constitution of modern society as well as for a proper understanding of history is explicit in Sumner's study of folkways and mores, and in his rejection of the rehabilitation-perspective on social reform (Collins and Makowsky, 1972:74). One must understand the historical 'forces' behind customary behaviors before understanding the problems of, or solutions to, modernizing societies. Maine's study of the history of law reveals an equal interest in the process of history and in the status of social relations and social conduct in modern societies. The movement from status to contract is a movement of progressive specialization occurring in all spheres of social and cultural life, affecting even the attitudes and terminologies of men in their everyday lives (1907:174).

Toennies' theory of the movement from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft is perhaps an even more explicit statement of the gradual rise of anxiety for man's life-situation in the modern world. With Maine and Durkheim, his historical comparison of types of social order reveals a loss in the ideals of community living and consensus or general will: modern societies are analyzed with attention to the precariousness of their integrative mechanisms and the potential breakdown of solidarity or normative order. Toennies' detailed analysis of types of willing, intellectual life, social identity, conduct, religion,

and consciousness all reveal the pessimistic and moralistic undertones of this theory of change, and led to doubt, if not contempt for, the prescribed concerns of modern industry.

Durkheim's theory of evolution is similar to that of Toennies in both its analytical focus and general orientation. While the instrumental system of skills or means and capacities for the accomplishment of industrial goals has progressed, the normative system experiences stress with the increase in population or 'moral density.' Organic solidarity becomes inadequate as the sole mechanism of integration to the extent that it requires increased individuality, and thus alienation, of individuals: shared ideas become more and more abstract, and the common industrial enterprise and restitutive laws governing that enterprise are the only connection between individuals and units within a highly differentiated society. Man's life-situation and his social relations are reflected in and influenced by these various normative 'pathologies.' The 'cooperative society' experiences stress at those points most important to its normative integration. Weber, too, recognized this precarious aspect of modern societies in his analysis of the institution of leadership and the rationalization of sociocultural life. Although he pointed out the sources of solidarity and opportunities for change, as did Durkheim, he is left with a rather pessimistic prediction as to the future of those left within 'the iron cage' (1958:182). Rationalization permeates all spheres of social and cultural life and, like capitalism, is 'a fateful force' in the progress of man.

This general 'disenchantment' with modern society characterizes

the overall tone of these particular evolutionary theories. Their tendency toward historical reminiscence and negation of planned change, rather than the pursual of an idealized future, however, is one important feature distinguishing them from the Marxian tradition of active intervention.

D. The Alignment of Concern and Freedom

The Marxian theory represents a very important expression of the myth of freedom at this point in time with its focus upon the social world and the anxieties of industrialization. The myth of freedom reaches its full revolutionary expression of critique and abhorrence with Marx and is the essence of the entire Romantic movement -- the beginnings of which had its roots in Vico and Von Herder's concern for the purpose of history, and the most recent expression of which articulates the tensions of twentieth century democratic society.

In the context of a revolutionary praxis, the myth of freedom expresses the anxiety of continuity (interpretation of identity or 'consciousness') and the revulsion against the mechanization and dehumanization of individual life. As Frye points out, it is in exactly this mood of abhorrence that the great revolutionary, religious, political, and intellectual movements have begun (Frye, 1971:53-54). The most important point for us is that from out of this abhorrence comes the insistence that man recover his power to create his own life-situation: "praxis revolutionizes existing reality through human action (Avineri, 1968:139)."

This emphasis upon the recovery of human creative power within the myth of freedom is related to the revived interest in historical meaning.

We have seen this interest begin to emerge in the early romantic theories of Von Herder and Vico, and later with increasing pessimism in theories such as those of Toennies and Maine. Within the myth of freedom, this interest in historical purpose is the insistence upon recovering, or 'redeeming' time, as the nineteenth century romantics put it. Secondly, the insistence that men realize the desired conditions of life is consistent with the idea of projecting an ideal form of civilization which man can realize through his own activity, also important to the myth of freedom. Both tenets point directly to the reinterpretation of social and historical identity as well: man is a social being whose thoughts are determined by his social activity (labor) and material conditions, and who, through practical activity, may realize the purpose and goals of his existence. Specifically, Marx saw in his revolutionary praxis a new consciousness in the proletariat which implied an immediate change of reality (Avineri, 1968: 148). As Frye has put it, for all radical myths such as the Marxian myth, "the only creative power in the situation comes from man himself, hence its truth and reality is connected with human desire, with what we want to see exist, and with human practical skill, what we are able to make exist" (1971:53).

We recall at this point that when man looks to the social world, he does so in the language of belief and anxiety, desire and construction. It is in this language, and with the above qualities of the myth of freedom, that Marx brings forth the alignment of theory and praxis designed to change the social world. The object of the theory is man himself, and the prescribed practice pertains to the practical activity by which man might realize his social ideals.

There is a simultaneous and important expression of the myth of concern present in the Marxian analysis as well. Marx also considers the successful production of the natural world and the rearrangement of established social authority: the social world must be changed in order to enhance production in both worlds. It is in this context that Marx is able to propose a plausible theory and praxis: his policy and interest embrace both the myths of concern and freedom, and thus the enhancement of both the natural and social worlds. In Frye's terms, the myth of freedom and the myth of concern are momentarily one and the same as they carry the same message for necessary change and progress (Frye, 1971:77).

In striking contrast to the liberal evolutionary theories, then, with their liberalism tied to a lack of concern for history and their optimism rooted in a picture of the unalterable future, is the Marxian theory of revolutionary praxis embracing both concern and freedom in the attempt to reproduce both the natural and social worlds. The major interest here is in controlled change rather than prediction, and the policy-orientation is consequently one of active intervention in the reproduction of the natural and social worlds.

Model-Type:	Interpretation of Past & Future	Dominant Myth:	Major Interest:	Policy-Orientation:
Conflict	Critical; historical consciousness	Freedom and Concern	Change	Active intervention in the reproduction of both the natural and social worlds

As Frye has pointed out, wherever communism has been socially established, it has become a social order characterized by a closed

and total myth of concern. Unable to fluctuate with innovation or unrest, and subjecting the once revolutionary and re-creative myth of freedom to the censorship of communism as the myth of 'ultimate' concern, the alignment of theory and practice becomes a compulsory loyalty to ideology and conformity to social structure. The one crucial source of instability inherent in all modern communist societies is the forced censorship of freedom. It is here that theory and practice cease to articulate the reproduction of both the natural and social life-worlds.

E. The Revival of Anxiety: The Modern Myth of Freedom

Our survey of theories of change has shown that the early linear evolutionary theories were primarily interested in prediction, and that the conflict theorists have been concerned with change and control. The cyclical theorists in contrast have been primarily interested in the interpretation of events and conditions in the social life-world. The re-emergence of historical awareness in the modern world and the pessimistic orientation accompanying their interpretations place these theorists in the context of the modern myth of freedom.

Oswald Spengler's new evolutionism appeared directly after World War One, explicitly rejecting the belief in indefinite human progress. Cultures are subject to the same growth and decline processes as are individual organisms; rising, fulfilling themselves, and then deteriorating. The modern western myth of linear progress is both meaningless and inadequate in its presupposition that the West is not only at the prime of its development but also one of the few 'high cultures' of world history (Sorokin, 1951:81). This linear orientation pervades

scientific and philosophical thinking, as well as the worldviews of individuals in their time-oriented and goal-directed everyday lives. Spengler argues in great detail that the West is in a stage of decline and decay, and is beginning to destroy itself from within through all the contradictions apparent in its ideational and material conditions. The West, in short, has reached a point of 'over-tension' and is in the process of decline (1926).

Arnold Toynbee similarly points out the sources of contradiction and conflict within changing societies, and focuses here on the loss of the capacity for 'creative response' to the challenges emerging in the modern world. Although he does suggest what the 'proper' responses would be for the modern West in this stage of history, he also makes clear its illusion of 'progress' in the mastery over the natural environment: "There is no correlation between progress in technique and progress in civilization" (1934:173). Toynbee thus reaches a conclusion similar to Spengler's in his pessimistic attitude toward the modern myth of concern: Western society has all the symbols of breakdown and disintegration.

Pitirim Sorokin similarly emphasizes the illusions of truth and fallacies inherent in the Western systems of science and philosophy. The modern West is a sensate culture. Its ideas are based on the principle that the sensory world is the true reality and value, and emphasizes the materialistic and hedonistic aspects of life. Furthermore, the West shows certain uniform symptoms of disintegration in its "substitution of quantitative colossalism for a sublime quality; of glittering externality for inner value" (1941:252).

Sorokin's critique of the modern western myth of concern is perhaps more intense or characteristic of Frye's 'abhorrence' and revulsion at the mechanization of human life than were the theories of Spengler or Toynbee. It also, however, aims exactly at the life-line of the modern myth of concern, pointing out its inability to control mankind and the course of sociocultural processes, despite the development of sophisticated theories and solutions to the maintenance of the social life-world (1941:104).

The overall orientation of the cyclical theories has been a negation of active intervention for planned change. As we have seen, this orientation largely derives from the fatalistic attitude regarding the cyclical process of change. We can summarize the dominant characteristics of these post-war theories according to their dominant concern, interests, and policy-orientation, as follows:

Model-type:	Interpretation of the Past & Future	Dominant Myth:	Interest:	Policy-Orientation:
Cyclical	Fatalistic; pessimistic	Freedom	Interpretation	Negation of planned change

F. The Revival of Liberal Optimism: The Modern Myth of Concern

The revival of liberal optimism in this country and this century has taken place within a new expression of an old myth of concern. The inevitable perfection or maximum efficiency of the social system is described within a theory of linear evolution, and the desired goal state is expressed by the social authority of the established <u>status quo</u> (A. Gouldner, 1970:360).

The liberal optimism of this century is rooted not so much in a lack of concern for history as in an over-concern for maintaining the present state of equilibrium. In an important sense, we have already 'arrived': the 'good society' has been attained; the goal is to maintain it at a level of maximum efficiency and adaptive capacity.

It is important to understand in this context the expression and implications of a nearly total or closed myth of concern. First, the survival imperatives of the system delimit the boundaries for potential re-creative action: all exchanges and input-output conditions are 'given' vis-a-vis the energic and informational hierarchy and the inter-systemic boundaries, respectively. Second, the value orientation of each subsystem is presumed to lie in agreement with the goals and requisites of the systemic whole, and do not change (Gouldner, 1970:359). Put differently, the desired goal state and all system requisites are identical, which means there must exist a limit to the amount of variation tolerable within any sub-system or the system as a whole.

It is precisely in this context of thought, where variation becomes 'dysfunctional' and is treated as temporary 'deviance' from an otherwise orderly system that we get the feeling of a closed myth of concern. Specifically, "the Parsonian 'social system' is a social world with its own ramifying network of defenses against tension, disorder, and conflict...an intricate and interlocking network of mechanisms that binds the system's energy into itself" (Gouldner, 1970: 352). Rather than outright censorship there is a cybernetic hierarchy of energy and information which is antithetical to the critique or disruption of systemic concerns, and which cannot tolerate a plurality

of myths (Frye, 1971:106). All attempts at critique in the past decade, have been focused exactly upon this over-concern for maintaining present informational and structural hierarchies rather than allowing for or encouraging participation and the re-creative capacities of men. There exists an anxiety against that same routinization of thought and behavior predicted by Weber, and against the assumption that the present social system is 'immortal' (Gouldner, 1970:353).

Parsons provides a conservative myth of concern, consistent with the tradition of linear theories which describe inevitable and optimal efficiency in the effort toward mastery over demands of the external environment. The tendency toward lack of concern with the social world is inherent in the notion of system control: all exchanges and processes must take place within a hierarchy of survival requisites and controls. The 'functional equivalent' of controlling for such requisites within the social world is the administrative processing of social welfare and social problems. The direction of primary concern thus lies at the level of system maintenance.

Similarly, a theory of cultural lag, although allowing for the forces of innovation and maladjustment, must treat the social world and its problems in the wider context of systemic adjustment. Whatever part of culture is 'behind' in the modernization process must readjust in order to remain consistent with the larger society, or else become a source of pathology, until its dissolution or assimilation (Ogburn, 1957). All such theories of societal guidance (A. Etzioni, 1968) and of technicians for societal control (T. Veblen, 1953) must take as their major point of reference the functional working of the system whole.

The important point here is that wherever the myth of concern directs itself primarily to the task of mastery over exigencies in the natural environment, it simultaneously and necessarily suppresses the reproductive potential of the social life-world by containing it within the requisites for systemic equilibrium and by cutting its members off from active participation. In recent decades, this suppression of the social world to the requisites and goals of technological advancement has resulted in the much-thematized 'identity crisis.' A feeling of alientation from one's society results from perceived gaps between the real and the ideal; between genuine concern for democracy and the tactics by which policies for technological advancement are carried out (Frye, 1971:138). A linear conception of history with its lack of concern for the meaning of the past has been revived, and the informational hierarchy represented by the modern system of mass media excludes members from active participation in society (Frye, 1971:147).

The entire question of equilibrium becomes problematic the moment it is established as the goal state of the technological myth of concern. It is precisely here that the myth of concern defines itself and its goals by the inclusion of certain imperatives and the exclusion of rival myths, or the critique offered by a myth of freedom. Social identity is precariously established on the basis of systemic concerns. It becomes problematic with every glimpse of those gaps between the real and ideal within the equilibriated system (Frye, 1971: 139).

The ultimate question becomes one of authority, and the status quo

and political leaders, no matter how functionally integrated or adaptive their ideas and structures, have never been capable of sustaining a conservative myth of concern indefinately without bending to the tension posited by the recurring myths of freedom. As Frye explains:

> In all societies, the pressure in the direction of a closed myth is also the tendency within society to become...a social body without individuals or critical attitudes...The basis of all tolerance in society, the condition in which a plurality of concerns can co-exist, is the recognition of tensions between concern and freedom...concern and freedom occupy the whole of the same universe: they interpenetrate, and it is no good trying to set up boundary stones.
>
> (Frye, 1971:108-109.)

Democratic societies are, in fact, constituted upon this recognition of the balance between concern and freedom; the United States Constitution is one of the most sophisticated expressions of this kind of synthesis.

G. The Rise of Critical Sociology: Realignment of Concern and Freedom

It is this recognition of the tension between the two myths that allows for a new form of criticism to arise in this decade, once again speaking the language of concern as well as the anxiety for freedom from the technological myth of concern. Not only is there the need for the recovery of reproductive or participatory powers in modern society, but also the felt need for (1) redirecting concern toward the social world in balanced proportion to the production of the natural world, and (2) the need to realign theory and practice, concern and freedom, to recover the sense of social identity and the potential to realize human ideals.

The recent tendency of critique within this context of thought has been to recover the dialectical mode of study as both the method for social science and as the way of describing social reality (Mannheim, 1936; Dahrendorf, 1959; Gurvitch, 1962). The dialectics of social processes create both the paradigm problems of scientists and the direction of their interests in scientific research. In other words, scientific concern is itself subjected to the same interactive processes as all other aspects of the social life-world.

This understanding of the development of scientific thought and the social world in general is an understanding of the dialectics of concern and freedom as they shape social identity, social concerns, and social reality. The focus of this critique thus extends to the sphere of science itself and to the processing of its concerns (T. Kuhn, 1962; R. Friedrichs, 1970; A. Gouldner, 1970). Most important here is the nature of the entire question raised, 'Knowledge of What?' (R. Lynd, 1939). It is in the context of this question that the social world once more recovers the potential for reflexive re-creation through critique, participation and reinterpretation. Society comes to be seen more and more as self-observing (H. Schelsky, 1057), and its knowledge as potentially emancipatory (J. Habermas, 1973). In Chapter Four we will discuss the consequences of this new orientation for theories of change through the presentation of a recent model which evolved from this critical perspective within sociology.

Summary

We have thus far seen that the development and alternation of the myths of concern and freedom reveals an alternation of interests,

attitudes toward the past and future, and policy-orientations toward change. Basic to the alternation of the myths of concern and freedom are the shifts in focus from concern with mastery over the natural world to concern for the constitution of the social world, respectively. Attitudes toward the past and future correspondingly alternate between the optimistic lack of concern for historical meaning and the recovery of a historical consciousness within the myth of freedom. Last, policy-orientations have alternated between the negation of planned change and the desire for active intervention in planning for the reproduction of the natural and social worlds. The following table summarizes our discussion of the historical development of primary interests, attitudes and policies vis-a-vis the alternating myths of concern and freedom.

Model-Type:		Interpretation of Past & Future:	Dominant Myth	Major Interest:	Policy-Orientation:
A. The Making of Modern Myths:					
Hobbes Hume	Evolutionary (linear)	Liberal Optimism	Concern	Prediction	Negation of Planned Change; Inevitable Perfection
Voltaire Von Herder Vico Hegel		Romanticism; Optimism (historical consciousness)	Concern	Prediction	Negation of Planned Change; Inevitable Perfection
Condorcet Condillac Bentham		Liberal Reform	Concern	Prediction	Reform
de Maistre de Bonald		Conservative Optimism	Concern	Prediction	Negation of Planned Change; Inevitable Perfection
B. Temporary Synthesis and the Expansion of Concern:					
Comte	Evolutionary	Positivist	Concern over Freedom	Prediction	Negation of Planned Change; Inevitable Perfection
Spencer			Concern	Prediction	Negation of Planned Change; Inevitable Perfection
C. The Anxiety for Freedom:					
Maine Toennies Durkheim Weber	Evolutionary	Increased Pessimism; Historical Consciousness	Concern over Freedom	Prediction	Negation of Planned Change
D. The Alignment of Concern and Freedom:					
Marx Dahrendorf Mannheim	Conflict	Critical (historical consciousness)	Concern and Freedom	Change	Active Intervention for Planned Change in the Natural and Social Worlds
E. The Revival of Anxiety:					
Spengler Toynbee Sorokin	Cyclical	Fatalistic	Freedom over Concern	Interpretation	Negation of Planned Change

Model-Type:		Interpretation of Past & Future:	Dominant Myth	Major Interest:	Policy-Orientation:
F. The Revival of Liberal Optimism:					
Parsons Ogburn Smelser	Evolutionary (linear)	Liberal Optimism	Concern	Prediction	Negation of Planned Change; Inevitable Perfection
G. Realignment of Concern and Freedom:					
Habermas	Historical Evolutionism	Critical	Concern and Freedom	Emancipation	Active Intervention for Planned Change in the Natural and Social Worlds

CHAPTER FOUR

REALIGNMENT OF THEORY AND PRACTICE

A. Introduction

This survey of sociological theories has focused on the relation between conceptions of change and policy-orientations regarding events and conditions in the natural and social worlds. We have discussed the nature of this relation between conceptions and policies along two dimensions. The first of these entailed a consideration of the centrality of conceptions of change to societies in the form of interpretations and prescriptions. The second entailed a consideration of the development and alternation of theories within a temporal or historical dimension of dominant concerns. At this point, we will consider in detail a recent model of change which derives from the contemporary critical orientation within sociological theory. This particular model will elucidate (1) the manner in which critical social theory attempts to align theory and practice, and (2) the manner in which the theory of alternation may be applied to the study of change in both the natural and social worlds. We will present this model by first explaining the philosophical assumptions and basis for critique of several other approaches, followed by a theory of social evolution and analysis of the stages of development of the natural and social worlds.

B. The Modern Formulation of Critical Social Theory: Jurgen Habermas

Jurgen Habermas (1975) has brought together a wide range of literature on modern western societies in order to dialectically

consider the structure of modern concerns and hypotheses relating to the dynamics and development of organized capitalism. In his examination of these hypotheses, Habermas has (1) illustrated the relevance of hermeneutics to social theory, (2) re-examined the systems approach to the study of society, and (3) demonstrated the relevance of linguistic philosophy to the philosophical assumptions of social theory. Basic to these ideas is his development of critical social theory through a reconceptualization of the philosophical foundations of historical materialism. Thomas McCarthy explains the necessity for this reconceptualization in the introduction to his translation of Habermas' work:

> The cleavage between fact and value, description and evaluation, science and criticism which Hume articulated and the empiricist tradition in philosophy and social inquiry has raised to the status of a first principle, is clearly incompatible with the idea of a critical theory of society. One of the defining characteristics of critical social theory is precisely its attempt to overcome the empirical/normative split and the separation of theory from practice that follows from it (emphasis mine). (T. McCarthy, 1975:x.)

Habermas accomplishes the alignment of theory and practice within a theory of communicative competence. This theory constitutes a linguistic reconceptualization of the philosophical assumptions of historical materialism. Insofar as it examines and recovers some of the concerns of classical philosophy which were encountered in our survey, we will briefly outline the development of his argument for the theory of communicative competence and his philosophical foundations for a critical theory of society. The formulation of this theory involves a questioning of the relation between modern ideological

interests, hypotheses, and the notions of 'truth' and 'reality' to which critical theory must appeal in order to legitimate its own standpoint. Within the context of the present study, Habermas reflectively considers modern interests, attitudes, concerns, and ideals while developing a critical social theory with a practical intention -- the self-emancipation of modern men.

1. Modern Interpretations of Dialectical Materialism: 'Official' Marxism and the Frankfurt School

In his argument for the necessary reformulation of the philosophical assumptions of dialectical materialism, Habermas describes the development of concerns and policies that have resulted from modern interpretations of dialectical materialism.

Distinguishing his materialistic critique from the philosophical modes developed by Hegel and the left Hegelians, Marx identified labor or practice as 'sensuous human activity.' As Habermas points out, this reduction of praxis to techne or instrumental action is somewhat offset by the conception of labor as social labor: man's productive activity takes place in a symbolically mediated institutional setting (McCarthy, 1975:xix). Productive forces are applied to the world of nature only within definite relations of production. However, because the notion of social interaction is incorporated into the notion of material production by Marx, the reproduction of the human species is seen to take place primarily in the dimension of the reproduction of material conditions of life. Material production forms the paradigm for his analysis of human action. All social phenomena are explained in terms of their material, i.e., economic, basis.

Habermas explains that Marx's critique of political economy simultaneously transcends this narrow categorical framework through his inclusion of the notions of ideology and reflective critique -- class consciousness and its expression in revolutionary practice. In this sense, the Marxian theory is a critical social theory: it is simultaneously an analysis of the dynamics of capitalist society and a critique of ideology -- "an empirical theory and the critical consciousness of revolutionary practice" (T. McCarthy, 1975:xx). It becomes a practical social theory with the rise of class consciousness and the process of self-understanding.

There is in this context of thought an 'unresolved' tension in Marx's theory between the reductivism of his categorical framework and the dialectical character of his social inquiry (T. McCarthy, 1975: xx). Important to our concerns is the fact that this tension was first resolved in 'official' Marxism through an exclusive focus upon the reductivist, deterministic side of Marx's dialectical materialism. This interpretation of dialectical materialism became the primary interest and instrument by which one could discover the movement of society and history, and thereby predict and control social processes. The critique of political economy as a deterministic science of the 'laws' of the development and downfall of capitalism legitimated the separation of 'revolutionary practice' from the formation of class consciousness: Dialectical materialism could legitimate party politics and technocratic social management while ideology forfeited the internal relation to critique and revolution that it held for Marx (T. McCarthy, 1975:xx).

The early Frankfurt School, however, began to question the assumptions of this interpretation. Although they accepted the Marxian critique of political economy, they questioned the idea that the internal development of capitalism would create both the objective conditions for a classless society and the subjective conditions for the self-emancipation of the proletariat. The interpretation of dialectical materialism thus underwent additional revisions:

> There was a recognized need to supply the 'missing link' between Marx's critique of political economy and his theory of revolution through systematically incorporating the sociocultural dimension neglected by 'mechanical' official Marxism.
>
> (T. McCarthy, 1975:xx.)

This reinterpretation brings us to the theories of Horkheimer (1934) and Adorno (1955), who believed that the critique of scientism as primary concern was the precondition to restoring Marxist theory as critical theory.

The convergence of the ideals of reason and freedom within philosophical idealism has traditionally been the chief enemy of critical thought. Horkheimer (1934) and Adorno (1955) replaced this with positivistic materialism as the enemy of critical thought, attempting to ground the ideals of reason and freedom in materialist theory. The critique of 'instrumental reason' thus became the primary task of critical social theory.

Where the progressive mastery of nature through science and technology is the primary concern and tool for creating the objective possibility for a free (classless) society, the potential subjects

of self-emancipation (the proletariat) are transformed: "The reification of consciousness was the price paid for the progressive liberation from material necessity"(T. McCarthy, 1975:xvi). According to Horkheimer and Adorno, technocratic consciousness eliminates the distinction between the technical and the practical, repressing ethics as a category of life. The practical dimension must be restored in order to overcome this repression of ethics and reification of consciousness. For Horkheimer and Adorno, emancipation is possible only through a radical break with instrumental, one-dimensional or technical thought (McCarthy, 1975:xxi). The theorists thus focused upon the process of rationalization and the manifestations of instrumental rationality, thereby restoring the socio-cultural dimension of dialectical social theory.

Habermas points out, however, that this reactionary focus on the sociocultural dimension of dialectical theory was accompanied by a weakening of the critique of political economy.

> In the final analysis, the early Frankfurt School did not so much integrate the psychological, social, and cultural dimensions into Marxist political-economic thought as replace the latter with the former.
> (T. McCarthy, 1975:xxi.)

Horkheimer made several other revisions in the notion of critical social theory through his materialist critique of ideology. First, he rejected the Hegelian notion of inevitable or guaranteed progress, and the idea of a universal history and system of truth. He furthermore stated the time- and culture-bound context of his own critical theory: critical theory is guided by an interest in the future; an interest in the realization of a truly rational society in which men

can make their own history with will and consciousness (T. McCarthy, 1975:xi).

It is at this point in the development of modern critical theory that Habermas raises two questions crucial to the revival of critical social theory: In what way can the interest in the future that guides critical theory be distinguished from the particularistic interests concealed behind ideological theories? To what conception of truth can critical theory appeal to legitimize its own standpoint (T. McCarthy, 1975:xi)? These questions bring us directly to Habermas' theory of communicative competence and reconceptualization of the philosophical assumptions of historical materialism in answer to the theory-practice problematic within critical theory.

2. The Theory of Communicative Competence

Habermas raises the question as to how, in a materialist theory of history, the idealist convergence of reason and freedom might be grounded (T. McCarthy, 1975:xiii). Habermas answers this question through a linguistic reformulation of the philosophical foundations of historical materialism. Language is here seen as a universal medium (along with work and domination) in which the social life-world unfolds. "The socio-cultural form of life is bound to systems of symbolically mediated interaction"(McCarthy, 1975:xiii). In this context of thought, what has traditionally been treated as the problem of consciousness becomes the problem of language in the modern world. According to Habermas, an adequate conception of language as one medium in which the social life-world unfolds can only be established in terms of a universal pragmatics. This universal pragmatics must

exhibit the normative basis of communication and explain the possibility of systematically distorted communication (McCarthy, 1975:xiii).

Because of the centrality and complexity of this notion of a universal pragmatics in Habermas' overall theory, we will outline the basis of his linguistic philosophy and explain its relation to the development of critical theory. The theory of communicative competence which is based on this idea of a universal pragmatics develops along three dimensions: (a) the relation between communicative action and discourse, (b) the consensus theory of truth, and (c) the supposition of the ideal speech situation. We will first explain these three aspects of his linguistic philosophy, and then illustrate the way in which the theory of communicative competence is linked to the philosophical foundations of historical materialism to establish a critical social theory.

a. The relation between communicative action and discourse

In analyzing the relation between communicative action and discourse, Habermas points out that any functioning 'language game' relies upon a background consensus. This consensus is based on the mutual recognition of four basic types of validity claims involved in the exchange of speech acts: (1) claims that the utterance is understandable, (2) claims that the propositional content is true, (3) claims that the speaker is sincere in his utterance, and (4) claims that it is right for the speaker to be performing the speech act (McCarthy, 1975:xiii). These validity claims essentially refer to basic claims about the truth of statements and the correctness of norms.

In normal interaction situations, these claims are all naively

accepted. However, as Habermas points out, it is possible for situations to arise in which any or all of these validity claims become problematic. When this happens, the background consensus is also called into question.

There are specific ways in which the background consensus must be restored. Habermas focuses here on the two general problems of claims to Truth and the correctness of norms. Both problematics must be resolved or 'redeemed' discursively, i.e., "by entering into a discourse whose sole purpose is to judge the truth of the problematic opinion or the correctness of the problematic norm" (McCarthy, 1975:xiv). Discourse about the truth claim of problematic opinions is theoretic discourse. Discourse about the correctness of problematic norms is practical discourse. There is a historical dimension involved in the development of theoretic and practical discourse and the knowledge and interests which are admitted to or excluded from discourse, as was briefly suggested in Chapter One.

The speech situation of discourse differs from normal interaction in two ways: (1) all motives are suppressed except the motive to come to an understanding; (2) there is a suspension of judgement as to the existence of certain states of affairs and the correctness of certain norms. As Habermas points out, however, normal interaction contains an implicit reference to these criteria for discourse:

> Insofar as interaction involves regarding the other as subject, it involves supposing that he knows what he is doing and why he is doing it; there is an assumption that he intentionally follows the norms he does, and that he is capable of discursively justifying them if the need should arise.
>
> (McCarthy, 1975:xiv.)

In short, there is a 'supposition of accountability' in normal interaction situations. This underlying expectation of accountability is a normal feature of functioning language games. On the other hand, Habermas points out that this very assumption of accountability is actually counterfactual.

> We know that institutionalized actions do not as a rule fit this model of pure communicative action, although we cannot avoid counterfactually proceeding as if the models were really the case...
>
> (McCarthy, 1975:xlv.)

The fact that this counterfactual assumption of accountability persists as an expectation can be explained within a theory of systematically distorted communication.

Habermas explains in this theory that counterfactual expectations are stabilized through the legitimation of the ruling system of norms (prescriptions), and through the grounding of belief in the legitimacy of barriers to will-forming communication (interpretations). Put differently, the claim that norms can be grounded is redeemed through legitimizing world-views whose validity is, in turn, secured in a communicative structure that excludes discursive will-formation. Those barriers to discursive will-formation which make a fiction of the supposition of accountability simultaneously support the belief in legitimacy that sustains the fiction. This, then, is the paradoxical achievement of all ideologies which critical theory seeks to elucidate and dissociate from its own standpoint.

Last, Habermas points out that this counterfactual character of the expectation of discursive justification for beliefs and norms also reflects the situation of discourse itself. "In light of the

possibility of systematic distortion, how can a discursively realized agreement be distinguished from the mere appearance of discursively founded agreement?" (McCarthy, 1975:xv) That is, which are the criteria of a 'true' rather than a 'false' consensus? McCarthy points out that if there are no reliable criteria for true consensus, Habermas' critical theory is subject to the same problem of concealed ideological interests as were the previous attempts to establish critical theory.

b. The consensus theory of Truth

Habermas' consensus theory of truth marks the difference between his own and previous critical theories by virtue of the connection he makes with classical philosophy. In his work on knowledge and human interests, he claims that this theory remains faithful to the core of classical philosophy, i.e., "to the insight that the truth of statements is linked in the last analysis to the intention of the good and true life" (McCarthy, 1975:xv). The consensus theory of truth makes good this claim with the idea that the elucidation of the notion of truth requires some justification of validity:

> Truth is not the fact that a consensus is realised, but rather that at all times and in any place, if we enter into a discourse a consensus can be realised under conditions that identify it as a justified consensus. Truth means warranted assertability.
> (McCarthy, 1975:xvi.)

The question thus becomes, under what conditions is a consensus a justified consensus?

The very act of discourse -- the attempt to come to agreement about the truth of statements or correctness of norms -- is accompanied by the supposition that agreement is indeed possible. In attempting

to rationally decide about the truth of statements or correctness of norms, we suppose that the outcome of discussion will be the result of the better argument, and not the result of systematic or accidental constraint (McCarthy, 1975:xvi). The exclusion of constraint, or the absence of systematically distorted communication, can be formally characterized in terms of the pragmatic structure of communication: "the structure is free from constraint only when for all participants there is a symmetrical distribution of chances to select and employ speech acts" (McCarthy, 1975:xvii). All participants must have equal chances to give arguments for or against statements, interpretations, explanations and justifications. These criteria refer us, finally, to the organization of interaction:

> The conditions of the ideal speech situation must insure not only unlimited discussion but also discussion free from all constraints of domination, whether this source be conscious strategic behavior or communication barriers secured in ideology...Thus the conditions for ideal discourse are connected with conditions for an ideal form of life; they include linguistic conceptualizations of the traditional ideas of freedom and justice (emphasis mine).
>
> (McCarthy, 1975:xvii.)

We are reminded by this of Frye's statement that the structure of communities and the structure of communication are linked, as reality and appearance.

The above conditions for the ideal speech situation rarely exist in the normal conditions for interaction. The ideal, however, can still be more or less adequately approximated, and can serve as a guide for the institutionalization of discourse and the critique of systematically distorted communication.

c. The supposition of the ideal speech situation

The ideal speech situation thus represents the conditions under which consensus is genuine, or rationally motivated. If one assumes that it is possible to come to a genuine consensus, and if, in actual discussion, one cannot determine whether the ideal conditions obtain, then the ideal becomes a reciprocal supposition. It is not necessarily a counterfactual supposition, however, but when it is, it is still effective in communication (McCarthy, 1975:xviii). Habermas therefore speaks of the 'anticipation of the ideal situation':

> This anticipation alone is the warrant that permits us to join to an actually attained consensus the claim of a rational consensus. At the same time, it is a critical standard against which every actually realised consensus can be called into question and tested.
>
> (McCarthy, 1975:xviii.)

McCarthy reminds us that whether or not this anticipated form of communication and life can be obtained, and whether the empirical conditions for even its approximation can be practically realised, is a question that does not admit of an a priori answer. However, the norms for rational speech that are built into universal pragmatics contain a practical hypothesis for Habermas (McCarthy, 1975:xviii). In his linguistic reconceptualization of the philosophical foundations of materialism, Habermas has recovered the theme of classical philosophy -- that theory and practice are inseparable. On this thesis rest the foundations for a critical theory with a practical intention: "the self-emancipation of men from the constraint of unnecessary domination in all its forms" (McCarthy, 1975:xviii). The emancipated form of life is the goal of critical theory, and it is inherent in the notion

of truth, and anticipated in every act of communication.

3. The Philosophical Foundations of Historical Materialism and The Theory of Communicative Competence: A New Approach To Social Evolution

In reformulating the fundamental assumptions of historical materialism, Habermas makes use of a distinction made by Marx between labor and interaction.

> Marx's concept of 'sensuous human activity' is analyzed into two components that, while analytically distinguishable and mutually irreducible, are interdependent in actual social practice: instrumental or purposive rational (zweckrationale) action and communication action or social interaction.
>
> (McCarthy, 1975:xxii.)

Habermas claims that on the basis of this distinction we can reconstruct the development of the human species as an historical process of technological and -- interdependently -- institutional and cultural development. Social systems expand their control over outer nature (natural environment) with the help of forces of production. This requires technically utilizable knowledge which incorporates <u>empirical assumptions with claims to truth</u>. Inner nature (social life-world) is adapted to society with the help of normative structures in which needs are interpreted and actions are licensed or prohibited. This transpires through <u>norms that have need of justification</u>. Thus, work according to technical rules and interaction according to valid norms is the distinction allowing us to reconstruct the development of man as a process of technological, institutional, and cultural evolution. This distinction is the basis of Habermas' theory of evolution in the natural and social worlds. We can see the importance of this distinction

as applied to the term 'progress':

> Political emancipation cannot be identified with technical progress. While rationalization in the dimension of instrumental action signifies the growth of productive forces and extension of technological control, rationalization in the dimension of social interaction signifies the extension of communication free from domination.
> (McCarthy, 1975:xxii.)

This distinction is developed by Habermas at four different levels of analysis. (1) At a 'quasi-transcendental' level, the theory of cognitive interests distinguishes the technical interest in prediction and control of objectified processes from the practical interest in maintenance of distortion-free communication. (2) At a methodological level, there is the logical distinction between empirical-analytical sciences aiming at technically exploitable nomological knowledge, historical-hermeneutic sciences aiming at expanding mutual understanding capable of orienting action, and the critical sciences, like psychoanalysis and critique of ideology, which aim at self-reflexive emancipation from distortions of communication. (3) At the sociological level, Habermas distinguishes between subsystems of purposive-rational action and the institutional framework in which they are embedded. (4) At the level of social evolution, growth in productive forces and technological control is distinguished from the extension of communication free from domination. McCarthy explains the crucial purpose of these distinctions:

> In drawing these analytical distinctions, Habermas' intention is clearly to overcome the reductivism of Marx's categorical framework without 'falling behind' Marx into the kind of left-Hegelianism, unscientific utopianism...of which the earlier Frankfurt

> school has been accused. Neither analyses of the economic 'basis' nor analyses of the socio-cultural 'superstructure' are adequate in themselves to comprehend the dynamics of advanced-capitalist society. The long proclaimed 'dialectical' interdependence of the different spheres of society must be reflected at the categorical and methodological levels if critical theory is to avoid the extremes of economism and neo-idealism.
>
> (McCarthy, 1975:xxiii.)

The theory of communicative competence is thus linked with the fundamental assumptions of historical materialism in order to provide a satisfactory framework for understanding historical evolution in both the natural and social worlds. This connection with historical materialism is developed along three dimensions within the theory of social evolution: (1) the development of forces of production, (2) the development of organizational forms and techniques that enhance the steering capacity of societies, and (3) the development and critical dissolution of interpretive systems (McCarthy, 1975:xxiii). Habermas thus integrates the economic, political, and socio-cultural dimensions in a way that earlier critical theorists felt was necessary but failed to accomplish (McCarthy, 1975:xxiv).

In sum, the theory of communicative competence which states the need for supposition of an ideal speech situation and the criteria and conditions for genuine, rationally motivated consensus, is linked to the Marxian distinction between labor and interaction in a materialist theory of history. This link provides the method for analyzing the historical evolutionary process of development of both the natural and social life-worlds. Work according to technical rules, i.e., technical knowledge incorporating empirical assumptions with claims

to truth, refers to the expansion of system control over outer nature through forces of production. Interaction according to valid norms refers to the way in which inner nature is adapted to society by way of normative structures which interpret needs and license behavior, and whose norms have need of justification. The connection between the development of technical knowledge and forces of production, and between the development of practical knowledge and the adaptation of inner nature will become clear with the illustration of different stages of evolution and the development of the steering capacities of social systems.

We may now proceed to define several key concepts which distinguish Habermas' orientation from the Parsonian approach to systems theory and evolution. These distinctions are best made within the context of a discussion about the formulation of the crisis-concept in contemporary social theory.

C. The System and the Social Life-World

1. The Conceptualization of Crisis in Social Theory

In explaining the analytical dimensions of our survey, it was pointed out that periods of transition and change or crisis cause the importance of interpretations and prescriptions to become especially apparent, and that during such critical periods these may undergo reformulation in order to either secure or redefine social identity and social concerns. We have identified the nature of crisis within different theoretical perspectives, such as the notion of the 'break-down' of modern civilizations predicted by the cyclical theorists, or the problem of 'identity crises' evolving from an over-concern with

functional imperatives for system control. Habermas considers the development of crisis in his theory of evolution, and the implications of acknowledging crises for critical social theory.

In its medical usage, 'crisis' refers to that phase of illness when it is decided whether or not the organism's self-healing powers are sufficient for recovery. As Habermas makes clear, disease is seen as something objective, contracted through external influences. Nevertheless, the crisis or illness cannot be separated from the viewpoint of the one who is undergoing it: "the patient experiences his powerlessness vis-a-vis the objectivity of the illness"(Habermas, 1975: 1). Thus, 'crisis' is associated with the idea of an objective force depriving a subject of his normal 'sovereignty.' Furthermore:

> To conceive of a process as a crisis is tacitly to give it a normative meaning -- the resolution of the crisis effects a liberation of the subject caught up in it.
>
> (Habermas, 1975:1.)

The dramaturgical concept of crisis refers us to that turning point in some fateful process which, despite all objectivity, does not simply impose itself from outside nor remain external to the identity of the persons caught up in it (Habermas, 1975:2). It refers to a contradiction which culminates in catastrophe, and is inherent in the structure of the action system and the personality systems of the principle characters.

> Fate is fulfilled in the revelation of conflicting norms against which the identities of the participants shatter, unless they are able to summon up the strength to win back their freedom by shattering the mythical power of fate through the formation of new identities.
>
> (Habermas, 1975:2.)

Habermas points out that this concept of crisis in classical tragedy has its counterpart in the conception of crisis found in the idea of history as salvation. This notion of crisis was transmitted from the eighteenth century philosophies of history to the nineteenth century evolutionary theories. Thus, Marx's idea of system crisis is considered the first socio-scientific conception of crisis. It is against this background of conceptualization, Habermas tells us, that we speak of social and economic crises in the modern world.

Last, Habermas discusses the modern use of the crisis concept in contemporary systems theory. Within the systems approach, crises arise "when the structure of a social system allows fewer possibilities for problem solving than are necessary to the continued existence of the system" (Habermas, 1975:2). Crises are thus seen as disturbances to system integration. Habermas' main criticism of this conception of crisis is that it does not take into account the internal causes of a systematic overloading of control capacities, or of a structural insolubility of control problems (Habermas, 1975:2). In other words, it focuses on the 'persistence' of systems (structure) to the exclusion of the 'performance' of systems (process). Correspondingly, problems of structural continuity, survival, and system maintenance are emphasized to the exclusion of discussion about the steering performances of self-regulating systems and the specification, attainment, and alteration of system goal values.

A further criticism is made here of the systems theory approach (e.g., N. Luhmann; T. Parsons) which is worth noting in distinction to Habermas' own approach to the analysis of social systems. The

'goal state' of a system refers to the "preferred state that a self-regulating system tends to achieve, and once achieved to maintain, across a wide range of environmental and internal variations" (Habermas, 1975:147). The values of the variables characterizing the system are the 'goal values' of the system; they describe the preferred goal state. The point of departure from the Parsonian scheme, however, comes with Parsons' claim that goal values are 'given' by institutionalized cultural values within society. Parsons claims in this context that values as such are relevant to the orientation of the social system because they are "the normative patterns defining, in universalistic terms, the pattern of desirable orientation for the system as a whole" (1961:44). Habermas argues that the goal values and cultural values of a social system are <u>not</u> 'given' and may become discrepant or undergo alterations. The goal states of social systems, furthermore, cannot be ascertained in the same way as biological or servomechanical systems (Habermas, 1975:148), as is attempted within systems theory approaches.

For Habermas, although not all systemic alterations mean crisis, a crisis may occur when systems try to maintain themselves through altering both their boundaries and their structural continuity: their identity becomes blurred, and the same system modification can be conceived either as a learning process and change, or as a dissolution process and collapse of the system (Habermas, 1975:3). Following this line of argument, there is an additional criticism made of the Parsonian approach to social systems analysis and the inability to conceptualize crisis occurrences:

> The range of tolerance within which the goal values of a social system can vary without critically endangering its continued existence or losing its identity obviously cannot be grasped from the objectivist viewpoint of systems theory. Systems are not presented as subjects; but...only subjects can be involved in crises. Thus, only when members of a society experience structural alterations as critical for continued existence and feel their social identity threatened can we speak of crises.

Habermas goes on to explain that social systems also have identities, and can lose them. There have been revolutionary changes where entire empires fall, as well as mere structural alterations. This idea of the loss of identity refers to the interpretations members of a system have and use in identifying one another as members of the same group. Through this group identity, members assert their own identity. As we have continuously pointed out, periods of transition or change refer to a rupture in traditional interpretations and/or prescriptions: "the interpretive systems that guarantee identity lose their social integrative power" (Habermas, 1975:4).

Habermas also points out, however, that a rupture in tradition as such may at times be an inexact criteria of system crisis, since the media of tradition and the consciousness of historical continuity themselves change historically. Furthermore, a consciousness of crisis may later turn out to be misleading: "a society does not plunge into crisis when, and only when, its members so identify the situation" (Habermas, 1975:4).

For Habermas the question becomes: how can we distinguish such crisis ideologies from valid experiences of crisis if social crises could be determined only on the basis of conscious phenomena? The

answer to that question is this: although subjects may not be conscious of the actual, objective crisis, secondary problems arise from this which do affect their consciousness and endanger integration.

> Crisis occurrences owe their objectivity to the fact that they issue from unresolved steering problems. Although the subjects are not generally conscious of them, these steering problems create secondary problems that do affect consciousness in a specific way -- precisely in such a way as to endanger social integration.
> (Habermas, 1975:4.)

Lastly, the question is raised, when do such steering problems arise? This question brings us to what is perhaps the most important distinction between the American tradition of systems theory and Habermas' theoretical orientation toward a theory of social evolution, as shall be explained.

2. Social and System Integration

According to Habermas, in order to know when steering problems arise and lead to the possibility of crisis, a socio-scientific concept of crisis must be developed which can grasp the connection between system integration and social integration.

> The two expressions 'social integration' and 'system integration' derive from different theoretical traditions. We speak of social integration in relation to systems of institutions in which speaking and acting subjects are socially related (vergesellschaftet). Social systems are seen here as life-worlds that are symbolically structured. We speak of system integration with a view to the specific steering performances of a self-regulating system. Social systems are considered here from the point of view of their capacity to maintain their boundaries and their continued existence by mastering the complexity of an inconstant environment.
> (Habermas, 1975:4.)

According to Habermas, the task here is to demonstrate the interconnection between the two paradigms, life-world and system.

The concept of life-world comes from P. Berger and T. Luckmann's discussion of the social construction of reality (1966). The distinction between life-world and system, or between social integration and system integration, has recently been conceived as a kind of 'double aspect' of society. Parsons, for example, attempts to connect the two via the connection between action theory and systems theory at the categorical level. Etzioni analyzes capacity for control and consensus as two system dimensions. Luhmann reformulates the phenomenological conception of meaning within a systems-theoretic perspective. For Habermas, each of these distinctions point to a common problem in the conceptualization of social systems, but do not solve it. In these formulations, "the structures of intersubjectivity have not yet been sufficiently examined and the constituents of social systems have not yet been grasped precisely enough" (Habermas, 1975:148). Habermas' distinction between the social life-world and the system is thus an attempt to overcome this problem within systems theory. As we shall see, he explicitly outlines the structures of intersubjectivity and the constituents of social systems in his theory of social evolution.

In demonstrating the connection between the life-world and system paradigms, Habermas explains that, from the life-world perspective, normative structures (values and institutions) are thematized. Events and conditions are examined from the point of view of their dependency upon functions of <u>social</u> integration (i.e., similar to Parsons' notions of integration and pattern maintenance). Non-normative components of

the system serve as the limiting conditions of integration for the life-world. On the other hand, from the system perspective, the steering mechanisms of a society are thematized, along with the expansion of the scope of contingency. Events and conditions are analyzed from the point of view of their dependency upon functions of system integration (Parsons' conceptions of adaptation and goal-attainment) (Habermas, 1975:4-5).

Habermas argues that if we comprehend the social system as life-world only, the steering aspect, i.e., performances of systems, is neglected. On the other hand, if society is seen as a system, then the life-world element is left out -- "the fact that social reality consists in the facticity of recognized, often counterfactual, validity claims is not taken into consideration" (Habermas, 1975:5). More precisely, the Parsonian scheme does take account of normative structures, "but it conceptualizes every social system from the point of view of its control center" (Habermas, 1975:5). In differentiated societies, the political system is therefore considered as a separate control center, and assumes a superordinate position vis-a-vis the socio-cultural and economic systems. It follows from this reasoning that social evolution is then projected onto a single plane of the expansion of power through the reduction of environmental complexity. This is identical to our earlier discussion of the domination of science, technology, and systemic control in the modern myth of concern, with its focus upon mastery over the natural world. Habermas' definition of the three dimensions of social evolution as the development of forces of production, increases in system autonomy, and changes in

normative structures is in critical contrast to this former orientation. Habermas insists that the validity claims constitutive for the cultural reproduction of life (i.e., claims to truth and correctness) forfeit their sense of discursive redeemability if comprehended as control media, and placed with other media such as power, money, confidence, influence, etc. (i.e., Parsons' analytical orientation)(Habermas, 1975:6). In short,

> systems theory can allow only empirical events and states into its object domain and must transform questions of validity into questions of behavior.
>
> (Habermas, 1975:6.)

In contrast to this, but posing similar problems, is the strategy of action theory, which produces a dichotomy between normative structures and limiting material conditions. "This conceptualization requires supplementing the analysis of normative structures with an analysis of limitations and capacities relevant to steering" (Habermas, 1975:7). Habermas is proclaiming, instead, the need for a level of analysis at which the connection between normative structures and steering problems is made. As he explains:

> I find this level in a historically oriented analysis of social systems, which permits us to ascertain for a given case the range of tolerance within which the goal values of the system might vary without its continued existence being critically endangered. The boundaries of this range are manifested as boundaries of historical continuity. Of course...the range of variations that can occur without causing a rupture in tradition...does not depend solely ...on consistency requirements of the normative structures themselves. The goal values of social systems are the product, on the one hand, of the cultural values of the constitutive tradition and, on the other, of the non-normative

> requirements of system integration. In the goal values, the cultural definitions of social life and the survival imperatives that can be reconstructed in systems theory, are connected (emphasis mine).
>
> (Habermas, 1975:7.)

The ranges of variation for structural changes can thus be introduced only within the framework of a theory of evolution. Habermas discusses these variations in terms of Marx's conception of social formation. The formation of a society is determined by its fundamental principle of organization, which delimits the possibilities for alterations of social states (Habermas, 1975:7). The 'principles of organization' refer to abstract regulations which arise at each new stage of development as emergent properties, characterizing the level of development attained. Importantly, organizational principles limit the capacity of a society to learn without losing its identity. Steering problems, therefore, will only have a crisis affect "if they cannot be resolved within the range of possibility that is circumscribed by the organizational principle of the society" (Habermas, 1975:7). The principles of organization therefore determine (1) the learning mechanism on which the development of the productive forces depend; (2) the range of variation for interpretive systems which secure identity; and (3) the institutional boundaries for possible expansion of steering capacity (Habermas, 1975:8).

Before presenting Habermas' illustration of the different stages of development and different organizational principles of societies, we must look at his definition of the universal principles of all social systems.

3. Constituents of Social Systems

Habermas describes three universal principles of social systems concerning (a) the exchange between social systems and their environments, (b) changes in goal values of the system, and (c) the level of development or learning capacity attained in societies. A discussion of these three principles will make Habermas' orientation toward social evolution clear and bring together the ideas formulated in his theory of communicative competence and linguistic reformulation of historical materialism.

a. The exchange between systems and environments

In pointing out the manner in which Habermas made his connection between the Marxian conception of labor and interaction and his own theory of communicative competence, we briefly described the way in which inner and outer nature are developed. In describing the constituents of social systems, Habermas explains these processes in greater detail.

All social systems have three 'segments' of environment: (1) outer nature, or the natural world; (2) other social systems with which the society is in contact; and (3) inner nature, or the members of society. Habermas is primarily concerned with the system's processes of exchange with inner and outer nature, for these processes are decisive for the specific form in which the socio-cultural life-world unfolds, or reproduces itself (Habermas, 1975:9).

As we have already seen, outer nature is appropriated through production processes. Inner nature is appropriated through socialization. As steering capacities develop, the social system extends its boundaries

into both inner and outer nature. "Control over outer nature and integration of inner nature increase with the 'power' of the system" (Habermas, 1975:9). Forces of production extract natural resources, and transform them into 'use values.' Socialization processes shape societal members into 'subjects capable of thinking and acting.' Specifically,

> Social systems adapt outer nature to society with the help of forces of production: they organize and train labor power; and develop technologies and strategies. In order to do this they require technically utilizable knowledge...One of the specific performances of social systems (is) their control over outer nature through the medium of utterances that admit of truth.
>
> (Habermas, 1975:9.)

By 'utterances that admit of truth' Habermas means the technical rules which govern instrumental action or work. Technical rules incorporate empirical assumptions that imply truth claims, i.e., discursively redeemable and criticizable claims to truth.

Inner nature is adapted to society with the help of normative structures in which needs are interpreted and actions are licensed or made obligatory. Social systems accomplish the integration of inner nature through the medium of 'norms that have need of justification.' By 'norms that have need of justification' Habermas means norms with a validity claim to correctness that can only be redeemed discursively.

> To the truth claims that we raise in empirical statements there correspond claims of correctness or appropriateness that we advance with norms of action or evaluation.
>
> (Habermas, 1975:10.)

Habermas makes clear his use of the notions 'utterances of truth' and 'validity claims' by explaining that at the socio-cultural stage of

development animal behavior is reorganized under the imperatives of validity claims. "This reorganization is effected in structures of linguistically produced intersubjectivity" (Habermas, 1975:10). Linguistic communication in this sense has a 'double structure,' since communication about propositional content takes place simultaneously with communication about interpersonal relations.

> This is an expression of the specifically human interlacing of cognitive performances and motives for action with linguistic intersubjectivity.
> (Habermas, 1975:10.)

Language thus acts as a 'transformer': psychic processes (sensations, needs, feelings) are fitted into structures of linguistic intersubjectivity; inner experiences are transformed into intentional contents -- i.e., "cognitions into statements, needs and feelings into normative expectations (precepts and values)" (Habermas, 1975:10). It is this transformation which produces the distinction between "the subjectivity of opinion, wanting, pleasure and pain, on the one hand, and the utterances and norms that appear with a claim to generality, on the other" (Habermas, 1975:10). The concept of generality is important here: it refers to the objectivity of knowledge and the legitimacy of valid norms. Generality thus insures the existence of shared meanings that is constitutive for the socio-cultural life-world.

In a similar manner, structures of intersubjectivity are equally as constitutive for experiences and instrumental action as they are for attitudes and communicative action. At the systems level, the same structures of intersubjectivity regulate the control of outer nature and the integration of inner nature, i.e.:

> the process of adapting to society that, by virtue of the competencies of socially related individuals, operate through the peculiar media of utterances that admit of truth and norms that require justification.
> (Habermas, 1975:10-11.)

According to Habermas, the extension of system autonomy is dependent upon "the development of productive forces (truth) and the alteration of normative structures (correctness)" (Habermas, 1975:11). Important in these ideas of the development of 'truth' and 'correctness' vis-a-vis productive forces and alternating normative structures is the assertion that these developmental processes follow rationally reconstructable patterns that are logically <u>independent</u> of one another.

> The history of secular knowledge and technology is the history of truth-monitered successes in coming to terms with outer nature...To understand the development of science and technology, we must...conjecture an inner logic through which a hierarchy of non-reversible sequences is fixed from the outset...Because the adaptation of inner nature also operates through discursive validity claims, alteration of normative structures, as well as the history of science and technology, is a directional process.
> (Habermas, 1975:11.)

Habermas is pointing out here the cognitive component inherent in the development of inner nature. As we saw in chapter one, and implicitly within our survey:

> In the development from myth, through religion, to philosophy and ideology, the demand for discursive redemption of normative validity claims increasingly prevails.
> (Habermas, 1975:11.)

Both knowledge of nature and technology, and world-views thus develop in a pattern that makes is possible to rationally reconstruct their evolution.

b. Changes in goal values

Habermas makes another important distinction in discussing the development of inner and outer nature which further differentiates his approach from other systems theories and brings his analysis closer to our discussion of alternating interests in the natural and social worlds. This distinction is his reference to the asymmetry in the form of reproduction of socio-cultural life.

> While the development of productive forces always extends the scope of contingency of the social system, evolutionary advances in the structures of interpretive systems by no means always offer advantages of selection. Naturally, a growing system autonomy and a corresponding increase in the complexity of the forms of organization of a society can burst normative structures that have become confining and destroy barriers to participation that have become dysfunctional from the point of view of control.
>
> (Habermas, 1975:12.)

In other words, normative structures can be 'overturned' through cognitive dissonance between secular knowledge expanded with the development of forces of production, and the dogmatics of traditional world-views. The most important point here is that the mechanisms causing advances in normative structures are independent of the logic of their development. There is, therefore, no guarantee that progress in forces of production will automatically release normative alterations to correspond to the steering imperatives of the social system (i.e., in contrast to the Parsonian argument for orientation of the whole system via institutionalized cultural values).

> To the proposition that goal values of social systems vary historically must be added the proposition that variation in goal values is limited by a developmental logic of structures of world-views, a logic that is not at the

> disposition of the imperatives of power augmentation (emphasis mine).
> (Habermas, 1975:13.)

In another important sense, inner nature also remains an inner environment after its integration into the social system: it resists complete absorption. Socialization, or the adaptation of inner nature to society, cannot be conceived as a reduction of environmental complexity in the same way that production is conceived in the adaptation of outer nature to society. In fact, with increasing individuation, the 'immunization' of individuals against decisions of the control center gains in strength.

> The normative structures become effective as a kind of self-inhibiting mechanism vis-a-vis imperatives of power expansion.
> (Habermas, 1975:14.)

In sum, societies may be seen as systems, but their mode of development does not follow solely the logic of the expansion of system power or autonomy:

> social evolution transpires rather within the bounds of a logic of the life-world, the structures of which are determined by linguistically produced intersubjectivity and are based on criticizable validity claims.
> (Habermas, 1975:14.)

c. The development of learning capacities

On the basis of his explanation of (a) system-environment exchanges and (b) changes in goal values, Habermas concludes that the steering capacities of systems change as a function of growing control over outer nature and of increasing integration of inner nature (Habermas, 1975:14). Specifically, evolution on both dimensions takes place in

the form of "directional learning processes that work through discursively redeemable validity claims" (Habermas, 1975:14). Central to Habermas' theory is the assertion here that the "development of productive forces and the alteration of normative structures follow, respectively, logics of growing theoretical and practical insight" (Habermas, 1975:14). Collective learning processes refer to the history of secular knowledge and technology, on the one hand, and the structural alteration of identity-securing interpretive systems, on the other. The development of these learning processes are explained in terms of the logically necessary sequence of their possible development.

We have already encountered the basics of Habermas' theory of the development of learning capacities in Chapter One. All learning takes place on two dimensions, the theoretical and practical. Both learning processes are connected with validity claims to truth and correctness, respectively, that can be discursively redeemed.

Non-reflexive learning (pre-scientific) takes place in action contexts. This refers us to the primitive stage of development, wherein theoretical and practical validity claims are taken for granted; accepted or rejected without discursive consideration. Reflexive learning, on the other hand, takes place in the context of discourse. The level of learning attained, as we have seen, depends upon the organization principle of society. Specifically, this refers to whether or not the organization principle permits (1) differentiation between theoretical and practical questions, and (2) the transition from non-reflexive to reflexive learning.

As was explained earlier, when the sphere of instrumental action

(labor) and empirical knowledge was admitted to the sphere of reflexive learning processes, the result was the rise of modern science, aided by the concerns and interests of positivism. Simultaneously, practical questions were devalued and considered inadmissable to theoretic discourse, no longer 'susceptible of truth.' Most important here is Habermas' assertion that the development of productive forces follow the logic of theoretical insight, and that the alteration of normative structures follow the logic of practical insight (Habermas, 1975:14).

Through his consideration of (1) the principles of organization which determine the learning capacities of a society, and (2) the asymmetrical appropriation of inner and outer nature due to their independent logics of (theoretical and practical) development, Habermas is able to rationally reconstruct the process of social evolution through the primitive, traditional, modern, capitalist, liberal-capitalist, advanced-capitalist and post-capitalist stages of development. Evolutionary stages are thus determined on the basis of (1) principles of organization, (2) learning capacities, (3) development of forces of production and alteration of interpretive systems or normative structures, and (4) changes in goal values and steering capacities of social systems.

We may now proceed to Habermas' application of this model in analyzing the various stages of development. We will focus here primarily on the modern capitalist stage of development, and on the criticism deriving from his critical social theory.

D. Illustration of the Social Principles of Organization

The analysis of the constituents of social systems delimited

three universal properties of systems which serve as the framework for a theory of evolution. These three properties were defined as processes concerning (1) the exchange between the system and its environments of inner and outer nature, (2) the change of system goal values and their variation within certain tolerance limits, and (3) the attainment of certain learning capacities according to principles of social organization. Based on these three properties of social systems, Habermas concludes that:

> steering capacity changes as a function of growing control over outer nature and increasing integration of inner nature. Evolution in both dimensions takes place in the form of directional learning processes that work through discursively redeemable validity claims. The development of productive forces and the alteration of normative structures follow, respectively, logics of growing theoretical and practical insight (emphasis mine).
>
> (Habermas, 1975:14.)

We may at this point proceed to Habermas' illustration of the stages of social evolution and the process of their advancement through (1) the development of productive forces, (2) the alteration of normative structures, and (3) the expansion of steering capacity over inner and outer nature, respectively. This basic model of evolutionary processes may be formulated in the following diagram:



We will now present the three primary social formations defined by Habermas' theory of evolution: primitive, traditional, and capitalist (1975:17). The analysis of each social formation will proceed along the major dimensions defined above of (1) the development of forces of production, (2) the alteration of normative structures, and (3) the expansion of steering capacities for the adaptation of outer nature and integration of inner nature. In analyzing these dimensions of the evolutionary process, we will focus upon the principle of organization characterizing each of the three types of systems. This principle determines the development of:

1. theoretical knowledge:	the learning mechanisms on which the development of forces of production depend
2. practical knowledge:	the interpretive systems securing social identity
3. goal values:	the institutional boundaries for possible expansion of steering capacities over inner and outer nature

Because of its influence upon the development of theoretical and practical knowledge, and the variation of system goal values, the principle of organization also explains the way in which different types of crises can be determined for each of the three social formations. We will therefore include sources of potential change and/or crisis in our analysis of the three different social formations.

1. Primitive Social Formations

In Chapter One we pointed out that the function of 'total' mythologies was the simultaneous provision of interpretations which define social identity and prescriptions which define rules for living. In his analysis of primitive social formations, Habermas similarly

points out that "world-views and norms are scarcely differentiated from one another" (1975:18). The learning mechanism in primitive societies is built into the context of instrumental action or work. Theoretic and practical questions regarding ideas of truth and the correctness of norms are embodied within a total interpretive system: they are not effectively differentiated with respect to life-practice.

This lack of differentiation between theoretic and practical knowledge is apparent in the fact that the kinship system constitutes the principle of organization or the total 'institutional core' of primitive systems. All interpretations, and rules for living and working are sanctioned by and grounded within the kinship system as steering system. There are no contradictory imperatives between system and social integration in this formation which could lead to change, crisis, or the development of major innovations. All sources of change are external:

> The usual source of change is demographic growth in connection with ecological factors -- above all, interethnic dependency as a result of economic exchange, war, and conquest.
> (1975:18.)

We may summarize the model of primitive social formation as follows:

Social Formation:	Principle of Organization:	Social and System Integration:
Primitive	Kinship Relations	No differentiation between social and system integration

2. Traditional Social Formation

The principle of organization in traditional social formations is

political class domination. The emergence of bureaucratic authority as control center of the system means the differentiation of political and familial sources of authority. Specifically, this refers to "the transference of the production and distribution of social wealth from familial forms of organization to ownership of the means of production" (1975:19). The central functions of power and control are surrendered to the state.

We pointed out in Chapter One that the differentiation of the polity or the economy also means the differentiation of social concerns. Specifically, subsystems arise at this stage of development which predominantly serve either system or social integration (1975:19). The point of their interconnection is the legal order.

Because it does lie at the point of intersection between subsystems serving system and social integration, the legal order requires legitimation from both spheres. This transpires through the institutional separation of secular and sacred powers; i.e., differentiation between the state as authority apparatus on the one hand, and the interpretive system of justifications for validity claims on the other. The legal order and moral system may be seen as the 'mediators' of this separation of interpretive and prescriptive powers:



As Habermas explains,

> To the differentiation between the authority apparatus and the legal order on the one side,

> and the counterfactual justifications and moral system on the other, there corresponds the institutional separation of secular and sacred powers.
>
> (1975:19.)

The emergence of the need for legitimation from both subsystems (i.e., those concerned with system and social integration) is an important property of this type of social formation. Because there is a political form of class domination, a power relationship is institutionalized within the society which is a potential threat to social integration. The opposition of interests may be kept latent only within the framework of a legitimate order of authority (1975:19). Legitimacy is here supported by world-views or ideologies which "remove the counterfactual validity claims of (new) normative structures from the sphere of public thematization and testing" (1975:19). Traditional world-views and a civic ethic justify the order to authority.

As Habermas points out, the development of forces of production occurs at this stage through the persistence of unplanned, 'nature-like' technical innovations: technically utilizable knowledge has not yet been drawn into the sphere of reflexive learning processes. There is, therefore, a limit on the development of productive powers. A surplus may be produced only by raising the rate of exploitation, i.e., through organized forced labor. Because surplus products are appropriated according to privilege, this means a new possible source of crisis and change within the traditional social formation:

> In traditional societies the type of crisis that arises proceeds from internal contradictions. The contradiction exists between validity claims of systems of norms and justifications that cannot explicitly permit exploitation, and a class structure in which privileges of appropriation of socially pro-

duced wealth is the rule.

(1975:20.)

The primary concern as to how socially produced wealth is inequitably distributed in a legitimate manner is solved, temporarily, through the ideological 'protection' of counterfactual validity claims (1975: 20).

The scope of system power is usually expanded through the increased exploitation of labor power, either directly through physical force, or indirectly through forced payments. Subsequent internal contradictions lead either to a loss in legitimation or to class conflict. The 'crisis' in traditional systems therefore may be seen as the result of steering problems: system autonomy can only be expanded through heightened repression of the sociocultural life-world. Change in this social formation occurs primarily through class conflict:

> Class struggles finally threaten social integration and can lead to an overthrow of the political system and to new foundations of legitimation -- that is, to a new group identity.
>
> (1975:20.)

The major features of the model of traditional social formations may be summarized as follows:

Social Formation:	Principle of Organization:	Social and System Integration:
Traditional	Political class rule	Functional differentiation between system and social integration

3. Capitalist Social Formation

Habermas delimits three stages of development within the capitalist principle of organization, the liberal-capitalist, advanced-capitalist,

and post-capitalist (state-socialist) social formations. We will pay particular attention here to the liberal stage of capitalism, as the primary features of this system coincide with the interests and concerns expressed in the liberal evolutionary and positivist theories of our survey. We will consider advanced-capitalist social formations, separately, at a later point.

The principle of organization in liberal-capitalist formations is the relationship of wage labor and capital. This relationship is grounded in bourgeois civil law, and refers to the important de-politicization of labor which is central to the ideals of 'civil society' and 'free commerce'. As Habermas points out:

> This signifies a depoliticization of the class relationship and an anonymization of class domination. The state and the politically constituted system of social labor are no longer the institutional nucleus of the system as a whole.
>
> (1975:21.)

The 'rational state' of Weber's analysis becomes the "complementary arrangement" to a self-regulating commerce: Internally, 'legitimate power' maintains the conditions of production; externally, the state politically insures the competitiveness of the domestic economy. Economic exchange has become the dominant steering mechanism of liberal-capitalist societies, while the state is correspondingly limited in its powers and functions. Specifically, once capitalism becomes institutionalized, the power of the rational state is limited to the following functions:

1. the protection of bourgeois commerce in accord with civil law (police and administration of justice);

> 2. the shielding of the market mechanism from self-destructive side-effects (e.g., legislation for the protection of labor);
>
> 3. the satisfaction of the prerequisites of production in the economy as a whole (public school education, transportation, and communication);
>
> 4. the adaptation of the system of civil law to needs that arise from the process of accumulation (tax, banking, and business law).
>
> (1975:21.)

Through these functions the state is able to secure the structural prerequisites of capitalistic production.

In traditional social formations, we noted an institutional differentiation between subsystems serving system and social integration. The economic system and means of production is there dependent upon legitimations drawn from the socio-cultural system. When the economic system is uncoupled from the polity, as is the case with the emergence of liberal-capitalism, the sociocultural world is freed from traditional ties. A strategic-utilitarian ethic for orienting action replaces traditional forms of legitimation:

> Competing entrepreneurs then make their decisions according to maxims of profit-oriented competition and replace value-oriented with interest-guided action (emphasis mine).
>
> (1975:21.)

The development of both forces of production and normative structures becomes possible within this principle of organization. Specifically, within the imperatives for the self-realization of capital, production becomes tied to labor-enhancing innovations: "the accumulation of capital necessitates development of technical productive forces"(1975:22). Through this process, technically utilizable knowledge is brought into

the sphere of reflexive learning. As has been pointed out elsewhere, the use of reflexive learning for the enhancement of instrumental action refers to an early alignment of theory (i.e., of liberal capitalist order) with practice (through technically utilizable knowledge).

As noted, one of the primary features of this social formation is the uncoupling of the class system and the economy from the state. On the other hand, because the state's functions and powers have become limited vis-a-vis the autonomous expansion of the economy, the burden of legitimation rests with the economy. The sources of its legitimation are (1) rational state administration, (2) abstract law, and, most important, (3) the strategic-utilitarian morality which, in the private domain, becomes a 'Protestant' or 'formalistic' ethic.

> Bourgeois ideologies can assume a universalistic structure and appeal to generalizable interests because the property order has shed its political form and been converted to a relation of production that, it seems, can legitimate itself. The institution of the market can be founded on the justice inherent in the exchange of equivalents; and, for this reason, the bourgeois constitutional state finds its justification in the legitimate relations of production. (1075:22.)

The theory of liberal-capitalism is thus aligned with the practice of free competition, and the ideology of the exchange of equivalents aligned with bourgeois civil law.

The overall organization refers us to Locke's theory of natural law, "wherein the relations of production can do without traditional authority legitimated from above" (1975:22). The socially-integrative affect of rational natural law is largely restricted to the domain

of the bourgeois: the proletariat, recruited from the lower classes, remain integrated by virtue of a fatalistic willingness to conform, traditionalistic ties, and repression through bourgeois ideology (1975: 22).

The de-politicization of class structures has an additional affect on the content and function of bourgeois ideology. Because the socially dominant class no longer retains its status as the politically dominant class, it must "convince itself it no longer rules" (1975:22). This is accomplished with the emergence of universalistic bourgeois ideologies which are (1) founded 'scientifically' on the critique of tradition, and (2) anticipate the state of society whose future is not denied by a growing economic society (1975:23). These characteristics refer to the scientific legitimation of interests and the conception of an ideal future which were encountered in the liberal and positivistic theories of change in our survey.

In sum, Habermas explains the 'extraordinary achievement' of the capitalist principle of organization as follows:

> It not only forces the economic system, uncoupled from the political system, from the legitimations of the socially integrative subsystems, but enables it, along with its system integrative tasks, to make a contribution to social integration.
>
> (1975:23.)

Liberal-capitalist society, however, is not without potential sources of crisis: precisely because the economic system contributes to social integration, problems in economy result in a direct threat to social identity. In this sense, the liberal-capitalist systems are susceptible to <u>system</u> crises. This becomes possible because: first, the develop-

ment of productive forces is not limited by the principle of organization; economic development can move in an unplanned, nature-like way. And second, the development of normative structures is similarly uninhibited by the liberal-capitalist principle of organization, because it permits universalistic value systems. Both areas of development, however, are incompatible with a communicative ethic which requires not only generality of norms but also the generalizability of normatively prescribed interests (1975:23). In particular, any opposition of interests resulting from the fluctuation of prosperity, crisis and depression typical of free commerce will be manifest first as problems of the economy as steering system.

> The opposition of interests, which is grounded in the relation of wage labor and capital, comes to light, not directly in class conflicts, but in the interruption of the process of accumulation, that is, in the form of steering problems. (1975:23.)

The idea of system crises is thus based upon the occurrence of economic crises, where the economy functions as steering system.

The liberal-capitalist model of social organization is summarized as follows:

Social Formation:	Principle of Organization:	Social and System Integration:
Liberal-capitalist	Wage labor and capital	Economic system as system and social integrative mechanism

Summary

The possibilities for evolution have been determined in each of the three developmental dimensions: production, steering, and socializa-

tion. For each of the three social formations discussed, the principle or organization was seen to determine (1975:23):

a. how system and social integration can become differentiated

b. when dangers to system integration result in dangers to social integration

c. what type of crisis predominates in each social formation

Habermas summarizes the connections made between (1) organizational principles, (2) stages of development, and (3) potential sources of system change vis-a-vis the particular types of crises each formation is most susceptible to, as follows:

Social Formation:	Principle of Organization:	Social and System Integration:	Type of Crisis:
Primitive	Kinship Relations	No differentiation	Externally induced crises
Traditional	Political Class Rule	Functional differentiation of social and system integrative mechanisms	Internally determined identity crises
Liberal-Capitalist	Unpolitical Class Rule	System Integrative Economic System also takes over Socially Integrative Tasks	System Crises (Economy)

We may now consider Habermas' model of advanced-capitalist social formations by similarly pointing out the developmental dimensions of (1) forces of production, (2) alteration of normative structures and (3) development of steering capacities. The analysis of the principle of organization will allow us to determine the potential sources of change and/or crises.

E. Crisis Tendencies in the Advanced Capitalist System

The preceeding models of primitive, traditional and liberal-capitalist social formations were based upon the three dimensions of development defined by Habermas' theory of evolution: (1) the development of the forces of production, (2) the alteration of normative structures, and (3) the expansion of steering capacities into inner and outer nature. According to Habermas, the various stages of evolution are defined in terms of the principle of organization which determines the extent of development possible along these three dimensions. In particular, the principle of organization determines (1) the learning mechanism on which the development of productive forces depends, (2) the range of variation for interpretive systems, and (3) the institutional boundaries for possible expansion of steering capacities. These refer to the corresponding separation of theoretical and practical knowledge, and to the variation in goal values defining the preferred goal state. Based upon these distinctions, Habermas has rationally reconstructed (1) the stages of social evolution and (2) the <u>possibility</u> of specific crisis tendencies peculiar to each stage of development.

The analysis of advanced capitalism proceeds along the same line of focus, with one exception: after presenting a variety of theories about the system of organized capitalism, and delineating the forms of possible crisis this social formation may experience, Habermas provides an analysis of crises that are either already existing or are believed to be unavoidable within the logic of system and social-world development.

Because this analysis of advanced capitalism elucidates the modern

application of critical social theory to the area of social change, we need to briefly review the necessary connection made between system and social integration on which this theory is based.

It was noted that the necessary connection between system and social integration remained unsolved within previous theories due to an inadequate understanding of (1) the structures of intersubjectivity and (2) the constituents of social systems. Habermas defines the structures of intersubjectivity within his theory of communicative competence as the social imperatives for validity claims. At the sociocultural level of development animal life is reorganized under the imperatives of validity claims. This reorganization is effected in the structures of linguistically produced intersubjectivity (1975:70). The claim to validity refers immediately to the demand for discursive justification. The social world is integrated through a process of socialization based on the discursive redemption of norms claiming validity. Similarly, the outer world environment is adapted through forces of production via the medium of utterances that admit of truth. These utterances refer to empirical assumptions with claims to truth. The empirical assumptions are the basis of technical rules according to which production of the natural world transpires.

Habermas speaks in this context of the adaptation of outer nature through forces of production as the 'production of truth.' Similarly, the integration of the social world transpires through the alteration of norms according to correctness (1975:11). Simply put, the production of truth and the alteration of correct norms develop according to independent logics of theoretic and practical questions; the adaptation of outer nature and the integration of inner nature transpires in an

asymmetrical relation vis-a-vis the reduction of system exigencies. The important point here is that both processes of development are grounded in the discursive redemption of claims to truth and correctness. The principle of organization of a system determines the extent to which, and the manner in which, such justification occurs or is blocked through systems of distorted communication. In other words, the structure of communication and the structures of community are linked; their interconnection is manifest at the levels of instrumental (work) and communicative (interaction) action, and in the possibility for new levels of learning.

The constituents of social systems have been defined as the universal properties of systems concerning (1) the exchange between the system and its environments, (2) the change in goal values of the system, and (3) the level of learning attained. As is clear by now, (1) the exchange between the system and the environments of inner and outer nature transpires through forces of production (according to technical rules with claims to truth) and socialization (according to norms with claims to correctness), respectively. (2) The change in goal values takes place through the expansion of system autonomy and steering controls into inner and outer nature. There remain important institutional boundaries which define the limits of possible expansion without threatening identity. In particular, the variation in goal values is determined by the developmental logic of world-views. (3) Last, the level of learning attained is determined by the principle of organization which either inhibits or enhances the growth of theoretical and practical knowledge vis-a-vis forces of production

and the alteration of normative structures.

The connection between the analysis of the structures of intersubjectivity and the constituents of social systems is made within the consensus theory of truth: the supposition of the ideal conditions for communication is linked to the conception of the ideal form of life; "the truth of statements is linked in the last analysis to the intention of the good and true life" (1975:xv). As shall become clear through the analysis of advanced capitalism, critical theory is based on this assumption of the inseparability of truth and goodness, facts and values, theory and practice. Critical theory has a practical intention -- the self-emancipation of men from unnecessary forms of domination. This goal is inherent in the notion of truth as connected to the intention of the ideal form of life -- this truth and this ideal are anticipated in every act of communication (1975:xvii).

With the philosophical foundations and practical intentions of critical social theory in mind, we may turn to Habermas' analysis of advanced-capitalist systems.

1. A Descriptive Model of Advanced Capitalism

According to Habermas, the expression 'organized' or 'state-regulated' capitalism refers to two classes of phenomena, both of which are attributed to this advanced stage of the accumulation process. The first class of phenomena concerns the process of economic concentration: the rise of national and, subsequently, multinational corporations and the organization of market goods, capital, and labor (1975:33). The second class of phenomena characterizing advanced capitalism concerns state intervention in the market (1975:33). On

the one hand, the spread of market structures means the end of competitive capitalism. The steering mechanism, however, is still the market so long as investment decisions are made according to the criteria of company profits. On the other hand, there is the supplementation and partial replacement of the market mechanism through state intervention: this marks the end of liberal capitalism (1975:34).

> Nonetheless, no matter how much the scope of the private autonomous commerce of commodity is administratively restricted, political planning of the allocation of scarce resources does not occur so long as the priorities of the society as a whole develop in an unplanned, nature-like manner -- that is, as secondary effects of the strategies of private enterprise (emphasis mine).
>
> (1975:34.)

There is an important tension here between (1) the unplanned, nature-like development of social priorities, and (2) the political planning of the allocation of resources which underlies Habermas' analysis of advanced-capitalist systems. In particular, this becomes the tension between (1) public will-formation (the process of deliberation and discourse) through participation, and (2) the lack of participation due to state intervention and political planning of social priorities. This tension is a major source of various crisis tendencies in advanced-capitalist systems.

a. The legitimation system

We noted in the analysis of libera-capitalism that the appearance of weaknesses in the market and the dysfunctional side-effects of this steering mechanism resulted in a disintegration of the bourgeois ideology of fair exchange. In advanced-capitalism, recoupling the

economic system to the political system (1) repoliticizes relations of production and (2) creates an increased need for legitimation (1975:36). The state apparatus shifts from its function of generally securing conditions for production to active engagement with the economy. The source of its legitimation, however, can no longer be rooted in either the residues of tradition nor the liberal bourgeois ideology of free exchange. Rather, there is the gradual establishment of civil rights within the universalistic value system of bourgeois ideology, which includes the right to participate in political elections.

The problem of legitimizing the state's involvement in the economy, in light of established civil rights for active participation, is resolved through the system of formal democracy. In other words, the arrangement of formal democratic institutions and procedures permits administrative decisions to be made independently of the specific motives of citizens (1975:36). This is possible by virtue of a legitimation process which elicits diffuse mass loyalty and generalized motives while avoiding participation. Habermas describes the situation as a structural alteration of the bourgeois public realm: it provides for institutions and procedures that are democratic in form, while the citizenry, "in the midst of an objectively political society, enjoy the status of passive citizens with only the right to withhold acclamation" (1975:37). Private investment thus has its counterpart in the civic privatism of the civil public.

> Genuine participation of citizens in the process of political will-formation, that is, substantive democracy, would bring to consciousness the contradiction between administratively socialized production and the continued private appropriation and use of surplus value. In order to keep this

> contradiction from being thematized, the administrative system must be sufficiently independent of legitimizing will-formation. (1975:36.)

In short, the public has become effectively depoliticized. There are but two residual requirements for legitimating state intervention. The first of these is civic privatism: "political abstinence combined with an orientation to career, leisure, and consumption" (1975:37). Civic privatism promotes the expectation of rewards (money, leisure, security) within the system, and is accounted for by a welfare-state substitutive program which incorporates an achievement ideology. The second residual requirement for legitimation is that of justification for the depoliticization of the public. This is accomplished through democratic elite theories, and technocratic systems theories of the type encountered in our survey of scientific and technocratic concerns.

> In the history of bourgeois social science, these theories today have a function similar to that of the classical doctrine of political economy. In earlier phases of capitalist development, the latter doctrine suggested the 'naturalness' of the capitalist economic society. (1975:37.)

b. Class structure

In advanced-capitalist social formations, the relations of production are repoliticized and the public realm depoliticized. The political anonymity of class domination is superseded by social anonymity (1975:37). This can be understood as a function of system crisis avoidance: advanced capitalist societies focus the forces of integration at that structural point where conflict is most probable -- class structure and class consciousness. This is accomplished through

a 'quasi-political' wage structure dependent upon 'quasi-political' negotiations. In this context, 'price setting' is seen as administrative control of price movements through compromises over wage movements. In the monopolistic and public sectors of industry, the commodity 'labor power' receives a political price (1975:38).

There is a broad zone of political compromise because (1) increases in labor costs may be 'passed on' through price changes, and (2) the demands on both sides of the compromise are the same: increased productivity, qualifying labor power, and improving the social situation of workers. "The monopolistic sector can, as it were, externalize class conflict" (1975:38).

Habermas refers to this process of quasi-political compromise as an 'immunization' process which constitutes one important strategy for avoiding class conflict. The consequences of immunizing the original conflict zone are these:

> a. disparate wage developments and/or a sharpening of wage disputes in the public service sector;
>
> b. permanent inflation, with corresponding temporary redistribution of income to the disadvantage of organized workers and marginal groups;
>
> c. permanent crisis in government finances, together with public poverty (i.e., impoverishment of public transportation, housing, and health care);
>
> d. an inadequate adjustment of disproportional sectorial and regional economic developments.
>
> (1975:38.)

Habermas points out that, since World War II, the most advanced of capitalist countries have been able to keep class conflict latent

through this immunization process. One important technique for immunization emphasized here is the broad filtering of dysfunctional side-effects of the averted economic crisis throughout quasi-groups, i.e., schoolchildren, consumers, the sick, elderly, etc. (1975:39).

> In this way, the social identity of classes breaks down and class consciousness is fragmented. The class compromise that has become part of the structure of advanced capitalism makes (almost) everyone at the same time both a participant and a victim.
>
> (1975:39.)

Based on this analysis of the legitimation system and class structure of advanced capitalism, Habermas outlines the following questions pertaining to class conflict, economy, and crisis as crucial points to a critical theory of advanced capitalism (1975:39):

1. Do the structures of advanced capitalism provide space for an evolutionary self-transformation of the contradiction of socialized production for non-generalizable goals?

   a. if so, what developmental dynamic leads in this direction?

   b. if not, in what crisis tendencies does the temporarily repressed but unresolved class antagonism express itself?

2. Do the structures of advanced capitalism suffice to ward off economic crisis permanently?

   a. if not, does economic crisis lead (as Marx expected) through social to political crisis?

   b. if not, where is economic crisis displaced?

3. Does the displaced crisis retain the form of a system crisis, or must we reckon with different crisis tendencies that work together?

   a. if the latter is the case, which crisis tendencies are transformed into deviant

behavior, and in which social groups?

b. does the expected anomic potential permit directed political action, or does it lead rather to undirected dysfunctionalization of subsystems?

(1975:40.)

Habermas claims in answer to these questions that the continued tendency toward disturbance of capitalistic growth can be administratively processed and transformed, through the political and into the sociocultural system. Although he can see no possibility of deciding about the question of a self-transformation of advanced capitalism, he states that the contradiction of steering imperatives for social and system integration in pressure for capital realization can produce a series of important crisis tendencies (1975:40).

We may at this point look briefly at his discussion of these possible tendencies, to see where they lie and why. Following this we will look more closely at his critical theory of modern systems and the analysis of two crises already apparent within advanced capitalist systems.

2. A Classification of Possible Crisis Tendencies

Habermas finds four possible crisis tendencies within advanced capitalism. He focuses in this analysis on crisis tendencies that are specific to the system, and the forms in which they manifest themselves.

a. Economic crisis tendencies

The economic system has an input of work and capital, and an output that consists of consumable values, distributed according to quantity and type across the social strata. Habermas points out that

a crisis evolving from an inadequate input of work and capital is atypical of advanced capitalist systems. It is more likely that the distribution of values (burdens and rewards) will not lie in conformity with the range of toleration permitted by the legitimating value system. This was the case with the liberal-capitalist formations, where the primary disturbances were manifest as output crises. Because the public is depoliticized in advanced systems, however, output crises are most likely to be realized as crises of the economy, rather than as sociocultural crises or disturbances within the legitimating value system. That is, although the fundamental contradiction between private appropriation and generalizable values exists, it is not manifest at the sociocultural level due to (1) the depoliticization of the public and (2) the diffuse mass loyalty and generalized interests which passively legitimate the interaction of polity and economy. The origin of economic crises and the system in which they become manifest are defined as follows:

Point of Origin:	System Crisis:	Identity Crisis:
Economic System	Economic Crisis	(none)

b. Political crisis tendencies

The political system requires an input of diffuse mass loyalty; its output consists of administrative decisions (1975:46). When the political system does not succeed in fulfilling the imperatives received by the economic system, its output crisis (administrative decisions) appears in the form of a rationality crisis. Input crises (loyalty), on the other hand, take the form of legitimation crises,

wherein the legitimating value system does not succeed in maintaining the requisite level of mass loyalty. Both crises originate in the same system, but differ in the form of their manifestation.

> The rationality crisis is a displaced system crisis which, like economic crisis, expresses the contradiction between socialized production for nongeneralizable interests and steering imperatives. This crisis is converted into a withdrawal of legitimation...The legitimation crisis, by contrast, is directly an identity crisis. It does not proceed by way of endangering system integration, but results from the fact that the fulfillment of governmental planning tasks places in question the structure of the depoliticized public realm and, thereby, the formally democratic securing of the private autonomous disposition of the means of production.
>
> (1975:46.)

A rationality deficit in public administration refers to the state's inability to adequately steer the economic system. A legitimation deficit means that it is not possible to administratively maintain or establish effective normative structures to the extent required (1975:47). The possibility of both types of crises reminds us that the polity is expanding its steering capacities into the realm of inner nature with the continued development of capitalism. As a result, organizational rationality spreads, but cultural traditions are undermined and weakened. Specifically,

> administrative manipulation of cultural matters has the unintended side-affect of causing meanings and norms previously fixed by tradition and belonging to the boundary conditions of the political system to be publicly thematized. In this way, the scope of discursive will-formation expands -- a process that shakes the structures of the depoliticized public realm so imperative for the continued existence of the system.
>
> (1975:46.)

The possible crisis tendencies originating in the political system become manifest in these forms (1975:45);

Point of Origin	System Crisis	Identity Crisis
Political System	Rationality Crisis	Legitimation Crisis

c. Socio-cultural crisis tendencies

The sociocultural system receives its input from the economic and political systems in the form of "purchasable and collectively demandable goods and services, legal and administrative acts, public and social security, etc." (1975:48). Any output crises in the economic and political systems will, therefore, become input disturbances for the sociocultural system. Sociocultural crises are always, therefore, output crises.

Crises originating in the economic and political systems can become manifest only through the sociocultural system by way of the withdrawal of legitimation (1975:48). This is explained by the fact that the social integration of society remains dependent upon the output supply from the sociocultural system. Output takes the form of (1) direct motivational support for the political system in the form of legitimating loyalities, and (2) indirect support through the motivation to participate in the educational and occupational spheres. A sociocultural system crisis will arise when normative structures change according to their inherent logic of development to the point where (1) the requirements of the state and the occupational system, on the one hand, and (2) the interpreted needs and legitimate expectations of members, on the other hand, are no longer

complementary (1975:48).

Habermas points out that such crisis tendencies are becoming apparent in advanced capitalism at the level of cultural tradition (i.e., moral systems, world views), and at the level of structural change in the system of childrearing (school, family, mass media) (1975:48). Through these processes, the 'traditional padding' of liberal capitalism is worn thin and the core components of bourgeois ideology are questioned. On the other hand, belief in science, post-auratic art, and universalistic value systems are retained in a normative framework that becomes dysfunctional from the point of view of steering: "Advanced capitalism creates new needs it cannot satisfy" (1975:49).

The origin and manifestation of the crisis tendencies for all three systems are summarized as follows (1975:45):

Point of Origin	System Crisis	Identity Crisis
Economic System	Economic Crisis	----------
Political System	Rationality Crisis	Legitimation Crisis
Socio-cultural System	----------	Motivation Crisis

Habermas concludes his analysis of possible crisis tendencies within advanced capitalist systems by maintaining that these social formations are susceptible to the following problems due to the fundamental contradictions of the capitalist system discussed thus far (1975:49):

> 1. The economic system does not produce the requisite quantity of consumable values, or;

2. the administrative system does not produce the requisite quantity of rational decisions, or;

3. the legitimation system does not provide the requisite quantity of generalized motivations, or;

4. the socio-cultural system does not generate the requisite of action-motivating meaning.

In order to ascertain the empirical validity of these tendencies, the performances of subsystems must be analyzed according to the level of development of social systems, as determined within the framework of a theory of evolution. The important point, and the point of departure from the Parsonian approach, is the analysis of the identity-guaranteeing limits of variation in goal states and the different logics of growing practical and theoretical insight, according to which the production of the natural and social world must take place.

3. Legitimation and Motivation Crises in Advanced Capitalism

Habermas presents a number of arguments for the occurrence/nonoccurrence of specific crisis tendencies in advanced capitalist societies. His primary focus, and one which elucidates his critical theory of society, is a focus upon the theorems of legitimation and motivation crises. The discussion of these crisis tendencies also pertains to our survey of alternating interests and myths as it allows us to view the processes and consequences of the alteration of normative structures vis-a-vis the expansion of steering capacities and the variation of goal values.

a. Legitimation crisis

Based upon his discussion of possible crisis tendencies, Habermas

claims that the presence of legitimation crises is the result of contradictory steering imperatives for system and social integration. Specifically, the expansion of the political system into the socio-cultural system through administrative planning lies in tension with the normal, nature-like development of culture. There is an attempt on the part of the polity to strategically manipulate meanings and values while remaining at a safe distance from the demand for discursive justification of validity claims. The expansion of steering controls into the public sector has three primary consequences. First, it makes problematic those elements of cultural tradition which were taken for granted precisely because of their capacity for self-legitimation. Consequently, cultural affairs become publically thematized as problems -- an unintended side effect of the administrative processing of the sociocultural system. Second, the normative structures of the socio-cultural system alternate with a conservative resistance to administrative planning: the horizon for planning and innovation contracts at precisely those points where extension of steering control is requisite for system integration. Third, and most important to our discussion, is the fact of the withdrawal of legitimation on the part of the socio-cultural system. Cultures are 'kept alive' either through hermeneutical or critical appropriation of cultural tradition, which "guarantee the continuity of a history through which individuals and groups identify themselves and one another" (1975:71). A culture that is objectively 'prepared' and strategically employed destroys this imperative force of cultural tradition and the sense of historical continuity. In short, the conditions of critique and hermeneutic consciousness necessary to

the reproduction of the sociocultural world are destroyed by the administrative processing of culture which results in the disruption of identity and loss of continuity. As we have maintained throughout, the formation of identity is intimately bound up with hermeneutical or historical consciousness, and social concern with the legitimate prescription of rules for living. We have further pointed out the necessity of critical attitudes for the critique of dominant concerns to the reproduction of socio-cultural life. The administrative planning of these areas inhibits the nature-like development of the sociocultural system, which reacts by altering its structures in a withdrawal of legitimation for policies and motivation for participation.

Legitimation crises are based on motivation crises, or the "discrepancy between the need for motives declared by the state, the educational system, and the occupational system on the one hand, and the motivation supplied by the sociocultural system on the other (1975:75).

We may now turn to the analysis of motivation crises in advanced-capitalist societies to conclude our presentation of Habermas' analysis of capitalist systems. The theory of legitimation crises is, in effect, the theoretical aspect of Habermas' critical orientation; the analysis of motivational crises will reveal the practical intention of his critique. Put differently, the legitimation crisis is rooted in systemic steering contradictions; the motivation crisis manifests the subsequent alteration of normative structures.

b. Motivation crises

Motivation crises refer to changes in the sociocultural system such that its output becomes dysfunctional for system integration.

In particular, output becomes dysfunctional for the state and for the system of social labor. The emergence of motivation crises refers to the alteration process of normative structures; the limitations placed upon possible system expansion into the area of certain institutions and values.

The most important type of motivation that the sociocultural system contributes to the integration of the whole society is its syndromes of civil and familial-vocational privatism (1975:75). Civil privatism refers to an interest in the steering and maintenance performances of the administrative system, but shows little concern for participation in the legitimizing process. "Civil privatism thus corresponds to the structures of a depoliticized public realm" (1975:71). Familial-vocational privatism coincides with civil privatism:

> It consists in a family orientation with developed interests in consumption and leisure on the one hand, and in a career orientation suitable to status competition on the other.
>
> (1975:75.)

Familial-vocational privatism corresponds to the structures of educational and occupational systems which are regulated by competition through achievement ideologies.

Habermas makes clear the importance of these two kinds of motivation to the political and economic systems. A crisis in motivation would be disruptive for the two subsystems central to advanced capitalist formations. To state that these two forms of motivational output are being destroyed requires the demonstration of (1) the erosion of traditions in the context of which these attitudes were previously produced, and (2) the absence of any functional equivalent for these spent traditions:

they are precluded by the developmental logic of normative structures (1975:75).

Habermas aligns these motivational patterns with traditional cultural patterns, assuming that "attitudinal syndromes typical of a society must somehow be represented at the level of socially effective cultural values" (1975:76). Familial-vocational privatism crystallizes around the achievement motive; its attitudes are 'positively' determined. Civil privatism delimits attitudes on the basis of deficient contributions to will-formation; these attitudes are thus 'negatively' determined.

The coordination of privatistic motivational patterns with cultural patterns reveals a mixture of pre-capitalist and bourgeois elements of tradition. Capitalist societies remain dependent upon cultural boundary conditions that they cannot themselves produce (1975:76). This holds true for the motivational sphere of civil privatism as well. Civil privatism is determined on the one hand by traditional bourgeois formal law with respect to <u>expectations</u> of the administrative system. On the other hand, it is tied to the traditionalistic civil ethic in the formation of its passive attitude toward will-formation.

In formal democracies, the condition for stability is a mixed political culture. Bourgeois ideologies require supplementation by a political culture which takes the participatory behavioral expectations out of ideology and places them with the authoritarian patterns left from earlier traditions. Habermas describes here the fusion of bourgeois with traditional and familial forms of political culture. Participation and rationality evaporate into particularism and a subordinate mentality (1975:77).

Familial-vocational privatism is analyzed from the same point of view. It is determined, on the one hand, by the specifically bourgeois value orientations of possessive individualism and utilitarianism, and on the other, by the achievement orientation of the middle class as well as the fatalism characteristic of the lower class, both of which orientations are traditionally secured by religious traditions.

Habermas points out that the religious traditions securing these value orientations are 'transposed' into educational processes in advanced capitalist societies through the structures of family and the techniques of childrearing. The important point here is that educational processes lead to motivational structures that are class specific; that is, they lead to the repressive authority of conscience and to individualistic achievement orientations among the bourgeois, and to an external superego structure and conventional work morality among the lower class.

Bourgeois culture has typically been dependent upon motivationally effective supplementation by traditional world-views: it has as a whole never been able to reproduce itself (1975:77). Habermas points out that religion cannot continue to satisfy communicative (interactive) needs, due to its retreat into the region of subjective belief. The secular components of bourgeois ideology (empiricist or rationalist theories of knowledge; the universalistic value systems of modern natural law and utilitarianism) are also insufficient to revive the former status of religion as motivationally effective.

In short, bourgeois ideologies live only for their own substance. They cannot:

1. offer support to interpretations overcoming contingency in the face of the basic risks of existence;

2. make possible human relations with a fundamentally objectivated nature;

3. permit intuitive access to relations of solidarity;

4. allow a real political ethic: in political and social life they accommodate an objectivistic self-interpretation of acting subjects.

(1975:78.)

There is one aspect of bourgeois culture, however, which is supportive of the 'victims of rationalization': art. Bourgeois art has become autonomous in the face of demands for employment extrinsic to art, and acts as a 'refuge' for the satisfaction of those needs that have become 'illegal' in the material life-processing of bourgeois society.

> I refer here to the desire for a mimetic relation with nature; the need for living together in solidarity outside the egoism of the family; the longing for happiness of a communicative experience exempt from the imperatives of purposive rationality and giving scope to imagination as well as spontaneity.
>
> (1975:78).

Bourgeois art, along with moral universalism, satisfies needs that cannot be satisfied within 'the system of needs' (1975:78). In contrast to this function of art are the economic and political functions taken on by privatized religion, scientistic philosophy, and strategic-utilitarian morality.

Based upon this interpretation of the dissolution of modern bourgeois ideology, Habermas claims that the sociocultural system will not be able to reproduce this privatistic syndrome of motivations so necessary to the continued existence of the system. His argument

for this assertion is presented in four steps.

1. The dissolution of bourgeois tradition

First, the residues of bourgeois tradition in which civil and familial-vocational privatism are embedded are being "non-rewardably dismantled" (1975:79). Habermas reminds us that the core components of traditional world-views were increasingly weakened during the development of capitalism:

> This was due to their incompatibility with generalized social-structural forces of the economic and administrative systems, on the one hand, and with the cognitive attitudes proceeding from the system of science on the other.
>
> (1975:79.)

These social-structural discrepancies are the consequence of the expansion of areas of strategic-utilitarian action, i.e., the expansion of steering mechanisms into the sphere of inner nature, and the penetration of technological concerns into the realms of interpretation and prescription. In Weberian terms, such discrepancies are analyzed from the point of view of the rationalization of areas of life previously regulated by tradition. In advanced capitalist societies, the expansion of subsystems of purposive-rational action corresponds to a <u>decrease</u> in the zones of communicative action. Habermas names five specific causes of this process (1975:79-80):

1. scientization of professional practice;
2. expansion of the service sector through which more and more interactions are subsumed under the commodity form;
3. administrative regulation and legalization of areas of political and social intercourse previously regulated informally;

4. commercialization of culture and politics;

5. scientizing and psychologizing processes of childrearing.

Simultaneously, there exist cognitive dissonances between dissolving, traditional world-views and the imperatives of the scientific system, which are made binding through generalized formal schooling and congealed to a behaviorally effective syndrome of motivation in a positivistic kind of consciousness (1975:80).

Habermas outlines three major trends characteristic of this general alteration of world-views. (1) Dominant elements of cultural traditions are losing the character of world-views -- i.e., of the interpretation of the world, history, and nature as a whole (1975:80). There is a popularizing of isolated items of scientific information, for example, rather than claims to reproduce a total interpretation. (2) There is the recognition of a plurality of beliefs, all of which are in competition for interpretive and prescriptive status, and none of which are decided as to 'truth'. "Practical questions no longer admit of truth; values are irrational" (1975:80). (3) Moral conceptions are detached from theoretical systems of interpretation. For example, the utilitarian secular ethic has detached itself from its foundation in natural law, and become unproblematic as 'common sense' (1975:80).

> Since the middle of the nineteenth century, this process has become conscious as the 'sublation' of religion and philosophy, a highly ambivalent process. Religion today is no longer even a personal matter; but in the atheism of the masses, the utopian contents of tradition are also threatened. Philosophy has been stripped of its metaphysical pretensions; but in the ruling scientism, those constructions before which a wretched reality must justify itself have also fallen apart.
>
> (1975:80.)

2. The structural undermining of ideology

Habermas' second 'proof' of the dissolution of traditional bourgeois orientations in which civil and familial privatism are embedded rests upon the fact of general social change.

The traditional achievement ethic of bourgeois ideology claims that "social rewards should be distributed on the basis of individual achievement" (1975:81). This distribution should reflect the differential achievement of all individuals. As Habermas makes clear, the pre-condition for this distribution of rewards is "the equal opportunity to participate in a competition that is regulated so as to neutralize external influences" (1975:81). In liberal-capitalist societies, the market was the mechanism for allocating this distribution of opportunity and reward. However,

> Since it has been recognized...that social force is exercised in the forms of economic exchange, the market has lost its credibility as a fair mechanism for the distribution of life opportunities conforming to the system.
> (1975:81.)

In the recent version of the achievement ideology, formal schooling takes the place of success in the market. As Habermas reminds us, however, the conditions under which this version of achievement ideology can claim success are limited to: (a) equal opportunity admission, (b) non-discriminatory evaluation standards, (c) synchronous development of educational and occupational systems, and (4) labor processes whose material structure permits evaluation according to individually accountable achievements (1975:81).

The credibility of this ideology is undermined in recent decades by two changes in particular. First, educational expansion has become

increasingly independent of changes in the occupational system. Simultaneously, there is an increasing number of areas in the labor process where evaluation according to individual accountability is improbable (1975:81). Second, monotonous labor processes are penetrating areas in which identity could previously have formed through the occupational role. Consequently, the motivation to achieve decreases, and an instrumentalist attitude toward labor spreads even among the bourgeois vocations of middle- and higher-level employees, and the professionals.

Habermas further points out the undermining of traditional possessive individualism of bourgeois ideology. The individualistic preference system becomes blurred in a society where a level of social wealth is attained at which it is no longer a matter of risk or a question of satisfying basic needs. Furthermore, what was previously an act of will-formation for the upper classes has become the massive manipulation of preferences by suppliers through market policies:

> Opportunistic adaptation of consumers to market strategies of monopolistic competition is the ironic form of the consumer autonomy that is supposed to be maintained as the facade of possessive individualism. Moreover, collective commodities represent a growing proportion of consumable goods as production is increasingly socialized. Conditions of urban life are becoming more and more dependent upon an infrastructure (transportation, leisure, health care, education, etc.) that increasingly discards the forms of differential demand and private appropriation.
>
> (1975:83.)

Last, Habermas points to the weakened socializing effects of the market due to the increased number of segments of the population who

do not reproduce their lives through income for labor. Among these are schoolchildren, the students, welfare recipients, the sick, the criminal, and the armed forces (1975:83-84). Simultaneously, there is an increase in the number of areas of activity where abstract labor is replaced (i.e., in economic and social values) by concrete labor. This results in a structural as well as ideological discrepancy between perceived ideals and the real conditions posited by modern system concerns.

3. The lack of functional equivalents for destroyed motivational patterns

As has been noted, the components of cultural tradition that are dominant in advanced capitalism crystallize around scientism and a universalistic morality. Habermas claims that certain irreversible developments have taken place in both spheres that have left no functional equivalent or adequate substitution for the traditions they destroy, due to the internal logic of their developments.

The political consequences of the authoritative status of modern science is ambivalent. First, traditional attitudes of belief cannot withstand the same demand for discursive justification that is established by modern science. On the other hand, temporary syntheses of isolated scientific information are popularized at the expense of global interpretations.

As Habermas explains, a scientific self-affirmation of the sciences promotes a positivistic common consciousness which can sustain the public realm. On the other hand, it also establishes the set of standards by which it can itself be criticized. Scientism thus removes

traditional attitudes of belief from the possibility of scientific justification while simultaneously providing the grounds for its own criticism. There is no fundamental equivalent for the motivational patterns supplied by traditional attitudes of belief.

With respect to the sphere of universalistic morality, Habermas explains the fact of the alteration of the moral system in terms of modern steering performances. When traditional societies entered into the modernatization process, the consequent increased complexity of inner nature resulted in problems of control that required the alteration of norms to be accelerated beyond that tempo intrinsic to the nature-like development of cultural tradition (i.e., hermeneutically and critically appropriated culture rather than administratively planned culture). Bourgeois formal law emerged making it possible to (1) release norm-contents from the dogmatism of tradition and (2) determine norms intentionally (1975:87). Positivized legal norms were thereby uncoupled from privitized moral norms. On the other hand, legal norms needed to be produced and justified according to principles.

> Whereas abstract law is valid only for the area pacified by the power of the state, the morality of bourgeois private persons...is not limited to the state of nature that persists among states. Since morality based on principles is sanctioned only through the inner authority of conscience, its conflict with the public morality...is embedded in its claim to universality; the conflict is between the cosmopolitanism of the 'human being' and the loyalties of the citizen which cannot be universalistic...
>
> (1975:87.)

Habermas claims that this contradition can only be resolved if (1) the opposition between morally and legally regulated areas is relativized, and (2) the validity of all norms is tied to discursive

will-formation. Only at this stage could morality become strictly universal (1975:87).

In the liberal capitalist situation, economic exchange had to be universalistically regulated. Liberal capitalism gave force to strictly universalistic value systems for the first time. The exchange of equivalents correspondingly provided the basic ideology by which the state could be freed from traditionalistic justification. With the advancement of organized capitalism, however, the exchange of equivalents as the ideological basis for legitimation crumbled. Simultaneously, new and increased demands for legitimation arose (1975:87).

> However, the moral system can no more erase the memory of a collectively attained state of moral consciousness once practical discourses have been permitted, than the scientific system can retreat behind an attained state of cumulative knowledge or block theoretical progress once theoretical discourses have been institutionalized. If the moral and scientific systems follow inner logics, as I am supposing they do, the evolution of morality, like the evolution of science, is dependent on truth.
>
> (1975:88.)

Habermas illustrates this claim through a discussion of the transition from bourgeois formal law to political universal morality.

A morality based on principles is a system that allows only general norms: norms without exceptions, privileges, and without limitation on the domain of validity (1975:88). Modern natural law constitutes the attempt to meet these criteria. The only norms allowed are those which define compatible spheres of action in which the individual can pursue his private interests autonomously. The interests themselves are morally neutral. The legal system is the only system that is morally justified with reference to consequences

that maximize the welfare and freedom of all citizens (1975:88). In this context, ethics remain the foundation of legitimation because, by defining the domain of legal action, formal law also defines a complementary domain of moral action (1875:88).

Universalistic utilitarianism also regulates this domain of action in accordance with natural law: all practical actions contributing to the advantage of an individual are permissable only insofar as they remain compatible with the chances of other individuals to pursue their advantage.

Habermas points out that this utilitarianism falls below the stage of internalization attained in the ethics of duty: "Motives for action remain external to the morally responsible subject" (1975: 89). If motives for action are to be included within the domain of moral evaluation, only actions that can be called generally good, and only actions that are motivated out of respect for the law, can be included. "Formalistic ethics binds the criterion of generality of norms to the further criterion of autonomy, that is, independence from contingent motives" (1975:85).

There are obvious limits to a formalistic ethics; namely, that motives incompatible with duty have to be excluded from the domain of the morally relevant and be suppressed. The interpretation of needs must be accepted as 'given': they cannot be made the object of a discursive will-formation.

> Only a communicative ethics guarantees the generality of admissable norms and the autonomy of acting subjects solely through the discursive redeemability of the validity claims with which norms appear. That is, generality is guaranteed in that the only norms that can

> claim generality are those on which everyone effected agrees (or would agree) without constraint if they enter into (or, were to enter into) a process of discursive will-formation. (1975:89.)

4. Conclusion: the continued effects of motive-formation

Habermas points out that the structures of bourgeois culture, 'stripped of their traditionalistic padding' and 'deprived of their privatistic core' are still relevant to will-formation (1975:89). Drive potentials are inserted into communicative action through a universal ethics, resulting in a socialization process that takes place 'with will and consciousness.' Specifically, the "fundamental convictions of communicative ethics, and experimental complexes of counter-cultures...have achieved motive-forming power" (1975:90). Put differently, the less the sociocultural system succeeds in coming to terms with the needs and convictions prescribed by system imperatives, the more the 'core components' of cultural tradition become relevant to the formulation of behaviors and meanings.

These 'core components' of culture refer to the critical and hermaneutic appropriation of tradition: that is, the presence of a historical consciousness and critical attitude which provide feelings of continuity and social identity. Their presence is requisite to the nature-like development of the social life-world (as opposed to administratively 'prepared' culture), and they rise to a level of consciousness during times of social stress that results in (1) the withdrawal of legitimation from state intervention in planning culture, and (2) the formation of reflexive attitudes regarding interpretations and prescriptions. From the withdrawal of support and the rise of

reflective attitudes inherent in a motivation crisis, there emerges the potential for a communicative ethics demanding a rational consensus about meanings and behaviors through discourse.

In short, as a result of the motivation crisis, "there exists a reflexive attitude toward socially tendered patterns of interpretations and behaviors which aid in the formation of identity" (1975:90). Habermas establishes the presence of this reflexive attitude at the level of the personality system:

> the components of the cultural tradition that are today dominant (and dysfunctional in their working) are more likely to be reflected at the level of the personality system, the more frequently the form of development of the adolescent crisis forces a 'second birth' and prevents a conventional outcome of adolescence.
>
> (1975:91.)

The forcing of a 'second birth' refers to the rise of reflection over conventional interpretations and prescriptions which results in the reformulation of identity. Conventional patterns of distribution arising from socialized production of nongeneralizable interests are criticized; the definitive limits of normative structures providing legitimation no longer provide the economic-political system with ideological resources, but confront it with new demands; i.e., for the discursive redemption of norms claiming correctness and utterances claiming truth.

> William James long ago contrasted the once-born and the twice-born; the once-born are those who unreflectively and 'innocently' accept the convictions of their childhoods; the twice-born are those who may adhere to exactly the same convictions, but who do so in a different way after a protracted period of doubt, criticism, and examination of those beliefs. Viewed as attitudes, the beliefs of the once-born and

> the twice-born may be identical, but the mind-set, cognitive framework, or developmental level of the once-born and twice-born are extremely different. In other words, we need to examine not only the beliefs men hold, but the <u>way</u> they hold them...
>
> (1975:90-91.)

The reflective attitude concerning meanings and behaviors of the socialization process refers to the way in which beliefs are held within the context of motive-formation; the 'rationally motivated' recognition of norms and meanings. Habermas' model of communicative ethics thus refers to those who, as participants in rational discourse,

> test the validity claims of norms and, to the extent that they accept them with reasons, arrive at the conviction that in the given circumstances the proposed norms are 'right'. The validity claim of norms is grounded... in the rationally motivated recognition of norms, which may be questioned at any time.
>
> (1975:105.)

Practical discourse refers to the expectation for the discursive redemption of validity claims. The supposition of the ideal speech situation is thus present in practical discourse: "practical questions admit of truth" (1975:110-111). As to the related supposition concerning the ideal conditions of life, Habermas refers to the need for justifiable norms that are based on rational consensus (or which would find rational consensus were practical discourse to take place). Democratic will-formation in this context refers to rational consensus about the desired conditions of life, and relies upon the presence of a truth-dependent mode of existence, i.e., on rational discourse regarding generalizable interests which can be discursively redeemed.

> Since all those affected have, in principle, at least the chance to participate in practical deliberation, the 'rationality' of the discursively

> formed will consists in the fact that the reciprocal behavioral expectations raised to normative status afford validity to a common interest ascertained without deception. The interest is common because the constraint-free consensus permits only what all can want; it is free of deception because even the interpretation of needs in which each individual must be able to recognize what he wants becomes the object of discursive will-formation. The discursively formed will may be called 'rational' because the formal properties of discourse and of the deliberative situation sufficiently guarantee that a consensus can arise only through appropriately interpreted, generalizable interests, by which I mean needs that can be communicatively shared.
>
> (1975:108.)

Habermas' model of communicative ethics thus expresses the practical intention of his critical theory: (1) it locates the sources of distortion and the contradiction of needs and interests inherent in the advanced-capitalist principle of organization, and (2) it points out both the possibilities for crisis and the potential for liberation from crisis in the supposition of the ideal conditions for speech and for living. The consensus theory of truth and the model of communicative ethics, based upon the intersubjective nature of community and communication, refer simultaneously to the ideal of generalizable needs and behaviors, and to the possibility of rationally attaining these ideals with will and consciousness. His theoretical perspective is one which focuses on:

> removing from the promise of meaning the ambivalence between truth claims and a merely illusory fulfillment: we can no longer avert recognizable contingencies by producing rationalizing illusion.
>
> (1975:121.)

Summary

Habermas has brought together a wide range of interests and concerns raised through our survey of sociological theories of change. In particular, he has (1) provided a model of change with which to understand the development of both the natural and social worlds, and (2) a theory of the directional learning processes of theoretical and practical knowledge through which evolutionary development takes place. In this context, he has offered an interpretation of (1) the alternation of interests in the production of the natural and social worlds through the exclusion/admission of theoretical/practical questions to the realm of discourse, and (2) an explanation as to the emergence of disturbances and/or crises basic to the production of both environments, due to the alteration of normative structures vis-a-vis growing imperatives for system survival.

The most important contribution that Habermas has made to the study of change is his connection between the 'system' and 'social' world paradigms. This connection is made through an understanding of system goal values which are the product, on the one hand, of cultural values, and on the other, of system imperatives for survival. The limits for the possible variation and expansion of goal values are determined by the tolerance level of alterating normative structures: the social world develops through a directional learning process which follows an inner logic not at the disposition of power augmentation. Crises arise as steering mechanisms expand into this sphere of inner nature in a manner that is irreconcilable with imperatives for social integration and the nature-like development of the social-life world.

It is in this context that we understand the asymmetrical relation between production of the natural and social worlds, and the possible sources of crisis apparent in modern capitalism: the reduction of exigencies in the external environment through advances in the forces of production do not automatically coincide with a similar reduction of inner complexities through increased integration. Rather, the development of the sociocultural system means greater complexity and increased problems of social integration vis-a-vis imperatives for system integration. The natural world develops according to the inner logic of gains in theoretical insight; the social world develops according to the logic of gains in practical insight.

This brings us to the core of Habermas' theory -- the linguistic reformulation of the philosophical assumptions of historical materialism. In his theory of communicative competence, Habermas illustrates the structures of intersubjectivity and the constituents of social systems which allow him to make the connection between the system and social paradigms. The theory of communicative competence illustrates the way in which the supposition of the ideal conditions for communication and for community are anticipated in every act of speech through the expectations of accountability and discursive redemption of validity claims. These suppositions concerning ideal conditions, accountability, and discursive redemption refer to (1) the possibility of distorted communication, or ideological and structural barriers to will-formation, and (2) the possibility of rational consensus -- agreement based on reasons -- about normative-validity claims. These suppositions refer to the sphere of practical discourse which is concerned with the

correctness of norms for action and evaluation. Practical questions concern validity claims; they admit of 'truth'. This last assertion constitutes one primary point of focus for Habermas; i.e., that practical questions can and must be returned to the realm of discourse in order to resolve the theory/practice problematic. According to Habermas, this return of practical questions to the realm of discursive redemption is an inevitable stage in the directional learning process of the socio-cultural system. By illustrating the recent emergence of experiential attitudes and countercultures reflectively reconsidering norms of socialization, Habermas has illustrated that practical discourse is indeed taking place, and that it leads to the recovery of motive-forming powers crucial to the formation of feelings of social identity, continuity, common concern and coherence.

This brings us to the final aspect of Habermas' theory of social evolution. The emergence of practical discourse about the correctness of norms for action and evaluation is a consequence of two factors inherent in the advanced-capitalist social formation. First, the thematization of generalizable interests and needs through practical discourse arises as a result of the contradiction between socialized production and private appropriation of wealth. Class conflict based upon inequitable distribution of opportunity, meanings, values and wealth are kept latent and 'externalized' vis-a-vis (1) the depoliticization of the public realm, (2) the removal of the state from direct responsibility for legitimation, and (3) 'quasi-political' compromises negotiating wage-labor. Social priorities are manipulated and use-values replace traditional values to supplement the disruption of the

nature-like development of cultural tradition. The scarcity of meaning which results from these processes, however, rises to consciousness as a direct threat to social identity and traditional social concerns, and results in a deficiency of legitimation and subsequent withdrawal of motivation for participation in the spheres of economy and education. Nongeneralizable interests are criticized, and generalizable concerns are thematized as cultural affairs -- a process that is highly dysfunctional from the point of view of steering.

This brings us to the second factor contributing to the emergence of practical discourse over the validity claims for norms of action and evaluation. As has been noted, the social life-world develops in the directional learning process of gains in practical insight. This evolutionary principle refers to (1) the increased need for legitimation and discourse vis-a-vis the expansion of secular knowledge and the extension of steering mechanisms into the sphere of inner nature previously regulated by cultural tradition; and (2) it furthermore refers to the directional process of developing moral or interpretive systems. The norms and values at the basis of motivational behaviors are intimately related to 'truth': they are circumscribed by a moral consciousness which evolves in a truth-dependent manner. Lastly, the 'highest' stage of moral consciousness corresponds to a universalistic moral system. It is in this context that we see the emergence of a demand for the discursive redemption of generalizable needs and interests.

Habermas' interpretation of the directional process of learning and the truth-dependent evolution of interpretive or moral systems

forms the basis of his argument for the potential of an emerging communicative ethics. This communicative ethics embraces both universalistic morals and generalizable interests by guaranteeing the autonomy of general norms of action and evaluation and their admission to the realm of practical discourse. The communicative ethics is the basis of motive-forming will: it refers to (1) the presence of a reflective attitude concerning prescribed behaviors and interpreted needs as a result of the administrative processing of culture, and (2) the recovery of the hermaneutical and critical appropriation of cultural values; i.e., the appropriation of culture with historical consciousness and a sense of identity.

It is on the basis of this reflexive attitude arising from the motivation crisis inherent in advanced-capitalism that Habermas defines both the presence and the potential of a democratic will-formation that allows for participation in the reproduction of the social life-world to take place with will and consciousness, based on a fundamental alignment of fact and value, reason and freedom, theory and practice, which is inherent in the very structures of intersubjective communication and community.

CHAPTER FIVE

'A BACKWARD GLANCE'

The purpose of this thesis has been to demonstrate the historical relation between (1) developments in conceptions of change central to social identity and social concern, and (2) the development of policy-orientations regarding events and conditions in the natural and social worlds. We have approached an understanding of this interrelation in three steps. First, we explained the way in which conceptions of change remain central to the formation of social identity and social concerns. Second, we surveyed a series of evolutionary, cyclical, and conflict models of change according to (1) interpretations of the past and future, (2) dominant interests, and (3) prescriptions or policy-orientations. Third, we analyzed the reformulation of theories of change along these dimensions within the context of alternating myths of concern and freedom. A review of these three dimensions of our analysis will clarify our findings on the historical relation between conceptions of change and policy-orientations. This will be followed by a discussion of the implications of the critical realignment of theory and practice for policy-orientations regarding continued production of the natural and social worlds.

A. The Centrality of Conceptions of Change

Based on Northrop Frye's interpretation of the motive for metaphor, we approached the idea of fundamental conceptions of change in terms of their function in the formation of social attitude. The earliest expression of ideas about origin, order, and change were embedded in

early myths or 'true fabels' which accounted for something central to a society's history, structure, and religion. These early myths arose out of a 'motive for metaphor,' or that desire to identify and associate self with surroundings. Metaphor is the archaic mode of expressing subject and object at once: it articulates the social form of human nature with the natural order.

In primitive societies there was an over-riding anxiety for feelings of continuity and coherence due to social and physical survival contingencies. It was pointed out that interpretations of the past and future which are based on fundamental conceptions of change offer a feeling of continuity: they provide an answer to the question, 'Who are we?' Similarly, prescribed rules for living arise from fundamental conceptions of change offering a sense of social coherence or common concern: they provide an answer to the question, 'How shall we live?'

These simple metaphorical expressions of the relation between man and his surroundings are based on fundamental conceptions of origin, order, and change, and attain canonical importance within societies as the basis of feelings of identity and common concern. Who one is and how one should live are 'given' within these early mythologies. As we have seen, the advancement of cultures to different stages of learning results in the formulation of 'total' mythologies whose primary functions are to maintain established definitions of identity and prescribed rules for living, as well as their legitimation. As has also been shown, the anxieties for continuity and coherence do not automatically disappear with the encyclopaedic drive toward comprehensive synthesis of interpretations and prescriptions: modern

cultures exhibit the same anxieties as do oral cultures, due to basic similarities in their communicative structures.

The further development of cultures and their conceptions of origin, order and change were discussed in terms of the rise of new notions of 'truth' and 'reality', and new criteria for their legitimation. Northrop Frye refers to the emergence of this new kind of reasoning as the rise of a 'truth of correspondence,' or the alignment of a body of words or numbers with some external structure. The transition from the truth of social vision or 'revealed truth' to truth as 'truth of correspondence' takes place with the rise of philosophical speculation and persists through (a) the force of an inner encyclopaedic drive inherent in all systems of knowledge, and (b) the articulation of the standards of the truth of correspondence through social attitudes. These standards include the suspension of judgement, tolerance of opinion, respect for the individual, and objectivity. The emergence of the truth of correspondence and its expression in social attitudes refers us to two factors central to the further development of societies: (1) the differentiation of social concerns, such as political and economic concerns, from the ultimate concern of religion, and (2) the articulation of socially critical attitudes within society. The tension between such critical attitudes struggling to liberalize dominant myths of concern articulates a major dynamic principle in the history of the reformulation of interpretations and prescriptions, theories and policies.

This first step of our analysis may be formulated diagrammatically, as follows:



B. The Historical Survey of Models of Change

Our survey of theories of change proceeded along the dimensions of (1) interpretations of past and future, (2) dominant interests, and (3) prescriptions and policy-orientations. These three dimensions correspond to those outlined above, as follows:



As we surveyed the major model-types, we found the following relations exist between conceptions of change (model-type), interpretations (formation of identity), dominant interest (base of knowledge), and prescriptions and policy-orientations (social concern):

Model-Type:	Interpretation of Past & Future:	Dominant Interest:	Prescription and Policy-orientation:
Evolutionary (linear)	Liberal Optimism	Prediction	Negation of Planned Change
Cyclical	Fatalistic	Interpretation	Negation of Planned Change
Conflict	Critical	Change	Active Intervention for Planned Change

The changes in dominant interests and policies were discussed with respect to the gradual rise of science to the interpretive and prescriptive status of a total myth, and the subsequent alternation between a fatalistic pessimism, liberal optimism, and critical orientation toward science as such, and conditions and events in the natural and social worlds in general. In particular, we were able to delineate the relation between those theorists and model-types most concerned for conditions in the social world, and those anticipating mastery over the natural environment.

Model-Type:	Interpretation:	Interest:	Focus:
Evolutionary	→ Liberal Optimism	→ Prediction	→ Natural World
Cyclical	→ Fatalistic	→ Interpretation	→ Social World
Conflict	→ Critical	→ Change	→ Natural and Social Worlds

In this context of thought we expressed the alternation of conceptions, interpretations, policies, and sources of legitimation in terms of the features of the myths of concern and freedom.

C. Alternating Myths

The rise of a myth of freedom means the rise of socially critical attitudes, or those attitudes which are in tension against dominant prescribed concerns. The myth of freedom refers to that anxiety for continuity which appears where social identity is threatened and which insists upon the recovery of a historical and reflexive consciousness and, through this, the recovery of the imaginative power for re-creative activity. The myth of freedom speaks in the language of desire and construction, belief and anxiety. It associates the ideal with the past, or, in the context of a revolutionary myth of freedom, with an immediate liberation and future ideal.

We noted from our survey that the myth of freedom emerged in the Romantic interpretations of the Enlightenment ideas by Vico, Voltaire, Von Herder and Hegel. Its presence was also conspicuous at the time of the appearance of sociology as the new science of society and as the means for making the new society.

The claims of the myth of freedom were suppressed, as positivism became associated with scientism, and the ideas of perfection with those of scientific progress. The rise of science as a total, encyclopaedic myth of concern was established within the positivist and empiricist tradition. There is a lack of concern for history that accompanies the liberal ideals of scientific progress, and a break-down of social identity and moral consensus accompanying the optimistic pursuit of a perfect future.

By the mid-nineteenth century, the myth of freedom rises again within a revolutionary consciousness. There is a reformulation of

identity and the conception of change, as well as a radical reformulation of policies toward changing conditions and events in the natural and social worlds. The revolutionary myth of freedom expressed abhorrence at the mechanization of life and revulsion from scientistic concern through Marx's formulation of a revolutionary praxis.

The development of advanced capitalism is linked to the re-emergence of a liberal myth of concern in this century. Science and technology obtain the interpretive and prescriptive status of a total myth of concern. At the same time, this system of 'truth' and 'reality' has not been without opposition from the modern myth of freedom, expressed through the thematization of crisis, riot and protest, and the general critique of civil rights and revulsion at the modern, positivistic consciousness.

This brings us to the re-emergence of critical theory as a new stage in the alternation of myths. It is in this context that we make the connection with Habermas' theory of social evolution and resolution of the theory/practice problematic.

D. Critical Theory and Will-Formation

The major point of connection to be made between (1) the historical survey of theories of change, (2) the alternating myths of concern and freedom, and (3) Habermas' theory of social evolution, lies with the distinction between 'open' and 'closed' mythologies and their corresponding structures of communication and community.

A closed mythology refers to the suppression of generalizable interests (Habermas); it is based on a structure of communication that cannot tolerate critical thought (Frye). It offers an 'either/or'

interpretive framework for life-practice, and constitutes an unalterable text for life-opportunity. It expresses anxiety for coherence or system integration in the face of critique and change, and must externalize conflict or the need for action through some anxiety-substitute or scape-goat concern. The tendency of a myth of concern is to move from broad principles and abstract laws to the inflexible prescription of beliefs and the obliteration of competing social attitudes and activities.

Open mythologies, in striking contrast, refer to the 'both-and' interpretive framework for life-practice. An open mythology may embrace a dominant concern, but does so in the context of a recognized tension between the claims of both orientations. This principle of openness constitutes the recognition of tolerance and tension between concern and freedom which allows for an organization of thought and institutions, of communication and community, that is life-supporting; i.e., it allows for the nature-like development of the social world.

The collision between concern and freedom produces a kind of 'culture shock' which results in defensive reactions and a withdrawal from participation. The growth of a myth of concern alone cannot provide a society with the social vision suggesting what should be done with newly gained knowledge; only through its interpretation with the myth of freedom is it possible to decide what experience finds possible and vision finds desirable (Frye),i.e., the reproduction of the social life-world with will and consciousness (Habermas).

Specifically, to the extent that (1) the growth of science and technology as a myth of concern refers to the reproduction of the

natural world through gains in theoretical insight, and (2) growth in reflective consciousness within the context of a myth of freedom refers to the development of the social world through gains in practical insight, this theory of evolution and the idea of an open mythology refers to the co-existence of concern and freedom, of theoretical and practical claims to validity, and of theory and practice. Both Frye and Habermas have pointed out the importance of the principles of democracy and the structure of democratic will-formation to the continued reproduction of the natural and social worlds. This conclusion derives from a theory of change which recognizes the cognitive component of evolutionary development, the alteration of structures and needs, and the necessary realignment of theory and practice as policy-orientation allowing an existence characterized by will and consciousness. Frye reminds us that:

> Preserving a myth of freedom along with a myth of concern in society is difficult and dangerous, for while a society with an open mythology is better for human life than a society with a closed one...there is a constant pressure within society to close its mythology...when it comes to identity, a myth of freedom seems very ineffective in comparison with the narcotic charm of a closed myth of concern, with its instant, convinced, and final answers. It takes time to realize that these answers are not only not genuine answers, but that only the questions can be genuine...
> (1971:156.)

In an open mythology, this sphere of genuine questions or open discourse refers to an area of commitment which, in this decade, makes the act of will-formation an act of historical significance (1971:157).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adorno, Theodor, W.
1955 'Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft'. Pp. xvi in R. Friedrichs, A SOCIOLOGY OF SOCIOLOGY. New York: Free Press.

Appelbaum, Richard P.
1970 THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company.

Avineri, Shlomo
1968 THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT OF KARL MARX. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bendix, Richard
1968 'Economy and Society'. Pp. 501-505 in THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press.

Berger, Peter and Thomas Luckmann
1966 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.

Bottomore, T. B. and M. Rubel
1964 KARL MARX. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.

Collins, Randall and Michael Makowsky
1972 THE DISCOVERY OF SOCIETY. New York: Random House.

COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, THE Charles F. Ansley, Ed.
1935 New York: Columbia University Press.

Comte, Auguste
1877 'The System of Positive Polity'. Pp. 14-19 in Amitai and Eva Etzioni-Halevy (Eds.), SOCIAL CHANGE. New York: Basic Books.

Dahrendorf, Ralf
1959 CLASS AND CLASS CONFLICT. California: Stanford University Press.

Durkheim, Emile
1951 SUICIDE. New York: Free Press.

_____,
1954 THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY. New York: Free Press.

_____,
1964 THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD. New York: Free Press.

Emmet, Dorathy and Alsdair Macintyre (Eds.)
1970 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS. New York: The MacMillan Company.

Etzioni, Amitai, and Eva Etzioni-Halevy (Ed.)
1964 SOCIAL CHANGE: SOURCES, PATTERNS, AND CONSEQUENCES. New York: Basic Books, Inc.

Etzioni, Amitai
1968 THE ACTIVE SOCIETY. New York: The Free Press.

Friedrichs, Robert
1970 A SOCIOLOGY OF SOCIOLOGY. New York: The Free Press.

Frye, Northrop
1957 ANATOMY OF CRITICISM: FOUR ESSAYS. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

_____,
1971 THE CRITICAL PATH. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Gardiner, Patrick
1968 'Philosophy of History'. Pp. 428-433 in THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. New York: The MacMillan Company and The Free Press.

Gouldner, Alvin W.
1970 THE COMING CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY. New York: Avon Books.

Granger, G.
1968 'Condorcet'. Pp. 213-214 in THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. New York: The MacMillan Company and The Free Press.

Gurvitch, Georges
1962 'Dialectique et Sociologie'. Pp. 74 in R. Friedrichs, A SOCIOLOGY OF SOCIOLOGY. New York: The Free Press.

Habermas, Jurgen
1970 TOWARDS A RATIONAL SOCIETY (trans. by J. Shapiro). Boston: Beacon Press.

_____,
1971 KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS. Boston, Beacon Press.

_____,
1973 THEORY AND PRACTICE. Boston: Beacon Press.

_____,
1975 LEGITIMATION CRISIS (trans. by Thomas McCarthy). Boston: Beacon Press.

Horkheimer, Max
1934 'Dammerung'. Pp. xvi in J. Habermas, LEGITIMATION CRISIS. Boston: Beacon Press.

Kendall, Willmoore
1968 'Social Contract'. Pp. 376-381 in THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. New York: The MacMillan Company and The Free Press.

Konig, Rene
1968 'August Comte'. Pp. 201-204 in THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. New York: The MacMillan Company and The Free Press.

Kuhn, Thomas
1970 THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lauer, Robert H.
1977 PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL CHANGE. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc.

Lichtheim, Robert H.
1968 'Hegel'. Pp. 314-343 in THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. New York: The MacMillan Company and The Free Press.

Maine, Henry Sumner
1907 'Ancient Law'. Pp. 24-25 in R. Appelbaum, THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company.

Marx, Karl
1932 MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. New York: International Publishers.

_____,
1904 'A Contribution to the Critique of Polity'. Pp. 30-39 in Amitai Etzioni and Eva Etzioni-Halevy (Eds.), SOCIAL CHANGE. New York: Basic Books.

Mannheim, Karl
1936 IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.

Martindale, Don
1960 THE NATURE AND TYPES OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Merton, Robert K.
1957 SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE. Glencoe: Free Press.

Mills, C. Wright
1959 THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION. New York: Oxford University Press.

Moore, Wilbert E.
1974 SOCIAL CHANGE. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Nisbet, Robert A.
1969 SOCIAL CHANGE AND HISTORY: ASPECTS OF THE WESTERN THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT. New York: Oxford University Press.

_____, 1972 SOCIAL CHANGE. Evanston: Harper and Row.

Ogburn, William F.
1964 ON CULTURE AND SOCIAL CHANGE. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Pareto, Vilfredo
1935 THE MIND AND SOCIETY: A TREATISE ON GENERAL SOCIOLOGY. New York: Dover Publishers, Inc.

Parsons, Talcott
1951 THE SOCIAL SYSTEM. New York: The Free Press.

_____, 1966 SOCIETIES: EVOLUTIONARY AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

_____, 1971 THE SYSTEM OF MODERN SOCIETIES. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

_____, 1968 'Emile Durkheim'. Pp. 311-319 in THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. New York: The MacMillan Company and The Free Press.

Rotowein, Eugene
1968 'David Hume'. Pp. 546-550 in THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. New York: The MacMillan Company and The Free Press.

Sahlins, M. D. and E. R. Service
1960 EVOLUTION AND CULTURE. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Schelsky, Helmut
1957 'Zeitschrift fur evangelische Ethik'. Pp. 208 in Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.

Smelser, Niel J.
1959 SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

_____, 1964 'Toward a Theory of Modernization'. Pp. 268-284 in Amitai Etzioni and Eva Etzioni-Halevy (Eds.), SOCIAL CHANGE: SOURCES, PATTERNS AND CONSEQUENCES. New York: Basic Books, Inc.

Smith, Anthony D.
1973 THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL CHANGE: A CRITIQUE OF THE FUNCTIONALIST THEORY OF SOCIAL CHANGE. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

SOCIETY TODAY, Second Edition.
1973 California: Communications Research Machines, Inc.

Sorokin, Pitirim
1942 MAN AND SOCIETY IN CALAMITY. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc.

———, 1947 SOCIETY, CULTURE AND PERSONALITY: THEIR STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers.

———, 1948 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF HUMANITY. Boston: Beacon Press.

———, 1951 SOCIAL PHILOSOPHIES OF AN AGE OF CRISIS. Boston: Beacon Press.

———, 1957 CRISIS OF OUR AGE. Boston: Beacon Press.

Spencer, Herbert
1852 'Sociology Vol. 1'. Pp. 9-13 in Amitai Etzioni and Eva Etzioni Halevy, SOCIAL CHANGE: SOURCES, PATTERNS, AND CONSEQUENCES. New York: Basic Books, Inc.

———, 1958 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF A NEW SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. New York: Dewitt Revolving Fund.

Spengler, Oswald
1926 THE DECLINE OF THE WEST. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

Steward, Julian
1955 THEORY OF CULTURE CHANGE: THE METHODOLOGY OF MULTILINEAR EVOLUTION. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

———, 1964 'A Neo-Evolutionist Approach'. Pp. 131-139 in Amitai Etzioni and Eva Etzioni-Halevy, SOCIAL CHANGE: SOURCES, PATTERNS, AND CONSEQUENCES. New York: Basic Books, Inc.

Toennies, Ferdinand
1957 COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY -- GEMEINSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT (Trans. and Ed. by Charles P. Loomis). Michigan: The Michigan State University Press.

Toynbee, Arnold J.
1946 A STUDY OF HISTORY. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc.

Turner, Johnathan H.
1974 THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY. Illinois: Dorsey Press.

Veblen, Thorstein
1953 THE THEORY OF LEISURE CLASS. New York: Mentor Books.

Wallis, George W.
1967 'Chronopolitics: The Impact of Time Perspectives on the Dynamics of Change'. Presented at THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE RURAL SOCIOLOGY SOCIETY, San Francisco, California, 1967.

Weber, Max
1947 THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION. New York: Oxford University Press.

_____,
1958 THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM. New York: Schribner.

Zaltman, G., P. Kotler and I. Kaufman (Eds.)
1972 CREATING SOCIAL CHANGE. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.