AMERICAN CATHOLICS, RACISM AND IMPERIALISM:
A SELECT STUDY OF RESPONSES TO THE ISSUES
AS INVOLVED IN AMERICAN EXPANSION, 1890-1905
by
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This thesis might be characterized as a limited study in the intellectual history of a moral idea. That idea is the principle that justice, equity, and full respect for the other's expressed will, must subsist no less between peoples and nations than between individuals, regardless of their faith, culture, and politico-social organization. It is today the governing ideal of the United Nations, the impetus to de-colonization, and the position of the Christian Churches. Yet in the nineteenth century, Dicey, the great English jurist, maintained that "barbarians" had no rights against "disturbance" by Europeans, who were alone judges of what constituted "barbarity" and were best equipped to dispel it. The British, on the whole, behaved in accord with this principle. Americans, on the other hand, while more prepared to respect or grant sovereign authority to countries as diverse as Muscat and Haiti, yet early inclined to emasculate that sovereignty by widely enforcing the principle of extra territoriality, on the grounds, as Caleb Cushing had it, that Christians could not be judged by pagan law. The rapid rise of racism, of militant nationalism, and of colonialism hardened the superiority of the West, further reducing the possibility of fair treatment for weaker peoples. It is my belief that repugnance at such developments should be instinctive to the Christian conscience,
and affirmation of all peoples' rights intrinsic to its doctrine. Yet it was formally Christian powers who resurrected the old Roman concept of imperialism, which was firstly a moral value declaring human cultures to be unequal, and maintaining that hence superior "rights" accrued to the self-determined "higher civilization." Beside this, political phenomena such as colonialism must be viewed as outgrowths. And powers such as America which did not at first bend to colonialism, certainly entertained this morality of imperialism in their dealings with China, Japan, and so on.

Yet the Christian critique of this morality, as indeed of racism, its most dangerous outgrowth, was hesitant, fitful, and often non-existent. Indeed, I would contend many Catholics, as such, upheld the false value system, some to the extent of formulating an informal theology of colonialism and even racism. This thesis investigates primarily American dissenters from such views, men who may well claim to be among the originators of present Catholic teaching and international principle, men who realized what Dr. Sidney Mead calls the first duty of Christian thought: the obligation to subject human ideologies to moral scrutiny.

It would have been easy to shorten this thesis greatly by culling from my sources the more obvious moral reflections. Such would too easily have reduced it to an affair of blacks and whites. One can only do full justice to men's thoughts and consciences by setting them completely within the context
of detail, of issue, of tradition, of opportunity, and of information, in which they moved. This is instinctive to the historian; to the theologian, it is only more recently become a duty. Hence, while this thesis certainly uncovers immoral theories, I doubt that it uncovers any immoral men; and although it exalts courageous moral insight, I doubt that it discovers any saints (although here I am less sure!).

This very study will demonstrate how my very interpretation and moral stance has been guided by one of its subjects, Humphrey J. Desmond (1858-1932), a graduate of the University of Wisconsin, and founder of the Catholic Press Association, a man of remarkable modernity, and one whose thought rebuts Walter Ong's contention that until today, American Catholicism never self-consciously defined itself as a new experiment in a traditional faith. My largest debt is to him.

I am grateful to Dr. William Miller, who permitted me to pursue my own devices in a readings course on American Catholicism; it enabled me to concentrate more fully on research later on and has much enriched this study; to Paul Messbarger, student of the Catholic popular culture of the era, who taught me to approach the "ghetto" mentality of late nineteenth-century American Catholicism with understanding, not intolerance, so that deficiencies in this regard are my own; to Tom Frari, with his detailed knowledge of Cardinal Gibbon's Church, for much understanding of it; and to him, and other graduate students of the department of theology, such
as Larry Ssettuba, who gave me a grasp of the ever-changing character of the Catholic Church's vision of herself, and substantiated them with information; to my friends Humberto Ravello, Luis Fernandez and Ed Lopez who evoked in me more sympathy for, and insight into, their respective Cuban, Filipino, and Puerto Rican peoples than they imagined, and whose influence would be greater had I been enabled to complete this as I had planned; to my brother Jim, with whom I discussed Spain's history and mentality before writing the sections involving them; to Dr. Lawrence McCaffrey, for many insights into the Irish Americans, which, thrown off at random, I have found myself recalling thankfully at many points in the writing of this; to my room-mate and closest friend, Rich Brigham, who listened to my ideas develop over the past year, and whose receptivity much lightened my research--carried on at the oddest hours to the disturbance of life!--and begot my enthusiasm for my work; and to Dr. Ralph Weber, who directed, encouraged, and befriended me, who did not once complain when it dawned on him what I had got the two of us into, and who sustained me when once it all seemed so pointless.

As all historical writing, this is the product of a person and of a time. My own pre-occupation springs not from acquaintance with the discipline of intellectual history, but from the conviction given me by my father, that right thinking in men's hearts alone begets justice in their conduct.
My subject matter was largely shaped by the current preoccupa-
tion of Marquette students with racial equality. It is not
usual to dedicate something so mechanical as a thesis; yet
if there is merit in this I would dedicate it to my father,
and also to Marquette's Students United for Racial Equality,
many of them my friends, who have in their different ways
lived in life the spirit which I but live in thought and ink.

David Doyle
Iowa City, Iowa
October 1968
P. 240, note 2. The section referred to was omitted.

P. 255, line 6 of the second quotation. A man may contend that...

P. 329, line 8. Silvela, not Silvea.

P. 363, line 6. Another radical similarly..., not "similarity".
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PART I

INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEM, AND THE SCOPE OF INQUIRY

In the later nineteenth century, thoughtful men were struck by two outstanding characteristics of their age: the acceleration of human history, and the shrinking of the world. Technological advances lay behind both these developments, by giving men a firmer confidence in their capacity to forward their well-being, and by drawing the whole of mankind into closer relations. Government policies, business enterprise, educational expansion, Christian missionary endeavour and the development of news media were planned in greater or lesser understanding of these facts. The world was become one.

Men, however, remained divided. They were accustomed to think in terms of the particularist communities/had been the vehicles of their distinct forebears' development. Often-times, they owed allegiance to several such communities--local, national, cultural and religious--which might coincide, harmonize or conflict. For centuries, these ancient, if changing entities had absorbed the energies of their adherents. Few men bothered with other worlds, apart from chancellors, storytellers and men of suspect religious orthodoxy. Each community possessed a resilient capacity to absorb massive extraneous cultural infusions, and yet retain, if not
strengthen its own group-consciousness. Thus did Prussia receive the French Enlightenment, by rationalizing its own system of government and education, and thus did Catholicism the sensibility of the Romantic movement by creating a new devotionalism; thus did the United States assimilate its immigrants yet retain its own culture, and, most dramatically, did Japan adopt the progressive, industrial, and statist style of the new Europe, yet become the vanguard of a militant Orientalism.

Such interchanges created scope for dialogue between different nations and traditions. Yet, tragically, each community still insisted on living out its own inherited and often complacent rationale, and aggressively re-asserted its self-interests. Although a strongly optimistic tradition survived, assuring many men that reason and good-will could overcome even the tendency to war itself, and producing as its fruits a variety of international conventions, and a movement for world peace through arbitration and disarmament, yet such optimism had ceased to have any but the most formal influence on the statesmen of Realpolitik, and was even losing its sway as a common faith. Especially in Europe, fin-de-siecle pessimism was gaining ground, as exemplified in the novels of Thomas Hardy, or the polemics of Max Nordau. A majority, perhaps, still believed in the progressive betterment of Western civilization; but no one emerged to argue how that process could embrace the confrontation with the new world of the East and the Tropics, nor, indeed, even the relations
between the Western powers themselves, arbitration apart. Hence the emerging world was viewed less as a promise than as a threat; and thus became an arena in which weakening communal identities could be re-asserted by policies of commercial expansion and territorial aggrandizement. Hence the depressing manoeuvres of late nineteenth century power politics, the greedy new imperialism and the rapid militarization. Journalists, sensing the mood of doubt as to the adequacy of the old creed of global progress and fraternity, contributed to the new anxiety with irresponsible talk of the Slavic Danger, the Yellow Peril or the Immigrant Threat. Cultures, ideologies, and religions tended toward a noisier and less tolerant apologetic. Ingrained and threatened particularism in faiths, cultures, and states, was scarcely the milieu from which to expect an optimistic and concerted championing of the worth and interdependence of all men, or the making of policies tending to their mutual and peaceful development.

One has compassion then for those strident, self-concerned and worried men who directed their age toward the failure and despair of world war. Inevitably, the pessimistic conclusions of the geopolitical Darwinists found hearers in them, not so much to influence them, as to confirm them in their divisive jealousies. Similarly, a spurious and dangerous racism, then enjoying immense vogue, appealed to them as an all-encompassing and "scientific" explanation of the dynamic modernity of North Atlantic civilization, as against the contented conservatism of coloured civilizations. It also
offered comforting reassurance against twinges of conscience when the European power system was arbitrarily extended over the tropics, a reassurance especially foolproof when this racism was married to Darwinism, as by Benjamin Kidd or John Burgess.¹ The late nineteenth century, confronted with the task of regulating the conditions under which the new neighborhood of the world's peoples and cultures could co-exist and inter-relate, was both too unalert to it, and too immersed in its own past and its fears, to solve it with justice, confidence or imagination, or even the beginnings of them. Only since the Second World War have men moved to correct the inequities and hatreds left by that time, and to construct a genuine world community.

Yet it is too easy to dismiss our great-grandparents as "a generation of materialists"; they had no precedents, really, in trying to recognise the duties demanded of them by a single world; it was unfortunate, in fact, when they chose to regard the arrogant and exploitative imperialism of Rome, or the salvation-conscious intolerance of Medieval Christendom, as such precedents. We have suffered enough global war to bring us—very imperfectly—to our senses; more important, perhaps, we have been beneficiaries of the much increased knowledge available of all peoples; we have lived in this one world where our ancestors were surprised by it; and, finally, we are heirs to the growing amount of sensible thinking on

¹Yet although one of the first champions on "scientific" grounds of white rule in the tropics, Burgess was to oppose America's colonial venture out of concern for her own people's liberty.
the issues raised. Such thinking is well contained in the
fervent appeals for world community addressed by John XXIII
and Paul VI to all men; and also in the pronouncements of the
II Vatican Council, insofar as that thinking is rooted in the
Christian Catholic tradition, and in the resolutions of the
World Council of Churches, insofar as it is rooted in the
Christian tradition at large. If most eloquently and per­s­
sistently proclaimed by formally organized Christianity today,
yet this fresh approach was anticipated by a minority of
secular thinkers after 1900, and voiced by governments
increasingly from the nineteen-thirties.

The purpose of this thesis is to probe the attitudes
and thinking of certain American Catholic writers and editors
between 1890-1905 in an attempt to discover to what extent
they presaged the present mind of Christians in these matters,
and, insofar as they failed, to examine those views they
actually did hold; in both cases being concerned to relate
these views to the preconceptions and influences which may
have moulded them, whether of their varied Catholicity, the
American milieu, their immigrant background.

I have few illusions about the scope of this inquiry:
it is most limited. It examines exhaustively but two news­
papers and one periodical, with cursory glances at a few other
periodicals. This alone has been sufficient to show me the
errors of generalization such similar random sampling of other
Catholic publications has caused those scholars who have had
occasion to touch upon some aspects of what is here studied,
notably Julius Pratt, on Catholic editorial response to war and imperialism in 1898, and Frank Reuter, on Catholic opinion of American colonial policies, 1898-1904. A wider sampling would therefore discover and correct imbalances in this study.

This caution need not, however, be cause for cynicism. Unlike Pratt and Reuter, I am not required to deduce a closed and full description of Catholic responses to specific policies. Instead, my principal aim is one of inquiry and suggestion; inquiry into how individual Catholics tended to arrive at their views, rather than provision of a catalogue and generalization of those views; and thence suggestion of the ways in which a Christian approach to international relations was helped or hindered. Sampling, in this case, is not useless. A conversation with a handful of well-acquainted and intelligent foreigners conversant with the problems of their society might mislead us as to the individual opinions of many of their compatriots, but it certainly gives vital and overall impressions of their country and the forces acting upon it. Similarly, I would have this thesis seen, not as a body of studied conclusions on the problems here at issue, but as a discussion with several of the most alert and sensible men in late nineteenth century Catholic America upon them.

Several suggestive points emerge as a result. They underlie the structure and direction of my argument. American

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2Julius Pratt, The Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands (Baltimore, 1936); Frank T. Reuter, Catholic Influence on American Colonial Policies, 1898-1904 (Austin, Texas, 1967).
Catholicity was elaborately complex at this time in the diverse viewpoints it encompassed. Although the distinction between Americanists and conservatives is an important one, operative no less in forming ideas on foreign questions as on domestic, there are other distinctions similarly operative, and often overlapping this first one.

First among these is that between Church-mindedness, narrowly conceived, and Christian-mindedness. The former regarded the maintenance and extension of the visible influence of the Catholic Church as the prime consideration by which human affairs were to be judged; the latter was principally concerned to demand, create or protect conditions, even quite secular conditions if necessary, conducive to the morality of human dignity, kindness and brotherhood preached by Christ. This is not to argue a basic antithesis between these viewpoints; ideally they should coincide. In practice, however, they were emphasized differently even to the point of incompatibility.

Clerical opinion was formed chiefly in a state of Church-mindedness, whether, and this is most important, the clerics concerned were Americanists or conservatives. Their whole training and interests schooled them to postulate the good of institutional Catholicism as the sum bonum of world order; their differences arose precisely over what conditions, no less international than national, caused the Church, so conceived, to flourish. The more quiescent laity tended to follow them. It was in the degree to which American Catholicity,
as personified in a few independently-minded laymen, and certain clergy, could divest itself of an instinctive identification with the Roman Catholic Church as a complex of interests, that it was enabled to make any searching Christian appraisal of the new world. If this is true, it is surely relevant not only to American Catholicism, but to any example of why Leonine Catholicism in Europe, although hailed as modern, acquiesced in the "New Imperialism"; and why it sought not to deny racist dogmas on the inferiority of coloured peoples but only to ease their effects with a Christian paternalism which implicitly accepted the basic postulate of inequality amongst peoples.

Why so many Catholics held a view of the Church that made them receptive to the prejudices of the age will be later discussed. The Church itself, in its human aspect, was the product of centuries of Europocentricity; so that inter-action between ecclesiology and the biases of Western culture was age old, and certainly did not begin merely in the late nineteenth century: the self-centredness of Europe and the introversion of the Church had long fed one on the other. The stigma of paganism gained cultural connotations, which as European civilization grew in confidence and enrichment, in turn hardened ecclesiastical attitudes towards the pagan.

To think freshly on the relations of peoples demanded, therefore, that the Catholic find new sources of self-education than those of the interests of the visible Church, or of the outmoded, if understandable traditions animating it. Those
traditions held the Catholicization of all mankind to be the Church's goal, and hence cannot be characterized as indifferent to peoples; they also emphasized the maintenance and intensification of piety among the existent faithful. But concern for non-Catholics, other than as potential converts, was most limited, when it was not dangerously warped. The sources of fresh education were thus necessarily outside of the Church, in the world. Of course the Christian principles which were then brought to bear on the newly illumined realities of the world had been transmitted, if unemphasized, by Catholic schools, for they were the principles embodied in the gospels (read in the Douai version), and in the lives of many of the Church's saints. Yet only by ignoring the Church as they knew it, and becoming receptive to the world available to them, could thoughtful Catholics hope to lay the seeds of the present passionate concern of the Church for the welfare of all men. Through the perspectives of immigrant national traditions and through experience of America, men groped toward a Christian view of the emergent world. God partly instructs men through the reality of their times; and through them, the Church is reborn from those nostrums and policies derived from past lives, the lessons of which have since congealed into irrelevance.

This then is my second guiding reflection; the paramount importance of their experiences in inspiring or prejudicing thoughtful American Catholics as they came to now one, now another, prospect of the diminishing world. Their complex
relations with their America, sometimes sharing its assumptions, sometimes ignoring or rejecting them, offered a more hopeful basis for such reaction than did their identification with the Church, although their qualified American-ness owed much to that very identification. To take an example, the degree to which they shared in the prevalent contempt for their coloured fellow-citizens, the Negro and Amerindian, was important; for those who bravely rejected it brought a similar open-mindedness to more distant coloured populations. Again, the instinctive but often searchingly argued critique of "Anglo-Saxonism" given by men only too aware of the composite origins of the American people, for being themselves of immigrant stock, offered a perspective from which to judge the slick generalizations of many expansionists.

It is for these reasons that this study will examine other attitudes than those immediately evoked by international events in which America was involved. The over-all focus of this study is two-fold. It springs from attraction to the standpoint of modern Catholicity, and a concern with its evolution. It is also rooted in concern at the manner in which American foreign policy has been, and is, formulated. Growing global responsibilities have required that America have within herself a diversity of traditions, and a body of independent critics, to speak to it on the problems at issue. An America of manifold and vocal traditions is better able to respond to the diversity of the world; an America frightened into nationalist consensus or a restrictive self-image must by
nature be insensitive to the complexities of other nations. The same has held true for all nations internationally involved. Hence, from an American, as well as a Catholic, perspective, the importance of the Catholic dissent from national policy evidenced in this study.
American Catholicism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century had between twelve and fifteen million adherents, thereby embracing about a fifth of all Americans. However, in terms of actual church membership, the Church served almost one third of the nation's organized Christians. In its rapid and continuing growth it was the chief beneficiary, in this respect, of the heavy immigration that began in the 1850s, changed radically in composition in the 1880s, and showed an overall increase in annual volume until 1915. The changes of the 1880s replaced the Irish, Germans and Scandinavians preponderance among in-comers, with a predominance of Italians, Slavs and Hungarians, although many of the former peoples continued to arrive. The conditions encountered by these later immigrants also changed, and were principally urban and industrial; the native attitudes to which they had to accommodate themselves were also changing and hardening. American Catholicism inevitably reflected the diverse reactions of the immigrants to their new home, for its whole energies were devoted to preserving their faith by a commitment to massive institutional growth, and by harmonizing the teachings of the Church to the life style, the prejudices, the nostalgia,
and the hopes of the newcomer. As these varied, so did the Church. It becomes almost impossible to separate the specifically Catholic and the specifically immigrant in the culture of American Catholics.

Relatively early, Irish bishops and clergy gained control over the Church; and they retained it, in large measure, after the national composition of the faithful changed. This was of crucial importance, for it imparted to the Church the temper of the Irish Americans, and hence transformed the Church into an agency of general, if discriminate, Americanization. For the Irish were the most socially mobile of all immigrant groups; by the turn of the century, less than half of the sons of unskilled Irish immigrant workers were themselves unskilled, and the proportion of Irish Americans in the professions was several times larger than in the previous generation. The Irish had also thrown themselves with enthusiasm into politics, countering Yankee discrimination by building their own often unorthodox power structures, through which they could advance themselves and influence the community at large. Identity of language certainly assisted these developments, and may have chiefly instigated them; but implicit in them was a confidence in America, its ideals and opportunities. America retained the faith in progress which Europe was already doubting after mid-century; and the Irish immigrant, full of hope, shared and buttressed that faith, so that notwithstanding the doctrines of original sin, elements in their Church were strongly influenced by their
confidence. However this faith never prevented even those in whom it was most marked, such as Humphrey Desmond (with whom we shall be dealing), from recognizing that man and society could go seriously and wilfully wrong.

The nobility and success of these recent strangers engendered a crisis of confidence among native white Protestant Americans. Status-anxiety, their essential reaction, found reinforcement and justification in the negative and anti-papist aspects of their religious tradition, or, in the case of less bigoted men, in sincere doubts as to the compatibility of American liberty and Roman Catholicism, an authoritarian faith. It is significant that during the Know-Nothing disturbances, the churches of the socially conservative and politically quiescent German American Catholics were left untouched, while Irish churches, only blocks away, were burnt down. Equally significant was the fact, as Humphrey Desmond noted, that the American Protective Association, which he fought so relentlessly and of which he was the first historian, was strongest in the Middle West, where the Irish as co-builders rather than inheritors of society, were prominent in social, political and professional leadership.¹

However, it was only one section of the Church that reflected the confidence, ambition and patriotism of the Irish Americans and their attempts to establish a close modus

operandi with native Americans. Another section tended to reflect the insecurities of those startled by the depth of nativist prejudice, and frustrated by the machinery of discrimination available to Protestant Americans, in the East and South generally, and particularly in New England; these Irish sought consolation in a strong recreation of the traditions of the old country, and were concerned to establish only the loosest modus vivendi between their own culture and that of America proper. The Irish of the eastern cities, which were socially dominated by oligarchies of their Protestant employers, saw in the long hours, low pay, and drab housing which they suffered, the inevitable outcome of what their radical patriot leader John Mitchell, had taught them to regard as a falsely Christian value system. They had little use for preachers of a generous rapprochement with American society, men such as Isaac Hecker, or Orestes Brownson (whom they termed a Catholic Know-Nothing). The ecclesiastical leaders of these more clannish and touchy Irish found allies in the leaders of German Catholics, particularly those of Ohio and Wisconsin.

The German Catholic tradition was largely conservative

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²Mitchell, himself Presbyterian, devoted his later journalism, and gave his sons, to the Confederacy.

³Many of the most prominent "German" Catholics, were in fact Austrian; Americans used the term to define a linguistic and cultural group that included German-speakers originating in Luxembourg, Austria, Bohemia and Switzerland as well as in the lands of the German Empire. Although there were important distinctions in Europe between them, crises such as the fight against Wisconsin's compulsory English schooling law united them in America.
and defensive, and it did not lose these characteristics on transplanting to America. Indeed, in America, it grew immune to liberal developments among Catholics at home: Bishop von Ketteler's Christian socialism, or the new theology associated with names like Friedrich and Döllinger, which, if discomfitted by the aftermath of the Infallibility decree, retained some influence. Only the social concern exhibited by the German Catholic Central Verein suggested the diversity which might have been in German American Catholicism. On the whole, German Catholics found it hard to accept the pragmatic character of non-Catholic America; being used to finding in the Fatherland, that those not with them were fervently and invidiously against them, whether statist Lutherans or godless Socialists, they saw Protestant Americans as veiled or potential enemies of the Church of Christ; coming, oftentimes, from states which before German unification afforded official patronage and status to the Church, they tended to view American separation of Church and State as another gimmick of militant godlessness. Accustomed to an almost caste system of occupations in Germany, they did not press for the advancement of their children: the son of a German Catholic brewer or cooper or tanner went himself into the same, or a related trade. Thus concerned to stake out their own sure position in society, they had little patience with those Irish, or their own unionized and socialist compatriots, who jeopardized this by refusing to accept a similar static position, and by noisily mixing with native Americans in politics. Above all,
however, influenced by the pervasive teachings of German philosophers of nationalism, they were determined to retain their own language and traditions; even a non-Catholic liberal German such as Carl Schurz, whose life embodied a deep desire to give public service to America, believed that only by retaining and transmitting their culture, could German Americans do their duty, not only to themselves, but to an America as yet relatively impoverished in culture. Milwaukee, before the crude nationalist outbreaks of the Great War, was a rich symbol of this design; and Humphrey J. Desmond, himself a firm Americanist in his conception of the Church, and a committed if circumspect opponent of Messmer and Katzer, the German prelates of the Wisconsin province, never denied, but actually championed Schurz's hope of cultural interaction, surely the most meaningful application of the "melting pot" theory.4

Other "Americanist" Catholics were not so tolerant; particularly intolerant was Archbishop John Ireland of St. Paul. His constant innuendos as to the un-Americanness of perpetuating German culture brought to a head the resentments and differences between German American and liberal Irish American Catholics. He did not understand the Germans' contention,—overstated, yes, but certainly not irrelevant,—that their Catholicism was rooted in their culture and language, and must be damaged if these were arbitrarily

4Commenting on Schurz's attitude, Desmond warned, "We must not permit 'vulgarization': a . . . thoughtless contempt for the old country style, . . ." Citizen, 5 May 1900.
suppressed. Since Ireland's whole program envisaged an ever strengthened colouration of American Catholicism with American values and patriotism, and since its theological basis, as formulated by the brilliant Monsignor Denis O'Connell, was based on a strong distinction between doctrinal essentials and optionals of custom which could be geared to the needs of different peoples, it is difficult not to find some of its protagonists guilty of inconsistency in their strident criticism of the German Americans' right to be different and in their insistence that the American Church be not only one in Christ, but also one in aspect. Seeking autonomy from the practices of Catholic Europe, they sought to refuse such autonomy to the minorities within their own Church. They justified this by saying that the future was with them, but as Humphrey Desmond remarked, if the future was with them so inevitably, why did they need to harass and pressure those who wished to enjoy what was left of the past? However, as we shall discover, the Americanists were inconsistent on more momentous matters than that of German American Catholicism, to such a startling degree as to lend substantiation to the contemporary conservative critique that their distinction between essentials and inessentials was really a front to hide a greater radicalism.

However, before probing this, one must first sketch the beliefs of the Americanists. Basic to their thought was

5 This apologetic had wide currency among liberal Catholic, other than theologians. Desmond himself used it: "An American Catholicism?" Citizen, 5 December 1896.
the reflection made by Alexis de Tocqueville fifty years before, that the temper of America was most favourable, theoretically considered, to true Catholicism. Isaac Hecker laid down the principal maxims; that since men can only pleasingly serve Christ in free response to Church and Holy Spirit, the American devotion to liberty was a promising pre-condition of the best Catholicity; that since the Protestant sects preached the complete corruption of natural man while American society had, paradoxically, an Enlightenment appreciation of him, of civic virtues, and of the ends of society, the more optimistic diagnosis of these by Catholicism made it the Christian faith most in harmony with America; that it therefore rested on the Catholic minority to regard America with friendliness, to participate in its public life, and to evidence in themselves those virtues, of community, activity and sobriety, which Americans cherished, and hence reveal to them that Catholicity and the American life were naturally, and supernaturally, complementary. The eventual conversion of America could thus be confidently expected.

There are obvious and implications in such thinking for any study of the relations between Americans and other people, as Christianly conceived. On the one hand, there are the possible deductions that if America's life and society embody so much virtue, and is, as it were, Catholic in body if not yet in spirit, then American Catholicism has no need to be critical of the nationalism born of such a society; and that since other societies and cultures are not so righteous in
their natural state, American Catholics need not be solicitous for them when they are confronted by the more righteous America. On the other hand, the temper of Hecker's ideas, that of a genuine open-mindedness to a non-Catholic culture, at a time when such liberalism was rare, could well be the inspiration of a readiness to assess other non-Catholic cultures in a like spirit, and be equally productive of tolerance, and even mutually beneficial co-action. Within the limits of this inquiry, some material emerges to show which ways those influenced by Hecker tended to embody these antithetical possibilities in their responses to foreign news. It is, however, important to note that for all its effects, Hecker's thought, to recur to my original distinction, was Church-minded. The order he founded aimed at the conversion of Americans.

It is for this reason that his thought was adopted as their ideology by the Americanists, who were all churchmen, with the exception of some writers and editors. It offered a bold and promising goal for the American Catholic Church. And in the meantime it offered a superior apology for the adjustments and attitudes the liberal Irish Americans had developed in their enthusiasm for America. These men were already up to their necks in American business, politics, and communal services, and had many Protestant friends and colleagues. Their priests were surely happy to be able to tell them that they were thus advancing the Catholic interest, rather than prejudicing the salvation of their souls.
The policies of the Americanist group of prelates and thinkers, notably Archbishop Ireland, Bishop John J. Keane, Monsignor Denis O'Connell and Fr. John Zahm, were formulated to strengthen and forward this ambience between Church and society, in the light of Hecker's optimistic rationale. They were supported, in varying degree, by a majority of the hierarchy, and more especially by Archbishops Gross of Oregon, Riordan of San Francisco, Kain of St. Louis, and Cardinal Gibbons of Baltimore, among its senior members. These men, however, may have partly owed their elevation by the Vatican to their capacity to establish a whole-hearted rapport with American society, for the Vatican has always had instincts toward what is worldly-wise; and their positions of leadership help disguise the real strength of defensive thinking among the immigrant masses, which stood revealed by the long years of conservatism characteristic of American Catholicism after these men had died off.

Ireland's group sought to re-assure Protestant Americans by vigorously defending the separation of Church and State, and by constructing for it an apologetic full of implied criticism for the European custom of official faiths. They encouraged lay activism and initiative in public and church life. They sought a compromise in the vexed question of whether Catholics should attend public schools, by pleading for Catholic trust in, and support of, local school boards. They themselves spoke out on public issues, particularly upon the general need of morality in politics. They concerned themselves with
raising the intellectual level of American Catholicism in various ways, for example by the foundation of the Catholic University of America, and by patronizing Catholic attempts to handle those new issues, such as evolution, and liberal scriptural criticism, which were exercising the Protestant mind. They prevented a vendetta against Catholic labour, then in process of organizing. They said their little bit for social justice although in general they seem to have trusted in the conservative industrial economy, perhaps inevitably, since its values were so inextricably bound up with those of America at large, with which they were holding dialogue. They preached the values of liberty, democracy, self-reliance and sobriety. They attacked cultural pluralism within American Catholicity, to remove the stigma of "foreignism" from it, as we have seen in their relations with German Catholics. They cultivated friendships with leading politicians, industrialists, publishers, and rising young men, from among their Protestant compatriots, men such as President McKinley himself, James J. Hill of the Northern Pacific, Lyman Abbott of The Outlook, and Theodore Roosevelt. They made the Church look American.

Their response to nativist American bigotry, as revived on a wide scale by Henry F. Bowers in the form of the American

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6 Robert D. Cross, The Emergence of Liberal Catholicism in America (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), is the most comprehensive account of the movement; it draws partly on more specialized studies, such as James H. Moynihan, The Life of Archbishop Ireland (New York, 1953), and Thomas McAvo, The Great Crisis in American Catholic History, 1895-1900 (Chicago, 1957).
Protective Association, is instructive. The association conducted a vigorous anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic propaganda; it controlled at its high point the political life of many smaller towns and a few small cities in the Middle West, and published seventy newspapers. Conservative Catholics, unsure of their status as Americans, alternately ignored or fulminated against it, and attempted to assuage their ruffled feelings by promoting a policy of unobtrusiveness in America at large, coupled with an inflation of the myths of their own communities to re-assure themselves. Liberal Catholics, on the other hand, ridiculed the A.P.A. as essentially un-American in its attempts to harness public life to sectarian goals, made much of its pro-British, and hence "unpatriotic" stand during the Venezuela crisis, and, withal, attempted to communicate sanely with its adherents and sympathisers on the grounds that they feared Catholicism only because they were ignorant of it. At no time did they descend to an hysterical "We are as American as you" campaign; they took it for granted that intelligent Americans realized that by now.

The real danger to the attempt to make Catholicism one of the three "religions of democracy" came less from any nativist recrudescence, than from a concerted alliance between conservative groups with the Church, who, with the Jesuits as spokesmen, could gain the ear of Pope Leo XIII. Leo seems in many ways like the present Paul VI, a man of great ability, aware of the need for new departures, yet at times veering toward conservative retrenchment out of fear lest reform wax
undisciplined. His varying receptivity to the arguments of either side had much to do with which state of mind predominated in him. The intrigues adopted to secure his patronage are interesting, although marred by unedifying squabbles for ecclesiastical preferment on behalf of now Ireland, now Michael Corrigan, the Archbishop of New York, and most prominent conservative. The Americanists welcomed America's emergence to world status as another means of bringing home to the Vatican the urgency of a wide-ranging detente between the Church and American political democracy and egalitarian culture. Yet the conservatives could counter by painting an image of America more in accord with the prejudices and jealousies of Vatican officials, who, however much committed to the ideal of a Church universal, had European hearts.

As a result, the Vatican's policies on American questions vacillated. On the one hand, it permitted the creation of the Catholic University, refused to allow conservatives to secure condemnation of the Knights of Labor, instructed the papal delegate to Washington not to issue a blanket prohibition of Catholic attendance at public schools, and rejected the Cahensly plan for a separate episcopate to serve German Americans. On the other hand, it issued a papal encyclical in 1894 rebuking false ideals of liberty and the idea that Church-State separation was good, instead postulating a State which patronized the Church as the normative desire of Catholics; it interfered in certain cases, such as those of the rectorships of the Catholic University of America,
and the American College in Rome, to oust some of the leading Americanists from positions of power, and to deny preferment to others; and in 1899, it issued a letter, Testem Benevolentiae, containing certain theological formulae attributed to extreme Americanists. Although careful to distinguish between these and the customs peculiar to Americans, this letter did somewhat impugn the expediency of the whole Americanist programme, if only because it was addressed to Cardinal Gibbons, and couched in such serious rhetoric.

These latter developments, and also the dispatch of the Papal Delegates to America, first Archbishop Francesco Satolli, then Archbishop Sebastiano Martinelli, not only heightened conflict within the American church, but also fed misgivings among native Americans about a local faith apparently subject to "foreign" authority (for such Catholic news was widely reported in the Protestant and secular press). This was particularly so in the case of Testem Benevolentiae, which, coming so soon after the Spanish-American War, was a caution or reprimand to those very prelates who had done most to re-assure Americans of the patriotism of their Catholic compatriots during the conflict.

However, one must sympathise with the Vatican's dilemma. Neither side in the controversies of the American Church would forego lobbying for its prestigious support. The Vatican was attempting to handle much more severe and pregnant tensions within European Catholicism, between proponents of Christian Democracy and a liberalized theology, and proponents of the
idea that the Faith was essentially authoritative and hierarchical, and as such, flourished best in an authoritarian and class-structured political society. Both groups in the American Church cast themselves in the role of sympathisers, if not actual allies, of these conflicting European groups. For this reason alone, the Vatican could not let the American Church go on its way unwatched, although, Denis O'Connell argued that only inessentials had undergone a sea change as the Church crossed the Atlantic. And even regardless of overt American sympathies, American developments had inevitable European repercussions. The whole history of the "Americanist Heresy" crisis testified to this. 7

The Americanists themselves saw little reason to confine their hopes for the Church to America; no more than any other Catholics, were they reared to see its mission in solely national terms. They sought the dignity of European antecedents for their desire to have the Church openly encounter modernity, by writing and speaking much of Belgian democracy, of Lacordaire, Montalambert and Ozanam, of Newman and Manning, of Daniel O'Connell and George St. Mivart, of Bishop von Ketteler and Lord Acton. 8 Characteristically, the debating society at Archbishop Ireland's seminary in St. Paul was

7McAvoy, Great Crisis, especially 105 ff. to the end; John Tracy Ellis, The Life of James, Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore, 1838-1921, Vol. 2 (Milwaukee, 1952), 1-80.

8The Catholic Citizen carried many such articles and editorials, 20 October 1894 for example.
called after Lacordaire. The desire to create a truly
catholic relevance for their views coincided with their
belief in the universal implications of "the great experi-
ment" that was America. It is this coincidence which fur-
nished the real key to any understanding of the views they
adopted toward American expansion.

They believed that the dominant trend of modern times
was the increasing spread of a democratic order of society
which had as its base a growing liberty for the individual,
and of a concomitant desire on the part of these men to share
their freed energies in the building of social and political
welfare and community. They also believed that the age was
pre-eminently one of vast improvements in the mechanical
arts, which made possible increased comfort in the daily life
of men; the benefits of these would be disseminated among the
masses through the democratization of the social order.

These trends were animated by all that was good in natural
man, not by materialism or a false individualism; they derived
their authority from Providential facts. America typified
them and thus presaged the future of the race. The growth of
America therefore embodied a moral end, the fuller develop-
ment of man. "If some of us are accused of flinging the
American flag too violently to the breeze," wrote Humphrey
Desmond, "it must be remembered that America, ... the United

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10 E.g., Catholic Citizen, 29 December 1900, "The New Century and the Old."
States, is to be the battlefield of the future of the world.\textsuperscript{11}

As Christians and Catholics the liberals argued with Hecker that liberty, not passivity, was the most fruitful basis for a mature Faith; hence the growth of democracy was to be welcomed. They also argued that material improvements, far from drawing man to a preoccupation with accumulation, freed him from the tyrannies of physical necessity, and enabled him the better to pursue his spiritual good. The modern age was hence one of promise, not danger to the Church. And even apart from this, expedience demanded that the Church attempt to harness and sanctify trends which were irreversible and universal. They did not deny the dangers of rampant unbelief, of materialism of man's new genius for self-improvement going to his head and causing him to proclaim his freedom from God; they were, as I have stressed, essentially Church-minded men. But they maintained that these dangers were to be countered, not by hostility to the age, but by a bold co-operation with all that was good in it.

Hence they especially deprecated the continuance of inter-denominational disputes among Christians as dangerous and irrelevant; they stressed the validity of Protestant baptism and worship, and the sincerity of their devotion to scripture, God's word. Thus they enthusiastically participated in the World Parliament of Religions at Chicago, 1893, to the horror of conservatives. Indeed, as a layman, Humphrey Desmond could permit himself to prophesy ecumenism as the

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 2 May 1896.
prelude to effective Christian witness in a world of massive social problems. He criticized those who anxiously scanned the census returns, wondering which sect would prevail; Christian unity could alone hope to make some impact for justice on "the soulless aggregation" that was Capital, and thus restore society. Otherwise secularism would be the sect that should prevail. 12

Indeed the Americanists maintained America's modernity to be that of a society Christian at heart. Desmond stressed that her laws were based on the fact of America's Christianity, although their authority derived from secular principle and democratic procedure; that American courts recognized this Christianity of fact, not of law, in adjudicating the disputes of their society. 13 The Americanists had to minimize the significance of anti-Catholic fundamentalism, which was so pervasive in American protestantism, finding expression not only in dramatic examples, such as the rise of the A.F.A., but in minor slights such as the removal of the Pere Marquette statue from the Capitol in Washington, the long delay in providing adequate Catholic services in the Navy, and also in the slighting, if not overtly hostile, tone adopted by many Protestant journals in their references to Catholicism. Americanists were annoyed when such facts were reported to Rome.

For, believing America's society to prefigure that of

12 Ibid., 15 December 1894.

13 Ibid., 22 August 1903.
the world, the Americanists held that the success or failure of their endeavour to harmonize the Church with that society would be the measure of the future vitality of the Church in the coming twentieth century, in every land. Denis O'Connell, in Rome, pressed this view with particular urgency; yet to conservative churchmen there, his views must have seemed an outgrowth of Yankee pride and self-assertion, lacking as they did his conviction of the unalterable destiny of the world's course.

The Americanists therefore took great heart from Leo XIII's recommendation that French Catholics rally to their Republic. On several visits to France, Ireland spoke of the qualities of Republican government, and befriended some of those who would have the French church speak to the masses in the idiom of the age. The new noblesse oblige, he told startled aristocrats there, was an obligation to the oppressed and the under-paid. 14 Liberal Catholics in America, no less than in Europe, had little patience with what they considered papal mismanagement of the Italian question, although their clerical leaders were circumspect in showing this. Appalled by the indifference and ignorance of Italian immigrants in religious matters, the liberals found in them further indications of how authoritarian Latin catholicity had lost touch with the faithful, although Italy had the highest ratio of priests to laity, and France one of the highest, in the

14 Ibid., 20 May 1899; Ireland was preaching in the church of St. Clotilde, Paris.
universal Church. Maintaining that nationalism was one of the most vital sentiments in the hearts of men, they could not see how the Papacy could so systemically offend and humiliate Italian pride. Believing that the future strength of the Church would spring from its capacity to speak spiritually and guidingly to the people of nations, they saw little point in the restoration of a Temporal Power the basic premise of which was the need of the Papacy for sovereign status that it might gain the ears of kings and thus promote Church interests by state policies. With their typically American conviction that all authoritarian societies were eventually doomed, liberals regarded this project as a dangerous anachronism.

In analysing the rampant anti-clericalism of late nineteenth century Europe, and the widespread loss of faith therein, they laid stress not upon the inroads of world, flesh and devil, as embodied in a triumvirate of Jewry, Masonry and Socialism (the vision of conservatives), but upon an impolitic identification of the Papacy with "Holy Alliance reaction" in a continent of masses yearning to breathe free. One of the symbolic victories of the conservatives was to have Rome pressure Archbishop Ireland into swallowing his

15 Ibid., 16 July 1898 and etc.

16 Ibid., 8 December 1900; later Desmond predicted, "The Church, having more to do with missionary enterprises, and less with courts, more with intellectual and social movements, and less with political and diplomatic questions, will veer ... more toward the spiritual, and less toward the temporal channel of activity," ibid., 7 February 1903.
pride, in writing articles upholding the Temporal Power (1900). In general, however, Americanists looked to the democratization of Europe and supported those who urged that the Church there must change its style. All of this was to prove of utmost importance when America went to war with a traditionalist Catholic state, Spain, and proceeded to take and administer its Pacific and Caribbean territories.

If in so many ways the Americanists were experimenting with attitudes which, in retrospect, foreshadow the temper of contemporary Catholicity, yet the weight of tradition in the nineteenth century was with their conservative opponents. These had few hopes of any fruitful interaction between the Church and the world, although few of them went to the ludicrous extremes of the Jesuit Civilita Cattolica of Rome, which on 17 May 1902 declared that it was the duty of Catholic adults to fight the modern world, and of Catholic young folk to separate themselves from it. While normally refraining from any formal criticism of American institutions, under which, after all, their flocks had so rapidly expanded, and while preaching the need for a fervent American loyalty, if somewhat, one suspects, in the mind of Paul's injunction that Christians obey authority and honour the king, they sought to infuse Catholics with a defensive caution for their dealings with the outside world. The attitude carried an aura of orthodoxy, where the optimism of the Americanists had a

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18Cited in Catholic World, Vol. 75, July 1902, review of reviews section.
distinct flavour of innovation; and it would have strong repercussions upon Catholic views of non-Catholic outside America, for its effects would not be mitigated by a common patriotism.

Nineteenth century ecclesiology, the current orthodoxy, was premised upon a severe and restrictive interpretation of the economy of salvation. This interpretation was not rigidly exclusive, but was of such a character as to cause traditional Catholics to feel that while those outside the church might attain salvation, they themselves would not give much for their chances. Furthermore, the tendency of the traditional view was to stress that the regenerative effects of Redemption must be consciously accepted at the hands of the visible Church, or, in early life, be mediated through her in the form of infant baptism; and to suggest that since these effects included not merely an infusion of saving grace, but a strengthening of the sources of natural virtue, the human will and understanding, it was unorthodox to picture non-Catholics, and more especially non-Christians, as capable of a large measure of human goodness. Such had been the habit of infideles like Voltaire. Arthur Preuss, the leading interpreter of German Catholic opinion to his English-speaking co-religionists, through the pages of his St. Louis Review, was perhaps the only lay editor well versed in theology, formally understood; it is instructive, and surely more than the result of his anti-American pique, that he accused Ireland of semi-Pelagianism, and Desmond of shaky orthodoxy,
because of the confidence they had in non-Catholics.

It was the inevitable result of such thinking that Catholics felt no sense of shame in writing vividly of the vices and weaknesses of non-Catholics and especially of non-Christians; for in so doing, they believed they were giving witness to the power of the Cross by depicting the chaos where it was absent. The results of this have survived to the present day; a survey of the prejudices of American students, normally regarded as undergoing a phase of open-mindedness, revealed that Catholics among them were most prone to reject peoples associated with "heathenism"; Chinese, Indians and Africans, and least prone to reject Christians of any culture or denomination. The survey, compiled during World War II, is probably still indicative of the residual or instinctive prejudices of today's middle aged Catholic Americans.

It is important to stress that the Americanists themselves were certainly not free of such attitudes; their disagreement with conservatives on this matter extended only to the case of Protestants, whose baptism and receptivity to the Gospel made them part heirs to this increased capacity for natural virtue. Since the goodness of Americans was a Christian goodness, it was no reflection on the power of Christ's self-sacrifice and Resurrection. Speaking of pagans,

19 Protestant students on the other hand, were more inclined to reject Christians of different culture, such as Americans, Greeks and Italians; Gordon Willard Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954), 450.
the clergy amongst the Americanists could be as closed-minded as their conservative colleagues, or Baptist evangelists. Fr. John Zahm, one of the pioneers of the Catholic attempt to reconcile evolution and dogma, allowed his experience of California's Chinese to reinforce his general antipathy to that people. However it may be that the liberals affirmed the Protestant elements of American goodness partly to deflect conservative criticism; the views of St. Thomas Aquinas, then once again moving toward wider currency, did not harbour such a doleful conviction of the condition of unbaptized, or natural, man. Certainly lay liberals used to mixing with all manners of men, and lacking a vested professional interest in the dissemination of salvation, were less insistent on the Protestant basis of public morality in America. No one at this time, however, ventured the modern theological opinion that the effects of salvation work upon all mankind; and that the Church is the gathering of all those who consciously acknowledge and give thanks for this supreme fact; and that her corporate mission is one of extending among men awareness of the Christ in the midst of them.

Traditional catholic ecclesiology had an obvious implication when the American republic, and more significantly, the European states came to concern themselves with the world at large: the interests of the Church, the sole vehicle of salvation, must take precedence over the convenience of pagans.

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Imperialist diplomacy played upon this notion to its own advantage in securing Christian countenance for colonialist policies. The Protestant churches, sharing similarly restrictive views of the process of salvation as their chief rival, were open to a similar acquiescence in colonialism.

There was an even more invidious corollary, never actually spelled out, but pervasively operative in Christian thinking on the relations between peoples. Since only in salvation was man born to his full humanity, a complete title to human rights could only follow conversion. Major infractions of the rights of many non-Christians were amply justified by lesser pagan interferences with the rights of a few Christians; a Paulist spokesman, and, indeed Cardinal Gibbons himself, said so. For it was the Christian who pleased God. As Leo XIII proclaimed, with passionate anxiety, in his manifesto to the twentieth century, "The world has heard enough of the so-called 'rights of man.' Let us now hear something of the rights of God." A short while later he would

21 Contemporary Catholics were well aware of the seedier sides of this juggling for Papal approval; e.g. John T. Murphy, "Germany and Russia at the Vatican," Catholic World, 77 (August, 1903), 427-35.


23 Tom Frari, who has studied the bishop's correspondence, informs me that John Keane did explicitly state this in letters to the Vatican. Yet Keane was a liberal!


25 From Divini Redemptoris, in Catholic World, 72 (January, 1901), 425.
express his grave misgivings as to the bloody path of imperialism: "Unjust wars are being waged by strong nations against weak and feeble peoples." But this was after the consummation of the imperialist adventure. It was the temper of his first statement, cruelly exaggerated, which lay behind Catholic advocacy of those policies which led to the brutalities of white Christian soldiers in Pekin in 1900, at Omdurman in 1899, and in the Philippines even as the Pope made this demand for justice for the Boers.

In viewing all men as the sons of God, and the obligations of justice as extending beyond all race and creed boundaries, even as Christ demanded that Jew assist Samaritan, the Christian and hence Catholic tradition contained in itself the seeds of an antidote to the dangers of a conjunction between militant Western supremacy and ecclesiastical Godliness. Leo XIII himself told a visiting French non-Catholic journalist, Madame Severine of Figaro, in answer to her question as to whether the truth might be spread by persecution or inter-racial wars:

The Church's work can only be accomplished in gentleness and fraternity. ... What races? they are all the sons of Adam, whom God created. What does it matter if human beings, in different latitudes, differ in colour and aspect? Their souls are moulded with the same substance. ... The only difference is that some are fortunate enough to know the true faith, and others are not. They are all equal in the sight of the Lord, because the existence of them is the outcome of his will.  

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26 Bernard O'Reilly, Life of Pope Leo XIII, 2nd ed. (New York, 1903).

27 Ibid., 703.
Not surprisingly, many minds in the Church were disturbed by this assertion, which, as a contemporary churchman noted, was "so broad, so utterly subversive of many traditional tendencies and long-cherished traditions in the policy of the Church and its various component parts."\textsuperscript{28} But in general the long-cherished traditions had gained such reinforcement from the prevailing attitudes in Western culture, that the much muted revelation of human equality could only mitigate, rather than change the system of inequality upheld by the dominant trend in Church thought, and could inspire only a minority to a different conception.

That the laity so widely acquiesced in these restrictive conceptions of the Church requires analysis. Again, it is a matter of inherited prejudices, racist presumptions, and the immigrant experience reinforcing the teaching of their pastors.\textsuperscript{29} They were open, too, to conservative views belittling the Christianity of Protestants. The Irish were pre-eminently prejudiced, with a few noble exceptions, against all coloured peoples. Justice Joseph McKenna of the Supreme Court, one of the few Catholics prominent during McKinley's administration, had first made his mark as a Congressman from

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\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., 707.
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\textsuperscript{29}Allport, \textit{Nature of Prejudice}, which I read after the first draft of this study was completed, comes to similar and illuminating conclusions on the manner in which secular and religious identities, when superimposed, reinforce prejudices, despite the ideals of religion. He notes that theologians see in this, the ultimate evil of the confusion of man's will with God's. See pp. 447f.
\end{flushright}
California arguing for Chinese exclusion.\textsuperscript{30} Lee Huang Chang, head of the Chinese state under the Empress Dowager in the 1890s, attributed America’s anti-Chinese laws, not without cause, to the Irish, whom he characterized as evil green barbarians.\textsuperscript{31} Irish violence against Negroes during and after the Civil War was proverbial; this would seem the explanation of the evidence the A.P.A. propaganda circulated among Afro-Americans in Boston and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{32} Indeed a recent study suggests that despite the leadership of President John F. Kennedy, and the teaching of John XXIII, the Irish in New York city (and hence probably elsewhere), retain sharp prejudices against coloured peoples.\textsuperscript{33}

Some of these resentments originally sprang from genuine bewilderment consequent upon the meeting of two radically alien cultures; an under-educated Irishman, with the best will in the world, would not know how to begin communicating with a Chinese. This might also have applied in lesser degree, to the question of the Negro. But there can be co-existence with a minimum of communication. And the Irish did not want any co-existence. Anxious about preserving a large pool of jobs, and hence high wages, they feared the coloured peoples’

\textsuperscript{30}R. J. Purcell, "Justice Joseph McKenna," Records of the American Catholic Historical Society, 56 (September, 1945), 177-223.

\textsuperscript{31}Catholic Citizen, 12 September 1896.

\textsuperscript{32}Pilot, 26 December 1896.

\textsuperscript{33}Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot (Boston, Massachusetts, 1963), "The Irish."
competition. Themselves despised, they found a cheap road to
self-esteem in cultivating contempt for others "below" them.
And they could not but be influenced by the racism which pervaded the world. British Evangelicalism had shown a callous
disregard for them, miserable on their plots in Ireland, or
exhausted and poor in the factories of England, while it
directed instead its Godly intent to the liberation of the
world's slaves. For this reason, as well as in sympathy for
any struggle for independence, the domestic Irish had shown a
marked sympathy for the Confederacy.34 The American Irish had
fought to preserve the Union, not to free the Negro.35 It was
the same John Mitchell who had exposed the "hypocrisy" of
British morality who became the most prominent Irish spokes-
man for the South. Perhaps, then, the Irish were predisposed
to make the most out of any conflict which arose between them
and the Negro. As to the Chinese: in the Far West, as the
railroads were completed, thousands of Irish and Chinese were
thrown into competition in a contracted labour market, thereby
exacerbating Irish prejudice. It would doubtless be very
instructive to study the organs of the Far Western Irish on
the Chinese question: Fr. Peter Yorke's San Francisco Monitor,
and Fr. Thomas Malone's Colorado Catholic. Both of these
priests were vigorous and colourful champions of Irish labour

Practical and historical causes, the zeitgeist of the times, and the need for psychological retrenchment in the face of Yankee contempt; each contributed to Irish-American racism. John Boyle O'Reilly's call to his people to lead a moral coalition of the oppressed fell upon deaf ears.

The Irish, particularly in the East, also harboured mistrust of all those not of themselves: the "Yankees," or native Protestant Americans, the Jews, the Poles and others. It may be argued that this is irrelevant to the growth of American Catholic attitudes to those coloured peoples of "the third world," even if it be allowed that their attitudes toward Afro- and Oriental Americans are so significant. But as any acquaintance with an Ulster Orangeman or a white American southerner of the old type will suggest, total close-mindedness does not discriminate among those in the "out-group"; all outsiders are subject to the same hatred, except where an identity of religion or mutual self-interest makes some seem less foreign. Insofar as Irish-Americans, or Catholic Americans at large, cultivated communal self-pity, bigotry, or culpable ignorance toward any of their fellow citizens, they impaired their ability to become a voice for tolerance, or a medium of understanding, when America began to encounter the world.

Often when the Irish Americans did champion a foreign people, as they were to do the Spanish Nationalists in 1936-'39,

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or as they did the Boers in 1899-1902, it was the consequence, not of any genuine attempt at mutual understanding, but of the projection of the Irish American identity to include these peoples. Franco embodied militant Catholicism, the Boers a brave struggle against the British colossus. And, noticeably, both peoples were far from America. When the struggles subsided, and the cause of temporary identification lapsed, Irish Americans lost all interest in understanding the pride of Spain or the sternness of Transvaal. This should help confirm the contention that many of them were not particularly outgoing people, as a community. There is cause, then, to probe why this was so.

Much has been said of the Mid-Western Irish in discussing Americanism; as self-respecting participants in the trans-Appalachian society they could afford to be tolerant and open. Often, indeed, it was the better-off Irish who could afford to travel to the interior to begin with; it was an expensive journey, especially in the earlier times. Only in so far as they were preceded by the condescending Yankee, or trapped amid worsening industrial conditions and heavy labour competition, as in Chicago, was their cause for the prejudices of insecurity to develop.

The Eastern Irish, on the other hand, inherited their society, and it frequently made them feel small. Malnutrition in Ireland caused many of them to look permanently scrawny as adults: "Monkeys!" as they were taunted. Under-education caused them to be disadvantaged. Outright discrimination
against them caused them to feel embittered. Drawing on their Irish experience, they looked to politics to redeem their situation; their politics were geared, not to national aims, but to the advancement of the local community. Politics enabled the labourer to become the tram-conductor, and hence educate his sons to become priests, lawyers or teachers; politics permitted the deflection of city contracts to Irish concerns, and hence the achievement of work for the many, and community status for the few.

To Yankees, such non-national politics were amoral; the Irish retorted that they would look to the nation constructively when the nation looked to them. Slowly the mechanics of political life ensured that this happened. It was assisted by a fervent devotion to America, conceived as an abstraction. Bishops might preach this from regard to all authority; but for a people schooled to a powerful nationalism at home, and finding in America freedom, and promise for their children, it was a natural transferral of loyalty. The desire to prove themselves, to belong, while it played a role, will not alone explain the mystical intensity with which this patriotism was held.

However this did not prevent the Eastern Irish disliking, often intensely, the native stock of America. This was partly a return for contempt encountered. But its roots went deeper. All Irish Americans viewed with grave misgiving many elements in the value system of indigenous America. Coming from a country bedevilled by a Protestant ascendancy,
and misgoverned by an industrial Protestant nation, they had
long confounded their woes with the effects of Protestantism
on their masters, despite the fact that it was a group of
Irish nationalist Protestants and Non-conformists, especially
Mitchell, who had formulated the Irish critique of the British
value system. There seemed to be many analogies between the
native American, and the Englishman; and the Protestantism
common to both strengthened the Irish-American tendency to
jump to an early condemnation of the Yankee. The differences
in values were real, and would have required a thorough effort
at mutual understanding between them. Sectarian preconcep-
tions helped prevent this effort being made.

Urban Irish Americans thought communally. To them the
strident individualism of the Yankee was irresponsible and
selfish; in it they saw the cause of the loose family ties
which seemed to characterize American life, and which to them
seemed to verge on the sacrilegious. For in Ireland, the
family had been the only harbour of trust and security in a
repressive society. They could not see that the Yankee could
look to his own interests since the abundance and opportunity
of America would ensure that his brothers would do fine on
their own. Herded into factory districts, many of the Irish
never experienced that sort of America. Yet even when they
experienced it, they believed that only in the family was
virtue learnt and guaranteed; family ties must govern sons
and daughters to the very day they chose to set up their own
families. This consideration was strong, too, among other
Catholic immigrants such as the Germans. It was true also of non-Catholic immigrants from repressive societies, such as the Jews from Eastern Europe. In all these cases, social necessity had reinforced religious teaching to exalt family life. This difference remained one of the sorest between immigrant and native American, particularly when the immigrant, or his children in turn used to the old way, were forced to watch the inroads of American custom upon the outlook of their offspring. In this, liberal Catholics were one with conservative; Humphrey Desmond, born and reared in the confident Mid-West, yet frequently lamented the loose-family ties of American life, the capricious way in which marriages sprang from chance romances, and the jaunty bachelorhood of independent young men who should surround themselves with family life.\(^{37}\)

If the immigrant could not accept Yankee individualism, he found it equally difficult to sympathize with the native concept of a Godly or virtuous materialism. In this, Catholic immigrants from nearly all parts of Europe were at one; and, again, liberals were often one with conservatives, if somewhat less polemical about it. Archbishop Ireland might praise the virtues of accumulation and say sharply that Catholics heard enough about holy poverty, and should hear more of holy industry; but few nineteenth century Catholics followed him. The spirituality of the Irish was particularly founded upon a

\(^{37}\text{Citizen, 2 August 1902, etc.}\)
theology of self-sacrifice, that emphasized identity with Christ's sufferings through poverty and deprivation.\(^{38}\) This was the natural response of a people condemned for generations to hardship. Their theologians found it very difficult to make the adjustment to the need for new formulae in a country which might eventually bring comfort to all; such Irish as did become wealthy were urged to create a synthetic deprivation by large benefactions to the Church, and to refresh their spirit thereby. Anyhow, for many nineteenth century Irish Americans only beginning the slow climb from poverty, the need for a new spirituality did not yet arise. It was good to be told of the spiritual dangers of wealth and worldliness, and to see the secure of this earth—the comfortable Yankee Protestant—as not so secure after all in the perspectives of eternity. So the theology of the Irish in this matter became the dominant teaching in the American Church, and American Catholics grew up attuned to the Gospel of Poverty in a country enthusiastic about the Gospel of Wealth.

This was significant for it placed Catholic thinkers in the vanguard of the struggle for social justice, by alienating them from the chief rationalization of their accumulative society.\(^{39}\) If priests were often conservative, and bishops

\(^{38}\)Dr. Michael Dempsey, formerly Professor of Moral Theology at Clonliffe, Dublin (c. 1924-1954), once told me that the gravest problem facing the Irish Church today is the formulation of a spirituality and theology of affluence.

\(^{39}\)Here I agree with Irving Wylie as against Richard Hofstadter, that in a Christian society most businessmen preferred to please God, than to struggle to be the fittest, when they gave thought to the justification of their enterprise.
more so, yet laymen like James J. Roche, Ignatius Donnelly, Patrick Ford, Terence Powderly and Humphrey Desmond were preaching control of corporate wealth, if necessary to the extent of selective nationalization, even before the formulation of the Populist programme.

Clerical attitudes on this were paradoxical; one has yet to read a convincing explanation of them. On the one hand their steady refusal to grant religious sanction to the entrepreneurial society around them left the Catholic laity free to attack it. Yet, on the other, their upholding the right to private property, and their inveighing against the spectre of Socialism hampered Catholic reformers from designing an alternative society. By sanctioning a mass of social service institutions, and by explicit condemnations, they questioned the ethics and very idea of Protestant capital enterprise, and may well have reduced even further the small number of aspirant Catholic industrialists. Yet they failed to offer any other basis for participation, at leadership levels, in the industrial revolution, nor, alternatively, did they hold out any vision of a different economy.

They agreed, on the whole, with the principles of Rerum Novarum; indeed Cardinal Gibbons was consulted while they were being drafted. And, as noted, they did not condemn labour organizations (although there were exceptions to this). Perhaps they conceived of Catholics as condemned in perpetuity to be servants of the new economy, and hence saw no reason to expound a theology which would enable them to become its
masters. If hardship was one of the surest guarantees of salvation, they may have been equally jealous of any ideology, whether Socialism or the Gospel of Wealth, which might focus their people's attention upon the world by promise of a truly meaningful materialism. Fear of industrial violence, even revolution, played a part in their attitude; the memory of the Molly Maguires was vivid, and even Powderly, who broke his connection with the Church because of its conservatism, later became a stalwart of the establishment and an advocate of the exclusion of immigrant radicals from fear of class war. Yet intelligent observers believed that Socialism in its more doctrinaire forms, would not triumph in a country of America's pragmatism, and traditions binding classes. Hence the strident, even hysterical, denunciations of radicalism by churchmen, were largely a struggle to maintain the allegiance of the Catholic workingman to the priest, lest it go to the political agitator. Even the restrained socialism of Henry George or Eugene Debs, while no imminent threat to the social order, could be viewed a seductive symbol of worldliness.

The prevalent prejudice against Yankee materialism, thus reinforced by the Church, helped intensify close-mindedness toward native Americans. The basis for an even more thorough-going repudiation of Yankee society was contained in the ascendent Catholic theory on the origins of capitalism, one which presaged the views of Max Weber. Protestantism, it held, laid stress on the individual's search for faith, outside of authority and community, and hence freed men to identify their
worldly advances with the favour of God, and thereby to wit­ness Him by vigorous self-pursuit. The self-judgment principle of the Reformation had led directly to the rationalized egotism of the Enlightenment, and thus provided the dynamic of Adam Smith's laissez-faire capitalism. The injustices of the social order could therefore be laid directly at the door of Protestantism. This view, hardly amenable to the good repute of Protestant America, was formally declaimed by the first Vatican Council; there was but one dissident, a brave Croatian bishop who sensibly pointed out that material accumulation was first rationalized in Florence, and that the Enlightenment was an outgrowth of French Catholic culture, not of Protestantism. 40

Even radicals such as Humphrey Desmond shared this view that there was an intrinsic relationship between Protestant teaching and the social evils consequent upon capitalism. 41 A theory offering so potentially wide-sweeping a critique of America; its individualism, materialism, Protestantism and economics, could of course do more than all else to ensure a self-righteous intolerance toward the nation in its Catholic minority, and perhaps also prejudice their openness to other peoples. Yet, surprisingly, this was countered so strongly by the practicalities of living in a pluralistic society, and by American patriotism, that few, if any, really lived it to its

40 Cross, Liberal Catholicism, 18. The bishop was Joseph Strossmayer; he was howled down.
41 Catholic Citizen, 13 June 1903, etc.
logical fulfillment, complete disaffiliation from, or war upon, American industrial society and its values.\textsuperscript{42} Even Catholics as radical as Fr. Edward McGlynn of New York, or Fr. Thomas O'Grady of Kentucky, the one a Single Taxer, the other a Socialist who dismissed \textit{Rerum Novarum} as "the mere private opinions of Cardinal Pecci on economic questions," were at heart reformers, not revolutionaries.\textsuperscript{43}

The real influence of the critique was probably more constructive than restrictive, from the viewpoint of both America and its Catholic minority. It diversified thought on America's vision of its economic self and its values, which was in grave danger of congealing into a repressive orthodoxy, as largely happened in the 1920s; and it created a basis for Catholic support of Progressive politics, when their instinctive antipathy to Puritan "moral effort" was in danger of turning them against them. It was equally significant in giving Catholics a measure of detachment from uncritical patriotism, and from the commercial dynamic of the "Large Policy" (whether conceived in terms of markets, imperialism, or exploitative colonialism). This is not to say that Catholics did not believe in the government's promoting prosperity by extra-American policies. But it did give them a remarkable freedom to criticize those policies when it

\textsuperscript{42}The twentieth century saw such a development in the birth of the Catholic Worker Movement of Dorothy Day and Peter Maurin.

\textsuperscript{43}\textit{Ibid.}, 8 March 1902; Abell, \textit{Catholics and Social Action}, 144-45.
appeared that the rights of humanity were being trampled on by the rights of Mammon, and to point out the ubiquitous proximity of Protestant merchant to Puritan missionary.

Critics born of Yankee stock, such as William Dean Howells and Henry Adams, could be as frank as the immigrant in diagnosing the nations ills as direct, if one-sided, outgrowths of certain of its traditional mores. What one must criticize in the immigrant, and not only the Irish immigrant, was their readiness to visualize even the native's virtues as faults, or worse. Fr. Walter Elliott noted this, and criticized it: the immigrant adjudged the American's sobriety as fanaticism, his industry as greed, his frugality as miserliness, his public service as servility to the state. This propensity to view another people's virtues as vices is the fruit of pure prejudice (an invincible refusal to see good in outsiders), and, as noted before, once acquired, dictates the approach to many other out-groups.

Desmond went to the crux of the matter, when discussing anti-Jewish prejudice at the time of the Dreyfus affair. Noting its prevalence in Orthodox and Lutheran states, as discrediting any explanation ascribing it solely to Catholic clericalism, he found its roots "in the universal disposition to believe ill of those who differ from us." Yet whence this disposition?

44 "The Human Environments of the Catholic Faith," Catholic World, 43 (July, 1886), 463-70; and this is echoed in the Citizen, 5 December 1896.

45 Ibid., 10 June 1899.
We may condescend forgiveness to those whose faults and inabilities are an implicit confession of the righteousness of our way. It is far more difficult to concede that there may be cultural systems and modes of virtue different from our own, yet as viable and humane. It is for this reason that prejudice was directed against Yankee virtues. And it is for this reason that so much American disgust and antipathy was evoked by the Chinese, with their resolute adherence to workable and venerable traditions; and that so little anti-Japanese prejudice existed (before 1904, when it grew, but only as a minority trend), for their ready and shrewd Westernization reassured us in our complacency. There were of course other minor reasons, but this was the chief one.  

To Irish immigrants with such a disposition, hardened by their experience of rejection (both in Ireland and

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46 This situation remains. A contemporary critic writes 'I doubt that it is the undeniable excesses of the Cultural Revolution which alone evoke Western abuse. At a deeper level, it may be the haughty self-reliance of China that offends a liberal West which has so often spoken of "salvation" in describing its efforts to "bring" China into the "international community." . . . Such assertive independence still upsets those who dwell spiritually in the imperialist epoch.' Ross Terrill, "Whose China Problem?" Motive, XXVIII (February, 1968), 9. It is gratifying to find such confirmation of that idea of intellectual imperialism, which is the only concept which does justice to the evidence of nineteenth century newspapers, whose editors had nothing to gain from "political" or "economic" imperialism. The Boston Pilot cited, 2 March 1895 favourably this statement: "Nothing but the humbling of China to the dust . . . will break down her cast iron attitude of insular arrogance and render her civilization possible."
America) at the hands of the Protestant and the cultured, the restrictive ecclesiology of their church came as a welcome sanction and strengthener of their state of mind. They had learnt from Daniel O'Connell to flatter themselves for communal reassurance, in a manner which required a close-mindedness toward others proportionate to their own lack of confidence. The image of a limited economy of salvation, of which Catholics were the chief beneficiaries, went far to convince them of their worth as against that of others. One can stomach much cultural and economic inferiority, much contempt and discrimination, when convinced one is a holy people, a people rich in "saints and scholars." One may even learn to love the contemner when convinced his salvation is dependent upon one's own religious mission. Thus did experience and Church teaching intertwine; the misgivings of clearer moments were off-set by the sermons of the priest.

Thus were the Eastern Irish, and all American Irish in some measure, predisposed to misunderstanding, or outright intolerance, when they came to think on people's beyond the seas. If God could only use the reality available to them to

47 An example of such rejection, that by New England's natives, is studied in Barbara Miller Solomon, Ancestors and Immigrants: A Changing New England Tradition (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), especially 43-58; Edmund Curtis, Jnr., has published a work (1968) on Victorian anti-Irish prejudice (in Ireland and Britain). Both writers find their theme to be essentially, and simply, hatred.

48 Denis Barrett and John Carter, in discussing The Northern Ireland Problem, recount the attitudes of Ulster Catholics in terms very similar to those used by William Shannon in describing Boston's Irish: rejection begetting bigotry. The preconditions are the same.
re-educate them, and hence indirectly move their Church toward
renewal, yet the reality they experienced so far was opaque to
any such purpose by reason of their peculiarities, and their
sharing the universal disposition of humans to believe best
of their own way. Yet, as we shall see, there were certain
aspects of their heritage working against this: what may be
called counter-tendencies, quite apart from the temper of
liberal Catholicism fostered in the trans-Appalachian Irish.
However one must not exaggerate these; otherwise one is liable
to under-estimate the independence and originality of those
who thought afresh, in face of their culture's exclusiveness,
their nation's pride, and their Church's rigidity.

In a post-revolutionary age, when the dynamism of
European culture appeared to have passed permanently from
Italy, Spain and Austria, to the predominantly Protestant or
rationalist milieu of the North (France, England and Germany),
European continental Catholicism was formative of a similar
inter-action between a rigid and defensive ecclesiology, and
the self-assertiveness of national groups embittered that
history had passed from their making. It is beyond the scope
of this paper to examine this in detail, although some points
may be noted. For Catholics who had themselves long been
trained to explain the richness of Renaissance Italy, the
empire of Spain, and the sophistication of La Grande Siècle
in terms of the wider scope to humanity's potential accorded
by the optimism and theandric stress of their creed, the
Protestant and rationalist counter-argument, that this same
religion was now the cause of their relative cultural and national impotence, seemed unanswerable. Having taken too much credit for the specifically Catholic, it was a just irony that they had now to take exaggerated blame upon it. Hurt national pride and a humbled religious assurance conjoined but seldom to produce a chastened re-assessment of the inter-relations of culture and faith. Instead, the original thesis was left unchanged, and begot, by way of reaction, a thorough-going arraignment of modern achievement as inadequate to a true humanism or an exact faith, since postulated on the "false premises" of "Protestant-liberal-rationalism."

This before Leo XIII was the orthodox defense. Even after him it retained great influence. We have discussed its effects on Catholic views of American life, and conservative Catholic opinions of liberal Catholicism. If there were elements in it that were wise, and helpfully critical, as an omniscient system it was most repressive. It was not wanting its critics, particularly in France and Belgium, and, on a more pragmatic level, in Ireland before Cardinal Cullen's time. The English converts, such as Newman and Manning, were similarly opposed to it and the more tellingly, because of their prestige and sincerity. And even reactionary Spanish Jesuits, such as Pedro Murillo, when they set out to analyze "Latin decadence," (the latter in Razon y Fe at the turn of the century) conceded that developments of value had to be
received second hand by Catholic nations. 49

The American Church benefitted little from French, Belgian or English liberal Catholicism, except by way of example. Catholic immigration from these countries was negligible. Such French priests as came after the Irish had gained hegemony in the Church were not conspicuously liberal, although the Sulpiceans among them were moderate rather than conservative. The bulk of continental Catholic immigrants and their priests came from the intellectual atmosphere described above, as also from authoritarian societies, such as Archbishop Katzer's native Austria, which deepened the conservative effects of that milieu. If the Irish Americans were often prone to defensive thinking, particularly when confronted with native hostility, they were not the victims of the systematized indoctrination of conservative Continental catholicism. By the time Cardinal Cullen's importation of Roman stringency and baroque piety began to take effect, the foundations of Irish American Catholicism were already laid, and reflected the earlier ambience (in Ireland) between popular politics and clerical leadership. Nor did the new conservatism fully triumph in Ireland, being opposed by men like Archbishop Croke of Cashel, who realized that their Church must temper Catholicity

49His articles were noted in the Catholic World, 75 (October 1902), 76 (February 1903) and 77 (April 1903). Characteristically, Murrillo attributed the "passivity" of contemporary Latins to a decline in Catholic fervour: the Spain of Philip II was that of Teresa of Avila, the France of Moliere was that of Marguerite Marie Alacoque, the Italy of da Vinci, that of Carlo Borromeo.
with strategic concessions to nationalism, social reform, and democratic agitation.

The effects of such conservative thinking affected Catholicism, in varying degree, until after the mid-twentieth century. By associating the justice of any Catholic nation's polity, or the quality of a Catholic people's culture, with the truth of the Catholic faith, it induced in Catholics a defensive and deep concern for "Catholic interests" everywhere: such interests were very often issues which today would be considered to involve Catholicism only in a most incidental way. In fairness, one must point out that traditional Protestantism tended, at least in its polemics, to a similar frame of mind: English constitutionalism and Yankee industry were somehow or other "Protestant." The basic postulate was the same: through the mystery of the Cross man attained, not merely his salvation, but his true humanity. Rival denominational claims as to which tradition,--Catholic or Protestant,--more fully made available or dispensed the immediacy of the risen Christ thus often degenerated into cheap comparisons of "Catholic" and "Protestant" cultures, as though the superiority of one or the other could evidence, even prove, the validity of these rival claims.

The logical and theological fallacies inherent in such apologetics are today obvious. It must be pointed out, however, that in principle Catholics must fall prone to such thinking more naturally than Protestants. Nineteenth-century Protestants might use such arguments; but the stress in their
tradition upon a clearer dichotomy between regenerate spirit and corrupt world, (the insistence upon which varied by sect), saved them from the necessity to defend all things historically "Protestant." Catholics, on the contrary, with their belief that salvation restored a harmony of spirit and flesh, *ecclesia* and *mundus*, intended by God when in creating the natural world He "found all things good," hence believed that more was at stake than the argument about the relative efficacy of Protestant and Catholic salvation; their understanding of salvation itself was involved.

Not that any but the sophisticated theologian was fully aware of this; but his thinking found expression in the more general defensiveness which his student clerics imparted to congregations and pupils, where, as noted, it could merge with secular prejudices. At its most exaggerated such thinking became that "integrism" dominant under Pius IX, and in some sectors of European Catholicism until our own day, which thought that to admit of errors in the structures and customs of individual Catholic Churches and nations was tantamount to heresy. American Catholics, even the most conservative, could not admit this; but while they might disclaim the theory openly, as did Americanists, or implicitly and regretfully, as did the Germans, the effects of becoming over-sensitive to being members of a mistrusted minority, adherents of a widely impugned Faith, were similar to those of integrism: a nervous desire to defend the reputation of everyone Catholic, past and present, however lackadaisical his faith, however incidental
to his achievements or failures were his beliefs. Even the radical Catholic, Humphrey J. Desmond, published a book, *Mooted Questions of History*, detailing for the enlightenment of Protestants, and the re-assurance of Catholics, such timeless embarrassments as Savonarola's execution, the character of the Inquisition, and the Galileo case, in a manner saving to the Church—and in accord with the best continental scholarship.

Desmond's spirit, however, was not one prone to indiscriminate whitewashing; it was certainly not neurotic. Hence accusations of "minimising," directed against liberal American Catholics, which had such a lamentable effect after Pius X's accession, hedging the thought of even such men as Monsignor John A. Ryan, certainly had validity in the perspectives of European churchmen given over to the "maximising" inherent in integrist. The Americanists, with their common sense and unimpeachable fidelity to true Catholicism, were the most practical and acute critics of the pretensions of such "maximising," even if unlike European liberal Catholics, they did not publicly inflate the issues to the levels of theoretical discussion. Today, however, we may admit, unlike even McAvoy and Ellis, that something much more was involved in 1899 than a conflict of custom; while not a conflict of dogma, there was an implicit confrontation of theologies. It centred primarily on the legitimacy of the secular perspective, and the liberal view has been largely vindicated by the influence of John Courtney Murray (an American) on
Vatican Two.

However, as noted, non-consequential thinking could affect even liberal Catholics. The tendency to assign, or to deny "guilt, by association," is too inherent in human nature for us to wonder at this, or to ascribe it solely to nineteenth century religious and general conditions. Such thinking at least brought everyone down to the same level, and initiated talk: for not only Protestants, but America's increasingly articulate Jewish, rationalist and positivist minorities could take issue with Catholics as to whose ideas produced the more progressive or humanist society. Such debate suited the down-to-earth character of the American mind, which all shared. And while talk cannot reach accord where its premises are so fallacious, and the disputants are concerned only with self-justification, yet at least it dispels stereotypes and prejudice, and, in the long run, may be productive of more fruitful grounds for discussion. Common sense caused Augustine to believe it improper for materialists and spiritual men to converse; but wisdom shows that even in bitter altercation, men can learn to understand other perspectives than their own.

It may be held that the implications of such closed, apologetic, thinking with regard to inter-national and inter-cultural relations would be as restrictive as those of the traditional ecclesiology of the Church, to which such thinking was so closely related. That they were, oftentimes, and to a depressing degree, this study will amply demonstrate, particularly in regard to the aftermath of the Spanish-American War.
But this is so evident, that it is best here to stress the positive results stemming from such thinking, for there were some. Many factors produced inwardness in American Catholics. Yet the tendency to associate the truth of one's faith with conditions existent among geographically the most dispersed, and historically the most diverse of all the world's peoples, caused American Catholics to take interest in affairs they might otherwise have ignored or given only a cursory glance. Samoa, Latin America, France, the Philippines, Manchuria, the Polish and Ukrainian provinces of the Tsar, the fortunes of Germany's Centre Party, the Irish Question, the Cuban revolt—all drew American Catholic attention outwards, not because America was involved, but rather because Catholicism was. Inevitable, where both American expansion and an alien Catholicism were involved, its interest was doubly engaged and sustained. The demands of an apologetical culture reinforced an otherwise somewhat loose community of identity to cause Catholic editors to publish material on German questions in Irish American papers or on African missions in Americanist organs, even as today the editors of Ebony or Negro Digest publish material on the new Africa, or multi-racial Brazil. If anything, the more conservative Catholics were more responsive to the "world" of Catholicism than were the liberals or Americanists, who tended to view the fortunes of the Church in terms of the future of its virile American branch. This should be a warning as to the complexity of the issues here involved: there is no slick formula to identify conservatism with
introverted parochialism, or liberalism with the cosmopolitan. If anything, it is where a liberal temper is merged with this conservative preoccupation with Catholicism regardless of national divisions, that interesting thoughts can be expected to develop.

However, unmitigated conservatism was productive of a narrowly Church-minded approach to things. Therefore, if a liberal approach to the relations between peoples is to be expected at all, then it can be expected of certain of the Irish Americans. Such incidental evidence as the research for this paper revealed (and it was quite frequent of occurrence) indicates that German Catholics were as conservative in such matters as they were in domestic: the interests of a narrowly conceived *ecclesia* must take precedence over all else. And perhaps more than any other European people, the Germans in the nineteenth century were deeply affected by racism, a racism shared by Conservatives and Liberals, Catholics and Jews, a racism which over-rode all ideological divisions, and caused the socialist candidate for governor of Idaho, Ernest Untermann, to proclaim that as there was a coming class (the workers), so there was a coming race (the white). There may have been German-American Catholics who transcended it, as did Baron von Hügel in Europe. Only a careful reading of their forty or so newspapers could discover them.
CHAPTER II

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY OF THIS STUDY

Discussion of sources has been reserved to this point that I may fit them into their contexts in the spectrum of American Catholicism. They are principally three: the Catholic World, volumes 43 to 80 inclusive, July 1886 to March 1905; the Boston Pilot, January 1894 to February 1905; and the Milwaukee Catholic Citizen, May 1894 to March 1905. The first is a monthly; the second and third, weekly newspapers. I also used the conservative Jesuit monthly, the Messenger of the Sacred Heart and the conservative clerical review, American Ecclesiastical Review, for the important years, 1898-1901.

Since there were around sixty English language Catholic newspapers in the 1890s, another thirty German, fifteen French, and more than a couple of Polish, Bohemian and other papers, this may seem a ridiculously limited basis on which to achieve any but the most vulnerable conclusions. This is particularly so when one considers the large number of monthly journals--devotional, missionary, instructive, and general--also produced by the Church. Yet it has been stated that this study should be viewed as a discussion with some intelligent late nineteenth-century Catholics, not as any sort of survey.

There are, however, reasons why this study is not as limited as at first sight appears. The full reasons for this
have to do with the individual qualities of the sources chosen. But in
general it can be stated that on major issues, Catholic editors at this
time published symposiums drawn from the editorial columns of their leading
associates across the country, often reproducing ten to fifteen editorials. These
normally represented the "ideological spectrum" of contemporary Catholicism,
sometimes even including translations from German-language papers, although
the consensus of German opinion was distilled and vigorously propounded by
Preuss in his St. Louis Fortnightly Review.¹

Catholic editors showed much sense of responsibility toward their readers in doing
this. And, furthermore, the quality of their columns suggests that either they
overestimated the intelligence of the average Catholic subscriber, or that we
should drastically revise the prevalent notion of a basic anti-intellectualism as
characteristic of immigrant Catholicism. To have experienced two worlds is
enough in itself to educate a man to curiosity and reflection. Certainly, the
rapid progress of American Catholicism toward intellectual competence, even
sophistication, in the past forty years, cannot be explained without some reference
to the immigrant home. In the home, the child gains its first stimulus or
orientation towards learning; many second generation children must have been
aroused to curiosity as a result of the discussions by their otherwise formally
under-educated parents of

¹Unfortunately unavailable to me.
the issues raised in the Catholic and secular press. ²

At any rate, these frequent and trans-national quotations have been sufficient to assure me that on specific issues there were but a few stands that might be taken; that certain types of thinking, such as that already noted of defensive concern for all Catholic cultures, were prevalent throughout American Catholicism, with only the emphasis varying; and that, upon the broader questions herein at issue, there were but a handful of governing approaches, although, of course individual editors never consistently exhibited but one of these: the church-minded and conservative, the church-minded and Americanist, the world-minded but American, and the world-minded and liberal.

Why were there but few alternative stands upon specific issues? Firstly because, as is normal, when an actual situation arose—particularly a confrontation between a great power and a non-Western people—there existed no hypothetically "open case": one bluntly made up one's mind. Then again, the press at that time, and particularly the weekly press, was often behind the event. Although great strides in communication and news-dissemination had been made, America maintained but a handful of correspondents abroad, who might be in a position to predict, rather than run after, rapidly developing situations; even such men as it had were too few to give themselves full-mindedly to, say, the direction of politics in one

²This was certainly true of Mgr. John A. Ryan who as a boy was taken by the arguments of Patrick Ford's Irish World. Broderick, John A. Ryan, 8.
European capital alone. The American press seems to have relied to a great extent on inter-exchange of newspapers to glean foreign, and even internal, news. The defects of this system are clear. Its effects on the weekly Catholic press were sometimes comic: e.g. editorials were published welcoming the hope of Spanish-American arbitration a few days after McKinley's war message had gone to Congress. However, Desmond, ever aware of the limitations of his work, could yet maintain, on several occasions, that this very delay freed the periodical press from the tyranny of unsubstantiated rumour, and hence gave its judgments—if belated—a more authoritative reputation. The opinions of such papers being more deliberative, they appear to have carried weight disproportionate to their often limited circulations: one thinks of Godkin's Nation and Abbott's Outlook.

Yet there was another cause as to why opinion on specific issues was not over-varied. Ernest May has more than adequately demonstrated that, upon foreign policy questions, the press in America did not so much make opinion, as wait upon it to crystalize. And this process of crystalization occurred chiefly through the dissemination of the opinions of quite a small elite: normally men of high community standing in politics, business, and the professions, who had experience of foreign parts. Some might be journalists, like Whitelaw Reid, but these were few. Many significant public figures—such as Morgan or Rockefeller—had little influence; Americans, it seemed, quite humbly aware of their ignorance of the
outside world, looked recurrently to the small numbers acquainted with that world. Such a pattern of opinion-making applied in other spheres: Bryce noted not one in twenty Americans had clear opinions on decisive questions; Humphrey J. Desmond trenchantly noted that de Tocqueville's praise of the public consciousness of Americans had no longer any foundations, if it ever had: political apathy characterized the mass, and represented the gravest threat to the American republic the nation faced; Edward Ross, in 1908, described the form of opinion-making in America as "an intellectual feudal system."

Such a pattern was also certainly true of the Catholic minority, although—perhaps because of its relatively recent transplantation—to a lesser degree. Finley Peter Dunne's model for Mr. Dooley was a Cavan-born Chicago pub-owner, Edward McGarry; Dunne admitted taking many ideas directly from his friend McGarry, and, following a visit to Europe, noted that whereas seven English cabmen would deliver themselves of the same opinion, and that the same which they had already read in the press that morning, three Dublin cabmen would hold forth diverse, and often idiosyncratic, views. Irish readiness to "opinionize" almost certainly followed the immigrants to America; but the substance of what was said usually was based on the opinions of their community's chief spokesmen. Love of language and contention might cause Irish Catholics to intermingle and oppose the views they heard, but no less than others were they dependent for authoritative information upon
a few.

The Catholic press granted front page prominence to the views of these few. Again, as with the nation at large, they were men with high status in church, immigrant politics, or the professions (businessmen were noticeably absent from the list: Charles M. Schwab, perhaps the most prominent in that diminutive band of Catholic captains of industry, and after 1901 one of the chief executives of United States Steel, was never quoted on such issues. However, he was neither of recent immigrant stock, nor in touch with the Catholic community at large: his ancestors came to Pennsylvania with Prince Gallitsin).

Churchmen were assured front-page space if they spoke, at all. Some did more than others, especially Gibbons, Ireland, Placide Chapelle of New Orleans, William Gross of Oregon and a sprinkling of voluble bishops, such as Thomas O'Gorman of Sioux Falls. The conservatives, being by nature much less inclined to court the press, spoke but rarely—and when they did, like Horstmann or McQuaid, it was usually in patriotic generalities. This can give one a lopsided impression of "official" ecclesiastical response to such issues; only the noisy James MacFaul of Trenton, New Jersey, conducting a quixotic crusade to mobilize the American laity into a huge federation to press a highly conservative, church-minded, grievance programme on the War Department's attention redressed, to some degree, the overall impression of satisfaction with Government policies the normal church spokesmen—chiefly
Americanist--managed to convey.

And although churchmen were accorded a hearing, this is far from saying that Catholics at large listened to them. Frequently, in publishing their opinions, editors such as Desmond, Roche, and even clergy like Malone of the Colorado Catholic or Lambert of the New York Freeman's Journal, added their own, often coldly detached, comments. In so far as a consensus animated the hierarchy, clerically-oriented journals such as the Catholic World and Ave Maria went along with it. This combination has misled Pratt and Reuter into some important errors.

For the Catholic press at large was much more than an ecclesiastical organ. Rooted, rather, in the need of immigrant communities for their own press, it inevitably reflected attitudes more open than the appellation "Catholic" might suggest.

Hence the hierarchy, despite their status and foreign experience, do not appear to have been the leading "opinion makers." This role fell more frequently to such traditional political personalities--with, as May demonstrated of their counterparts in the nation at large--as often had considerable foreign experience. These men, at once responsive to the interests and attitudes of the communities they guided, and well-traveled and well educated in world politics, could be expected to come up with opinions more than narrowly Catholic, instead fusing intelligent commentary on outside events into the natural preconceptions of their audience. The pronouncements of these men were given major prominence, in the Catholic
press. Even when disagreeing with them, editors tended to be more respectful than when dismissing the opinions of "political bishops." This study, while concentrating upon editorial opinion, will take note of their ideas.

The list of them is quite limited. Thomas Gargan and Patrick Collins of Boston; Michael Davitt, frequent visitor from Ireland; Patrick Ford, Frederick Caudert, Patrick Egan (former U. S. envoy to Chile) and Fr. McGlynn of New York; Charles Bonaparte of Baltimore; William Onahan and Colonel Finerty of Chicago; Jeremiah Curtin, former U. S. envoy to St. Petersburg, and translator of Sienkiewicz; and in Milwaukee, the old Fenian, and administrator of the Plankinton estate, Jeremiah Quin. ³

Unlike in the nation at large, journalists also were important opinion-makers, not merely reflectors. This is particularly true of the two laymen on whom this study will concentrate, Humphrey J. Desmond and James Jeffrey Roche, of whom more will be said. In the context of what we are saying, however, it is important to note that both were fairly prominent in politics, Roche eventually becoming U. S. consul in Genoa; and that both travelled abroad on several occasions; furthermore, both seem to have had extensive acquaintanceships among other respected community leaders. All of this gave significance and weight to their opinions.

³An excellent account of several of these men, Ford, Collins, Finerty, Davitt, and Egan, and of the sources of their power, is Thomas N. Brown, Irish-American Nationalism, 1870-1890 (New York: Preceptor Books, 1960).
Other journalists, particularly those priests who seem more Irish-American than clerical in their orientation, Phelan of St. Louis, Malone of Denver, and Yorke of San Francisco, were more than mere disseminators of opinion. And the wide-ranging and perceptive work of Finley Peter Dunne, if not syndicated to the Catholic press (perhaps it appeared too frequently or was too expensive), was widely quoted therein. Dunne stands in a category all his own: a critic of society whose real preoccupation and force was moral, however entertaining the garb in which his thoughts appeared. One wondered whether in fact his work was so diverting as to blind people to its intent—as serious as the work of Godkin; but there is evidence that contemporaries were fully aware of his purpose—a Catholic World reviewer regarded him as "philosophical."

Ironically, this most Christian critic was not a practicing Catholic (although his admiration for Leo XIII caused him to visit the pontiff in Rome); perhaps this further substantiates the conclusion occasioned by this thesis that Church-consciousness, at that time, was often prejudicial to an outward-going Christianity.

Particular mention should be made of those Catholics then prominent in national, as distinct from community, politics. The two Supreme Court Justices—Edward White and Joseph McKenna—were largely cut off from any opinion-making role by their Republicanism (it was this, too, that prejudiced Catholic receptivity to the views of Ireland. The reformist and anti-Imperialist Charles Bonaparte did not suffer from
this identification with 'business Republicanism,' despite his allegiance to the party). Catholics were, on the whole, Democrats, except in cities, such as Milwaukee, where national rivalries could drive anti-Irish elements into the Republican party.4 We must always bear in mind, particularly when dealing with Roche and Desmond, that their general, although not indiscriminate, allegiance to the Democrats, and that of their readers, required that they criticize Republican expansion policies for party purposes. Yet this point is here deliberately relegated to the status of a secondary consideration: the depth of their arguments and sentiments on such matters reveals concern much deeper than that necessitated by party politics; what they have to say should not be prejudiced or discounted by any over-emphasis on its possible internal political implications. But it was the Democrats in national politics who were most influential: particularly the flamboyant, oratorical, and not overly intelligent Congressman Bourke Cockran. A friend of most of the Irish members at Westminster, a prominent New York lawyer, and a papal knight, Cockran had all the prerequisites necessary to make him moulder, par excellence, of Catholic opinion; except for two crucial drawbacks, his preoccupation with aping the worst mannerisms of that high society which the Catholic communities despised, and his failure in Congress to espouse reform with

4This observation was a commonplace of the times; annotated bibliographical surveys show nearly all Catholic papers to have been Democratic. In the 1890s, however, matters were complicated by defections to McKinley due to the currency issue.
any consistency. Catholic editors were as prone, therefore, to mock Cockran, as they were to listen to him. The same was true, perhaps more strangely, of their attitude to the Minnesota Populist, Ignatius Donnelly. Donnelly undoubtedly was given, like Cockran, to bombastic and often meaningless oratory. His views on race and America's destiny, however, were so crudely assertive as to make one glad the Catholic press did not afford him much respect by the period under consideration.

If one can single out one man as most consistently respected by, and influential upon, Irish American opinion, it would be not an American, but an Irishman, Michael Davitt. On the Venezuela dispute, on Imperialism in general, particularly the British variety, on the question of Philippines retention, on the Boer War, Davitt had always much to say. By the 1890s Davitt's status in Ireland had waned somewhat. But in America he was seen as standing above those partisan post-Parnell squabbles which discredited the whole Irish nationalist parliamentary movement in American Irish eyes. Davitt, too, had a manner of identifying the cause of the oppressed of whatever peoples or creeds, and the cause of the victims of any political or economic power structure. Unlike many Irish political leaders, he seems also to have been warm and approachable.

In both these respects he was not unlike the other great moulder of Irish American opinion, John Boyle O'Reilly. Although dying in 1890, O'Reilly's traditions remained a
significant influence upon Irish Americans, particularly through the work of Roche in the Boston Pilot. O'Reilly's truly global charity, however, was not such that one could live with it all the time: he bore no rancor against native Americans, attempting instead to mediate between immigrant and indigenous citizen. A Catholic World writer, on the occasion of the unveiling of the O'Reilly memorial in Boston, said he proved the compatibility of Irish patriotism and the broadest philanthropy and love of freedom for all in the highest interests of humanity.  

Noting that in a country of heterogenous origins, "racial antipathies . . . are the most strenuous forces in the silent currents of daily life," which fact deserves the status of a "social law," the writer praised O'Reilly for presenting an alternative vision, and hailed the memorial as presaging a "new covenant in nationality."

Roche often cited O'Reilly's opinions, deducing from them the specific application required by the case under consideration. In nothing was the Pilot under Roche as consistently and boldly faithful to O'Reilly's heritage, than in its continued championship of the Afro-American, at a time his condition was worsening throughout the union.

At a time when in Europe realists were learning to view nationalism as productive of endless conflicts requiring adjustment or war, O'Reilly's espousal of a latter-day romantic vision of a brotherhood of peoples may have had something

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*Catholic World, 59* (August 1894), editorial section.
to do with the friendliness with which America later accorded aspirant European nationalisms; possibly, too, however, it contributed to that tendency of Irish Americans to feel that national self-assertion by the United States could have none but good implications—a naive view which received a salutary check in the period under consideration.

Before discussing the actual papers used, one must ask to what extent Catholic opinion was formed by the Catholic press. Firstly, to judge from the complaints of Catholic editors, only a minority of Catholic homes took such papers. Secondly, that a home did take one, was no guarantee that it would be influenced by it, particularly on subjects then considered only peripheral to Catholic Christian commitment, as were foreign policy, and world affairs. Thirdly, upon such subjects, Catholics no less than their fellow citizens were open to a barrage of information and opinion from the secular press, which, presented daily, had greater opportunities to influence the minority of them who became vocal, or even took stands, on such issues. Fourthly, and particularly so among second-generation and later Americans, personal and professional or occupational friendships must have extended beyond the communities moulded by the traditional opinion-leaders of church, local politicians, and journalists perpetuating immigrant traditions; if only to sustain intelligent conversation, the more outward-going Catholic would have had to discuss such issues largely on the premises available to his non-Catholic or more fully Americanized friends.
A recent study has demonstrated that whereas in Ireland, the Catholic accords the Church—its hierarchy, priests, lay activists and press—a large measure of influence, even control, over his attitude to the arts, politics, business, consumer habits, entertainments and general opinions, the same is not true of even the immigrant Irish Catholic in America. Obviously, it must be even less true of the second and later generations. American Catholicism has been thus "protestantized," or "americanized," in the manner described by Will Herberg: the Church provides the spiritual dimension and focus of worship for people whose patterns of life are decided largely by secular forces, and whose decisions are made quite autonomously, in response to status, occupational and educational considerations, rather than to Catholic instruction.

In Ireland the desire to body forth religious community affects all aspects of life, and can do, since outside of Ulster, there exists a national consensus of faith. In America, no such consensus exists; the conditions of life vary greatly; hence religious community cannot be socially expressed through any but the broadest uniformities of custom and attitude: the failure of Prohibition was the proof of this. For, despite much nonsense written about Irish (or

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German) Catholic subservience to a clerical elite (to which Biever himself contributes, although a Jesuit) the essential pre-condition for religious influence on national life is communal acceptance of it: where community and Church differ, as in Ireland over the land agitation, it is the Church that has to give way.

While Biever and Herberg are sociologists analyzing the present characteristics of American Catholicism, there are specific grounds, as well as general, for believing their conclusions to have retrospective validity with regard to the formation of Catholic attitudes in foreign policy, two studies have revealed that Catholics in the earlier twentieth century did not generally promote, adhere to, or even passively support policies advanced by the consensus of ecclesiastical leaders and propagandized by the Catholic press. Attempts to have the American government withdraw all support for anti-clerical governments in Mexico, and to influence the Roosevelt administration toward a "positive neutrality" in Franco's favour during the Spanish Civil War failed because ecclesiastical leaders could never cause politicians to take note; for they could not arouse the Catholic voters as a whole to real concern. As will be seen, the failure of Bishop McFaul's American Federation of Catholic Societies, in its political

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aims, was due to similar reasons, although in this case matters were made more complex by the failure of most of the hierarchy to support it, and by the outright hostility of much of the Catholic press, and several leading Catholic societies, such as the Knights of Columbus.

However, one should not therefore too casually dismiss the opinion-directing power of the Catholic press. Recent studies have shown the part played by that press, and the Church and Irish-American community leaders generally, in fostering McCarthyism, and, indeed, in popularizing an extremist commitment to the American side in the "Cold War." The contrast between the success of Catholic propaganda in this case, and its failure in those earlier instances is instructive. From 1946-1954 there was a real coincidence of interests and tendencies among American Church leaders, and Catholics in general, with national preoccupations. The "Irish establishment" in the hierarchy had long been accused of inadequate concern for non-Irish groups in the Church; a loud defense of the religious and political rights of East Europeans in Europe on their part gave Polish, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Hungarian and German Catholics in America—as far as such groups still existed distinctively—a real feeling that this was their Church speaking. The hierarchy too, long underestimated at Rome, found that its militant anti-Communism

brought it much prestige at the court of Pius XII. Among Catholics at large, by now dispersing from the security of the ethnic areas to the status tensions of the pluralistic suburbs, the campaign offered a convenient mode of stressing their Americanism, and of affirming their "bourgeoisification," by condemning radicals with an inadequate sense of the sanctity of property, and the inviolability of the principle of self-reliance. The nation at large was convinced it was facing a grave danger to its interests and ideals, and its hopes for a better, if somewhat Americanized, world. Bishops, Catholic laity, and Americans at large were appalled by the power of a dictator whose ruthless contempt for human values and liberties was eventually to provoke a reaction even in his own Soviet Union, and seemed to recall the evils of Hitlerism, which men longed to banish for ever.

No such coincidence marked the Catholic campaigns of the 1920s against Mexico's revolution, or of the 1930s against the Spanish Republic; Catholic spokesmen were running against the general tide of American sympathies or indifference. Dwight Morrow did secure some mitigation of the anti-clerical laws of the Calles government; Franklin D. Roosevelt refused to lift the embargo on arms for the Republic. But in neither case were these actions responses to Catholic pressure. Rather they represented actions necessitated by a mass of domestic considerations.

We may therefore conclude that Catholic opinion-making was effective, even upon Catholics at large, only when it did
not appear esoterically ecclesiastical; only when it harmonized with general considerations and influences acting through the American milieu as a whole. Then it could be quite significant, giving the aura of religious sanction to secular disposition. Thoughtful Catholics might be expected to pay attention to their press when it gave added arguments to one or other sides of a public issue: in which case it might conceivably assist them to make up their minds. Humphrey J. Desmond seems to have understood this well; while not denying that a Catholic press had a duty to espouse Catholic rights in special circumstances, he maintained that the Church and its organs could be most effective in public life when they caused Catholics to pursue and uphold the moral cause in all social and political conflict, rather than to create their own causes. If he spelt out this theory principally with regard to municipal and domestic issues, it undoubtedly underlay his frequent editorials on foreign issues. He felt more comfortable illuminating the moral issues of Imperialism than in bickering about friars' rights in the Philippines. And doubtless he was more influential in the former task.

The premises of this argument as to the influence of the Catholic press may, however, be challenged—on a number of grounds. Catholics by the 1920s and later were largely Americanized; they were already confining the role of their Church in the manner of Americans in general; and they were accepting that it was not as members of a series of communities, but as individuals, that they would be assimilated into
American life.

However, in the nineteenth century this was not so. True, doubtless, of the Irish Americans of the Middle West as the century progressed, it was much less true of immigrants of any nationality in the East. The shock of uprooting, so excellently described by Oscar Handlin, caused the first generation to try to simulate amidst the urban conditions of the new country, the cultural and communal life reminiscent of the agrarian conditions of the old. And sheer weight of numbers, which, if absent, would otherwise have rendered this task quixotic, lent feasibility to it, and, indeed, assured it a measure of success. Nowhere were the new ethnic societies closed transplants of the old; everywhere they were open and transitional. But of places such as Massachusetts, which had 600,000 Irish by the 1890s, or Milwaukee, where fifty to sixty per cent of the people could speak German in the late 1880s, one may truly speak of distinctively Irish- and German-American communities.¹⁰

One of the methods of creating such communities was by enhancing the role of the Church; while the functions it served in Europe could clearly not be duplicated, they might well be approximated. Yet if the Church was thus accorded an influence among immigrants unusual in America as a whole, there was something distinctively American, and conditional,

¹⁰Oscar Handlin, Boston's Immigrants: A Study in Acculturation (Cambridge, 1941); Bayrd Still, Milwaukee: the History of a City, 2nd ed. (Madison, 1965).
in the manner it was done. It was the lay community that had to consciously bestow that role; the role was not assured by history. It was hence subject to revision by the Second and later generations.

Another paradoxically American method used by the immigrant to create a reflection of old country community was the publication of newspapers. And it was natural that the two tasks--of stressing the Church's role, and of articulating community through a press--should have been combined. The fascinating thing about many Catholic newspapers in America, which have since become official or quasi-official diocesan organs, is that they were originally founded by independent laymen for such communitarian, rather than narrowly ecclesiastical purposes. Indeed, a cursory survey of the volumes of a recent exhaustive survey of the nineteenth century Catholic press suggests that this was true of by far the majority of them, whether Irish, German or other. It is this which explains the ease with which so many Catholic papers could discuss issues from the more promising orientation to world, Christianly conceived, than to church, narrowly conceived. Sometimes, indeed, Christianity gave way to traditional and even unChristian immigrant resentments, as shall emerge.

For these reasons one may counter-argue that where immigrant communities retained their cohesion, the influence

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11 Eugene P. Willging and Herta Hatzfield, Catholic Serials of the Nineteenth Century: A Descriptive Bibliography and Union List, 1st series, RACHS, 66-68 (1955-59); 2nd, multivolume, by state (Washington, 1959-60).
of the Catholic press may have been more significant than one might think in the light of subsequent patterns. Expectably, the Boston Pilot therefore tended to argue its editorial viewpoints in terms especially relevant only to a distinctly Irish American community, and a Catholic one. The Milwaukee Catholic Citizen's more intelligently American approach reflected editor Desmond's conviction that the days of a distinctively Irish paper in Milwaukee were over: it was he who, in 1882, took over and transformed such a paper, the Catholic Vindicator, into an organ with a remarkably contemporary approach. The change in title, from the apologetical to the self-assured, was symbolic of the change.

Hence we may conclude that the better editors of Catholic papers geared their approach, and exercised their influence, in the manner most appropriate to their readership. None of them believed they could create opinion in a vacuum, apart from the influence of America's secular media; the most conservative organs, such as St. Paul's Der Wanderer, conceded that influence by the very fact of fighting it.

There is, however, another qualifying factor. America in general before 1914 was not the America subsequently to develop. Native America--at least in rural areas--read its Bible, listened reverently to its preachers, bought Protestant newspapers, and often influenced state politicians in the direction of distinctly Protestant legislation. Federal government officials and national politicians, themselves more publicly devout than today—as H. Wayne Morgan has shown,
McKinley's piety was far more than pose--were wary of the power of the great non-denominational Protestant weeklies _The Outlook_ and _The Independent_. Against such a background, public issues were often discussed with more overtly moral concern than is customary today; only this can adequately explain the prevalence of Christian rationalization for business enterprise, the apologetic of righteousness behind many of the arguments for national expansion and self-assertion, and the ethical dynamic of the rhetoric and politics of Populism and Progressivism.

In such a context, the Catholic press might find its influence enhanced, rather than eroded, by addressing itself in those more general moral terms familiar to all Americans. It is only against such a background that Desmond's policy of non-sectarian, but moral, involvement for Catholic press and people can be understood (as, of course, the whole confidence of the Americanists).

Yet when all this is allowed, it still seems true--on the evidence previously cited, and to be further cited--that many Catholics took their opinions on foreign policy issues from the secular society in preference to the Catholic; and their attitudes in general to other peoples and cultures even more so, modified only by such traditions and needs for self-esteem as their instinctive opposition to an "Anglo-Saxon" interpretation of American life, and global destiny.
Having discussed these general considerations, we will now proceed to the actual sources of this study. Since much has already been said of the general policies of the Boston Pilot and the Catholic Citizen, and of their editors, Roche and Desmond, the information upon them will largely be by way of factual elaboration.

The (Boston) Pilot

This paper, successor to a small Boston Irish Catholic weekly, The Jesuit, which had been founded by Bishop Fenwick, was launched, after an initial failure, in 1838. Characteristically named after the leading Dublin paper of the time, it was owned and published by a man who was to make himself one of the most important Irish American leaders, and his paper the largest in circulation of all Irish organs in the United States.

Patrick Donahoe, born in Ireland in 1811 (on March 17), was brought to Boston when he was ten. As a lad, he had worked with several local newspapers; he took over The Jesuit, which had a circulation of but 500, from its ecclesiastical ownership, and, with its printer, the Protestant Irishman Henry Devereux, used it as a foundation for a national—as distinct from municipal—Irish American newspaper. Donahoe lived until 1901, to the very end taking a close interest in the paper, which he had seen grow to a circulation of 103,000 (in 1872), settling around one of 70,000 in the period this study is concerned with. However, despite appearances, the national importance of the Pilot declined after the 1880s, as
even did its state-wide influence; for as Irish communities settled across the country, they founded their own newspapers. Donahoe fought to the end to retain this nationwide importance; and even though he could not in the nature of things, succeed, such was the reputation he established for the paper that outsiders continued to regard it as the pre-eminent organ of Irish America, and Catholic editors across the country reproduced its copy, and retailed its editorial opinions with respect. The *Pilot*, which in the 1840s and 1850s had served the Irish in such distant communities as Milwaukee, thus continued its wide service in an indirect way.

Donahoe was himself not of literary bent; a founder and organizer, he addressed his energies to a multitude of informational, charitable and political services to the immigrant Irish and to America. Yet his attitudes stamped the paper. He was a Democrat in politics, a devout Catholic, and a warmly American, as well as Irish, nationalist. He wished to minimize the conflict between native New England and the newcomer. During the Civil War, he was a strong protagonist of the Union cause, raising Irish troops: his paper always took a proprietary interest in the Sixth Massachusetts. Donahoe was also--like many Irish--radical in his political beliefs; his paper being disowned by Bishop Fitzpatrick in the 1840s, who instead backed Brownson's *Catholic Observer*. Business instinct caused Donahoe to capitulate; he removed the cap of

12 Brownson attacked Donahoe as "guilty of heresy" in 1847!
liberty which previously adorned the *Pilot*’s masthead, and henceforth ensured that in theological, social, and political questions, his paper should not openly flaunt the ecclesiastical establishment. This cautious ambience between radical sympathy and Catholic circumspection must have plagued his editors to the end; there is some evidence that in the 1890s the editor at that time did not allow himself to expatiate on social issues too openly, tantalizing the reader with little quips as to the degeneracy of capital, or the right of the state to the resources of the nation. In this respect the *Pilot* stands in contrast to papers such as Patrick Ford’s *Irish World*.

Donahoe seems to have, in addition to his energy, one vital talent: an ability to discern quality among the masses of men who came to him. The editors and contributors to the *Pilot* stand as a veritable university of Catholic intellects in the nineteenth century; and although the literary quality of the paper varied by period and editor, it never ceased to be a paper of intelligent comment, if sometime diffuse, in the manner of the time. This, combined with its circulations, gives added reason for the contention made previously, as to the nascent intellectualism of Catholic America.

In the 1840s the brilliant but anti-clerical Young Irisher, Thomas D’Arcy McGee was editor; his writing precipitated the aforementioned crisis. In the 1850s a native American and friend of Brownson’s, Fr. John Roddan, was editor: educated and ordained in Rome, he had been affected by European
liberalism, which Brownson had later largely stamped out of him; at this time John Gilmary Shea and convert Bostonian Charles Fairbanks were contributors. After Roddan, an Italian ex-Jesuit, Fr. Joseph Finotti was editor, until 1870.

In that year Donahoe made his most brilliant discovery—that of John Boyle O'Reilly. Idealistic, energetic, and of unquestionable literary ability, O'Reilly was the perfect instrument to carry out Donahoe's purpose of reconciling native and immigrant; to this practical task, however, O'Reilly brought an over-arching vision, which permitted the accommodation of this purpose to the continuation of the paper's strongly Irish Nationalist position—an aim which had vexed editors and contributors before, due to its seeming inner contradictions. O'Reilly had been the son of a schoolmaster in County Meath from whom he gained a very good education; he worked on papers in Ireland and England, was arrested for Fenian activities, and exiled to Australia, 13 whence he escaped to America in 1869, when only 25. The failure of the Fenian invasion of Canada in 1870 caused him to resign the movement; the erstwhile militant became the great reconciler. His literary ability, and his respect for culture and education generally caused Boston's Brahmins to admit him to their circle. For twenty years he fought for his vision, which embraced cultural, national, religious and racial tolerance,

13 There is an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (1955) on his Australian sojourn, by Martin Clement Carroll, at the University of Iowa.
dying exhausted at 46 in 1890. During O'Reilly's editorship the Pilot attained its maximum circulation, and published its most distinguished cast—Wiseman, Newman, Manning, Brownson, Hecker, Rose Hawthorne (Nathaniel's convert daughter) and Abram Ryan.

It has been necessary to say this much, for after 1890 the Pilot was edited by James Jeffrey Roche, protege, colleague, friend, and biographer of O'Reilly. As one scans his Life of O'Reilly, or the Pilot itself after 1890, one grows convinced that it was not mere hyperbole that caused Roche to call O'Reilly his guiding light. Roche was himself a man of talent, less original, perhaps, than O'Reilly's; of emotion, if less passionate than O'Reilly's. O'Reilly's influence upon him was decisive. As the gloom of debasement and disfranchisement spread over the black's America, Roche reprinted O'Reilly's passionate and remarkable pleas for full Negro equality, taking consolation that O'Reilly had been saved this sight of the worst. In the 1890s Roche reprinted, systematically, every one of O'Reilly's poems in the Pilot. And Roche and Donahoe clearly wished to maximize, as well as continue, the influence of O'Reilly: a free copy of the biography was given with all subscriptions to Donahoe's Magazine, a periodical of popular culture (1878-1902), which amplified the Donahoe-O'Reilly world-view.

14 James Jeffrey Roche, Life of John Boyle O'Reilly, with his complete poems and speeches edited by Mrs. John Boyle O'Reilly, introduction by James Cardinal Gibbons (New York, 1891).
Roche, like O'Reilly, was the son of a school-teacher, and was also born in Ireland, at Mouhtmellick, Laois, May 31, 1847; his father, Edward Roche, emigrated to Prince Edward Island, set up a school, educated his son, and became provincial librarian. Unlike O'Reilly, Roche received higher formal education, at Charlottetown's St. Dunstan's College. Coming to Boston, he had some success in business, and in 1883 became assistant editor of the Pilot. While his poetry lacks the lasting qualities of O'Reilly's, it was graceful, intelligent and disciplined in language, and pleased the ears of the time. This—together with his openness and affability—won him access to the most sophisticated Boston circles; like O'Reilly, he became a member of the Papyrus Club. Yet one gets the impression from the Pilot under his editorship that he did not strain himself to explain old New England to the Irish Americans as O'Reilly did.

Like O'Reilly, Roche was an intense Irish nationalist, although never a militant, as his mentor was. Their common feeling in this regard was something more than a desire to propagandize the cause of Ireland itself, and to influence American public opinion on behalf of its independence. As Browne and Shannon have pointed out, the nationalism of Irish Americans was in many ways their own: it was a mode of affirming the value of their heritage, and their intrinsic worth as a people, in face of the charge (and perhaps at times their own misgivings) that they came but as beggars to America—beggars for its freedom, its opportunities, its
culture—and brought nothing of their own (but Catholicity).

The Pilot embodied this nationalism; and, despite the acceptance of its successive editors in Boston society, it preached rather the value of Irish Americans as a community to America, rather than working for the assimilation of them as individuals into American society at large. Roche and O'Reilly—themselves capable of personal assimilation—must have felt subjectively somewhat like the mid-twentieth century Negro intellectual or executive, in recognizing that their people as a whole were still largely isolated from American life; to take advantage of personal capacity to leave one's people was not possible, nor honourable. This explains why Roche could never become like Desmond, the mid-westerner, proud of his Irish heritage, but determined to be fully American.

There are one or two significant details about Roche, illustrative of the fact that he, far more than O'Reilly, accorded an intense devotion to America. These details are also important in understanding his approach to foreign affairs. He devoted twelve years of his life to researching and writing a two-volume, somewhat imaginative, account of the individualist expansionists (The Story of the Filibusters, 1891). He had a brother in the U.S. Navy—John Roche, a pay clerk who was killed in the Samoan disaster of 1889. And

15 Desmond, who greatly admired Roche, called this "epitaph of the brave, lawless, generous anomaly on civilization" his "best prose work." Citizen, July 2, 1898.
O'Reilly, who had been to the Pacific coast toward the end of his life, confirmed in Roche the tendencies which these details point toward—a profound attachment to the mystique and the power inherent in expansion and a strong navy.

The strength of America became almost a cult with Roche, as we shall see. Perhaps it is to be explained not alone in terms of American nationalism, but as the natural enthusiasm of one whose every image of his native country was of a people oppressed by power (or, from the iconography of the time, of a girl ill-treated and sorrowing), for some righteous and powerful force which could redress the wrong—just as a psychologist would today explain the idolizing of the prize-fighter among the Irish Americans as a compensation and vicarious redress against a social system that so humbled them, and memories which so angered them.

But this devotion to American power was tempered by an instinctive effect of the whole preoccupation with Ireland's people, and the teaching of O'Reilly. Roche had only to see any people in the role of the oppressed, and his sympathy was with them, even when they were victims of America itself. This is most important; his commitment to the self-assertion of the United States, under O'Reilly's influence, was not to power because it was American, but power because it could be used for righteousness; and, unlike Theodore Roosevelt, Roche had a clear apprehension of when the sword of justice became the sword of self-centred injustice.

Since The Pilot reflected the mind of a community bent
on retaining its cohesion, the preconditions for any real Americanist leanings in its editors were absent; Donahoe aimed a friendly co-existence of Irish and Yankee, not a society free of community. The conservatism of the eastern Irish has been dealt with at some length; and while O'Reilly and Roche might desire rapport with native America, they had to accept the tenor of Irish Boston. Although his friendly admirer, Roche found Desmond's bold challenge to Catholics to encounter secular America as individuals too liberal for his taste (he said so in reviewing Desmond's *Chats Within the Fold*, 1901).\(^\text{16}\) The *Pilot*’s preoccupation with group consciousness was not the sole factor working against "Americanism"; the outlook of Archbishop (formerly Bishop) John Williams, who left his stamp on his people by leading them over forty years, from 1866 was also important. Williams was essentially a pastoral priest, unconcerned to map out guidelines for the Church in American society; although a close friend of McQuaid of Rochester, he was neutral in the conflicts between conservatives and Americanists. The *Pilot*, although not to become an official diocesan paper until purchased by Archbishop William O'Connell in 1908, reflected the tone set by Williams; this further guaranteed it against the theoretical (as opposed to emotional) nationalism inherent in Americanism, while not preventing it to express its sympathy for such "liberal" causes as labour (Williams had opposed condemnation of the Knights).

\(^{16}\) *Pilot*, 16 November 1901.
In 1903, The Pilot, one of 20,500 periodicals in the United States, was awarded a "gold mark" by the American Newspaper Directory, not on account of its circulation figures, but, as the citation ran,

because of its select circulation among readers of more than average intelligence and purchasing power. . . . The Pilot is the one religious journal accorded the gold mark, and while fundamentally a Roman Catholic publication, is best known as the organ of the Irishman in America, famous for its decided opinions and vigorous style.  

Sufficient reason to rank it as a major historical source for any study of nineteenth-century Catholic opinion in America. 

The Catholic Citizen

Whatever the select circulation of The Pilot, The Catholic Citizen of Milwaukee presents consistently more food for thought. While never attaining a circulation approximating that of the former, the Citizen became the most widely read Catholic newspaper in the Middle West. Perhaps more significantly, for the purposes of this study, it was recognized by contemporaries as the most "attractive" of Catholic newspapers; it was certainly one of the most intelligent.

All this was due to its editor and publisher, Humphrey

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17 Ibid., 11 July 1903.

18 For The Pilot, Willging and Hatzfield, Catholic Serials, 2nd Series, pt. 10, Massachusetts, 12-21; Lord, Sexton, Archdiocese of Boston; for Roche, article by Richard Purcell in the Dictionary of American Biography, XVI, 63; by C. McGuire, in Catholic Builders of the Nation IV (1923), 175; and by Desmond, in The Catholic Citizen, July 2, 1898, together with the internal evidence of The Pilot itself, 1894-1904, as well as his own published books.
J. Desmond. For over fifty years Desmond ran it (1880-1932); and he conceived of his task as much more than publishing a community paper. In those years he wrote around 15,000 editorials, being old-style enough to feel a paper must speak its editors' views. At the same time he published several books of his own; was active in Democratic politics; founded several associations concerned with Catholic Truth, Temperance, and Civil Reform; contributed to national magazines; led the area campaign against the A.P.A.; and built up a newspaper chain.

These were not the random activities of a man of much energy; they were different aspects of a coherent plan—an attempt to organize and inspire an intelligent and vocal lay Catholicism, which would defend and explain its faith, and promote the moral and social welfare of secular America by participation in its life through competence in their callings, and involvement in the better reform movements of the time, on the part of individual Catholics. Desmond was at once the prototype and the embodiment of the liberal Catholicity demanded by the Americanist bishops—and in many ways was more radical than they. Nor was he so merely in a pragmatic way; in his books and editorials he enunciated the rationale of his activities, not by way of apology but to win converts. Well informed in his faith, he quoted now Newman, now Manning, now continental figures to support his views.

19 As evidenced in many of his editorials; for a collection conveniently available, on just this goal, see Humphrey J. Desmond, Chats Within the Fold (Baltimore, Maryland, 1901).
Yet perhaps the most notable element of Desmond's mind was its detachment. Unlike Archbishop Ireland, he was no doctrinaire; he judged everything in its context—hence we find him freely changing his ground as new facts came to his notice. He was, for one of Irish descent, remarkably unemotional—the antithesis of the passionate, imaginative, and inefficient stereotype of the "Celtic" temperament. But for Desmond's own sensible rejection of racial mythology, it would be tempting to find the key to this in the Norman ancestry of his parents; Desmond himself would doubtless find the key in his Ontario-born father, a stern and energetic Victorian, whose religion was dutiful and "intellectual" rather than "emotional." The elder Desmond, Thomas, was by turn a school-teacher, secretary to the Milwaukee Public School Board, and Wisconsin manager of a national insurance company. He encouraged in his children habits of disciplined reading, an intellectual and forceful maintenance of their faith, and—prophetically—the production of their own "newspaper." Honest, diplomatic and abstemious, he commanded respect rather than warmth in those outside the family. His son obviously much admired him.20

Desmond's judiciousness was undoubtedly formalized by his education and early practice as a lawyer. Not only temper of his writing, but its metaphors and often its explicit method, owes much to his legal training. Desmond's reluctance

20 Humphrey J. Desmond, Thomas Desmond: A Memoir (Milwaukee, 1905).
to opinionize before he was sure of his ground and his determination to secure the maximum of information decisive to any disputed issue also springs from this background, as well as from his serious view of the calling or duty of the journalist. His portrait shows him to be perhaps of even sterner disposition than his father, his piercing rational gaze behind pince-nez: his writing is clearly expressive of his whole personality. Where O'Reilly and Roche had a great fear of limited charity "scrimped and iced, in the name of a cautious, statistical Christ," Desmond was perhaps the first American catholic to call for a total rationalization of the Church's social involvement, and its abdication to the state of such functions as the upkeep of orphanages, reformatories and hospitals, which the state could carry out more efficiently and economically. Yet Desmond was far from cold: he prized family life as few American men did, and his general approach to political and social problems was as humanitarian as any in the age. His sense of justice was not dependent on emotion, but upon his conviction of the dignity of men: such a justice may seem less attractive than O'Reilly's, but it was not to be misled or attenuated, once committed.

Desmond was breath-takingly well read, in history, literature, contemporary Catholicism, American society and institutions, and, of course, law. He also seems to have found time to read a prodigious selection of contemporary journalism. All of this enriched his writing. A pragmatic radical, he seems to have been clearly influenced by men
like Acton (on whom he published material), and shared their view of history as the servant, not the tyrant, of men. In all but the essentials of Catholic dogma and the unchanging characteristics of men, he recognized the promise of freedom inherent in the nineteenth century apprehension of the developing, as opposed to the static.

In this, he was clearly unusual among Catholics. It is characteristic of him that when Leo XIII died, he singled out as his greatest achievement the opening of the Church to the spirit of scholarship; and that, commenting upon ultramontanism (his \textit{bete noire}) he saw its gravest dangers to lie in the inhibition of rigorous searching of the meaning of gospel and tradition. Trained by his father to be a Catholic by intellectual assent, he believed the Church could maintain itself only by presenting itself with intelligent understanding of modern man. Had he known his contemporary, Walter Sullivan, he could not but have sympathized with him. Sullivan might well have penned these lines:

\begin{quote}
Ultramontane partisanship is unnecessary to Catholicism, driving scholarship away and sneering at the need of erudition; it contemns those who \ldots{} in the end, will really convince the world that the Church is the true guide.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

Nothing perhaps so marks off the character of the \textit{Citizen} from that of the \textit{Pilot} than this belief in modern scholarship. The readers of the \textit{Citizen} were made aware of

many of the stresses facing Catholicism: Desmond, for example, published material on Fr. John A. Zahm and St. George Mivart in his pages.\textsuperscript{22} The \textit{Pilot} on the other hand had the cavalier attitude that if good Catholics ignored such challenges as that of evolutionism they would go away. Rebuking the Chicago \textit{New World}, which had remarked that the Catholic press seemed to waste its time attacking Protestantism as a 'spent force' while ignoring those challenges, such as higher criticism, which made it seem so, the \textit{Pilot} replied that the Catholic press was not read by those Catholics most likely to be acquainted with

the word of the youngest and most flippant Far Western college professors on matters of higher criticism or scientific research. \ldots Such Catholics judging all Catholics by their mean, half-educated and pitiful selves and having thus logically a deep contempt for their fellow co-religionists, would be impressed \ldots rather than by our rebuttals.\textsuperscript{23}

Anyhow, direct attacks on the various isms that are the final outcome of disintegrating Protestantism are beside the mark.\textsuperscript{23}

However with regard to questions of racial and intercultural relations, this self-imposed insulation of the \textit{Pilot}'s staff from the new science enabled it to disregard precisely those intellectual currents arguing for human inequality. At this time anthropology, ethnology, history and political science—as taught in the universities—were largely committed to explaining the failure of the East and the tropics to be

\textsuperscript{22}E.g., \textit{Citizen}, 15 July 1899.

\textsuperscript{23}\textit{Pilot}, 14 March 1903.
the West in terms of inherent differences in human capacity, sometimes even of the "disunity" of the human species (conceived evolutionally). Desmond, with his learning and respect for modern science, was of course open to these views, which we now generically dismiss as racism (although few of better scholars of the late nineteenth century were as crude as Gobineau in the 1850s). It is important to remember this when discussing certain of his attitudes, particularly toward the Negro; and changes in them are therefore the more significant, in being personal to him.

Another important factor governing Desmond's approach to international relations, again in contrast to the Pilot, is the very restrained nature of his feelings for Ireland;--a logical outcome of his rejection of a closed Irish-American community, as well as of his being a few generations removed from it. Clearly proud of his ancestry--which stemmed from the Earls of Desmond--as of the Irish elements in his community and tradition, he published much news of Irish interest, was acquainted with the leading Irish-American political figures in the Middle West, met members of the Irish party on his visit to Westminster in 1901, gave prominence to the statements of Irish spokesmen such as Davitt, and upheld the cause of Irish independence in several editorials.

Yet he was first and foremost American. While he had little wish to see Britain prosper, and saw in her the classic embodiment of oppressive imperialism, he tempered these sentiments with a recognition that it was in the interests of the
United States to maintain understanding with her; his mood varied, but at times he could judiciously see the Irish Question as peripheral to U.S.-British relations in the long run, and hope that it might be solved early to clear the way to their closer relations in the future. He had none of that implacable and irrational hostility to Britain such as was displayed by the *Pilot*, the *Irish World*, and the *New York Freeman's Journal*.

The most remarkable thing about the *Citizen* was that it existed in the mouth of the lion's den: Milwaukee was the stronghold of Austro-German conservative Catholicism in America. It says much for Desmond--and should moderate our view of Archbishop Frederick Katzer--that the radical *Citizen* retained full ecclesiastical approbation during Katzer's episcopate. The two men had clearly differing conceptions of the Church's role in America: Desmond published, but strongly criticized, the letter of the hierarchy of the Wisconsin province to Leo XIII which accused their fellow-American prelates of 'Jansenistic' manipulation in their denying the existence of the errors condemned in *Testem Benevolentiae*. But Desmond, whatever Preuss might say, was no bigoted or doctrinaire Americanist: he lacked the somewhat uncritical nationalism which was the basis of Archbishop Ireland's thought. He respected Katzer for his honesty and integrity, although he found him brusque and old-fashioned. He supported

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24 *Citizen*, 5 August 1899.

25 *Citizen*, 25 July 1903, obituary of Katzer.
Katzer's defence of German language and culture. He saw in the quality of German family life a rebuke to and a model for America. He not only had a capacity to apprehend and respect virtue in its different modes, as his father taught him, but was of a disposition no less conciliatory for its forcefulness.

Hence he had little patience with the bickering between the different wings of the hierarchy. Although certainly alive to the issues in the conflict, he attributed the manner in which it became a divisive and scandalous public dispute to the vanity of the participants, feeling doubtless that if he could respect German catholicism while maintaining his liberalism, so should others. This led him to one of his boldest positions, and one implicitly theological. On a number of occasions defending his right to publish criticism of the prelates, as well as information on their disputes, he said it was the right of the laity to recall bishops to the unity of Christ, if necessary by shaming them. If in many ways a precursor of Vatican II, here he seems to go beyond it.

Relations between Desmond and Katzer's more integrist

26 E.g., above, pp. 18-19.
27 Citizen, 8 April 1899.
28 Thus he wrote "Our own opinion is that the truest policy for the Catholic Church ... was to let German Catholics alone; and let their priests have full power to direct their future," Citizen, 23 July 1898.
29 Citizen, 29 May 1897, 25 February, 1898, 12 August 1899.
30 Citizen, 5 August 1899.
successor, Sebastian Messmer, were less happy. The editor had criticized the new archbishop when the latter had been bishop of Green Bay, particularly for impolitic and irrelevant anti-Socialism. In 1922 Messmer established an official diocesan paper, the Catholic Herald, presumably to provide a conservative alternative to Desmond's journal. In 1935, ironically, the two papers were to merge: by then Desmond was dead.

Even were his Citizen a negligible paper in point of circulation, his qualities of mind which mark him as one of the most acute and original laymen of his time, would be sufficient reason to study it. For this is, as noted, a study of Catholic thought, not a survey of Catholic opinion. Yet the Citizen was very influential. Desmond systematically bought up the subscription lists of the Western Chronicle (Omaha) in July 1898, the Catholic Witness (Detroit) in December 1898, the Catholic Review (Brooklyn) and the Catholic American (New York) in January 1899, and the Catholic Voice (Green Bay) in April 1902. He used these lists to extend the Citizen's circulation, discontinuing the original papers. A second aspect of his avowed rationalization of the Catholic press—he maintained twenty-five English papers would be sufficient for Catholic America, and ten German—was to take over important papers, and found others, which in all but their local news sections would be replicas of the Citizen.

31 Citizen, 8 March 1902.
carrying his editorials. In 1900 he took over the *Northwestern Chronicle of St. Paul*, a liberal and important paper to which Ireland was an occasional contributor; in 1904 Maurice Egan's *New Century* of Washington D. C.; in 1902 he founded the *Iowa Catholic Citizen*, particularly for Sioux City; and in 1912 took over the *Catholic Journal of the New South*, of Memphis. In 1900 the circulation of the *Citizen* itself was 10,000; its subscribers included several bishops and several score of pastors in the East, whether intent on discovering what heresy was going on in the Middle West, or in need of stimulation in face of the overwhelmingly conservative character of the eastern Catholic press, one cannot tell! Of course, it may be they merely desired an intelligent paper.

*Catholic World*

The *Catholic World* had the reputation of being the foremost Catholic monthly magazine in the country. Today it remains, with *Ave Maria* and the secular *Nation*, one of the three surviving journals of the forty founded in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War. Its value to this study lies both in its influence, and the fact of its being "a monthly magazine of general literature and science" (its self-description);

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32 For the *Citizen* and its chain, together with important notes on Desmond, Willging and Hatzfield, *Catholic Serials*, 2nd Series, pt. 2, Wisconsin (Washington, 1960); the internal evidence of the *Citizen*, 1894-1905; historical issue of the *Citizen*, 19 June 1920. There exists a biographical study of Desmond, an M.A. thesis completed at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, the existence of which I learned too late for use for this account.
it has thus been most useful in furnishing a cross-section of articulate, and particularly clerical, attitudes on other peoples and cultures, for it was essentially a journal of contributed articles. It is of course weakest in giving immediate response to the news; its editorials were always sketchy, and, after 1904, discontinued.

Its character changed radically during the period 1865-1905; for this reason I have used volumes earlier than the scope of this study warrants. Founded by Fr. Isaac Hecker, and published and managed after 1869 by Lawrence Kehoe, a Republican, for the Paulist fathers (Hecker's order), the World up until 1888 reflected Hecker's editorship: it was patrician, intellectual, and Americanist, strongly so (although the term was not yet used). Fr. Augustine Hewit continued these traditions when he took over as editor in January 1889. By 1897 the World enjoyed a nationwide and select circulation of 22,000. In that year an Irish-American priest, Fr. Alexander Doyle, took over. He had previously written "Catholic Truth" tracts; he now determined to make the World an illustrated popular journal with a much broadened circulation. In this he was only too successful.

The quality of the World fell off quite rapidly. Under his editorship too, its liberal Catholicism is mitigated, perhaps reflective both of Doyle's own nervousness of change, and the ecclesiastical politics of the New York archdiocese. Yet quality writing can still be found in the unsigned book reviews by the Paulists; and in these years it had a most
interesting feature--a summary of the important articles in all the leading Catholic reviews in Europe. From both these, one can deduce that the modernist ferment was operative--strongly so--in clerical circles in America, by 1904.

Doyle also abandoned the America-first approach of Hecker and Hewitt, permitting publication of a series of articles by George MacDermot, CSP, in the most intemperate Irish American tradition, viewing all the world's evils as of British origin. Yet Doyle himself, in his editorials, was more judicious. Of the more popular items now common, a series of travelogues give much insight into Catholic views of various foreigners.

In general the World, whether under Hecker or Doyle, was essentially Church-minded; from it most of the evidence of the inadequacy of such a view to new world problems is derived, evidence the more convincing because of the World's liberal tradition. In social questions, the World was frighteningly conservative, despite the milk-sop of a few articles by Msgr. John A. Ryan in 1900 on "A Living Wage"; apart from frequent resounding attacks on socialism, it maintained that only a "free" economy left scope for such vital moral traits as charity and self-reliance, necessary to salvation. This may have reflected the patrician origins of the Paulist order, and also its attempts to exalt all that was most "noble" in American custom; it is also reflective of a very prevalent
mode of thinking then common among "moral" theologians.\(^{33}\)

PART II

ATTITUDES BEFORE THE WAR OF 1898
CHAPTER III

THE SECULAR RATIONALE FOR EXPANSION

The War of 1898 and its aftermath came, not by way of accident, but as the outgrowth of an American concern for expansion which had been mooted vis-a-vis Asia as early as the 1840s and 1850s, and which had been since boldly defined by such statesmen as Seward, Fish, Evarts, Blaine, Frelinghuysen, and Bayard, largely in terms of commercial supremacy over the potential markets of Asia and Latin America. If, as Ernest May demonstrates, the War first brought the United States into the day-to-day calculations of the great European powers, this was not because Americans were not already committed to an active foreign policy before it. It was rather because the Americans did not conceive their policies in terms of jockeying for advantage in the concert of nations, but rather of pressing forward their commercial and strategic frontier in areas at least formerly peripheral to the interests of the powers. Pursuing her goals with the "innocence" of the frontiersmen, the United States could afford contempt for such nations as Germany and Britain which pursued theirs with an aggressive intent to be cock of the global walk.

But if Americans at large believed it was possible to expand with relative good-will toward Europe, the State Department had never been quite so sanguine. Diplomatic
adjustments became increasingly common, concerned with places as afar as Madagascar; and, when necessary, various Secretaries of State could be quite firm, toward their European counterparts. One of the reasons for the early revision of the origins of the Spanish American War on the part of the American people, lies, I believe, in their shocked disbelief that an essentially well-minded people could fall to the level of Old World squabbling. Both the *Pilot* and the *Citizen* (together with other Catholic papers such as the *Providence Visitor*), which had even shown impatience toward McKinley in the spring of 1898, as well as a sophisticated understanding of all the commercial, strategic and humanitarian issues at stake, were by autumn 1898 attributing the war to the yellow press and the politicians.¹

Certainly the war forced Americans to examine their minds about the issues involved in expansion; this was particularly so of Catholic Americans, for the War was fought against a Catholic power, and the acquisitions gained in consequence of it were overwhelmingly Catholic in population. References in the Catholic press to extra-territorial affairs multiply from 1898 onwards; references to Cuban, Filipino and Puerto Rican issues, together with general debate on the issue of colonialism, aggregate more than references to all other foreign issues in the same period (1898-1905), and at least

¹*Pilot*, 3 September 1898, agreeing with Secretary of State Sherman the war might have been avoided; *Citizen*, 3 September 1898, citing *Providence Visitor*, which quoted the cynic Talleyrand: "Distrust your first impulses, for they are too generous."
twice as much as references to all foreign questions, 1894-spring 1898; so the indexing of notes upon the sources of this study reveals.

But pre-occupation with the issues of expansion was by no means negligible before 1898: it looms, in the Catholic press, at least as large as criticism of the social order in an era of depression and strikes; except at election times, it bulks almost as large as questions of federal politics. Only the ecclesiastical debates and their implications, and matters of state and local politics are more important to Catholic editors. Far from being isolated then, the mind of articulate lay Catholicity had expanded with the interests of the country.

Hence the debates of 1898 and afterwards were carried on in no strange idiom; hence, too, it is important to study Catholic attitudes in the period, before 1898, to illumine the changes and continuities occasioned by the war. Yet it is, I feel, important to divide the study at 1898, since after the war, men like Desmond groped toward full reconsideration of their previous assumptions.

If Americans honestly believed before 1898 that an expansive or "large" policy need not involve conflict with the European powers, or entanglement in their alliance systems of mutual reinsurance, yet they could scarcely avoid recognizing that such a policy must necessitate relationships with those peoples with whom they wished to trade, particularly Asians
and Latin Americans. From the vantage point of the late twentieth century, it is these relations, not those with Europe, which were the most important in defining the shape of the emerging international community. Hence one cannot look, as Ernest May does, to the growth of European recognition of America as the significant element, exclusively conceived, in the growth of American relations with the world. While important, this is surely secondary to the origins of American relations with the underdeveloped world, with three-fourths of the human persons of our earth's community. And the bases of these relations were laid before that date beloved to diplomatic historians--1898, a date which, in its continuing pre-eminence, only confirms the "Caucasian" bias of American foreign policy.

A confluence of various and even contradictory thought-streams and special interests produced something approaching a consensus among Americans with regard to these non-European peoples: which was that of regarding them as unequals. Their relationship with Americans was not something which was to be discussed and arranged with co-equal status accorded both participants; it was to be decided, essentially, in line with the interests and preconceptions of Americans. The policy on the new frontier thus bore similarities to that adopted on the old, where schools of thought ranged from the wipe-'em-out group, to the benevolently-Americanize-them group, but where the essential assumption of American superiority was
Roman in its imperious self-assurance. Even Cleveland, an apparent exception, did not restore to Hawaii its native government.

America overseas interests has been commercial in bias since before the revolution; even before the industrial revolution created huge surpluses beyond domestic consumer capacity, the American economy's financial lubrication owed a great deal to foreign trade. Hamilton, in *The Federalist* urged on the projected national government specific promotion of foreign commerce, and the maintenance of a navy to assist this policy. As American agricultural and industrial exports grew in volume, the Federal government gave increasing attention to the task sketched for it by Hamilton. Even before the Civil War, a rationale was developed to justify this form of national expansion. Since geography and the prior dominance of industrial Britain in European and near-eastern markets dictated that the United States take its wares to east Asia and Latin America, spokesmen even before the emergence of Social Darwinism, argued the right of America to make the other cultures of these areas over in the Western image, that their value-systems might be altered to require the heavy and consumer goods with which America was oversupplied: otherwise "it is better that an inferior race become extinct, than

that the development of a superior race should be prevented.\(^3\)
American commercial expansion was premised on the exportation of the American way of life. The coming of Spencer and Sumner only added rationalization to a commitment already made by the guns at Shimonoseki in 1864.

More sophisticated thought was required to mask the essential vulgarity of this presumption. It was afforded by the basic assumption of American nationalism, that America was not a closed community, one tradition among many, but rather a great experiment in human destiny, for participation in which all white people were at least theoretically eligible. Nineteenth-century Americans—including Archbishop Ireland and Humphrey J. Desmond—hence could not understand why the perverse Canadians insisted on opting out of this experiment; they naturally attributed it either to ignorance, or to British machinations. American beliefs, in fact, demanded that they ignore the self-motivation lying behind Canadian assertion of autonomy in 1867.

Since the American experiment was one of developing the highest potential of humanity in liberty, cooperation, prosperity and culture, it inevitably followed—even before Gobineau’s thesis gained circulation—that those immediately incapable of joining in must be generically, or "racially" inferior. Such would seem the rationale, when men even

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paused to consider one, of the treatment of the Indian; it certainly underlay the early reaction against Oriental immigrants. Although there were minority Christian and Enlightenment counter-currents affirming the contrary—currents gaining their widest hearing immediately before the Civil War—the operative principle remained "by their works you shall know them," the works being "known" from an uncompromisingly American viewpoint. "Mission" required the Americans to spread their faith to such peoples as were capable of it—some Senators wanted the United States to afford aid to the revolutionaries of 1848. "Manifest destiny" required that Americans expand the population and economic base of their enterprise by taking over contiguous under-populated regions—much as Stalin's concept of world revolution required the consolidation and expansion of its heartland in Eurasia. Both were moved by purposes analogous in their pretended universality.

Seward, from 1865-69, promoted a policy of non-contiguous, if broadly continental, territorial acquisition. He planned for American commercial hegemony in Asia and Central America, guaranteed by control of an Isthmian canal, and strategic points such as Hawaii and the Danish West Indies. It is important to note that his policies were opposed less on grounds of principle—the principle was a logical extension of the need to promote the great enterprise that was America—than on the grounds that American destiny (and business!) did not yet require them, and because anti-Imperialism and anti-colonialism were the vogue in Europe both on grounds of
"economical government," as propounded by the Manchester school, and of the transparent failure of Napoleon III's designs, for which the pejorative term "imperialism" was coined. Anti-annexationist opponents of Seward and Grant, such as William Lloyd Garrison and Gerrit Smith, were personal friends of John Bright of England, and acquainted with these ideas. 4

By the 1870s, however, recession in America combined with a swift volte-face on the part of European powers toward global policies, to convince American administrations of the need for similar policies of their own; while the prejudice against positively occupying tropical Pacific and Caribbean areas remained, the desire to promote American prosperity, if need be by high-handed methods, possessed successively Grant, Evarts (1877-1881), Blaine (1881, 1889-93), Frelinghuysen (1881-1885) and Bayard (1885-1889): reciprocity treaties with Hawaii and Latin nations, the opening of Korea, attempts to thwart the de Lesseps inter-ocean canal project, the non-transfer corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, the acquisition of a base in Samoa (1872), and attempts to cement bi-laterally open door trade relations with China (1880) and Japan (1878) were aspects of these new policies; attempts were made to convince the American working-man that his continuing employment depended upon such policies rather than upon reconstruction.

of the social order. American business did not need to be told.\(^5\)

The 1880s produced varied and sophisticated justification of these new policies, and calls for more of the same. Yet there is a strange irony about all the arguments advanced: they argued that these expansive ventures must be undertaken to affirm American superiority by averting impending American decadence, both moral and material. Although the statistics of actual homesteading and economic investment in the Mid-West and West proved their diagnosis and pessimism premature, prominent analysts were by the late 1880s convinced that the frontier, America's safety valve and chief investment field (as it was imaginatively, rather than realistically, viewed), was closing, and that the dynamism of American society and economy, premised on continuing growth, demanded a newly aggressive extra-territorial policy, if it were not to run down. Frederick Jackson Turner saw that such a policy could not be merely "commercial"—it must have political implications; Alfred Thayer Mahan added it must have militarization connotations. Josiah Strong and Brooks Adams—with their differing Christian and positivist stress—argued that with the constriction and industrialization of America (a land of high individual expectations), class tensions, personal frustrations and competitive greeds threatened to destroy America: only by turning outwards in a spirit of Christian commitment (Strong) or martial humanism (Adams) could America attain moral

\(^{5}\)La Feber, *New Empire*, 32-61.
regeneration and economic prosperity.⁶

In justification of the essential self-centredness such expansion involved, a martial and exclusive Gospel, a newly systematized racism in replacement of the largely informal superiority complex of the past, and a slick Darwinism embodying both and hallowing as scientific fact the drive for commercial, cultural and moral hegemony, were developed. As Burgess and Fiske maintained, the highest form of society was the political, in the creation of which the Teutonic peoples excelled; the Anglo-Saxon branch, made up of English and native Americans were politically, industrially and religiously mature: other peoples must bow to them, be directed by them, or continue in their contemptible inferiority and not cause trouble—with evolution, they would eventually die out or be Westernized. Latins and Slavs were degenerate versions of the Caucasian; coloured races were inherently fated to moral backwardness and, at best, mock civilization.⁷

If one can judge from the degree to which these teachings became the cliches of press and politicians, such thoughts were greedily devoured by native Americans seeking to discover a modern rationale for their feelings of superiority over the new immigrant, and to bolster their self-esteem when they were not quite so sure of themselves. The movement to affirm

⁶Ibid., 62-101; Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (Baltimore, 1936), 1-22.

identity with Great Britain—then committed to an imperialism and a patrician social order both anathema to American traditions—can be best understood in terms of the inner tensions of American society between newcomer and native; as well as of a more general desire to participate in what appeared to be a glorious destiny for the English-speaking. Alfred T. Mahan could at one point even affirm that the American Revolution was a mistake!8

In so far as the formulae for a "large policy" were thus Anglo-Saxonist and Protestant, American Catholics might be expected to take exception to them, and hence to criticize such a policy. Yet in so far as that policy could be construed as nationalist or "patriotic," they would be tempted to support it. Self-esteem, as much as any concern for the inferior peoples, could prompt dissent. What is lacking, at least before 1898, is a searching critique, based on Christian egalitarianism, of the Western assumption of superiority so pervasive before 1898. Let us examine those aspects of American Catholic thought that bear upon the Catholic response to racist and expansionist dogma; and then the specific reactions to issues such as those of Armenia, Samoa, Hawaii, European imperialism in Africa, particularly Ethiopia, the Isthmian Canal question, the Sino-Japanese war, and the Nicaraguan and Venezuelan disputes. In discussing some of the themes of thought, evidence will be drawn from the whole period, 1890-1905.

8Citizen, 16 June 1900.
CHAPTER IV

THE POINTLESSNESS OF PAGANISM

All cultures before the twentieth century held that the religion of a society embodied its noblest characteristics: religion as man's quest for truth. If one despises the spiritual heritage of a people, there is little barrier left to despising them; if one respects that heritage, one may cease using their per capita income, or their literacy rates, as the criterion of their worth. It was the early great students of Hinduism, such as Horace Wilson, who mitigated British policy in India by inculcating reverence for Indian religion; the racist superiority which was the basic cause of the Indian Mutiny sprang from the importation to India of the intolerance of the Evangelical Revival of the 1840s, a mood which swept the old reverence away as "idolatrous."

Since the "age of improvement" would have found it next to impossible to surrender belief in the superiority of its progressive culture, respect for other religions than the Christian could have proved a brake on the intolerance born of this belief. Catholics had precedents for such reverence in the work of Matteo Ricci in China, and Robert de Nobili in Bengal, in the seventeenth century. However, the tendency of Enlightenment and nineteenth century freethinkers to critically arraign the claims of Christianity by writing well of the
other great Asian-born religions—a tendency which had yet to culminate in Frazer's *Golden Bough*, helped cause all Christians, not merely Catholics, to adopt an aggressively negative attitude to these faiths. Comparative religion, having come into being as an enemy of Christianity, was hence largely eschewed by it until all religions began to be equally condemned by atheism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

Ironically, the Americanists, who often cited the work of Ricci and de Nobili as proof of the mutability of liturgy, custom and canon law, and who participated in a parliament of religions in Chicago which included Buddhists and Hindus, do not seem to have been very much less intransigent on the inferiority of these faiths than conservatives. Possibly their very sophistication frightened Catholics, accustomed to viewing the non-Christian religions as, at best, fragmentary and humanly unsatisfying glimpses at truth.

At any rate, it is remarkable that the only sympathetic account of a non-Christian religion in twenty years of the *Catholic World* was one about Kenya Masai beliefs, which was inspired by the boldly modern belief that "philological monuments" illuminate theories on the origin and unity of the human species, and similar, if dimmed, traditions, as to the existence of the human soul. The author showed that the Masai, contrary to popular belief and despite their belief in a number of spirits, were essentially monotheist, postulating a

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great creative "white God of the Firmament over all." By comparing language roots, he grew to believe that other Bantu peoples at least originally shared similar views. The writer was not a scholar--his whole style betrays this. But it is interesting that this respect for Masai beliefs could cause him to break with the arrogant stereotype of native degeneracy made by other priests in Africa, such as those in the Congo (as also evidenced in articles in the *World*) and say: "many of these tribes have excellent natural qualities; they are black, but they are not to be despised."\(^2\)

Thus there was a direct connection with regard to Africa as to the respect or lack of it accorded both native religions and Africans as men. One finds a similar relationship in writings on Asian cultures, and on Islam in Africa. An interesting and scholarly account of Buddhism and Burmese life admitted the sophistication of Buddhist philosophy, but saw it as essentially atheistic and spiritually suicidal in its doctrine of "nirvana." Modern scholars such as Huston Smith recognize that "nirvana" does not signify annihilation, but the extinction of all those desires which cause pain and unhappiness;--as a flame returns to the atmosphere on being blown out (or so ancient Indian physics had it) so does the

human soul burst free. But a learned Benedictine, writing in 1891, insisted that "nirvana" must condemn, rather than fulfill human life; although he admitted, incredibly, that Buddhist thinkers told him his interpretation was wrong, he insisted it was the only logical interpretation of the texts. From this central misinterpretation, the whole of Burmese and Buddhist culture could be condemned as anti-life; and since "nirvana" was "nothingness," those who pursued it must be atheistic. He admitted the Buddhist morality

bears a striking resemblance to Christianity. Yet the greater the resemblance a false religion bears to a true one, the more reprehensible its errors appear.

In an amazing non-sequitur, he described Karma (what today we understand as man seeking and making his true self) as "a self-centred system of ethics;" hence Buddhism was

simply a system of ethics, a rank atheism, and nothing better. In confirmation of which assertion we will now add that the Burmese have no priesthood, no altar, no sacrifice, and consequently no God . . . (hence) . . . there is no morality without God.

It is less the details of his discussion that are false--they are usually accurate. But the spirit in which they are approached is one of nervous hostility, so different to that of Vatican II:

Buddhism in its multiple forms acknowledges the radical insufficiency of this shifting world. It teaches a path by which men, in a devout and confident spirit, can either reach a state of absolute freedom or attain supreme enlightenment. . . .

Intelligent Catholic World readers, perhaps wondering as to the justice of the Anglo-Burmese war, recently concluded in annexation, could find implicit condemnation of Burma in this
description of its whole culture as anti-life. 3

The higher forms of Hinduism were treated with similar nervousness. Another scholarly missionary, basing his work on the researches of Mgr. Laouenan, Vicar-Apostolic of Pondicherry, affirmed the relative recency of Brahmanism in its final form; its eclectic character proved it could not be the true religion; any authentic elements in it must have been borrowed from early Christian traders following the classical trade routes! At least, however, both these writers recognized the need to know their antagonists' faiths well. 4

Confucianism, probably the most realistic program ever devised for social order and the preservance of human self-respect in an unequal society, was treated with even greater disdain. Its lack of an intransigently idealistic or religious base has always left Confucianism vulnerable to attack—even within China itself, by teachers such as Lao Tzu; but at its heart has been a passionate commitment to the dignity of ordinary men, expressed in realizable teachings. It is China's greatest achievement, both in the manner it has been lived, and in its creation. Yet in reply to a writer in The Outlook (Reverend A. H. Smith), who appealed for tolerance of Chinese


4Right Rev. Francis S. Chatard, "Brahmanism Does Not Ante-date the Mosaic Writings," Catholic World, 58 (February, 1894), 729-43. At a more popular level, ignorance mingled with prejudice: one writer attacked Buddhism—a democratic faith—for upholding the caste system! Pilot, June 13, 1903.
rites and customs, the Reverend Bertrand Cathonay, a Dominican, asserted that the Church had not studied them for one hundred years to come to a false conclusion in holding them idolatrous. Praising the civil order of Chinese society—with only one percent of the police European communities require—and the didactic and "unsullied" character of its classical literature, he went on to stress the polygamy, divorce, infanticide, and quasi-slavery of females which were tolerated in that society. Inconsistently he praised the Chinese for "the remarkable use of primitive traditions and natural lights to impregnate their laws, institutions, and customs . . . with a wonderful character of mildness and moderation," yet went on to affirm their country and culture "a huge rotten tree, which seems deprived of sap"; the arrogance of the Confucian literati blinds them to the need for salvation. 5

Toward Islam the tone adopted was equally disparaging, and even less inclined to give any credit to its moral and religious influence—perhaps precisely because Islam is so close to Judaism and Christianity, with its submission to the "one God, living and enduring, merciful and all-powerful, Maker of heaven and earth," and Speaker to men; 6 and its reverence for Jesus and honour to Mary. As the Allied march on Jerusalem in 1917 was to show, the hatred of Islam born in

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6 Vatican II, "Decree on Non-Christians," citing a letter of Gregory VII to Anzir of Mauretania, in Abbott and Gallagher, Documents, 663.
Europe during the Crusades outlived the growth of irreligion in the industrial age; nor were Catholic Americans immune to the tradition. Cruelty was generally seen as a natural outgrowth of Islam, not its perversion; the savagery of Madhist Sudanese (mild when compared with their subjection to Briton and Egyptian) and of the Turk—both groups, incidentally, regarded as dubiously orthodox by the Moslems of the desert—proved the "degeneracy" of that faith. "Mohammedanism" asserted one writer "has waged a furious war from the moment it left the desert until today," (against all) "that is purest, holiest, and most enduring in family life and modern society." Islam, like Christianity, never denied that its adherents might abandon the spirit for the world, prostituting their faith in the process; various reform movements, such as that of the Sufi, arose periodically to combat the trend, as they have in Christianity. Statistically, Islamic society was much less war-like and more given to the arts of peace than Western Europe; it has been more, not less, tolerant of cultural and religious minorities; and its teachings on family life and fidelity marked in fact a striking advance over the customs they replaced. But the stereotype of Islam as war-like, callous and hedonistic was maintained by United States Catholics, and had significant repercussions in their foreign policy opinions. The same writer who could discuss African beliefs with sympathy, spoke of "the dark demon of Mohammedanism, our greatest enemy." The issues of Crete, Armenia and the Philippines involved Moslems, and this stereotype only inflamed
opinion on already embittered issues. The Boston Pilot ridiculed the censuring of U.S. officers who had fed pig-meat to Moslem Filipino rebels, affirming it was unnecessary to go into spasms about the insult to the Mahometan conscience, since "every Christian walking the earth was a living insult to that sensitive spirit." As for the Pilot, "our sympathies are with the pig." Thus did the intolerance of the educated become the prejudice of the mass.7

This pervasive intolerance made easy that affirmation of the primacy of the Christian's rights, and the implicit denial of the rights of non-Christians which determined many of the responses to specific questions, as well as inhibiting criticism of secular policies of militant white mission and national self-concern. And it was those religions which offered the most sophisticated obstruction to the work of Catholicization that were the most slandered. That missionaries—the chief source of such prejudice—were themselves so bitter from frustrated concern for souls, with a gloomy theology to intensify their frustration, may evoke our understanding, but their resultant prejudice infected those who shared no such concern.

CHAPTER V

RACISM

Most of our great-grandparents grew up in an atmosphere saturated with one form or another of racism—the belief that the species homo sapiens is divided into sub-species varying in their characteristics and capacities. It has been earlier affirmed that the very facts of the nineteenth century world seemed to require such a comprehensive explanation of the diversity of cultures. In our era, horrified by Dachau and shaken by apartheid, in an era in which black Africans and indigenous Asians have proved themselves capable not only of imitating, but of improving upon, the rational and technological culture once peculiar to "the West," it is important to bear in mind that good men were once racist, in the technical sense—just as a communitarian future may well find it difficult, but indispensable, in writing of twentieth century America, to understand that good men as well as bad were once individualists. This is not to deny, as we shall see, that the nineteenth century had its inhuman racists as it had its callous individualists; and such people were often condemned by men whose racism was more humane, as by others whose individualism was tempered by responsibility. Nor is this to try to deny that all the racism of that era was objectively productive of much social
and inter-national evil; but it is the tragedy of human history that moral innocence does not necessarily preclude indirect, but no less bad, concrete outcomes from the beliefs and practices of men.

This said, it is important to distinguish the types and divisions of racism once common. Modern ethnologists divide the human family—solely on the basis of physical characteristics, all other criteria having been abandoned as spurious and inapplicable—into five, and even six, subdivisions.¹ Nineteenth-century scientists recognized basically three groups—Caucasian, Negroid and Mongoloid; and, as a glance at the Cambridge-University edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica (1910 edition) shows, scholarly opinion believed that these groups had differing emotional, intellectual and even moral characteristics, inherited as definitely as their cephalic index, skin pigmentation, and hair form. Such teachings represented a grave threat to the Christian tradition; yet awed by the "positivist" or "scientific" case for them, Christians tended to accept their details, while reserving the belief that all men were God's children. However, the two could be reconciled—God obviously wished some of his progeny to be more children than men; and the relations between them should be adjusted accordingly. This was to be openly asserted by some Catholics.

¹The question was authoritatively summarized for me by Professor E. Estyn Evans of Queens' University in 1962. See Raymond Firth, Human Types (London, 1956), 13-37.
There was a second mode of reconciliation. Since the
epicentre of civilization had moved successively from the
coloured cultures of the South and East, and since each civili-
zation was considered, by law, to be "higher" than the previous,
it followed that God had marked different races for different
tasks in the development of the world toward maturity. Hence
emerged what one might term "Providential racism," a form of
racism which the evidence shows nineteenth-century American
priests and prelates to have upheld no less uncritically than
Kaiser Wilhelm, if less exclusively.

However there were strong counter-currents serving to
modify such racism. Publicists, taking their cue from the
more tentative of ethnologists' divisions, erected the most
intransigent (and vulnerable) superstructure of assertions upon
a triple division of the "European" race into Teutonic, Latin
and Slavic branches--descending branches, according to the
publicists. By the late nineteenth century scholars such as
Deniker were already discrediting the whole notion of a
"European" race, and distinguishing the primal stocks--on a
physical basis without linguistic or cultural connotations--as
the Teutonic (including various "Celtic" and "Slavic" peoples,
such terms being solely linguistic), the Alpine, and the
Mediterranean, all of them by historic times so inter-mingled
as to prohibit neat classification of nationalities into any
"racial" genera. It was precisely at this time, however, that
the meaningless Teutonic-Latin-Slavic division was gaining
popular ground, becoming naturally most popular among those
people, including native Americans, who chose to identify with the "dominant" Teutonic strain. Such an extension of racism could not go unchallenged by the spokesmen of non-"Anglo-Saxon" Americans, as nearly all the Catholic Americans, and all of the 'new immigrants' were.

This counter-current of criticism could take various forms. At its most promising, it could lead men—as it did John Boyle O'Reilly—to a healthy scepticism for all racist hypotheses, and an anticipation of the conviction of modern ethnologists that human potential has nothing to do with race. Others did not deny the tri-partite division, but sought to prove that the "Latin" and "Slavic" "races," while distinctive from the Teutonic, had been, and were, productive of achievements complementary to those of the Teuton, and certainly not inferior to them. Still others, from practical and historical observation, demolished the division as spurious, at best indicative only of different language and cultural traditions, which were quite interchangeable, especially in the melting pot of America. Yet both these latter groups were less promising than the first in that they affirmed the unity of Europeans only to deny equality to the coloured peoples; they made but a very partial revision of the superstition of race. Yet, as we shall see in studying Humphrey J. Desmond, even to have made this revision led to an openness of mind capable of making further revisions.

One other point deserves note. There were many men, such as Theodore Roosevelt and Archbishop Ireland, who had
little time for any "heredity" interpretations of race, but who were so convinced and proud of the sway, progress and destiny of the English-speaking peoples, that they upheld a sort of open Anglo-Saxonism; men of character and culture from various racial backgrounds could become members of this dominant "race" by a process of acculturization. The privilege, however, was fully available only to whites. This relatively "open racism" could not but be appealing to immigrants desirous to participate not merely in American life, but in some great destiny; for the rising power of the English-speaking was a fact, as well as a theory, of the times. It became too, the corollary of United States nationalism as the basis of Americanist beliefs within Catholicism, particularly useful when the need arose to disparage "Latin" Catholicism. It too could have its "Providential" interpretation, no less than the closed Anglo-Saxonism of Josiah Strong; in fact being open to many men, it was the more eligible for the Divine blessing.

America including within its boundaries peoples of every European background, and sizable Negroid (Afro-American) and Mongoloid (Amerindian) minorities, it was thus not merely as speculation that American racism took its forms, but as experiment and contest. Americans brought to their view of overseas peoples assumptions already forced on, or challenged by, groups of their fellow-citizens. It will be therefore

2 For Roosevelt's ideas, Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore, Md., 1956), 41-47.
important that we discuss Catholic attitudes to Anglo-Saxonism, to the Negro, and to the Indian. Firstly, however, let us examine the evidence of Catholic response to racism in general.

Father Hecker, it must be recognized, was a racist of a most intransigent sort. When noting that Leo XIII's encyclical "On Human Liberty" spent much time attacking false liberty, Hecker said this did not apply to Western peoples, but only to Eastern, among whom liberty "produces a democracy of Napoleonic plebiscites and South American pronunciamentos. It is the pretense of democracy and the reality of absolutism."

But that he was writing before the publication of Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law (1890), Hecker went on to lecture his readers in a manner that would otherwise lead one to suspect the influence of John Burgess:

The Citizens of this free republic but partially understand how much difference there is between the races of men. . . . The Chinese are not a whit behind many thousands of our native white population in intelligence, yet are hopelessly victimized by paternalism in China, and are a thoroughly pagan race in spite of their intelligence. And now the problem of servility and hence false religion has gradually crept over other races. . . . There are nations in Europe which seem to be shaking off their vermin upon the U. S. . . . an ignorant population who do not wish to be enlightened in our sense of the word. . . .

The Western and the Eastern races are fighting for their ideas of liberty as they understand them in the streets of Rome. . . . the Holy Father is a judicious arbiter.3

Other priests of the Paulist order could not but share much of the Providential racism of their founder. Fr. Walter

3I quote extensively because of Hecker's stature and influence. Isaac Hecker, "The Mission of Leo XIII," Catholic World, 48 (October 1888), 1-13. He seems, unlike others, to have included the Irish among those given to true liberty.
Elliott might write, when defending Americanism "But Sem, Cham and Japheth are equally at home in the universal church and each in his own way, and each way good for each ... the human environments of Catholicity should follow the traits of the race in which it has established its divine influence"; but this unusual generosity was used solely for the purpose of argumentation, and the Paulists were among the most vigorous proponents of the idea that the Catholicity of New Yorkers and Minnesotans was the best possible for Tagalogs and Illucanos. Father H. E. O'Keefe, describing racial superiority as a "vocation," denied that the militarization necessary to its fulfillment was a threat to American institutions, continuing:

The danger shall rather be when we lose the consciousness that our purpose in history is to effect the betterment of high and low types of races by imparting vigour to their religion and giving them the material benefits of our mechanical genius.

A friend of the Paulists, H. C. Corrance, went further in giving elaboration to this "calling" of the highest race. Dealing with the objection that the Saxon and Teuton peoples were lost to that truth at the Reformation, which was preserved by the now decadent Latin races, Corrance affirmed that Providence had made great use of men who did not know God before now—Cyrus was the chosen of God (Isa. 44:16), Pharaoh was raised up to show forth His glory (Exod. 9:16), above all the pagan Empire of the Romans was the instrument facilitating the rise of His Church. Could it be doubted, therefore, that Providence was behind the rise of the Anglo-Saxon-Teutonic
race to world power, and that, in time, they would be ingathered to the true faith, effecting vast changes in it in harmony with its dogmatic essence. Even before then, however, their pre-eminence was an instrument of God.  

It was precisely the "liberals" who were most exposed to such enlightened thinking. The spokesman of the liberal Catholic minority in the East, Fr. Edward McGlynn, affirmed that the English-speaking peoples had a providential destiny. Another radical, the Bryanite Fr. Malone of the Colorado Catholic, also speaking in favour of a colonialist future for America around the same time, asserted at Chicago

if we recognize our God-given destiny as world saviours we cannot help but succeed, for the hand of God will be with us.

Nor was such a Christian and moderate as Cardinal Gibbons immune to racist dogma, although he had little time for a Providential view of it. Speaking on recent troubles in the American South, he said

The supremacy of one race over another, where the two co-exist, is axiomatic to history. It is the function of Christianity to mitigate the tensions arising from this.

Since modern communications were placing all the world's races in co-existence, many of Gibbons' listeners and readers could


5Citizen, 3 September 1898 (Malone) and 4 February 1899 (McGlynn).

6Citizen, 3 December 1898.
not fail to conclude the two principles applied also to United States relations with Filipinos and others.

The stand of Archbishop Ireland on racism was individual, interesting, and ambiguous. Convinced of the superiority of the American way of life and type of Catholicity, he was prepared to espouse an open or cultural "Anglo-Saxonism" as an instrument with which to assert these convictions. However, being Irish-born, he could confess to Mgr. Denis O'Connell that at heart he was no warm Anglo-Saxon; however he granted he would use the fact of their sway. Also, he was one of the first major Catholics in America to assert the right of Negroes to full social and professional equality; in proof of which he opened St. Thomas College to Negroes, one of only two Catholic colleges so open in the country. Justifying his stand he prophesied "The time is not distant when Americans and all other Christians will wonder that there was a race problem." Yet he was later to become one of the strongest propagandists of the white man's burden, for British as well as Americans. Perhaps his views can be vindicated of inconsistency if we interpret his racism as cultural, and, as noted, an instrument of American nationalism, rather than a cause of it.⁷

Before his change of mind (which started in late 1898), Humphrey J. Desmond was strongly racist, and not merely by

emotional inheritance or mid-Western milieu. He minimized the role of blacks in the Cuban revolution (they furnished one third of the insurgent troops, and one of its greatest leaders, Antonio Maceo), asserting "The heads of the Cuban army and state are white men, and the Cuban centres in this country are also civilized and able men of pure Caucasian blood." He implicitly condoned racist imperialism when earlier arguing: "(Spain) holds Cuba much as England holds India--to plunder it. This may do in the case of a barbarian or savage race; but the Cubans are white men." The most revealing and remarkable evidence of his earlier prejudice comes, however, in an editorial criticizing Church expenditures on coloured missions, when so many immigrant Italians--surely of even lesser percent literacy than the Negores, fifty-six per cent of whom could read at this time--were living outside of contact with the Church.

The soul of a negro or of an Indian is just as worth saving as the soul of an Italian. But a civilized Italian Christian is more easily saved, and at a less expenditure of money--and his salvation when accomplished is less likely to relapse. ...

He went on to note

... a white civilized Italian is a greater energy for Christianity than a converted savage.

Justification for this racism-of-salvation was found in the activities of the Apostles, who went to Rome, rather than wasting their time in India or Ethiopia, realizing one Roman, from the vantage point of the spread of Christianity was worth a dozen black men in the jungle.

Undoubtedly Desmond, justifiably irritated as to the
neglect of the Italians, here let slip sentiments which ani­
mated many Catholic clergy and laity at the time. 8

Yet Desmond--rather like Theodore Roosevelt--could even
at this stage tribute a coloured's achievements; he drew
attention to Edmonia Lewis, the Afro-Indian (Chippewa) sculp-
tress who had studios in Rome and to Charles Young, the first
Negro to graduate from West Point. 9 Receptivity to such
abilities boded well for Desmond's subsequent re-education.
So too did his disbelief in the myths of Anglo-Saxonism.

The Boston Pilot alone crusaded against all forms of
discriminatory racism. The Christian piety of O'Reilly and
Roche, the Enlightenment's continuing influence on a minority
of patrician Bostonians, the repulsion from all dogmas and
slogans used to justify British imperialism, the example of
Ireland's subjection, the need to affirm America a multi-
cultural and multi-racial society, and a concern for the Afro-
American--these were the roots of this then most unusual
stand. Once adopted, it knew no bounds: the editors of the
Pilot could take a whole column to upbraid a Belgian editor
for calling the Shah of Persia "a swinish brute." 10

It was not that the Pilot denied that races had dis-
tinctive traits, as well as physical characteristics; one

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8Citizen, 11 December 1897 and 26 March 1898 (Cuba); 5 March 1898.

9Citizen, 13 February 1897 and 13 August 1898; Desmond characterized the young black lieutenant as "a tall fine-
looking young man . . . every inch a soldier."

10Pilot, 26 May 1894.
could not expect otherwise in the nineteenth century. However it denied that any race was inherently incapable of development and that any one race was "superior" in having a monopoly on the virtues—both social and moral—necessary to the truly good life. More boldly, it argued that where a people seemed politically inept or even barbaric, the rights of peoples were so basic that one could not deny the right of such a people to live its own political or cultural mess in freedom. Thus it defended Haiti's independence when others ridiculed it. Furthermore it cautioned against always using Western models as criteria of civilization: there existed other modes of self-government than the Anglo-Saxon. It attacked the whole notion of "a tuitionary annex," agreeing with the Boston Herald that to develop a people against their own will, not at their own pace, was immoral.

Thus, unlike Desmond, Roche could gladly admit the heavy black support of the Cuban revolution:

... speak contemptuously of the revolutionary movement as being confined to a 'band of lawless negroes.' Well, negroes have just as much right to independence as white men, and it is better to be lawless or outlawed than to be subject to laws enacted by a tyrannical ruler 3,000 miles away.

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11 E.g., "The Latin Americans are fit for self-government. Every people is. When any country fails to make the most and best of the opportunity, it is . . . because ages of tyranny have temporarily numbed its energies." Haiti "the sole example of failure, has the right to be its own master." Pilot, 6 June 1903.

12 Pilot, 30 July 1898.

13 Ibid., 10 May 1902.

14 Ibid., 23 November 1895.
Unlike others, Roche had under O'Reilly's influence, arrived at a consistent approach to the problems of racism and white destiny before the debates of 1898-1900 affected not only America but the world. Hence these years see clarification and application of earlier principles, rather than re-education toward new ones. These principles anticipate in all their essentials those of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and of the Johannine encyclicals.

Roche firmly maintained his views embodied the best of Catholic tradition: his anticipation of our own was hence not incidental to his Catholicism. Racism and white superiority were dogmas unknown to the early Catholic Europe, and were still yet relatively unknown in southern Europe and Latin America—witness the honour done the Alexandre Dumas', father and son, in France, although they were of mixed blood, and the multi-racial Gregorian University in Rome. If this gave an over-sanguine view of the facts, at least it called attention to the integrity of the tradition.15 The nationally-based Reform denominations of the maritime north created racial discrimination with their notions of a chosen people, prosperous in the world. This again was an over-simplification of the facts, overlooking both the role of Spain and Portugal in the inception of the Atlantic slave trade, the survival of slavery in Brazil after its abolition in most Protestant states.

15 Ibid., 24 February and 26 May 1894; 7 December 1895: in Latin America, argued Michael Lynch, the races coalesced in the consciousness of God. Pilot 28 December 1895.
and the essentially a-religious roots of modern "scientific" racism in nationalism, not theology. Yet it gained relevance from the fact of so many American Protestant preachers upholding white superiority and mission, such as the sermon of Rev. William W. Landrum affirming

Anglo-Saxon in the dictionary of the pious Southerner means modern Israel. . . Pure blood is next in importance to pure religion. Pure blood is an article of true religion. 16

By arguing racism to be un-Catholic, the Pilot placed itself on firmer grounds with its somewhat sectarian readers, than by arguing it to be an infringement of general human dignity. By identifying racial discrimination with the discrimination suffered by immigrant Americans, as both proceeding from a nativist and un-Christian definition of America, it attempted to portray racism as un-American. 17 One cannot but praise highly O'Reilly and Roche for their lonely witness in this matter. After Roche became consul at Genoa (1904), his successors fell into a vulgar racism vis-a-vis Far Eastern questions—a peculiar and sad inversion of the progress of the Catholic Citizen.

Accepting in principle the possibilities of racial assimilation or integration, and enthusiastic for a strong and expanded America, the Pilot was yet to condemn territorial acquirement on the grounds that Protestant America was so

16 Pilot, 6 June 1903.

17 E.g., Pilot, 1 May 1897. One also remarks that the Pilot (22 December 1900) noted the Boston Herald also admitted the racial exclusiveness of Protestant cultures.
riddled with racism that the outcome of such policies would be the extermination, enserfdom or suppression of native peoples, even as native Hawaiians had been decimated under Congregationalist oligarchy, and as Amerindians had been harried and driven from lands once theirs by the advancing Yankees. An uprising of a band of Pillager Chippewas in Minnesota in October 1898 against "white injustice, exploitation and tyranny" seemed positive proof that

the white man of any race, and especially the English-speaking race, manages to make himself cordially detested by men of other colour wherever he goes.18

The Pilot quoted the detached view of F. R. Guernsey of the Boston Herald, who was commenting on the snobbery of American women in Mexico, in support of its pessimism.

Not until we learn to be more cosmopolitan, show a wider humanity, will we be fit to govern Puerto Ricans and Filipinos. Our race prejudices are too strong. We sit in the seat of the scornful, and when we travel we have it carried with us to sit in as we inspect the 'natives'. Lord, help us!19

Nor did Roche see any grounds for hope, prophesying, on the basis of reports of Governor-General Taft in the Philippines, and the Baptist missionary, Anna Shaw, in Cuba, as to American prejudice:

Racial bitterness is growing and the next half-century will see the problem forced upon us.20

Perhaps nothing is as indicative of the sway of racism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the

18Pilot, 15 October 1898.
19Ibid., 25 January 1902. 20Ibid., 8 March 1902.
fact that exploitative imperialism went largely uncriticized as millions of people in Africa, Asia and Oceania were subjected to it, until its power was turned against a few hundred thousand primitive Afrikaner farmers—who were white. It was the Boer War which evoked Hobson's first critique of imperialism, in which was sketched the basis of his more famous attack; it was the same war which first led English Catholic intellectuals such as G. K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc to participate in the "Little England" agitation with humanist politicians such as John Morley; it was the same war which caused Leo XIII, after long silence, to issue his condemnation of imperialist wars. It is symptomatic, too, that his earlier criticism of racism to Mme. Severine was evoked not by concern at colonialist excesses in Africa or Asia, but by anxiety at the rising tide of anti-Semitism in Europe. Clearly what was tolerable when practiced on coloured peoples was intolerable when practiced on white Europeans.

This is what makes the stand of the *Pilot*, and the gradual change in Desmond, the more important, although in the latter case the Boer War had much to do with it. For the institutional Church was to remain racist, despite Leo's condemnations of anti-Semitism and imperialism. Cardinal Rampolla, Papal Secretary of State turned down as unthinkable the requests of Filipinos, many of whom would later join the Aglipay schism, for native bishops—white Americans replaced white Spaniards.

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As the Church condemned class hatred to inhibit working-class group resentment more than to restrain capitalist power, so too the Church preached racial love to facilitate a Christian coloured peacefulness under white rule, not to be the prelude to true inter-racial justice. In January 1903, Leo XIII encouraged Filipinos to accept the Americanization of their Church and country, concluding with a quotation from Augustine:

For the brotherhood of Christ is greater than that of blood. For the brotherhood of blood bears only the likeness of the body, but the brotherhood of Christ shows the unanimity of heart and soul, as it is written 'the multitude of believers were of one heart and soul.'

The Boston Pilot could have borne the quotation on its masthead without shame. And insofar as Americans began revision of racist-imperialist assumptions without reference to South Africa, they share this credit.

22 Letter of Leo XIII 'On the Re-Organization of the Filipino Church,' Pilot, 31 January 1903.
CHAPTER VI

ANGLO-SAXONISM

Reticent, on the whole, of coming to grips with racism truly defined, American Catholicism showed no similar reluctance in combatting its refinement—"Anglo-Saxonism." As noted, the critique could take the form of ridiculing the whole idea, of postulating an open, cultural "Anglo-Saxonism," which really was little more than an exalting of English-speaking culture, or of accepting Anglo-Saxonism while denying its superiority or even self-sufficiency, by countering with the values of Celtic, Latin and Slavic cultures or "races." The role of Anglo-Saxonism in the formulation of late nineteenth-century American nationalism, imperialism and racism is sufficient to merit this short account of Catholicity's critique of it. Its role in mobilizing native American opinion for accord with England, and hostility to Spain in 1898, makes the critique more significant—and understandable. The association of "Anglo-Saxonism" with militant Protestant nativism made the critique vital and inevitable.

It is important to stress that on this one subject, the immigrant Catholic Americans were firmly united. German-American, and Polish-American societies joined Irish-Americans in condemning the chief political fruit of Anglo-Saxonism: the movement for Anglo-American alliance, realizing that, in
the United States, it was rooted largely in the tensions consequent upon their immigration. Certainly, until the 1890s, Britain was the "hereditary enemy" of the United States, so profound an observer as Lord Bryce admitting that anti-English feeling was too bitter and too universal to be the result of immigrant agitation. Nor—as the Catholic and ever secular press noted—had patrician British contempt for American culture and democracy really abated, many of the more sophisticated London journals being quoted in proof of this. However "Anglo-Saxonism" became a real force modifying these antipathies, despite Prince Bismarck's discounting it in his usual forceful manner:

Closer Anglo-American relations are doubtless feasible; but an alliance is improbable.... Besides, it is a mistake to call the Americans Saxons. This dwelling on so-called race interests is nonsense in politics. Look at the Russo-French agreement and the Drei'bund. Politics are not dictated by such far-fetched sentimen
talities.

All the resources of Catholic journalism were brought to bear on Anglo-Saxonism, from detailed research to debunking wit. The attempt of the A.P.A. to define American loyalty in terms of Protestantism evoked less trouble on its part; for

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1Pilot, 22 October 1898 (Germans), Citizen, 1 April (Germans) and 15 July 1899 (Poles).

2Pilot, 15 February 1896.

3E.g., Citizen, 10 September 1898, quotes London Saturday Review, that the United States "exemplifies the depth of public depravity to which civilization is capable of descending." See also Ernest May, Imperial Democracy (New York, 1961), 47, 54.

4Pilot, 28 May 1898.
Catholics could demonstrate the attempt to sectarianize social and official life to be unconstitutional. Anglo-Saxonism, on the other hand, appealed to a more educated public than religious bigotry. It could also rally those urban native Americans lost to formal religion. Anglo-Saxonism, when hereditably, not culturally, conceived, threatened to permanently prevent the assimilation of the immigrant; culturally conceived, it denied the true interchange permitted by the melting-pot tradition. At its worst, it could result in the acquittal of a Pennsylvania sheriff who had twenty-four miners shot dead, on the ground that they were "foreigners" (a case which evoked the abhorrence of all of immigrant stock, despite their own ethnic tensions).5

Tom Paine expressed the essential principle a century before: "Europe and not England is the mother of America."6 Serious Catholic criticism elaborated upon this. Anglo-Saxonism was an epithet popularized by a few persistent, narrow-minded, pig-headed clansmen.7 Its high priest was of part Scots and part Illinois French descent--John Hay.8 As Daniel Defoe humourously noted centuries before, the English themselves were a mongrel people--of Celtic, Anglo-Saxon, Norman, and Scandinavian admixture.9 When one analyzed the successive immigrations that made America, one discovered Anglo-Saxon Americans to be in a minority: of white Americans,

5Citizen, 18 September 1897.
6Cited, Citizen, 31 July 1897. 7Ibid.
8Pilot, 9 May 1903. 9Citizen, 28 June 1895.
12 3/4 millions were foreign born or the children of foreign born; another approximately seventeen million were of third and fourth generation non-English extraction, or of precolonial Irish, Scots, Dutch, German and French extraction; but twenty million Americans, at most, were of English descent. Moreover the proportion of those of non-English extraction continued to rise. Many people claimed Anglo-Saxon ancestry out of snobbery who had no title to it, as Mr. Hennessey and Mr. Dooley proved themselves true Gaelic Norman Chicago Englishmen to each other's satisfaction. And sure of course Theodore Roosevelt wasn't falling for this nonsense—was he not of Dutch and Scots-Irish extraction?

When "Anglo-Saxon" Americans themselves attacked the cult, they were prestigeously cited in the Catholic press. Former President Benjamin Harrison admitted he could identify with the England of baronial and parliamentary liberties, of common law and religious tolerance. But contemporary England symbolized patrician privilege, and imperialist exploitation and adventure. The president of Lafayette College, Pennsylv ania, argued an Anglo-Saxon policy to be un-American.

An all supreme Anglo-Saxon Federation is the dream of petty selfishness. What we must desire is that truth and righteousness shall prevail on earth. Mutual understanding, mutual good-will, and a fair share of the

10 Citizen, 2 July 1898. Also 12 January 1895.
11 Citizen, June 7, 1903.
12 Ibid., 15 April 1899, citing Finley Peter Dunne.
13 Pilot, 19 October 1901.
14 Citizen, 23 March 1901.
world's markets is a much higher policy than that of mutual suspicion, mutual hostility and medieval exclusiveness of trade.\textsuperscript{15}

Nor did the claims of the "Anglo-Saxons" to be an especially gifted people withstand scrutiny. The most unmixed "Anglo-Saxon" area in the United States was the white South; it was also the most brutal, politically corrupt, and, proportionate to white population, the most illiterate.\textsuperscript{16} Law-enforcement was so lax, and mob violence so common, that one could justifiably retort "Are the Kentuckians Fit for Self-Government?"\textsuperscript{17}

Where Humphrey Desmond concentrated on demolishing Anglo-Saxon myths, and gave short shrift to a Celtic counter-myth, which, as he saw, only conceded in principle the essential distinctiveness of the Anglo-Saxons,\textsuperscript{18} he also showed himself aware of the faults of the urban immigrant which caused the native American to wish to identify himself as of separate and better race. Anticipating, in one brilliant editorial, the argument of the sociologists Thomas and Czarnecki, Desmond admitted the new immigrants were often corrupt; but argued that this had nothing to do with their racial characteristics, but was due to the dislocation and temptations of urbanization. No one has yet demonstrated that the urbanized native (Anglo-Saxon) American is better proof

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15}Ibid., 29 October 1898.
\item \textsuperscript{16}Ibid., 30 November 1895.
\item \textsuperscript{17}Ibid., 10 February 1900.
\item \textsuperscript{18}Ibid., 7 March 1896, criticizing the editor of the Michigan Catholic. Of Norman descent, Desmond was well aware the Irishman was anything but pure Celt!
\end{itemize}
against such a transition, while non-English immigrants who
go into farming are as fine as their counterparts of the
seventeenth century. 19

Others, accepting a distinct "Anglo-Saxon" people or
culture, concentrated on refurbishing the image of the Latin
peoples. Surprisingly little was said in defense of the
Slavs, except where they were ill-treated. If most immigrant
East Europeans were Catholic, few journalists identified their
culture as Catholic—and most were probably completely ignorant
of Slavic achievement, hence assumed there was none, and there-
fore found it unhelpful to their Catholic or race apologetics
to bring up the matter. The battles of Sobieski were an
exception, and were cited to shame "Christian" civilization
during the Armenian and Cretan massacres.

The focus of north Europeans was too limited, center-
ing on physical energy, industriousness, intellectuality and
utility. The Latins embodied more fully those elements of
refinement, artistry, aestheticism and *joie de vivre*, equally
indispensable to a rounded civilization. 20 The contribution
of the Latin peoples to civilization and religion during the
classical, medieval, and early modern period was ineradicable.
Not only in the arts, but also, contrary to the stereotype,
in the sciences—witness da Vinci, Galileo, Volta. 21 Even

19 *Citizen*, 21 July 1900.

20 Dr. O'Leary in *Mosher's Magazine*, cited in the
*Citizen*, 12 May 1900.

21 *Citizen*, 30 July 1898.
today the Latins were enriching culture (if the names cited in support of this contention exhibit conservative taste, and 'Christian' caution: the priest-composer Perosi, the dramatist Rostand, the painter of the scripture cycle, Tissot). If Latin Americans seemed backward in business and industry, it was because they did not know the corrupting ambitions of white Protestant individualism, but put community before self. More important, they and all Latins, dwelt in zones deficient in natural resources, enervating in climate, and either sparse or tropical in vegetation. 'Anglo-Saxon' achievement, then, was less a matter of blood than of promising environment: Englishmen in Malacca and Jamaica, Americans in the cotton belt, themselves grow lazy and unproductive.

It is significant to note the extent to which this defense of the Latins coincided with the secular press war on Spain, 1895-99, although it continued after it. It was one of the elements modifying lay Catholic hostility to Spain, even when they did not question She must be evicted from Cuba.

There were finally, of course, those Catholics—clerics for the most part, both Americanist and conservative—who accepted cultural-political Anglo-Saxonism. The grounds on which they did so were ecclesiastical, and almost identical

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22Citizen, 14 January 1899.

23Michael Lynch in Pilot, 28 December 1895 and Dr. Henry A. Adams (editor of Donahoe's Magazine) in Citizen, 5 November 1898.
with the grounds on which they supported imperialism. Their viewpoint will hence be reserved for discussion until we present both Catholic sides of the great debate of 1898-1900. The Catholic World on the whole typified the view, although it had dissenting contributors.
CHAPTER VII

CHRISTIANITY AND THE 'LOWER RACES'

If Catholics, despite the exceptions such as Roche and O'Reilly, accepted the thesis that white men had a stern duty towards peoples considered inferior, they also sought to mitigate the dangers proceeding from the performance of it. In the first case, they tended to view civilization as synonymous with Christianity; hence they kept a particularly vigilant eye on the way Christian, and more particularly, Catholic coloured peoples were treated. For clearly the rhetoric of white mission had less application to an already Christian people than a pagan, since the ultimate gift of the white man, his faith, was already possessed. Since many Catholics in this age swallowed their moral scruples about colonial and commercial expansion precisely because it might prove the prelude to conversion, these scruples could be voiced where that task had been accomplished already. Moreover, Christianity made something even out of quite backward peoples. On this score, one Kate Mullaney published an article revealingly entitled "Christ the True Civilizer." Fr. A. P. Doyle could note proudly, that the Filipinos were originally "little removed from savagery," but that Catholicism had "elevated" them. If there were redeeming features to Haiti, "this fierce half-barbaric child of the French Revolution, this unfortunate
offspring of race hatred," they were due to Catholicity, argued another writer. Missionaries held that a strongly authoritarian Catholicism might even decontaminate the Amer­
indian, normally believed "too close to nature to live a supernatural life."1

This special consideration accorded non-white Christians could in certain circumstances extend even to upholding their right to self-determination. The "church-minded," who were most prone to support imperialism for ecclesiastical reasons, were also most likely to repudiate it where it was a case of Protestants ruling Catholics and haltering their rights, as was thought to have happened in Samoa, and as German-Americans thought would happen in the Philippines.

There was a second force mitigating the Catholic sup­port for imperialism. No colonial official or entrepreneur had the right to break the moral law in a flagrant manner with regard to their wards. If the moral law was conceived in a much narrower sense than we should see it—confined to the basics of the decalogue, the interpretation had it—nonethe­less it was offered as a distant check by disfavour on excesses against "natives." Thus the Catholic World, which had long before urged British reconquest of the Sudan from the militantly Islamic Madhi, yet expressed horror at the unnecessarily savage massacre of Omdurman. It also spoke

1Kate Mullaney, Catholic World, 72 (January 1900), 489-95; A. P. Doyle, "Religious Problems in the Philippines," ibid., 68 (October 1898), 119-24; Jane Marsh Parker, "A Glimpse of Hayti," ibid., 51 (May 1890), 244-49; Anon., "Native Indian Vocations," ibid., 65 (June 1897), 343-55.
strongly against forced demoralization of natives through official opium traffic in Asia under British auspices; criticized the Brussels African Conference for not introducing stronger international control, even suppression, of the liquor trade run by Europeans in Africa; consistently supported the acts of the same international conference, and the work of Cardinal Lavigerie, to suppress slavery in that continent; condemned the importation of forced South Sea contract labour into Queensland; and fiercely denounced the plan of the secretary of the department of Indian Affairs under Harrison, to force all Indian children into foster-schools, and break up Indian family-life on the grounds of it being the school in which they were "trained from childhood to love the unlovely and rejoice in the unclean." 2

Desmond of the Citizen was certainly no less concerned in this regard than the contributors to the Catholic World. When the government of India—which gained $22 millions a year in revenue from the opium trade—issued a Royal Commission report on the effects of the drug, concluding it was no

more harmful than alcohol, he commented drily.

The physique and general characteristics of the Oriental races that use opium . . . are not in accord with the conclusions. 3

On the whole, however, the Citizen did not take much note of goings-on in the colonial world—China and Cuba excepted—except to issue routine condemnations of English rapacity. 4

A realist, Desmond once specifically averred there was little point indulging in pity for those faraway peoples beyond one's ability to aid. True, doubtless: but pity could also have served to prepare men morally for situations later arising, within range of aid, or to familiarize them with the notion that coloured peoples have basic rights. Of course, he had yet to fully recognize this himself!

Since the Pilot was concerned not to guard such peoples against the abuses consequent on colonialism, but rather to deny the very premises of colonial "mission," and since in this regard it made no distinctions between Christians and non-Christians, at least formally, to detail its attacks on such abuses in this section would be beside the point. For it made those criticisms not to instigate reform, but to confirm the iniquity of the whole system.

3Citizen, 11 May 1895.

4E.g., Citizen, 25 January 1896.
CHAPTER VIII

THE NEGRO AND THE INDIAN:

FAILURE IN AMERICA, LOST HOPES FOR THE WORLD

A dilemma the ecclesiastical imperialists failed to admit or resolve was the basic one as to how American colonial personnel could avoid injecting into their relations with native peoples the racism so 'axiomatic' at home in treatment of the Negro, the Amerindian and the Oriental immigrant. For clearly such 'official' racism could grievously prejudice both the civilization-mission of the United States, and the spiritual mission of the Church: as it was to do both in the Philippines. Perhaps they hoped racism was not exportable, or trusted, like Leo XIII, to the influence of the Holy Spirit.

But it was not merely the Pilot that saw the dilemma as insoluble until American life was revolutionized.\(^1\) Desmond, and many leaders in the anti-Imperialist agitation came to recognize this too. In diagnosing this, they were uncovering the origins of what may be the greatest problem facing America today in international relations: that she cannot begin to treat the underdeveloped world, predominantly coloured, with honesty, never mind that generosity demanded by justice, until she recognizes the full humanity of her own racial minorities. This is what causes a recent commentator

\(^1\)Pilot, 26 November 1898.
to affirm

The policy of white America toward the poor non-white peoples of the world is as purblind and clumsy as its policy toward the poor non-white population at home. . . . in the end, perhaps, the Negro may yet save white America from itself. 2

Nor was it merely anti-Imperialists and journalists influenced by Christian and Abolitionist tradition who recognized this. A writer in the Catholic World, itself editorially blind to the problem, noted on a visit to Jamaica

Americans as a rule are not liked by the coloured population . . . as the prejudice co-existent with American blood is impossible to eradicate or conceal. We are unconsciously unjust, as we judge every dark skin by the flotsam and jetsam washed to our shores by the "late unpleasantness."

Having started off with such a good intention, the writer then went on to lament that on the island, the blacks

are gradually absorbing everything--army, parsonage, college, government clerkships and every other walk of life

--where they would be much better in industrial schools, learning trades, or on the farms, since

the intensely conservative Creole, who will not associate with the coloured race, is being driven to the wall. 3

That this prejudice, which could thus corrode attempts at open-mindedness, was not cultural (as some would rationalize it even today), but based on pure race hatred by whites, is touchingly proven by a passionate letter sent to the Pilot in gratefulness for its stand for inter-racial justice. It voices

3 Helen M. Sweeney, "From Lands of Snow to Lands of Sun," Catholic World, 59 (June 1894), 402-17.
all the despair of Negroes in the darkening mineties—(and hints at their feeling should the present prove a false and frustrating dawn):

The outlook is not only dark, but growing darker.... Strange as it may appear, the more respectable and self-respecting we become, and the nearer we approximate conditions that tend to make us better citizens and better members of society, the more intensely are we hated. 4

And indeed the situation was worsening. Whereas originally the Pilot was prepared to grant that many lynchings resulted from the procrastination of the law in dealing with genuine black criminals (accepting the myth that Negro passions were more violent than white), it noted, with appalled recognition of their roots in race hatred, that in 1901, of 107 recorded public killings of blacks, but nineteen were for rape. 5 In 1903, a crowd in Belleville, Illinois burnt a Negro alive, and, in a frenzy of blood-lust, dragged him half alive from the fire and tore his body to shreds. 6 Weeks later, 25,000 people turned out in Wilmington, Delaware to burn another Afro-American to death. 7 Booker T. Washington, seeing the failure of his hope that by quiet, patient self-improvement on the part of Negroes would prejudice be stilled, spoke of "the present season of anxiety, almost of despair," and said that an organized joint appeal by his people to the conscience of America might be the only redress. He saw--

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4 A Washington Negro to the Editor, Pilot, 22 January 1898.
5 Pilot, 4 August 1894 and 11 January 1902.
6 Ibid., 13 June 1903. 7 Ibid., 4 July 1903.
prematurely--the danger of Negro counter-riots.\textsuperscript{8}

The\textsuperscript{9}\textit{Pilot} watched all this with sickening heart. Just before his death (Roche revealed) O'Reilly had been growing optimistic, moving close to the Booker T. Washington position that by individual example, white contempt could be quelled. How irrelevant it now seemed. One feels Roche must have had Negro friends, from the depth and frequency of his concern--around fifty editorials and many news reports on the problem, from 1894 to 1904. His editorial opinion changed in response to the growing urgency of what he came to view as the "worst crisis" ever to confront the black race.\textsuperscript{10} At first he looked to the Booker T. Washington formula (although never uncritically);\textsuperscript{11} he criticized abuses such as lynching and the quasi-slavery of new contract systems and black child labour in Northern-financed factories;\textsuperscript{12} he obviously believed in the moral education of whites through editorials expounding the rights of Negroes as fully American, possessing the rights and culture proceeding from this.\textsuperscript{13} He identified their cause with that of the new immigrants,\textsuperscript{14} and also with Catholics\textsuperscript{15}--both subject to discrimination and disabilities. He drew attention to outstanding Negro achievement--to Blanche K. Bruce, former U.S. Senator and Registrar of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{8}Ibid., 18 July 1903.
\item \textsuperscript{9}Ibid., 15 August 1903.
\item \textsuperscript{10}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{11}Ibid., 5 February 1898.
\item \textsuperscript{12}Ibid., 22 September 1894, 13 June 1903, 30 August 1902.
\item \textsuperscript{13}24 February 1894, 13 April 1895.
\item \textsuperscript{14}5 March 1898.
\item \textsuperscript{15}1 May 1897.
\end{itemize}
Treasury,\textsuperscript{16} to William Henry Smith, Librarian to the House of Representatives,\textsuperscript{17} both born slaves. He hailed black heroism in the Civil and late Spanish-American Wars.\textsuperscript{18} He looked to the workings of politics to give blacks offices, and hence recognition; at first he had confidence in T. R. Roosevelt in this respect, following the President's dinner with Booker T. Washington and appointments of Crum and Lewis (both university graduates) to minor offices.\textsuperscript{19}

But he became pessimistic and disillusioned.\textsuperscript{20} Having once welcomed the Negro's joining the Democratic party (as had O'Reilly),\textsuperscript{21} he came to admit both parties used the black without being committed to him: public feeling and violence, as well as political apathy, negatived the few token appointments made.\textsuperscript{22} He published the views of the rising young Harvard graduate, W. E. B. DuBois,\textsuperscript{23} and criticized the policy of Booker T. Washington as "not the only, and perhaps not the wisest gospel," even if it were the only one at present acceptable to outsiders.\textsuperscript{24} He demonstrated the contempt in which the majority of Negro editors held Senator Hanna's

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} 26 March 1898.
\item \textsuperscript{17} 26 December 1903.
\item \textsuperscript{18} 14 September 1901.
\item \textsuperscript{19} 26 December 1896, 1 May 1897, 31 January 1903.
\item \textsuperscript{20} The Republican party is playing a mean dishonest game, rewarding coloureds only where their lives are endangered, 26 November 1898.
\item \textsuperscript{21} 1 September and 20 October 1900, 25 October 1902.
\item \textsuperscript{22} 8 August 1903 etc.
\item \textsuperscript{23} 13 September 1902.
\item \textsuperscript{24} 8 August 1903.
\end{itemize}
legislative proposal to pension ex-slaves: it was another
evidence of political manipulation of the black.\textsuperscript{25} He readily
admitted, how in several states his own Democratic party was
betraying the Negro by enacting disfranchising and "Jim Crow"
laws.\textsuperscript{26}

Had he believed that the Negroes' advance depended
solely on the whites' acceptance of it, this would have driven
him to despair. But from John Boyle O'Reilly, from Fr.
Joseph Slattery, Superior of the Josephites (the mission order
to Negroes), from educated Bostonian black activists\textsuperscript{27} and
from his own reflections on both the Negro and the Irish-
American experience, he learnt to uphold something it is tempt-
ing to describe as Black Power--the corporate and organized
self-reliance and group assertion of the black people.

O'Reilly, his mentor, had incredible boldness in the
matter. In the 1870s, almost a century ago, he argued that
since Negroes were despised generically, there was no point
in their trying to disarm ignorance and prejudice as individ-
uals. Their achievement would either be discounted, or
detached from, and not credited to, the image of their people.
His language suggests the depth of his identification with

\textsuperscript{25}19 March 1903.

\textsuperscript{26}E.g., 19 March 1904 (Maryland) and 1 November 1902
(North Carolina).

\textsuperscript{27}Of this I have no proof. There is no reliable study
of Roche--only articles. But I am convinced he must have
known such men as Ed. Everett Brown, who led Boston Negroes
into the Democratic party; and certainly Washington, who ad-
dressed the John Boyle O'Reilly Reading circle, and, through
him others, \textit{Pilot}, 1 December 1900.
Negro strength is in Negro unity, and it must so continue till the crust of white man's pride, prejudice and ignorance is broken, torn off and trampled in the dust forever. 28

Roche elaborated on this idea. He early understood that phenomenon to be embodied in Martin Luther King: the identification of this movement with black religious life. Separate churches, ironically the fruit of discrimination, gave blacks a purpose of solidarity and a sense of sanctuary. 29 Hence he supported the right of Boston's black Catholics, following their own request, for special Masses. 30 He backed Fr. Joseph Slattery's call for negro priests on the evidence of Bsh. Janssens that "the coloured men mistrust anything carried on for their benefit by the whites, unless the coloured men are themselves allowed the principal parts." 31 And he joined Slattery's prophetic call for a 'Black Parnell,' to lead his people in agitation. 32

Such radical thinking affected Roche's approach to foreign affairs in a number of ways. It reinforced in him

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28 Roche, O'Reilly, 348-49.
29 8 January 1898.
30 10 December 1898.
32 Pilot, 8 January 1898, quoting Slattery. The priest had even more radical ideas--he proposed that the Southern states become a series of "Black Republics," following the migration of white Southerners north, since the cry 'the white men must rule,' justified the counter-cry 'the black men must rule.' He in turn was inspired by Professor Gilliam in the North American Review; see Catholic World, 44 (December 1886), 309ff.
his conviction, born of the Irish experience, that one country had no right messing around with another, however "benevolently." A young Boston Negro Catholic, Robert Ruffin, who attended meetings of the John Boyle O'Reilly reading circle, was one of those contemporaries of Du Bois first to grow fascinated by what was happening in Africa. Roche editorialized upon an article which he wrote for the Weekly Bouquet: in it the early precursor of present black American's identification with Africa argued with great sophistication that the imperial powers were at fault in generically describing all of black Africa as equally primitive, for by so doing they would tend to destroy the relatively advanced civilizations of the Mandigoes, the Neys, and others. Again, with great prescience, Ruffin noted that, contrary to the stereotype, native black Africans were not warlike peoples. Easily preyed on by militant Muslim slavers, they were now in grave danger of being made the 'industrial serfs' of the Western powers. Ruffin's ideas gave body to Roche's own predisposition. 33

For Roche, the evidence seemed increasingly clear that white Americans were, in fact, carrying their anti-Negro complexes abroad. The official appointed by the U. S. (under the terms of the condominium) to Samoa, Chief Justice Chambers, insulted its people because he "drew the line at colour." 34

One of the first American school-teachers in the Philippines

33 *Pilot*, 28 January 1899.

was fired for blatant "nigger prejudice" turned against the natives. The behaviour of U.S. troops in the Philippines, the results of the 'Insular Cases' in the Supreme Court, and his own visit to Cuba and Puerto Rico reinforced his conviction.

He responded in two ways. He came to believe that American Negroes must be warned that imperialism and white supremacy were two aspects of the same coin. He noted that Bishop Alexander Walker of the Afro-American Council had turned against McKinley on these grounds in 1899. He published the explicit arguments of Wm. Lloyd Garrison to the same effect, made before the National Negro Business League. He made much of the manifesto drawn up by leading Boston blacks on behalf of the anti-imperialist Bryan.

He also grew to see the present policies of the Western powers not merely as productive of repeated examples of the oppression of individual peoples, as he had in the past; but as tending to set the stage for conscious and global interracial confrontation, even war. Lin-Piao, our contemporary theorist of the war of the coloured 'countryside'--including American negroes--against the white 'cities,' could scarcely

35Ibid., 13 June 1903. 36Ibid., 20 October 1900. 37Ibid., 1 September 1900. Garrison (1838-1909), the son and biographer of the abolitionist, was a prominent advocate of the single-tax, free trade, negro rights, women's suffrage, repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act, and anti-imperialism.

38Pilot, 20 October 1900.
hope for more from a commentator nearly seventy years ago:

The Boxer Uprising is the beginning of race war, the punishment for the so-called civilization which dreams only for conquest and lives only for sordid ends of trade. The United States has failed miserably to rule the Black and the Red; let us leave the Yellow alone before they refuse to let us alone in the not too distant future. 39

Clearly had Roche had many articulate counterparts in the ecclesiastical establishment, in his journalist profession, in his political party or even among immigrants at large, the attempted accommodations of these days might have been initiated sooner, and by Christians rather than secularists.

The Church, with its traditions, with the resurrection of its consciousness of its multi-racial role following the canonization of Pedro Claver in the 1880s, the abolition of slavery in Brazil, the work of Lavigerie and Damien of Molokai, the foundation of the Josephites, the Mill Hill Fathers, the order of Charles de Faucauld;--the Church had not the excuse of ignorance. Yet, in America, Fr. Joseph Slattery seems to have been the only consistent defender of Negro virtue and upholder of the Negro right to social justice. Even Archbishop Ireland became a backslider on the stand he made in the early 1890s, which won him so much admiration among coloureds. 40 In the new century, he was to

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39 Ibid., 14 July 1900. Despite the title of this section, I have not had time to demonstrate Roche's identification of Negro and Indian, made in this quotation; but he made it repeatedly, influenced again by O'Reilly, who had championed the Madoc Indians of Oregon, massacred after the killing of General Canby (Roche, O'Reilly, 138-39). See, for example, Pilot, "White Man's Country," 13 April 1895; 5 March 1898 (cf. fate of Oklahoma Seminoles to Negroes).

40 Pilot, 22 January 1898; Moynihan, Ireland, 228.
echo the counsels of patience, passivity and individual moral improvement clearly inadequate to the dimensions of the crisis. So disheartened were the blacks, so grateful for any crumb of recognition, that they applauded his notice of them. Not until the 1920s, when Fr. James Gillis, CSP, took over the Catholic World, and Fr. John La Farge, S.J. began to edit America, did the clerical order produce strong champions of Negro equality. It was not until then that Monsignor John Ryan interested one of his students in writing a study of the 'morality of the colour line,' warning him it would be immensely difficult—and failing to secure him a commercial publisher. Hidebound and timid in this matter, the Church, as such, in America, was disabled from viewing the morality of imperialism and colonialism in a fresh light.

The section on the 'pointlessness of paganism' demonstrated that Church attitudes to the coloured people's religions abroad haltered its conscience on racism. The same was true with regard to the indigenous Negro. O'Reilly and Roche stand in remarkable contradistinction to churchmen on this matter. O'Reilly went so far as to argue "The most spiritual man in America is the Negro. He worships with his soul, the white man with his narrow mind." He believed all America

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41Pilot, 28 March 1903.
42Broderick, Ryan, 177. Even Ryan himself did not actively interest himself in the question until 1939 and then it was conservatively; ibid., 262-63.
43Roche, O'Reilly, 142-44, 288-92.
must be sanctified by this spirit. Roche, admitting the limitations of Negro Protestantism, yet argued it was all they had for their 'deeply religious nature,' until the Catholic Church could show itself forth "as the only religious body which sees him primarily and essentially as a man, and only incidentally as a Negro."44

Most Catholic churchmen, like Desmond in his middle years, saw Negro religion as primitive and emotional, childlike and unstable; they were utterly oblivious to Christ's saying 'unless you become as little children, you shall not enter the kingdom of heaven.' One gains a strong innuendo from Slattery's appeals for aid, that many churchmen, again like the earlier Desmond, did not consider the Negro worth the Church's efforts. In so far as the Paulists and Americanists were trying to conform Catholic morality and even Catholic spirituality to the ideals of New England puritanism that emphasized activity, responsibility, self-reliance and intellectual assent, they were further cut off from appreciating a faith that stressed community, warmth, emotionality, and, above all, total dependence on the felt presence of God to give meaning and endurance to life in the world--life which the Americanist saw as opportunity, but Negroes saw as bondage.

The Catholic World published many articles by Fr. Joseph Slattery in which he explained Negro failings, with deep understanding, in terms of the effects of the 'quarters' system of slave days, rather than of innate moral inferiority,
and in which he said bluntly, discrimination and race hate were wrong, that discrimination loomed large in the Church, and that too many Catholics countered Ireland's appeals with the cry "No Social Equality." He saw a great opportunity if the whole church, not merely the provinces of Baltimore and New Orleans, were mobilized to aid the Negro, and promote his conversion, although he saw this could be done only through Negro priests. He was seconded by Bishop Janssens and Fr. E. L. Quade in the desire for conversion, if both these churchmen did not share his open-mindedness as to the Negroes' character. But Quade at least attacked all the evils of white exploitation—overcharging in stores, underpaying for produce, rack-renting, social discrimination, and political disfranchisement. These writers all hoped that Catholicism would so elevate the moral character of the Negro, that prejudice would be dispelled, and that Catholic education would enable the Negro to intelligently avoid exploitative situations. None of them, even Slattery, proposed what Roche acted upon—that frontal attack on the bigotry of the whites, to the whites, without which Negro self-improvement would achieve no social change. 45

From 1896 onward, however, with matters so much worsening, the World did not publish another article on Afro-Americans,

nor publish a single editorial upon them; one can only assume that the new editor, Fr. A. P. Doyle, at heart had little interest in the Negro, and felt discussions of their plight would not help his attempts to give the magazine a popular circulation.

A similar prejudice to that against the Negro obtained in Church circles vis-a-vis the Indian; he was "childlike," his "ideas are gross." In a reply to a plea for Indian vocations—which the editor had noted would provoke controversy!—a Fr. Frederic Eberschweiler, S.J., missionary at the Fort Belknap reservation, said bluntly

Can the red race produce its own clergy? It is impossible. . . . Is not the ordinary vocation to the priesthood not a flower that grows only on the heights of civilization.46

—an argument reminiscent of Desmond's March 1898 position that the civilized were more value to the kingdom of God than the semi-civilized. Only when Indian issues were injected into the cold war of Protestants and Catholics in America did ecclesiastical interest really flame up: when successive Republican administrations attacked and disendowed Catholic mission schools.47 Then churchmen, and particularly Bishops


47 Thomas McMillan, "The Indian and the Future," ibid., 56 (October 1892), 116-23; Charles Carson, "The Indians as they Are," ibid., 68 (November 1898), 146-60, which ended with the rather chilling sentiment, "Although the missions may not be able to save them from extinction, yet they can smooth the way for the departing footsteps of this once powerful people." See also, Moynihan, Ireland, 281-83.
Messmer and McFaul of the American Federation of Catholic Societies, made such a great fuss, that the more conciliatory Roosevelt appointed Archbishop Patrick Ryan to the Commission for Indian Affairs.\textsuperscript{48}

The Paulist viewpoint—so rooted in Hecker's prejudice as to the superiority of white America—expressed perfectly the interaction of lack of justice toward domestic coloured minorities, with failure to properly evaluate the moral dimensions of colonialism. One of their members expressed it succinctly:

How far the taking of this Western continent from the Indians may be justified is not a question which anyone would dream of discussing seriously. Nor even should entering upon the territories of savages in Africa, under conditions approved by a sense of humanity ... offer much room for difference of opinion among practical-minded men.\textsuperscript{49}

The layman could rejoin, expressly mindful of Christ's reminder, that

We have expiated the crime of slavery in the blood of the Civil War. We have yet to answer our crimes against the Indian. ... Our God is a God of the poor and lowly. ... We cannot murder the least of his children on grounds of colour and hope to escape the wrath of God.\textsuperscript{50}

The faltering attempts of some Churchmen, the braver

\textsuperscript{48}Citizen, 23 June, 13 October, 24 November (Messmer's program), 21 December (resolutions of AFCS) 1901; 26 April 1902 (Ryan's appointment); Charles Bonaparte was also appointed, Pilot, 24 January 1903.

\textsuperscript{49}George MacDermot, CSP, "The Great Assassin and the Christians of Armenia," Catholic World (December 1896), 295-305. The writer was introducing these analogies to prove the point that the interests of Christians were antecedent to the rights of pagans—(the Turks).

\textsuperscript{50}Pilot, 5 March, 1898.
deeds and statements of others, to defend the coloured peoples clearly impressed the Negro. It is my contention that the Church in America missed a crucial opportunity—to take the leadership of the Negroes before native American whites, and perhaps then, in turn, to re-educate the episcopal palaces of Europe on the dangers of identifying with an imperialism of white supremacy. The fact that Catholics in America were to some degree "outsiders" themselves, and largely poor, gave them a measure of acceptability in Negro eyes which they cannot now regain, having since become the parvenus of bourgeois America. That this is no fanciful theory is here elaborated.

In spring 1901, Professor Jesse Lawson, Vice-President of the Afro-American Council, and former U. S. Commissioner to the Atlanta Exposition, told 1,200 members of Colored Baptist Lyceum of the District of Columbia, that King Dollar had succeeded King Cotton in suppressing the Negro; his only hope now lay in the Roman Catholic Church. Loud applause followed.51

A year later, Colonel William McKee, reputedly the nation's only black millionaire, owner of coal mines, farms and businesses, died, and although like Lawson not a Catholic, left his entire fortune to Archbishop Ryan of Philadelphia. Ryan, like Ireland, had won black respect by being the (second) figure in the country to integrate a private institution—St. Vincent's College.52

51Citizen, 25 May 1901.
52Ibid., 19 April 1902; Moynihan, Ireland, 228.
These facts, together with the praise given the *Pilot*, and Booker T. Washington's recognition of the work of John Boyle O'Reilly, lead one to conclude that the Negro was so oppressed, so desperate for an advocate in the white society, that the Church could have given truly Christian service to him. It must have been intensely frustrating to Roche and Slattery, and to Negro catholics like Ruffin, to see the Church fail to meet this challenge.

Fail it did: not only to take such a leadership role, but even to diminish prejudice among its own adherents. On August 6, 1903, the Western Negro Editors' Association, meeting at Colorado Springs, determined on memorializing Pius X to have him use his influence with U.S. Catholics to mitigate their race antipathies, and, (in their words)

to break down the spirit of unfairness so prevalent among the labour unions, composed in large measure of Catholics, which in many instances deprive the negro of the opportunity to earn an honest living.

The *Pilot*, having many Irish American labourers among its readers, dealt with such problems in a bold manner: the labour competition of the newly industrialized South (where cheap wages obtained) could be met not by reducing Northern wages, but by equalizing the pay of Black and White. The workingman in every section, of every colour, bettered his whole class when his own status was improved.

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55 *Ibid.*, 22 January 1898. It concluded by stressing "We must treat (the Negro) justly. . . . Christianity commands it; humanity dictates it; prudence commands it; necessity compels it. 'What are thou about to do, for this man is a Roman.'"
Few Catholics were prepared for such boldness. Cardinal Gibbons and Humphrey J. Desmond, while they both condemned lynching (Desmond eventually demanding a federal anti-lynch law), yet condoned the new disfranchising legislation on the grounds of the Negro's not being mature enough to be a political man. In Desmond's case, this was after his attitude had somewhat liberalized. Around the same time (August 1900) he could affirm,

We are prepared to make allowances for the feeling of contempt with which the white Southerner views the inferior and subject Negro population, and, following Booker T. Washington's visit to President Roosevelt, informed the South that it need not blow its top, since no one else in the North would be as hospitable.

On the whole, then, the American institutional Church by turns ignored the black, patronized him, or implicitly condoned his subjection. It never substantially dealt with him as a man, nor consistently defended him as its mission—as Christ embodied to the world—demanded. Since this Church through the work of Slattery was perfectly aware of the Negro plight, and its own opportunity, it seems possible that it was so concerned to "arrive" itself, that it would not champion him for fear of marring its image with that majority of respectable Protestant Americans who despised him,

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56 *Citizen*, 9 February 1901, 18 August 1900, 3 December 1898.

57 *Citizen*, 4 August 1900. 58 Ibid., 26 October 1902.

59 A recent discussion of the matter by Edward Keating was justly titled *The Scandal of Silence* (New York, 1965).
as well for fear of upsetting its own laity.

Not once during Roche's editorship did he ever criticize a bishop (Ireland excepted, for political partisanship), nor ever impugn official Church policies. Yet it is probable that the following lines sprang from exasperation with its attitude, which is the one characterized, rather than that of the nation:

We must not look on the negro as wards of the nation, as mere children . . . but as a self-existing, independent race, understanding its own value.\(^60\)

Had this lesson of Roche been learned by the Church at large it could have been extended—as it was by him—into the fundamental principle of inter-racial and inter-cultural relations throughout the world.

\(^{60}\textit{Pilot,} 20\text{ July 1902.}\)
CHAPTER IX

THE IMAGE OF EUROPEAN COLONIALISM

Undoubtedly one of the real influences upon Catholic, and indeed all, Americans when they came to consider their own nation's expansion was the image of European colonialism. Indeed the position they took with regard to European expansion they tended oftentimes to adopt toward questions posed by the Philippines and Hawaii. Although there were important exceptions to this, such as John Burgess, the editors of the Pilot and the Citizen are examples of such consistency.

However, one has to note that Desmond and Roche and their associates did not probe European colonialism deeply in the 1890s. Their firm stand was an automatic, and often perfunctory, response to issues they considered essentially moral. It was rarely accompanied by specific, detailed accounts of each new European venture. A crippling lack of information (and after all the conquerors themselves were the sole news source from parts of Africa and Asia); the fact that colonial expansion had been largely accomplished before the 1890s; and the reflection that ethical meditations from a distant nation would have little effect on the politicians of Europe, explain this.

Thus, where American ventures tended to evoke fresh thought at each new event, news of the Europeans' activities
caused Desmond and Roche only to repeat themselves, if with varying measures of irony, indignation and pained resignation. The response and suffering of native peoples was left solely to their imagination, the voice of the ubiquitous 'spokesmen abroad' of our own day being denied all but the leading victims of late nineteenth century imperialism. Hence this account must necessarily be short, lest it become a catalogue of names, the significance of which dulled by elaboration of the same response. Instead, those events evoking editorial comments will be summarized, followed by a general analysis of those comments.

French hostilities against Madagascar, the ill-fated Italian campaign against Abyssinia, and German moves against China and Samoa were criticized. Britain's wide-ranging usurpations, interventions and brutalities were frequently deplored; those against the Ashanti (Ghana), the Ahmalubi (Natal), the Mashona (Rhodesia) and the Sudanese in Africa; against the states of Burma, Transvaal, China, Egypt and Thailand; against Africans generally through her participation in, or legitimization of, the Zanzibar slave trade, and against East Asians through her patronage of the opium trade. Maladministration by the British of India was a by-word with the Catholic press, as of course was that of Ireland. Actions by the great powers against Latin American peoples were of course more fully criticized; these, involving the United States, are reserved for later discussion.¹

¹Pilot, 7 April, 5 May, 20 and 27, October, 17 November 1894; 27 April, 19 October, 23 November, 4 December 1895; 11, 18 and 25 January, 14 March, 4 April, 11 December 1897;
Colonialism in general was blanketed under the prohibition "Thou Shalt Not Steal," the attendant killings under the even more serious commandment. But lacking detail to make their fulminations live, editors were forced to grab for their Roget's Thesaurus. The predatory, plundering, robber powers, given over to insatiable and avaricious greed and lust for gold, dismembered nations, plucked territories, exploited peoples, and worked continents for all they could get. These bloody land-grabbers, buccaneers, global confidence tricksters, and pirates, were bent solely on selfish national aggrandizement. The imposition of a 'protectorate' was often proceeded by massacre;—doubtless to convince the natives that they required protection. The international bullies picked only on peoples too weak to withstand them; at heart, they were craven, weak and insolent. John Bull was by far the worst offender: it would be immoral for America to conclude an arbitration treaty with such a power, for it would imply acquiescence in the evil gains he had drawn about him. Arguments of Anglo-Saxonist organs, such as the New York Sun, that British colonialism was beneficient, could be repudiated by appeal to the facts.

Apart from the effect on their national morality, such
policies had demonstrable ill-effects of political consequence on the states pursuing them. The craze for territorial expansion causes the over-extension of power resources; hence in time of crisis, the sprawling mollusk easily falls, as did the Alexandrian, Roman, and Spanish Empires. For this reason it could be prophesied that Russia, not Britain, nor Germany, nor France, would be the great power of the future, for its strength was self-centred:

When the day of trial comes, may it be soon! the Colossus of the North, like the giant of the West, will be found self-dependent, self-supporting, and an easy victor over... the British empire.  

Furthermore, colonialism increased the burden and cost of armaments, strengthened the power of central governments, intensified international rivalries, hence necessitating conscription, and in these ways curtailed individual liberty. In every street, and on every railway platform, of Europe, soldiers were to be seen. The tax burden was enormous. The complicated power alignments ensuing prevented concerted initiative on problems which would benefit from it—the salvation of Crete and Armenia, a redefinition of the temporal status of the Papacy, the working out of arbitration and disarmament procedures.

The persecution of Dreyfus evidenced the malignancy of military power in such circumstances; the famines and bread-riots of Sicily, the impoverishment that expensive policies perpetuated; the rise of Social Democracy in Germany, the

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2Pilot, 11 December 1897.
dangers when domestic problems were ignored. American churchmen, returning from Europe, praised the United States for its freedom from such ills. One of these men was John J. Keane; while Bishop Spalding, although conservative, admitted that in Europe, socialism was meaningful, for there militarism perpetuated wretchedness, and over-awed the people. 3

It is significant that while editorials upon colonialism were frequent in the lay-controlled Pilot and Citizen, they were a rarity in the clerical Catholic World, even in the more colonially-active 1880s. And such as there were, were ironic, rather than morally roused: indeed, the periodical looked to the reconquest of the Sudan, and the conquest and dismemberment of China, to facilitate the ways of Christ. 4 Yet as we have seen, it was far from acquiescing in outright evils, even though it might accept the new imperialism. However, with an attitude thus marked off from that of the Pilot and Citizen, it becomes the more understandable that it so radically parted company from these journals on the issue of American colonialism.

Occasionally editors had sufficient information (or misinformation) to give a picture of what was transpiring in the colonial world. Such pictures did little to mitigate an


4 For Sudan, p. 154 above; and China, p. below.
overall impression of man subjecting man for pride, man using man for gain: details, in fact, blackened it further. In a frightening but all to plausible account of British Egyptian policy, Wilfred Peace argued that the Sudan had been purposefully depopulated by famine, and then permitted to revolt into separation (despite Gordon), to deprive the Khedive of Egypt of his principal reservoir of soldiery. Thus was Britain enabled to halter and mulct Egypt, while U. S. engineers, improvers, and agriculturalists had been dismissed from the Khedive's service, to prevent any modernization being credited to him.5 The Sudan meanwhile lapsed under the control of the excusably xenophobic, and fanatically anti-Christian Madhi—causing clerical spokesmen, such as Dr. Henry Hayman, to call for its reconquest.6 In the event, the brutal reconquest by Kitchener's army, shocked even the Catholic World, which spoke of 'civilizing savagery,'7 while the Pilot was appalled by the use of Lewis guns, and the policy of no prisoners, at Omdurman.8 For the Citizen, the more cautious Desmond reproduced an article from the North American Review discussing the legitimacy of the British Nile expedition. But he too noted the immorality of the strategy behind Egypt's take-over by Britain, and the euphemism of the term "expansion" in circumstances where a nation was derived of sovereignty to

768 (February 1899), ed. 817 September 1898.
preserve the dividends of wealthy European bondholders.\(^9\)
Perhaps too pre-occupied with current American problems, he did not comment on Omdurman.

Another case which fascinated contemporaries was that of the attempted conquest of Ethiopia by the Italians. Catholic Americans were delighted that European colonial arrogance had received an irreversible check at Adowa. And if Humphrey Desmond swallowed some antipathy to the Negro blood of King Menelek, he noted with pride that his great general, Ras Makkonen, was purely Ethiopic (a Semitic people). Furthermore, the Ethiopians were a Christian (Coptic), and 'civilized' people: Cardinal Massala, their Lavigerie, vouched for that, although characterizing their society as feudal.\(^10\) The \textit{Pilot} was most outspoken in welcoming Italy's defeat.\(^11\) Perhaps more significantly, so did the \textit{Catholic World}, at some length. But the scope for a "missionary imperialism" was little in Ethiopia, and, more significantly, the defeat of the Italians, and the resignation of Crispi, their anti-clerical prime minister, in consequence, could be represented as a visitation by God on a people who had disowned and insulted the Papacy (in its temporal aspects). John J. O'Shea, analyzing Italian affairs subsequent to the defeat, gloated over it for this reason: it was 'a punishment that fits the crime,' he averred, doubtless with the song of the

\(^9\) \textit{Citizen}, 3 October 1897, 4 March 1899.
Mikado's self-important executioner humming in his head. Italy had embarked on the war to prove itself, to assuage its pride over the French acquisition of Tunisia, which it coveted, and to offset domestic revolution. But the result was too heavy a price to pay for a United Italy and a place in the 'armipotent' Dreibund. One of the Ethiopians' previous monarchs, Theodore, had told Sir Robert Napier 'First you send a missionary, then a consul to take care of him, and then an army to mind the consul'; but in this case, the army had closed a promising field of missionary activity by begetting hostility to Europeans. (By 'missionary' was probably meant 're-union' activity.)

Abyssinia has a claim on our sympathy as being the only Christian kingdom in Africa, although if it happened to be pagan, the moral guilt would not be lessened. An unusually uncompromising statement for the time!

These are but two detailed, if important examples. With such thought prevalent among Catholics, it was almost inevitable that many of them respond with horror to the idea of America aping the militarist imperialists of Europe, particularly when the people involved had a claim on their sympathy as being the only Christian state in Asia.

Under these new circumstances, European colonialism was to be the more searchingly probed; but that must be reserved.

12 J. J. O'Shea, "The Ethiopians Unchanged Skin," Catholic World, 63 (May, 1896), 227-41; editorial, ibid., 64 (January 1897), noting that Menelek dealt partly through the Pope, and criticizing Italians for continuing to fight during the preliminary cease-fire.
to discussion of the debates on imperialism, 1898-1900, of which it formed a part. It is the contention here that vicarious experience of European experiments with colonialism gave American Catholics certain pre-conceptions vital in 1898, and a disposition to regard the issue as one of high morality. But we must also note the deficiencies of their response to it; content with facile moralizing, and resigned to colonialism as the most likely relationship between 'advanced' and 'primitive' peoples for years to come, like it or not (the historian, Professor Brooks Adams, suggested it last 175 years, hardly flattering the assimilative capacities of the latter), they did not attempt to think of alternative and viable answers to the question of how otherwise could these peoples interact when the age threw them into contact. Colonialism and 'protectorates' were unacceptable; but what could one substitute? how could one culture be mediated to another with a minimum of dislocation, and injustice? how was the message of Christ to be separated from the cultural and political challenges of the West, which might beget reaction, as in Sudan and Ethiopia?—especially when the missionaries themselves, being human, carried with them assumptions of cultural, and even racial superiority? Aware of these problems, except perhaps that of the missionary himself, American Catholics yet showed no sign of answering them. This inevitably reduced the value of their critique of Imperialism (or of their support of it)

13 Citizen, 26 June 1897, summarizing an article of his.
when American policies demanded it; either they spoke largely in noble negatives, without alternative solutions, if against it; or repeated cliches, if for it. Realizing the inadequacy of this, they perforce groped more deeply; but in the early 1890s they lost the opportunity of thinking on Europe's experience. But then, scarce any of them can have at that time envisaged their country a major colonial power!

Finally, it must be noted that there was a direct, if predictable, correlation between attitudes toward colonialism, and those toward race and culture. The Pilot, dubious about the superiority of many aspects of Western civilization, and strongly anti-racist, was most forthrightly anti-colonial. The Citizen, more assured as to the value of Western culture, although not blind to its deficiencies, and certainly then tinged with racism, was more perfunctory in condemnation of colonialism, except where 'Caucasians,' or at least 'Semitic' and 'Aryans' were involved (as Desmond saw it): Latin Americans, Egyptians, Indians, Boers, Ethiopians. He was not above crediting the propaganda smear that the King of Ashanti had 3,333 wives (a figure Biblical in its unlikelihood), or describing the partly black Menelek as "the wiliest and most guileful negro on the dark continent," one sunk in perfidy. Doubtless, even among those who rejected it, such as Roche, the pervasive myths of the racial inferiority of non-whites must have helped inhibit bold thinking in the

14 December 1895 and 14 March 1896.
matter of framing Christian, and non-colonialist guidelines for sharing Western culture with those peoples. In our own day, we see many committed radicals and socialists deflected from constructive hope by the complexity and ubiquity of conservative economics and social morality. In the dilemmas of 1898, perhaps Roche knew their bleak frustration, when even colleagues in his struggle were anti-imperialist for the wrong reasons, racist reasons.
CHAPTER X

AMERICA! AMERICA!

Among the rationalizations to which men resort to justify an expansive or imperial foreign policy, probably the most important, if often the most intangible, is their view of their own state. The Romans vindicated their Empire as the reward of the **virtus**, **gravitas** and **pietas** of their ancestors; nineteenth century Britons similarly vaunted the manliness, enterprise and Godliness of their nation to explain their vast inheritance;—and both Roman and Briton attributed much to their unique political institutions. By the nineteenth century a host of conflicting foreign policies were similarly animated: state upon state had recourse to the myths of its particular nationalism.

The United States was certainly no exception, and the myths sustaining it focused on the virtue of the people, their democratic constitution, and their feeling favoured by God. Of late, their prosperity came to figure in these myths, but perhaps more as an additional proof, were it needed, of these first truths. Such myths are doubtless necessary to men's corporate self-esteem, and to their group endeavour. Held uncritically, and buttressed by contempt for other peoples, they are the first ingredient of a selfish foreign policy, and often, indeed, of a complacent domestic policy,
ignoring new problems and new needs. It would be difficult
to criticize the state's overseas relations, did not one
first detach oneself from these myths.

This section seeks to quickly examine the explicit
positions taken by the Catholic papers on America's myths.
We have already discussed the general considerations causing
an immigrant faith at once to criticize the country harshly,
and yet also belong, in love, to it. Closer evidence sug­
gests that detachment was the more usual mood, detachment
without animus, in the spirit of Webster's remark "To be a
critic of one's country, is not to be an enemy to its promise."
The apartness of the immigrant group's view helped further
Christ's principle and gift, which Christian editors shared,
even unconsciously: be watchful of the things and ways of
the world.

What is remarkable, however, is that not once, in all
the ten years and more of the Pilot, Citizen and Catholic
World, was there a single paean to America, in any of them,
even in conventional commemoration of the Fourth of July. The
jingoism of Archbishop Ireland was alien to Roche and Desmond
particularly.

The prelate's nationalism could cause him to tell
veterans:

War develops patriotism as nothing else. . . . in case
universal arbitration were to prevail, some other
spring of the noble virtue must be sought for, one so
rich and powerful as war remaining for the time being
unknown to me. . . . There are things worse than war,
national dishonour, and loss of national self-respect,
the wreckage of the national inheritance of dignity
and liberty; and if war is only the preventive of these things then let war come with all its miseries.

Asked by appalled correspondents of the secular press how as a minister of Christ he could speak thus, Ireland replied with the assurance of a Theodore Roosevelt as to the nation's righteousness:

The New Testament does not in all cases abhor the sword, for we read in it also, "He beareth not the sword in vain for he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil." ¹

Other leading churchmen, while eschewing such belligerence, sanctioned many of the myths of the American self-image: Fr. Thomas Conaty, Rector of the Catholic University the manliness and Godliness; Cardinal Gibbons the pacific tradition; John J. Keane the freedoms, active consensus and decentralization thought to control public authority; Bishop Spalding the value of capitalist enterprise to the common welfare. ² These are but a few examples. Some of the relevant statements had more than a hint of national self-congratulation; all, on the other hand, were made in a context of exhortation, with the redeeming implication that Americans could fall short of their myths. But nonetheless even to use nationalist myths as a spur to morality is in some measure to condone nationalism, and demean morality. Ideally morality should be enjoined for

¹The original speech was widely quoted and caused much criticism, hence the reply, according to the Citizen, 6 June 1896, which carried both; some Catholic papers welcomed it. Moynihan, Ireland, makes no mention of it.

universal reasons, and thus make men sympathetic to men everywhere as subject to similar dilemmas; morality promoted in a particularist spirit can sanction exclusiveness and divisiveness: thus ancient Israel, Puritan England, and the Holy Ireland of nineteenth century propaganda.

Desmond, thorough as he was, expressed himself on these broad matters. At times he did so with apparent inconsistency. But this seems only because he shared the problems of the nineteenth century liberal considering nationalism: their illusion that to cultivate love for, and identity with, one's own nation necessarily entails a regard for other nations. This might be true, certainly, as when Desmond supported the Czechs in their bid for more autonomy,3 and when America itself propounded the Fourteen Points twenty years later. Yet of itself, nationalism offered no principle by which to compose a clash of national interests, and usually exacerbated such a clash. Some higher principle was required: Desmond and Roche saw this fitfully. A certain confusion between patriotism and nationalism hindered them,4 and, indeed, lay at all the heart of the liberal's difficulties in general in this matter.

3Citizen, 11 December 1897.

I should define nationalism as a dedication to a country's advantage as defined by its own myths and worldly interests; patriotism as a love of the country's well-being established in consistence with universal moral principles. Nationalism can ignore domestic corruption, even sustain it as "traditional"; patriotism not only must see and combat it, but admit it to outsiders. Of course the two blur in our thinking on many national issues, so that we cannot expect more, and should expect less, of nineteenth century men.
Because both patriotism and nationalism involve dedication, a measure of self-transcendence, the religious mind has been peculiarly susceptible to them. Thus alone can we interpret Archbishop Ireland’s strange speech. Even Desmond could write, explicitly

In the normal course of human events, a man is a good citizen, because he is a good churchman and not in spite of it. Love of country is a generalization of that love of one’s neighbour which is a corollary of love of God. ⁵

He therefore concluded that while of course God was above country, there was rarely necessity to remember this. Similarly, Fr. H. E. O’Keefe could eulogize patriotism as being akin to that love of family divinely ordained. ⁶ And an Americanizer, Lewis Hubbard, did not reject the thesis of a conservative German priest, that national sentiment vivifies and sustains religion, but instead implied strongly that the real question was which nationalism would best sustain the faith of future Americans. ⁷

Thus not only was devotion to the nation believed analogous to religion, by evoking selflessness; it was believed to strengthen religion when the two were experienced together from childhood. As Desmond wittily pointed out, the very

⁵Citizen, 6 February 1897.


⁷Hubbard, “Nationality and Religion,” ibid., 50 (December 1889), 396-400. H. J. Desmond later himself argued that the survival itself of the Catholic faith in America depended on its having a form consistent with American customs and traditions; Citizen, 13 April 1901.
German priests most critical of undue adulation of America by liberal Catholics, themselves adjourned all meetings of the Priesterverein with a rousing *Die Wacht am Rhein* (the song of the German unification movement). The closeness of the two made a critique of nationalism by religion less natural than might be expected. But the very conflict between German Catholics and the Americanizers made some such discussion inevitable, quite apart from discussions occasioned by secular affairs.

In an early moment of clarity, Desmond said there were higher duties than those of nationality; as Arnius Sylvius ("we fancy he was a wise ruler") noted ages since, "the true patriot puts the good of his family second to that of his country, and his country second to the good of the world." Nationalism, continued Desmond, was almost unknown when Christendom truly existed: it was fostered by the Reformation "which began the tyranny of money over all spiritual things."

Again we have that peculiar tendency of post-Tridentine Catholicism, as we saw with racism and capitalism: if one must damn something, associate it with Protestantism! However, from the promising insight as to nationalism's limitations, Desmond fell straight into the trap that held Archbishop Ireland and other Americanizers (even as it had its fountainhead in Jefferson):

We Catholics, who represent the highest ideals of citizenship, must take higher ground. Our country is dear to us not because it is America but because

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it stands for those essential things which make for the highest glory of God, and the progress of the world.  

The dangers inherent in such messianic complacency have become all too clear since 1896; a true patriotism, as any authentic self-knowledge, would be wary of such claims. Yet the very standards which Americans (not merely Catholic Americans, as Desmond claimed) set before themselves contained the hope of such humbler patriotism when the gulf between rhetoric and reality became too glaring.

However in the meantime, Desmond elaborated his first view—and also drew the practical conclusion, in the Venezuela dispute, that America be sole judge of her own interests, and that the youthful, vigorous nation expand. Later, he had to deal with an argument of the conservative American Catholic Ecclesiastical Review that mature involvement in secular society by individual Catholics led to an uncritical patriotism. In defending the former against charges of Liberalism (in Pius IX's sense), he somewhat simplistically denied the danger of the latter, by showing that patriotism was not necessarily Liberal; quite the contrary. However, he did admit that "needless flaunting" of the American flag in schools and even sanctuaries could beget "a false nationalism," a "puerility of patriotism," but denied that such could ever become a heresy.

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9 Ibid., 15 February 1896.  
10 Ibid., 1 February 1896.  
11 Ibid., 22 February 1896, and also below, 258-59.  
12 Citizen, 6 March 1897.
Over three years later he returned to the theme, again with religious criticism of nationalism in mind. His thoughts seem most important, for he articulates feelings one is convinced others held unconsciously. Nationalism he recognized as strongest sentiment of the age, men sacrificing perhaps more for country than for anything else. While the Church might hope to eradicate it from the hearts of those in the religious orders, so dedicated "to contemn all motives of human respect," it would be unwise to stifle it among the laity, in whom it is so embedded. While nationalism at times prompts "unChristian and unbrotherly attitudes," it is much more frequently the well-spring of unselfish conduct. Consequently

Much the better attitude towards it is to overlook its occasional exuberances and aberrations, and evoke and direct its nobler and better promptings . . . (lest) the needless and injurious impression is made that patriotism and piety are at variance . . . Assuredly this was not the policy of the great apostles . . . (who) ever sought to afford the largest liberty of choice in non-essentials.  \(^{13}\)

The background of this was of course both the war against Spain and the more recent Testem Benevolentiae, which had both intensified conservative misgivings as to American (Catholic) nationalism, and liberal distrust of residual immigrant nationalisms. Desmond was attempting to be a peacemaker. But his assumptions are important, and one must

\(^{13}\)Ibid., 3 June 1899. However, he did warn against that "invidious nationalism" which would set the nationality of a pastor above his education and priestliness. Ibid., 27 May 1899.
note the mistaken ones: unselfishness is not in itself good, but only in terms of the ends it serves—tyrants, criminals, false doctrines and aggressive states have evoked uncompromising selflessness; secondly, for the crucial statement, he switches from talking of "nationalism," to the milder "patriotism," to imply patriotism and piety are not opposed.

However, it would be difficult to deny the common sense of the advice Desmond gave. As he himself recurrently argued, many Italian immigrants were found so hostile or apathetic toward the Church because the short-sighted policy of the Papacy on the Roman question had offended their national loyalties. And he also noted the contrasting case of Ireland, with its patriot prelates such as Croke; although his peppery correspondent, Jeremiah Quin gave proof the Church had in certain instances alienated Irish militant nationalists. If Desmond's explicit discussions seem insufficiently alive to the dangers of nationalism, yet implicit in much of his writing is proof that he was not nationalistic himself, the Venezuela crisis apart. He was most critical of his country's social system, and also of some of its political assumptions. The Pilot, too, while proclaiming "Let the Ends Thou Aimest at be God's, Thy Country's and Truth," yet tempered this motto's nationalism by critically regarding the nation's myths in its editorials.

14 ibid., 13 November 1897, 30 September 1899.
15 ibid., various letters.
Desmond, in the wake of the great depression of the 1890s, warned that the alignment of sweat against privilege, of hammer beating anvil, was entering American life, re-introducing the very evils of Europe which America was once structured to avoid by guaranteeing all men plenty and privilege in return for toil. He defended Coxeyism, attacked President Cleveland for subservience to the money interest, and responded to the Pullman strike by affirming it to be time "to legalize a revolution" in many departments of public life, when Archbishop Ireland was deciding bluntly "Labour is in the wrong." He defended America, and loyalty to it, on the very ground that it had avoided the militarism of Germany, the chaos of Italy, the extremism of Spanish politics, the unresolved social crisis of post-industrial France and England. He visualized America as a battlefield for the future. This was the reverse of patriotic complacency--America must remake herself, the time was one of crisis.

There was no use looking to the wealthy: the great fallacy of the "Gospel of Wealth" has always been that the possession of much creates an infinite desire for more. When, occasionally, the wealthy did give, they invested in "masoleums of books," not projects for the general welfare. The Church particularly must mobilize to better the condition

16 Ibid., 6 October 1894.
17 Ibid., 9 June, 14 July, 8 December 1894.
18 Ibid., 2 May 1896. 19 Ibid., 28 January 1899.
20 Ibid., 13 July 1901.
of the poor. It is a minor thing to prate of charity, a good thing admittedly, but ancillary to the claims of justice.

Not the loftiest spires could extenuate a congregation of hovels.

Socialism might, in its philosophical aspects, be false; but its prevalence was symptomatic of grave ills in society.

Not working class agitators, but the heartless industrialist, was the real provocateur of class hatreds mounting in American society. The Church was misguided if it condemned the abstract materialism of Socialism only to uphold the more dangerous and real materialism that was capitalism.

American traditions and institutions were resilient enough to Americanize that socialism as it took root: the program of the Social Democrats illustrated such a process already. The crisis was so grave, that populists, radicals and socialists must be welcomed as "social physicians": their ideas contained the germs of inevitable reforms, such as municipal ownership of utilities, and nationalization of resources.

Not conservatism, but a politics of Christian social conscience, was the answer to the Socialist challenge, whether in Germany or America. The growth of the trusts was so revolutionizing.

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21 Ibid., 3 August 1901.  
22 Ibid., 6 July 1901.  
23 Ibid., 22 June 1901.  
24 Ibid., 22 November 1902, etc.  
25 Ibid., 6 June 1903.  
26 Ibid., 20 September 1902.  
27 Ibid., 8 February 1902.  
28 Ibid., 29 February, 18 July, 17 October, 1896, etc.  
29 Ibid., 22 March 1902.
industrial life as to make nostalgia for the era of the independent concern irrelevant: hence the lessons of Socialism were indispensable.\textsuperscript{30}

Now could America afford to be self-contained in these matters. The pioneering experiments of Australian and New Zealand, in industrial arbitration, national insurance, and state control or ownership must be learned from; prelates such as Archbishop Carr of Melbourne recommended them.\textsuperscript{31} Experiment and revolution, both in the economic and political order, were Desmond's recommendations to the dawning twentieth century. Its task was one of "social revolution": not the socialism of Marx, nor anarchism, nor nihilism, but

a prudent and systematic uplifting of the entire mass, without bloodshed and without violence, - a Christian and equitable re-adjustment of things.\textsuperscript{32}

Since at least the early 1890s Desmond recognized that poverty was occasioned by the structure of society, not by defects of self-reliance. He was clearly influenced by the radical wing of Populism, whose doctrines, far from being romantically agrarian, provided the impetus to later reform; Desmond favourably reviewed several works by the intellectual leader of that group, Henry Demarest Lloyd, including his Wealth Against Commonwealth and In Newest England.

The great anthracite strike of 1902 crystallized his

\begin{footnotes}
\item 30 Ibid., 5 April 1902, 27 June 1903.
\item 31 Ibid., 20 June 1896, 3 June 1899, 16 February 1901.
\item 32 Ibid., 29 December 1900.
\end{footnotes}
thoughts. Poverty was a vast system with its own laws, which must be confronted by state action. Quibbles about rights of contract and property meant little; since workers support families, the basic unit of society, and create schools and churches, society itself becomes a party to all wage contracts. It can hence regulate them, if necessary by wholesale confiscation and nationalization of industries, railways and mines. Catholics must take the vanguard in this revolution, and not content themselves with acts of charity; although these were all right as far as they went, the greatest act of charity "after relieving the pressing wants of the present, (is) to assist in revolutionizing the structure of society that is guilty." Yet many churchmen had an avidity to deny this, warning against class hatred in the workers, and so threatening to array the Church against the people on the social question, as once in Europe it was arrayed against democracy, to one its own decay. Yet how could worry in the name of Christianity that J. Pierpont Morgan get six per cent on his watered stocks? The really dangerous classes, the ruling few in the world of finance and industry, created by their greed the conditions for social disintegration.

One should even welcome the existence of extreme radicalisms the programmes of which one would not endorse, for they would frighten these classes in the direction of

33 Ibid., 6 September 1902; see also 13 September 1901.
34 Ibid., 6 July 1901.
35 Ibid., 4 July 1903.
36 Ibid., 20 September 1902.
concessions. 37 Yet too many churchmen would consecrate the existent social order, if they could: men such as Bishop Quigley of Buffalo or Bishop Katz of Denver. 38 Hence Bishop Spalding's admission that a man might save his soul despite the adoption of false economic theories was to be welcomed. 39 Desmond saw that all the radicalisms of recent American history—Greenbackism, grangerism, populism, and social democracy—shared a commitment to the great Benthamite principle, of re-ordering society to bring some happiness to all. 40 Logically, he supported the first great reform campaign of Robert La Follette, noting with satisfaction that the aspirant Wisconsin governor read extracts from Bryan's Populist newspaper at his meetings. 41

A critic of the assumptions and results of the American ideal of free enterprise, Desmond was also a harsh critic of American politics, that pursuit which Americans had traditionally prided themselves upon, as they had created it. He held a moral revolution in political life to be the necessary prelude to social reform, as well as something desirable in itself. In this he was an early progressive, and quite un-Irish in political style. Time and again he warned against

37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 8 March 1902 and 13 June 1903.
39 Ibid., 22 November 1902.
40 Ibid., 16 March 1901.
41 Ibid., 13 September, 25 October, and 1 November 1902.

Norman Pollock's *The Populist Response to Industrial America* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1962), convinces me Desmond shared in the making of the more creative ideas of their progressive minority.
voting for the man one knew, rather than the man one judged to be good; time and again against for the Irish as such, rather than for integrity. Although a Democrat, he believed candidates must be dispassionately set one against the other, regardless of party labels. 42

He was convinced that this duty sprang from Christian commitment, and was thus a precursor of Vatican Two's Catholicism of public service. He was not, however, an isolated prophet; his fellow Catholic publisher and Milwaukean, William Bruce, entered local Democratic politics in a similar spirit, although agreeing with Edmund Burke rather than Desmond on the matter of party loyalty: Bruce had the reputation of being the only uncorrupt Democrat in the state machine. 43 Yet few Catholics followed their call, and Desmond was well aware that priests often supported corrupt and special interest candidates for office, and boldly suggested they did so out of consideration for ecclesiastical finances. 44 And indeed at this time Mayor David Rose of Milwaukee, so corrupt as to inspire a novel from one of the muckrakers, consolidated his hold on the city through donations to the Catholic churches, among other ways. 45 "Applied Christianity" should inspire Catholics as in the manner it caused young Chicagoans to form

42 Ibid., 12 January 1901, etc.
43 Details will be found in Bruce's autobiography, I Was Born in America (Milwaukee, 1937).
44 Ibid., c. 1899: reference mislaid.
45 Bayrd Still, Milwaukee, 308.
a Society of Christian Endeavour to pursue municipal reform.\footnote{46} Dedication to the public welfare should be one of the hallmarks of liberal Catholicism: in this Archbishop Ireland and Desmond were one.\footnote{47} Indeed he defended the Americanism attacked by Maignen and others as

an endeavour to make Catholicity a force in the moral reforms, literature, and public opinion of the country.\footnote{48}

Yet while Desmond argued the Catholics must cooperate with moral and social reformers, if only because, whatever conservatives thought, they could scarcely create a parallel society of their own,\footnote{49} quite apart from more generous considerations, nonetheless he never proposed that Catholics take American moral standards and religious custom as their own. Christians should help form the temper of society, which to thousands was the chief and only standard of right and wrong, in its opposition to grave vices; but must recognize that it offered no call to self-denial. The spirit of the age was one of compromise, stepping between sin and the Church to defend popular inclination and custom.\footnote{50} Similarly, American religion, publicly conceived and publicly manifest, was "diffident, craven and parasitic," terrified of being

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\footnote{46} \textit{Citizen}, 27 June 1896.  
\footnote{47} \textit{Ibid.}, 20 March 1897, 6 April 1901.  
\footnote{48} \textit{Ibid.}, 25 February 1899.  
\footnote{49} There cannot be Catholic multiplication tables, nor a Catholic railway system, he noted wittily; \textit{Ibid.}, 6 August 1898.  
\footnote{50} \textit{Ibid.}, 25 May 1901.
found to be supernatural, and hence laughed at.\textsuperscript{51} The age was addicted to change, to sensation, and Christianity tended to become unobtrusive since it is not "new"—only when the population of the world of conscience was considered, its silent, irresistible power would shine forth.\textsuperscript{52}

One so thoughtfully Christian (remarkably more so than the \textit{Pilot}'s or \textit{Catholic World}'s editors), so much more relevant and succinct in relating Catholic demands to American life than many mid-twentieth century preachers, could not be uncritically nationalist. Of course, as William Leuchtenberg has shown, concern for internal reform need not necessarily exclude an aggressive nationalism directed elsewhere; such was to be true of many of the Progressives.\textsuperscript{53} And Catholic reformers such as Fr. Edward McGlynn, and Fr. Thomas Malone were in the forefront of the ecclesiastical imperialists. But Desmond did not share their faith in the morality of America; although an advocate of the need to rescue Cuba, he strenuously opposed the rhetoric of moral superiority accompanying the attack on Spain, as shall be later detailed.

Here, his most telling phrases can be quoted:

\begin{quote}
Idolators are not the only kind of men who have the habit of making their gods; and putting into the mind of their deity the petty spites and purposes which fill their creature brains.
\end{quote}

Belligerent nations have always had the same tendency; but

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{51}Ibid., 8 June 1901. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{52}Ibid., 15 June 1901. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{53}William E. Leuchtenberg, "Progressivism and Imperialism," \textit{Mississippi Valley Historical Review}, 39 (December 1952), 483-504.
\end{flushright}
military power and good government alone determine victory, and weakness, mismanagement and corrupt politics decide defeat.\textsuperscript{54}

Moreover, Desmond gave direct evidence that in his mind a just expansionism could not be launched by an unjust society:

\begin{quote}
We cannot expect philanthropy and benevolence to inspire imperialists in their foreign policy, if wrong, injustice, and special privilege have been the fruits of their domestic policies.\textsuperscript{55}
\end{quote}

Less intellectual and more journalistic, the \textit{Pilot} made no close examination of nationalism; but in a series of penetrating editorials, even more harshly stripped away the American myths than did the \textit{Citizen}. To the editors of the \textit{Pilot}, the glaring inequalities of American life made a mockery of the traditions and pretensions of the democracy. How could one accuse the radical economist, Professor Richard Ely, of the University of Wisconsin, of heresy, when the national orthodoxy was defined by that minority, the capitalist leaders, capital-owned legislators, capital-governed courts and capital influenced newspapers.\textsuperscript{56}

Like the \textit{Citizen}, the \textit{Pilot} supported the Pullman strikers and Eugene Debs, recently convicted for contempt of court. Any good man, it commented, should have contempt for the courts.\textsuperscript{57}

It enthusiastically welcomed H. D. Lloyd's \textit{Wealth Against...
Whereas the *Citizen* adopted a non-partisan position, the *Pilot* sympathized with the Populist revolt, and backed Bryan in the election of 1896, quoting such other Catholics as favoured him, and criticizing Archbishop Ireland and others who blamed him for fomenting class hatreds. It bitterly repudiated the notion that America's wealth was a sign of American Godliness:

>a country which makes the money power predominant over every natural right is not the country of God's righteousness.\(^{60}\)

It continued by re-affirming God to be a God of the poor, to remind readers that His service was incompatible with that of Mammon. And when the outbreak of the Spanish-American War was causing militant Protestants to more stridently proclaim the Gospel of Wealth, the *Pilot* printed the ultimate criticism, as phrased by the *Ave Maria* (published at Notre Dame)

>Material prosperity depends on other causes than religion, and in no case can it be interpreted as the visible sign of God's pleasure or displeasure. The only promise of temporal prosperity recorded in the Bible was made not by Christ, but by Satan on the pinnacle of the temple.\(^{61}\)

The *Pilot* too recommended lay involvement in the quest for social security, in accordance with the norms prescribed by Leo XIII.\(^{62}\) It was, in this, at once less insistent, and

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\(^{58}\) Ibid., 2 February 1895.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., July-November 1896.

\(^{60}\) Ibid., 5 March 1898.  

\(^{61}\) Ibid., 28 May 1898.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., 11 December 1897.
more cautious, than the Citizen. It saw no good in Socialism as such, and welcomed the repudiation of it by the American Federation of Labor, under Samuel Gompers' and David Goldstein's influence. But it was a strong critic of the moves toward purely sectional self-concern in the trade union movement, warning of a combination of organized industry with organized labour against the general welfare. The unorganized worker, the independent producer, the consumer masses would have no redress against such exploitation. The Pilot had long advocated nationalization of mines and railways, yet the unions opposed this, on the ground that it was politics. The unions cared only for the wages and security of their members:

To work for the betterment of mankind, for a more humane and intelligent industrial system, for a life in which each is for all, and all for each, is 'politics.'

The Pilot was even more critical of the racism of American society, as a reflection upon the American credo. The Citizen in large measure ignored this; to the Pilot, it was crucial. Fifty years before Gunnar Myrdal examined the nation, it proclaimed the American dilemma:

The constitution and its amendments have defined the United States clearly as the country of the people, regardless of race, color, or creed. When it ceases to be that, it ceases to be the experiment and trust and hope of millions of people not only here but all over the world: the Land of Promise to suffering and toiling humanity.

As we have seen in a previous section, the Pilot was very

63Ibid., 28 November 1903. 64Ibid., 6 June 1903.
65Ibid., 13 April 1895.
aware of the extent to which the Negro and Indian were oppressed, and denied elemental rights. In this instance it noted that the South was not alone guilty, for in "the Pharasaical North" there was not a Negro congressman, nor one important city official who was black; nor did there exist one club which would admit the Negro on terms of equality, although the North had Negroes both educated and influential.

The *Pilot* was also aware that prejudice against immigrants mocked American ideals, and so was the *Citizen*, with which it welcomed the presidential vetoing of restrictive legislation affecting their entry.66 Nor was it merely passive in this: in the wake of a symposium in the *Boston Herald* detailing the contribution of different groups of the New Immigration, the *Pilot* stressed that all must be welcome, whether Lithuanian, Greek, Armenian, Jew or Lebanese.67

Both the *Pilot* and the *Citizen*, in frequent editorials, attacked the Protestant nativism of the A.P.A. on the ground that it was constitutionally un-American to define American in terms exclusive of any man, whatever colour, creed or ethnic origin marked him. More generously both came to the defense of the Jews, at that time slandered in every European nation as anti-Semitic propaganda mounted. The *Citizen* early recognized anti-Semitism to be a version of "APAism," welcomed

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66 *Citizen*, 6 February 1897 (citing *Northwest Catholic*), 13 February 1897, and 19 December 1896; *Pilot*, 14 March, 1897, 5 March 1898.

67 *Pilot*, 15 November 1902.
the disqualification of the anti-Semitic mayor-elect of Vienna, deplored the visit to America of the leader of Germany's anti-Semites in the Reichstag, and boldly defended Captain Dreyfus, to the extent of criticizing those religious orders which slandered him. This all exemplified Desmond's readiness to allow his sense of justice to vanquish the stereotypes in his mind, for he once wrote of the Jews as unspiritual, bred and schooled to a materialistic view of life. He diagnosed anti-Semitism as the prototype of all irrational prejudice, scarring every nation without exception, not merely Catholic France, as some charged; he found it incompatible with true Christianity.

Both the Pilot and the Citizen welcomed American representations on behalf of Russia's Jews; indeed, the Pilot criticized Hay for failing to intervene on behalf of Rumanian Jews. Many American Catholics shared the prevalent anti-Semitism: the Citizen's editorial on Roosevelt's initiative was defensive—-but also a bold expression of the thesis of this section, that to Pilot and Citizen, justice came before national self-esteem:

We are told that Russians and Kaffirs may, following the precedent . . . send us anti-Nigger lynching petitions. Very well. Let them do so. We need that sort of prodding. The more the better. Let the nations freely read the moral law to each other if it will

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68 Citizen, 7 and 14 December 1895, 10 June 1899.
69 Ibid., 19 June 1897 and 29 January 1898; these were caused by European reports.
70 Ibid., 10 June 1899.
71 Pilot, 14 December 1901, 8 and 15 November 1902.
help make them more just and humane.\textsuperscript{72}

The \textit{Pilot} too could take a more general swipe at America, apart from the specific ills of money-seeking, racism, religious prejudices and nativism. It criticized the United States as being too prone to create flattering "myths" about itself; and warned that with modern communications, such falsities could take root all too rapidly. The United States was not thrifty, but wasteful; not hard-headed, but sentimental; not sensible, but naive.\textsuperscript{73} No more than the \textit{Citizen}, could it uncritically view American expansion as that of messianic democracy.

Negative confirmation of our contention that a critical Christian knowledge of America could help cause dissent with its foreign policy is found in the \textit{Catholic World}. Critical of the immigrant rather than favouring him, silent on the plight of the negroes, most conservative on the social question (apart from such scandals as child labour), quite frighteningly anti-Semitic, generally enthusiastic about America, and quite non-plussed by the reservations of \textit{Testem Benevolentiae} (a proof of "the devotion of Americans to the Holy See"), the Paulists were quite happy to see Uncle Sam stalk abroad, warts and all.\textsuperscript{74} And it was the more reform-

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{72}Citizen, 11 July 1903. \textsuperscript{73}Pilot, 12 September 1903. \textsuperscript{74}On the immigrant, esp. Hecker, 48 (October 1888), 1-13; Elliott, 43 (July 1886), 463-70; for anti-Semitism, A. de Chequier, "The Anti-Semitic Movement . . ." 48 (March 1889), 741-51; Frank McGloin, 51 (May 1890), 232-36; Anon., "Jewish Preponderance," 52 (November 1890); Editorial, 68 (January
\end{flushright}
minded contributors to their journal (such as Bishop Spalding who could affirm a bond of sympathy with Socialists, and feel that a social system which sustained Irish rack-renting and London sweating-shops ought to be overthrown), that were potential anti-imperialists: he became one.75

Hecker's enthusiasm for America left its mark of the World long after his death. He was so convinced of its merits as to look to a future when a widespread democratic polity among Catholic nations, beneficial to the Church, would cause the College of Cardinals to become "a representative body of all mankind, a religious senate of the world."76 The rule of law and the freedom of her institution made America unique, and the best field for a spiritual Church, working on the souls of men.77 His companion, Walter Elliott, could say bluntly "If men come not here to be Americans, let them live and die where they were born.78 The vexed Roman question would be solved, wrote A. P. Hewit, when the Pope could reign, "presiding in love," over a confederation of Christian democracies, without any need of temporal power.79

1899); C. C. Starbuck, "The Jew . . . the Christians' Antagonist," 71 (September 1900), 828-41, also editorial; for other contentions, evidence follows.

75Spalding, "Socialism and Labor," 53 (September 1891), 791-807; also below.


78Elliott, 43 (July 1886), 463-70.

79"American Catholics and the Roman Question," 55 (June 1892), 425-36.
Remarking on Leo XIII's first major Encyclical to the American hierarchy (1895), the same writer defended:

The medieval ideal was: that a society of Catholics should be a Catholic Society. The people of the U. S. are not a society of Catholics and therefore the nation cannot and ought not to be a Catholic society. 80

So far did the Paulists curry this identification of the mutual good of the Church and Republics, that one writer published an article for them, "The Catholic Church, the Parent of Republics," 81 a tract on what Acton once termed 'medieval Whiggery.'

Thus whereas Christianity encouraged Desmond and Roche to stand back from their country, and judge it, Hecker's ideas had the reverse effect on the Catholic World, which had scarce a critical word for the ills of the country, a few contributors like Slattery, the Josephite, apart. Even he, however, was careful not to caste his concern for the Negro in the form of criticism of America. And apart from the immediate aftermath of Rerum Novarum, the World became very conservative on the social question, criticizing the whole idea of "Catholic Socialism" and arguing that private charity was the better cure than government melioration, which restricted personal piety and initiative. 82 This was the very reverse of Desmond's argument, and, indeed, scarcely in the spirit of the World's

80 "Encyclical . . . to . . . the U. S.", 60 (March 1895), 721-26.

81 J. T. Scharf, LL.D., 61 (June 1895), 290-304. John Courtney Murray's reasoning is hence not new!

82 Anon., "Professor Nitti's Catholic Socialism," 62 (October 1895); "The Church and Social Work," 66 (December 1897).
own contributor who had interpreted Leo's letter on the condition of labour,

that the church should take a lead in a world-wide movement for the relief and elevation of the toiling struggling masses.83

For within six months the World was using Rerum Novarum as a stick with which to beat Henry George, then very influential.84 By 1903, when the great Pennsylvania strikes had driven the Citizen and the Pilot to the verge of socialism, in championing nationalization, the Catholic World was arguing as though the encyclical had never been published:

The inequality in the human family may thus be pronounced unalterable and incurable. What then is left to be done? Why, it is simply to reconcile people to endure, peacefully and contentedly as may be, their condition.85

That this was no mere contributor's view is evidenced by an editorial the next month, which warned the trade unions that if capital was made the slave of labour, it would withdraw itself from industry, so that progress would collapse and poverty ensue!86

The Paulists championed "Patriotism in the Parish Schools,"87 and exalted America, because they believed the

85 Reverend W. J. Madden, "Final Word on Socialism," 77 (September 1903), 723-29.
86 Editorial, 77 (October 1903).
87 Editorial, 76 (March, 1903).
Church would flourish in liberty. Yet they failed to see that very liberty was jeopardized by the politics of plutocracy, the conditions of mass wage slavery, and the brutality of racism and nativism. Their over-riding concern was for souls; they feared a radical emphasis upon material improvement would turn men's eyes to the things of this world. They found in low wages the dignity of Christian poverty, although they condemned the down-and-out as irresponsible. Their priestly concern did not prevent them from rationalizing their social beliefs in thus arguing theologically (a convenience widely availed of by conservative Protestantism also). A saner Catholic tradition held that bad conditions of life militate against holiness, rather than promote it. Yet with much naivete, the Paulists pressed the idea that ordinary men be so spiritually possessed as to be relatively indifferent to poverty, ignorance and oppression. They forgot the worker had to see his family share such asceticism. Is it mistaken to find a direct connection between such attitudes, and the startling announcement that although French subjugation would bring much suffering and humiliation to the Malagasy people, their spiritual state would be much improved by the conquest?


89 Thomas Gilleran, "Catholicism in Madagascar," ibid., 62 (January 1896), 533-42.
PART III

THE RESPONSE TO ISSUES OF EXPANSION

1890-1898
CHAPTER XI

ARMENIA AND CRETE: AND THE
'UNSPEAKABLE TURK' 1895-1897

The Armenian and Cretan massacres and insurrections vividly illustrated the extent to which the American imagination could be enlisted on behalf of moral causes, on behalf of "little nations" far away. They formed that education in humanitarian impulse which was to bring the country to war with Spain. The Armenian question, particularly, demonstrated that America had a group no less determined than Gladstone's in England to be the conscience of mankind--their names perenially recur in the Cuban, anti-imperialist and anti-U. S. army (Philippines) agitations: Wm. Lloyd Garrison Jr., Julia Ward Howe, Senator George F. Hoar, and Robert Treat Paine.¹ They centred on Boston;--hence Roche, himself so humane, could hardly avoid involvement in their cause.

But this reaction to a distant situation also illustrates the beginnings of a less reassuring aspect of American confrontation with the world: the belief that righteous sentiment somehow intuitively sees the right and wrong in most complex affairs. The Armenian massacres were provoked largely by a quasi-anarchist and irreligious nationalist group, the Hentchaks or Huntchagist--which was opposed in Armenia by the

¹May, Imperial Democracy, 25-29.
Gregorian, Orthodox and Uniat priests, and by American missionaries. Like the later Cuban Junta, however, the Hentchaks carried on sophisticated propaganda work in America; they portrayed the Turkish Sultan’s official troops as conducting the massacres, which in fact embarrassed the Sultan, and were carried out chiefly by local Muslim Kurdish peasants, as the cumulation of generations of religious antipathies. The Sultan did little enough to prevent them, probably welcoming the decimation of an incipient nationalist movement. But the Hentchaks welcomed the massacres, for they would drive the Christian peasantry into a political cause, and might provoke an international reaction to ‘Turkish barbarity’ such as occasioned the creation of Bulgaria in 1878.2

Similarly matters in Crete were no black and white case of Christian against Muslim. The Ethnike Hetaeria, a nationist movement in Athens which wished the recovery of Macedonia, determined to exploit an exceedingly complex situation in Crete—which had a measure of autonomy, and a Christian governor. A group of disappointed Christian officeholders had taken to the mountains, proclaiming a Fidelista-type revolt. The Sultan, in response, interfered with Cretan autonomy;--this drove moderate Christians over to the revolt, and caused them to massacre the local Muslim minority (which through death and flight, fell fifty per cent in the next ten years).

2Sir Charles W. Wilson, "Armenia," Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed. (1910), II, 567-68. The scale of the eventual killings must have dismayed them, however.
To forestall Turkish suppression (and capitalize on the Sultan's problems in Armenia), a Greek army landed. Its ultimate aim was probably the incorporation of Crete (and Macedonia), in Greece. The great powers eventually intervened to establish autonomy under their control, and ensure protection for the harassed Muslims. 3

The European powers were certainly aware of these complexities, and of the fact of their being little to choose between the murderous passions of any group of Near-Eastern peasants, once aroused—whether they were Muslim or Christian. American agitators and the American religious press, both protestant and catholic, saw matters more simply: the powers, because of their mutually jealous rivalries, were failing in the age-old duties of armed Christendom.

Catholic interest in these areas had been quickened by Leo XIII's "rediscovery" of the Eastern rites. Monsignor Hassoun, patriarch of the Uniat Armenians, and Archbishop Sembratowicz, patriarch of the Uniat Ukrainians, had been made Cardinals by him. Leo had also plans, never fulfilled, to found universities in Constantinople and Athens to create the inter-Christian understanding vital to further reunions. 4

Catholic interest and American humanitarianism hence coincided, to large degree, on these issues. Hence too, on these, the church-minded Catholic World, and the world-minded

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Pilot and Citizen could speak with one voice, the first somewhat more stridently. It was with regard to Armenia that a Paulist came to be almost explicit as to the rights of Christians being so important as to abrogate those of "pagans." This writer, George McDermott, wrote in a style of utmost contempt for Turks, denying that the Sultan had any rights to deference from European ambassadors. With editor A. P. Hewit, CSP, he argued not only that the European powers were amoral in not intervening, but that the United States should intervene; since this was improbable (the Monroe Doctrine forbade it), at least America should protest from coast to coast and exert diplomatic pressure on Turkey. Other contributors were even more violently anti-Turk.

If the Pilot said less than the Catholic World, it was equally indignant. To Roche (as to Fr. McDermot) the solution was to allow Russia to take over Armenia; only English perfidy was preventing this natural consummation. In fact the Russian government, although deeply embroiled in the complex ecclesiastical politics of the Armenians before 1895, was wary at this time of alienating the Sultan or inheriting another fissiparous nationalist movement; during the massacres,

5"the negro has more title to respect than Hamid II."


7Pilot, 15 December 1894, 30 November 1895, 7 December 1895; Catholic World, 62 (February 1896), ed.; ibid., 62 (March 1896), ed.--suggesting Hewit, the editor before Doyle, was also anti-English in this matter.
official Turkish guards protected the Orthodox Armenians, over whom Russia had protectionary rights, thus saving her the trouble of intervening.

The Citizen too argued the duty of Christendom to sweep the Turk from Europe (hardly the location of most Armenians!) and blamed the delay on English selfishness. The Armenians were associated with all seven million Christian subjects of the Porte, by a Maronite priest contributor. And American intervention was hinted at, although it was later affirmed this was Europe's task, not America's. Desmond himself could here as always learn, and come up with a realistic suggestion—he grew to accept the Kurds' blame and to suggest an international protectorate for all the Armenians, recognizing with humour:

The dismemberment of Turkey is hardly to be expected, as Turkey subserves a place in practical politics, preserving a certain balance of interest. Besides, the Turkish government is mortgaged to posterity!

As the massacres intensified, however, Desmond's judiciousness was replaced by angry impatience, and he called for the destruction of the Ottoman Empire: diplomacy was now 'a soulless subterfuge'; and he agreed that concerted representations by all the European powers could have prevented many deaths.

Both the Citizen and the Catholic World made appeals

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8Citizen, 8 December 1894. 9Ibid., 12 January 1895. 10Ibid., 18 May and 23 November 1895. 11Ibid., 14 September 1895. 12Ibid., 19 September 1896.
for the Armenian Relief Fund, of which Archbishop Corrigan
was a trustee. 13

That all this interest owed much to the fact of many
Armenian Christians acknowledging the papacy, and to the
hope that the rest soon would, is attested by explicit state­
ments to this effect, as well as the Catholic World's opening
its pages to a series of articles on the Armenian Uniats,
including one by Bishop Terzian of Adana. 14 An irony of which
the "church-minded" do not seem to have been aware is that
the massacres increased the Uniat membership considerably:
for the Uniats, unlike the Gregorian majority and the Protes­
tant Armenians, enjoyed the protection of France, which
guaranteed that Turkish officials, as in the case of the
Orthodox, did much to deflect Kurdish hostility from them.

But the view from Rome differed from that in America.
Irish-Americans, particularly, had a traditional affection
for Russia, if only because they saw her as the hereditary
foe of England, as well as a continuing friend to America.
The accession of Nicholas II could evoke the most roseate
hopes for the future of Russian constitutionalism and Polish
Catholicism. 15 Hence they were prepared to give Russia the

13Ibid., 30 November 1895; and Catholic World, 63
(May 1896), 279.

14R. M. Ryan, "Why Catholics Sympathize with Armenia,"
Catholic World, 62 (November 1895), 181-85; Henry Hyvernat,
"Armenia, Past and Present," ibid., 62 (December 1895), 312­
26; Rt. Rev. Paul Terzian, "The Church in Armenia," ibid., 60
(November 1894), 212-26.

15Anon., "Is it to be a New Era in Russia?" ibid., 63
(July 1896), 525-33; Pilot, 10 November 1894.
Christian inheritance of the Ottoman Empire. Henry Hyvernat, a European professor at the Catholic University of America, on the other hand, knew well the relentless jealousy of Moscow's Tsar and Holy Synod toward the Uniat movement; he therefore defended Turkish rule as against Russian expansion, regarding the Sultan as essentially well disposed to the Papacy.16

Sympathy came as readily for Crete. Again, the Great Powers, particularly selfish England, were sacrificing Christians to their national interests. Brave little Greece was shaming the great and strong. When the Greeks suffered some reverses, Desmond commented bitterly that not the German officers only but the whole fiscal and commercial system of England played Janissary to the Turkish power. He welcomed the lifting of the multi-power blockade of Crete from Greece, attributing it to that hero of the Irish-American tradition, the aged Gladstone.17

Both the Citizen and the Pilot gave direct evidence that the moral crusade on these matters preconditioned American Catholics for intervention against Spain: both ran editorials comparing and contrasting the little activity of the Europeans against Turkish barbarity, to the readiness of the United States to heed humanity's call in Cuba.18

16Hyvernat, "Armenia. . . ."
17Catholic World, 64 (March 1897), editorial; 65 (May 1897) editorial; Citizen, 20 February, 21 March, 3 April and 15 May 1897; Pilot, 13 March 1897.
18Citizen, 5 March 1898, arguing that the final action of the powers in Crete (supervising the creation of real autonomy) indicated that intervention in such matters "is the unwritten code of the internation Christian comity" when things have gone too far; the Pilot, 23 April 1898, spoke only of European failures.
SAMOA

Samoa, in itself a small Polynesian archipelago, yet assumed some prominence in American concerns by reason of its being a way station on the route to the vast projected markets of eastern Asia, and of its offering an outpost to defend the planned Isthmian canal. Resident American traders played upon these considerations, so that by 1872 a treaty was drawn up between U.S.N. Commander R. W. Meade, and native chiefs, which was ratified in 1878. Great Britain and Germany countering with similar agreements, the United States negotiated with those powers to secure their mutual interests by means of a joint protectorate (1889). The case, as the historian Frederick Jackson Turner noted, was an early example of how the new commercial frontier would necessitate political involvements. Disagreements between the powers continued, with final settlement—amounting to an Americo-German partition—being achieved only in 1899.¹

Yet the case engaged Catholic attention less because

¹La Feber, New Empire, 35-36, 41, 55-56, 61, 70, 38-40, 323-24; Pratt, Expansionists, 26-27, 201, 274. The de facto cooperation of America with the European Powers in China during the Taiping revolution (1853-1862) to preserve Chinese unity, is an earlier example of such political involvement, unnoted by La Feber, or Turner, for its full significance.
of the intrinsic questions of the arbitrary disposition of native interests and of the destiny of America, than because its details involved a struggle between Catholic and Protestant missionary interests. These interests were tied up in the causes of rival claimants to the Samoan throne. The Catholic Mataafa and the Protestant Malietoa (candidate of the London Missionary Society) each required the support of the powers: the British ensured it went to Malietoa, although the islands' most famous figure, R. L. Stevenson, upheld the cause of Mataafa as the more popular. Perhaps the British and Germans opposed Mataafa less for sectarian reasons, than because he would prove capable of opposing their designs, since he commanded widespread support as the lawful candidate. And political exigencies demanded the powers agree, after a hurricane disaster, in which then opposed American and German sailors had perished together, had convinced statesmen that Samoa was not worth tragedy, either of conflict or otherwise.

At any rate, this matter meant that the Catholic press had, in this instance, peculiarly Catholic reasons for championing the right of self-determination by native peoples: the Catholic World, with its ecclesiastical bent, could thus second the humanitarian Pilot in calling on the United States to refuse to countenance the policies of its partners in the condominium, and even suggest complete withdrawal by America when disgusted at one point by the princely salary extorted for the United States chief justice there. However before the dilemmas of 1898 were posed, the Pilot believed the United
States must remain, Roche being then pledged to the naval and commercial strengthening of America, and hence vulnerable to the apologetics of retention. In fact, it went so far as to criticize Secretary of State Gresham for indifference to the islands. Personal considerations reinforced this: Roche's brother, a pay clerk in the United States Navy, had died in Samoa in 1889. The *Pilot* reconciled its dual concern by arguing that a United States protectorate (as advocated by Stevenson) could guarantee native rights, against the British and Germans, and specifically recommended the New Zealand concept of "trusteeship." However, Roche had misgivings about remaining on grounds of American interests alone:

> In common justice all three (powers) should leave Samoa alone, as America would cheerfully do if the European buccaneers would mind their own business, and leave Samoa to its lawful owners, the Samoans.\(^2\)

In 1898, Malietoa died; and civil war broke out again. Nine years before, the powers had composed their rivalry by agreeing to exclude Mataafa permanently from paramount chieftainship. Now, however, the Germans chose to back the resurgent Mataafa, still the popular leader; for they wished to drive Britain from the islands, and divide them with America. Britain and America supported the new London Missionary Society candidate, Tanu, if primarily for anti-German reasons. They helped him by dispatching the U.S.S. *Philadelphia*, with H.M.S.

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\(^2\) *Pilot*, 7 April 1894, also 26 May, and 2 June 1894, 5 January 1895; *Catholic World*, 64 (March 1897), "A Visit to the Samoan Islands"; Mary Nixon, "In Tolafaa Land," *ibid.*, 69 (April 1899), 88-100.

Articles to this effect were written by Lloyd Osbourne and Isobel Strong, both relatives and associates of Stevenson (who had died in 1894); they were republished in the Pilot. The Scottish novelist had explicitly been forgiven his marrying an American divorcee on account of the nobility and self-sacrifice of his long struggle for Mataafa (and his defense of Damien of Molokai), even if the Catholic press carefully distinguished forgiving, from condoning, the deed! The doughty Michael Davitt now also took up Mataafa's cause.3

The Catholic World stormed against this violation of the American representative principle. The Pilot, comparing the ruthlessness of opposing gun-boats to grass huts, to the current war against the Filipino revolutionaries, saw both as indicative of the brutalities which must ensue from colonialism, and from even de facto involvement in the imperialist rivalries of Europe.4 Noting that the Samoan language had no words for inhospitality and ingratitude, it asked was it only by being instructed in English, by being civilized, that they could learn 'the fullness of baseness.' It demanded that McKinley

3Pilot, 29 April and 20 May 1899.
4Citizen, 22 April 1899, saw likewise and also warned that Britain was deliberately estranging the United States from Germany through such involvement.
recall Chambers and reverse American policy. The Citizen concurred in supporting Mataafa, pointing out that the predominantly Protestant natives wanted him.⁵

For the Pilot and the Citizen, the issue was one with the moral crisis emergent in the former Spanish possessions, by this time. The Catholic World was less sincere: for at this same time it was denying the representative principle to those territories. To it, the good of the Church was the essential principle. This became evident, when it found itself enabled to support America's Samoan policy once the government retracted commitment to the London Missionary Society. When, a while later, the Boer War forced Britain to bow to Berlin, and the islands were divided, as Germany had long designed, into German and American spheres of interest by a new Berlin Treaty, the Catholic World hailed this as "the most important national event of the month." It archly noted:

The Far East is going to be the arena of the world's strivings during the next quarter century, and makes our securing a coal station, and naval base at halfway house vital. In the natives of the island we shall find a docile and submissive people... especially progressive in matters of religion.⁶

Archbishop Ireland would scarcely have welcomed this identification of docility and progressive religion by protagonists of his Catholic imperialism.

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⁵Catholic World, 68 (March 1899), ed.; Pilot, 8, 15 and 29 April, 20 May 1899; Catholic Citizen, 18 February, 15 May 1899.

⁶Catholic World, 70 (December 1899), ed.; also 70 (November 1899), ed.
The *Pilot* and *Citizen* did not protest the treaty, perhaps through weariness, or because it was specified that native chiefs retain much authority. But when the future of the bulk of the islands was thrown open by Germany's defeat in 1918, Roche's vision of trusteeship was fulfilled.  

7 However the *Pilot* did warn, 20 July 1901, that depopulation could follow forced Westernization unless the natives showed self-reliance, and engaged in commercial farming; fortunately Samoa proved too poor to merit such Westernization!
CHAPTER XIII

HAWAII

The Samoan question was a minor outcome of the United States strategy of commercial penetration and naval power in Pacific areas. The Hawaiian question was a major one, and a rehearsal of the problems more fully posed in 1898: in particular whether that strategy, together with recognition that other powers with greedy intent might act if the United States did not, could justify an American colonialism, when the whole tradition of public authority in the United States had been based on the sanction of the consent of the governed. Samoans had not communally opposed United States authority; many followed Stevenson in regarding it as their best safeguard; and after 1899, tribal chiefs in Eastern Samoa (the part allocated the United States by the Berlin Treaty) voluntarily surrendered their sovereignty to her. But while Hawaiian aboriginals were coloured, and hence might be excepted from the principle of consent as Amerindians and Negroes were generally at home, they possessed in the native crown a traditional, articulate and unitary public authority; therefore, unlike the latter, they were a political nation by the criterion of thinkers from Aristotle onwards, and hence entitled to full application of the principles of political theory. Furthermore, they were uniformly and staunchly
Christian. Demands within Hawaii for annexation by the United States came from the powerful American minority--planter and trader descendants and associates of the Congregationalist missionaries. These had gained a preponderance of political control in 1887, and seized it altogether after a change in United States tariff policies jeopardized their prosperity, and native unease threatened their position, as a prelude to effecting that annexation (if Washington agreed) which could secure both. To Cleveland, as to Harrison before him and McKinley afterwards, the crux of the issue lay in determining to which interest to give precedence: the native, embodying sacrosanct moral tradition of Americans; or the planter, involving the interests (and romance) of an assertive Pacific strategy. Cleveland compromised: morality was saved by his rejecting annexation, interests guarded by his refusal to see the native Queen, Liliuokalani, restored. McKinley went ahead with annexation when the Spanish-American War and renewed propaganda as to Japanese designs, changed the climate of opinion.¹

Both secular and sectarian considerations prevented the Catholic press from determining this issue, as others, on rigid ground of principle. Oddly enough, the Catholic Citizen did better, in this regard, than the Pilot; but in this, it was undoubtedly affected by the more parochial temper of the Mid-west, as when it lectured its readers

Hawaii takes up altogether too much national attention. The explosion last week at Butte was more sanguinary than the last two revolutions and rebellions at Honolulu.2

It adopted a consistent policy of opposition to annexation, both on grounds of the principle of consent, and of the additional costs for defense which would ensue, for

We should have to build a navy if we acquired Hawaii, San Domingo, Cuba and other islands that from time to time suggest themselves...3

Carl Schurz was cited as a proponent of the moral aspects of its case, and Mahan specifically repudiated as the leading annexationist. H. J. Desmond was only prepared to consider acquisition if it were the best way to cure jingoism of wanting more colonies by the experiment of having one!4

Other Catholic papers supported his views, the Catholic Columbian (Columbus, Ohio) arguing the illegality of a treaty proposed for conclusion with an oligarchy (one of the several abortive such arrangements was then before the Senate).5

Strange to say, the Citizen did not refer to Hawaii at all when McKinley finally finished the matter.

The Pilot's generally anti-imperialist stance was at first confused on the Hawaiian case. For this case arose when Roche and his contributors were most susceptible to Mahan's dream of a navally superior America—which dream required

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2 Citizen, 26 January 1895.
3 Ibid., 30 March 1895, also 29 February 1896.
4 Ibid., 17 July 1897.
5 Cited in Citizen, 24 July 1897.
naval bases, such as those at Pago Pago and Pearl Harbour, which might well be guaranteed only by annexing the relatively weak nations which leased them. These considerations were compounded by a frank recognition that the projected Isthmian canal would require outlying bases from which to control the sea routes converging upon it, as Mahan himself warned; and by the coincidence of the Hawaii question, after 1895, with the Cuban. When arguing that Cuba should be aided for it offered ideally assimilable territory, the paper was also inclined to think that Hawaii was also readily assimilable. Inevitably, its attitude varied.

At first, however, it upheld Cleveland's reversal of support for the United States 'filibusters' there shown by Harrison. As a Democratic paper, political loyalty constrained it to do so. But it was also sensitive to criticism from Dublin by Irish nationalists, that the United States was tending to a bullying, Anglo-Saxon policy toward Hawaii. It supported this position by publishing material from the Seattle Telegraph demonstrating the islands not worth the taking. Yet it was far from arguing that the United States be indifferent. It mistrusted Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham for lack of stout Americanism against the hated

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6Pilot, 29 January 1898. 7Ibid., 24 February 1894.
8Ibid., 10 March 1894.
9Ibid., 13 January 1894. As late as January 1896 it was still opposing annexation, and fearful that the proposed Baker amendment to the Monroe Doctrine would be used to enable it; 18 January 1896.
English, believing him ready to accommodate their designs in Samoa, and Nicaragua (the Mosquito Coast affair). It feared similar English designs on Hawaii, and not without some grounds, since confirmed by historians of the matter. In January 1895, it warned that Gresham questioned the value of both Samoa and Hawaii, and retorted that they mean nothing...save important outposts in the great ocean which in the immediate future is to be the political and commercial centre of the planet.

It went on to make its first explicit connection between these archipelagoes and the Isthmian Canal (then projected through Nicaragua, itself seen as threatened) in the fulfillment of the American destiny in this exhilarating geographical revolution. And J. B. O'Reilly's own testimony, on the importance of the Pacific (occasioned by his visit to the West Coast not long before his death) was adduced in support of this.

Hence it was predictable that it swung to the support of annexation when party loyalty no longer required the contrary. In January 1897 the Republican McKinley came to the Presidency. By late July the Pilot was approving the treaty for acquisition then before Congress. Yet its conversion was...

10Pilot, 9 June 1894 (both), 26 May and 2 June 1894 (Samoa). See also above p. 224, below pp. 248-50.

11Pilot, 9 June 1894; and Pratt, Expansionists, loc. cit., especially 59, 67, 125-26, 196-97. Pratt however does point out that British intrigue, such as it was, was exaggerated by the annexationist party in Hawaii, for their own ends.

12Pilot, 5 January 1895.
not water-tight; for while at first the *Pilot*—especially Roche, with his fondness for filibusters—glamourized the Americans responsible for the creation of the Hawaiian Republic, comparing them to Sam Houston's Texans, and slandered the natives, in a rare burst of intolerance, as 'barbaric decapitaters,' it was soon to turn strongly against them when they failed to show the moral capacity for self-government expected of them: the criterion was their treatment of native followers of Liliuokalani who rebelled in early 1895.\(^\text{13}\) Furthermore, as more information became available on the general set-up there, its original notions, based on paltry press dispatches, inevitably changed. In March 1895 it obtained and republished a Protestant indictment of the islands' 'Congregational despotism' and the manipulation of the franchise. The frequency of martial law proclamation was deplored, and annexation painted as the desire of the white oligarchy. At the same time the *Pilot* published a letter from the Hawaiian charge d' affaires, F. P. Hastings rebutting the charge that the Republic slandered and obstructed the saintly lepers' priest, Damien of Molokai.\(^\text{14}\) Sectarian preconceptions were thus injected into the matter, and given ample material. That the Congregationalist clique at least maligned Fr. Damien seemed true for R. L. Stevenson defended him also, to Catholic thankfulness. At any rate, by the time

\(^{13}\text{Ibid.}, 20\text{ January 1894; 16 February 1895, asserting "American capability for self-government is on trial before the world, in a small way it is true, at Honolulu."}\)

\(^{14}\text{Ibid.}, 2\text{ March 1895.}\)
the Philippine's church question arose, the misdeeds of 
Hawaii's Protestant missionaries and their sons—particularly 
the decline of the native population from 108,000 to 30,000 
under their auspices—became a favourite polemical rejoinder 
to those who criticized the Spanish Friars. ¹⁵

Such matters, however, did not at first prevent the 
Pilot's shift to an annexationist viewpoint, which was pre-
ceded by a warning against Japanese covetousness. ¹⁶ The 
conversion when it came was closely reasoned: the Hawaiian 
educational system, with its compulsory English, its American 
textbooks and numerous American teachers makes for easy 
assimilation. The case, as mentioned was closely identified 
with a concurrent demand for the taking of Cuba. In case of 
a major war, the United States would have to conquer these 
islands anyhow;—how much better to be defending them? Nor 
should their integration pose problems—statistics show that 
the United States absorbs as many foreigners a year by immi-
gration, without indigestion, as the combined population of 
Cuba and Hawaii. As to their value: Alaska, once dubbed 
Seward's Folly, has within the last months been discovered to 
be a gold mine. ¹⁷ Unspoken, but perhaps also operative, must 
have been some change of ideas about the oligarchy. Its sup-
pression of the 1895 revolt showed it to be firmly entrenched;

¹⁵Catholic World, 67 (July 1898), ed., and 68 (Octo-
ber 1898), 119-24; Pilot, 1 November 1902.

¹⁶Pilot, 8 May 1897.

¹⁷Pilot, 31 July, 14 and 21 August, 9 October 1897.
native Hawaiians could not be any worse off, and would probably be better, under the United States.

Assistant Secretary of Navy, Theodore Roosevelt (who won the Pilot's approval for his impartiality as New York Police Commissioner as well for his sturdy patriotism)\(^\text{18}\) and Secretary of State John Sherman, were praised for their refusal to be fussed by Japan's attitude.\(^\text{19}\) Ex-Secretary of State John W. Forster was quoted approvingly on the dangers of Britain acting if America did not.\(^\text{20}\)

Naval power, rather than commerce, was the chief attraction of an acquisitive policy to the Pilot. It was then pre-occupied with British 'encirclement' of the United States--the bases at Esquimalt, British Columbia, at St. Lucia, at Halifax; the tentative understanding between Britain and the recently victorious Japan; the probing, in Nicaragua and Venezuela, to find the weak points in the Monroe Doctrine; the claims in the Bering Straits and Alaska.\(^\text{21}\)

The Pilot hence filled out its scheme for 'an offensive-defensive position' by a plan to buy Madeira or the Azores "at least as important to our welfare as Hawaii."\(^\text{22}\)

But its traditional commitment to the principle of consent and to Irish anti-colonialism was reconciled with this new departure by the firm warning

\(^{18}\)Pilot, 12 June 1897. \(^{19}\)Ibid., 14 August 1897. \\
^{20}\)Ibid., 1 January 1898. \\
\(^{21}\)See the relevant sections in Chapter Fourteen. \\
\(^{22}\)Pilot, 9 October 1897.
we will have no Sabine wives, no unwilling spouse of a despotic conqueror, no Poland, no Ireland. 23

That this repudiation of the forcible integration of Hawaii (or Cuba) was perfectly sincere was proven when, in response to the publication of Hawaii's Story by Hawaii's Queen by Liliuokalani, it changed front again, arguing on its front page against acceptance by the United States of a Hawaiian State run by 'recreant missionaries,' and wondering if an American protectorate for a restored native monarchy were feasible. 24 However, within two weeks it answered itself, by publishing on its front page the views of Admiral Belknap U.S.N., that such a restoration was not possible, that the United States must have a counter-balance to Germany's Kiaochow and Britain's Hong Kong and Esquimalt, that the island was already fully Americanized, and that the oligarchy might be by-passed by governing the new island through Presidential Commissioners, as was the District of Columbia (which had twice its population). 25 This seems to have been the final specific stand of the Pilot on the question, before the shocks of 1898 weaned it from Mahan's ideas, and Hawaii's future was subsumed into the general debates on 'imperialism.'

If the Pilot did not again mention Hawaii, even as also the Catholic Citizen, we discover one interesting personal

23 Ibid., 14 August 1897. 24 Ibid., 22 January 1898.

25 Ibid., 5 February 1898. The week before it had shown some unease over the necessity of take them: "Honour ordains we take them, if ... at all, with the fullest compensation to the native government," ibid., 29 January 1898.
footnote by a priest some years later. From his very stance, one finds further confirmation of the point suggested by the silence of the Citizen and Pilot after early 1898, that even opponents of annexation acquiesced in the inevitable. But Fr. Tom P. McLaughlin's comments, made following a visit to the island in 1901, are interesting for their dissent, and first-hand knowledge. He found the Kamakas (natives) not immaculate, but good; the immigrant Japanese not morally inferior to other nations, and faithful to family life; and United States ships providing the only basis for local prostitution. Progressively (for his time), he concluded "human nature is about the same the world over." He attacked the "practical slavery" of contract immigrant labour, bound for ten years at seventy-five cents a day. He then boldly continued, that while he supposed it heresy to say the United States flag be pulled down where once it was raised--yet there was a precedent in Havana; and

It makes the heart sad to see it floating where it has been raised against the will of the people.

Further, he suggested the missionary clique had misled McKinley as to the views of Hawaiian's Possession of the island benefited not America, but a few heathen millionaires and an army of foreigners.

Yet in Hawaii, among the Belgian Missionaries, he had discovered a true inter-racial friendliness in the Church, and been caused to 'feel, as he never felt practically in life before, the meaning of the Brotherhood of Man and of our Lord's
saying, Love your neighbour as yourself.\footnote{Rev. Thomas P. McLaughlin, "Aloha, Hawaii," Catholic World, 74 (March 1902), 713-31.}

Both the *Pilot*, and the *Citizen* (despite Desmond's racist preconceptions at the time), had reached toward an understanding of these truths, without this firsthand experience, aided or hindered by a complexity of circumstance. The Church-minded *Catholic World*, however, did not see fit even once to comment officially on a crisis of choice recognized by even secular politicians such as Cleveland to have an essentially moral character. Even McLaughlin's belated article was published as travelogue rather than comment, and illustrated as such with curiosities of costume and scenery.
A conservative scholar, Samuel Flagg Bemis, is at one with more recent students, such as May and La Feber, in noting that Cuban intervention in 1898 must be understood in terms of a search for hemispheric power begun in the early 1890s. Without this, Americans could have ignored Spain's bloody activities as they had ignored them from 1868-1878. Furthermore, Bemis anticipated La Feber in suggesting the urge to new markets behind this policy, and May in interpreting the Venezuela crisis as no less than an attempt to assert hemispheric hegemony. And he stressed that the symbol and the centrepiece of the whole design was the Isthmian Canal issue.¹

The contemporary business sense, the military and naval mind—and indeed that vaguer, but perhaps even more potent force, the popular imagination, were all taken by the vision. The Catholic press reflected this, often energetically. As we have seen, the Pilot justified a continuing interest in Samoa and Hawaii, among other reasons, by picturing them as

¹Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States (New York, 1944), 118-32.
distant defenses for an American security system. Certainly sober minds which might question the El Dorado of the markets of Asia, or the Pacific's becoming the centre of the earth, could assent to the need for continental security. And, as Thucydides long ago illustrated in his study of the conflict of the Hellenic Leagues, some demonic instinct drives men to find security only in supremacy.

Certain special factors re-inforced American Catholic susceptibility in this matter. Most significant was the Irish-American hostility to Britain.² Difficult though it may be to imagine, Great Britain then held a position of great power in the Western Hemisphere: its huge fleet, with bases commanding all American coasts--the Western from Esquimault, the New England from Halifax, the southern Atlantic from Bermuda, the Gulf from St. Lucia and Jamaica--was unchallengable at sea. Congress, always parsimonious, only authorized the first American heavy battleships in 1890. Britain also had a huge economic stake in Latin America, both in trade and investments, to the extent of giving it a large political influence in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina. Less important, but somewhat symbolic, was the fact of aspirant sophisticates of Latin America's governing classes modelling their manners and leisure pursuits on those of the English gentry (if they took their intellectual culture from Paris). The United States had such a large distance to make up in

²See the section on this subject for a general survey of press evidence.
these respects, that one can thus understand how Theodore Roosevelt, with his many English friends and relatives, and his warm experience of English life, could yet take so hawkish a line in 1895 against Salisbury as to become a hero to Irish-America. The United States had but one immediate advantage (as distinct from long-term resources): the vulnerability of the Canadian frontier. It was a vital one.

Another factor was the Catholicity of Latin America. If American Catholics, particularly the more liberal among them, admitted amongst themselves that its forms were usually a none-too-fetching advertisement for their creed by the standards of Puritan propriety, yet they clearly welcomed American encounter with it as an effective corrective to the parochialism of American protestantism, and indeed of some of themselves. It was good to feel—and to remind one's non-Roman neighbour—that the Americas, conceived together, were predominantly Catholic. On the other hand, American Catholics could, and did, use the contrast (rather than the unity) between Latin catholicity and their own, to justify their peculiar ways to themselves and to the Vatican.

As broad discussions of hemispheric supremacy were occasioned by the specific issues arising, they shall be here so reported, rather than abstracted into one general summary, followed by short accounts of each issue. The Cuban question, so vital after 1895, shall however be reserved until the

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3 A major article by Michael Lynch on Latin Americans and their faith appeared in the Pilot at the height of the Venezuela crisis: 28 December 1895.
account of American Catholic opinion on whether to war with Spain—except where incidental references were made to illuminate these other matters. Of course one cannot rigidly compartmentalize, for one issue would be recalled in the approach to another, quite apart from these broader points of the Monroe Doctrine, the Canal, and curtailing Britain.

The Nicaraguan Question 1894-1895

In the 1890s the American government (and press) was very concerned to guarantee the conditions necessary to drive a canal through the Isthmus, through Nicaragua, by the Managuan lakes. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1850) offered a major obstacle to this. Signed when the United States was more concerned to avert imminent sectional conflict, it specified that any such canal be subject to joint control by both parties: neither she nor Britain could close or fortify it against the other. In trying to by-pass these unpopular provisions, the Cleveland-Gresham administration discovered Britain to have an important leverage in its traditional protectorate over the autonomous Indians of Nicaragua's Mosquito Coast, with its port, Bluefields. American businessmen had, since the Treaty of Managua ratifying the protectorate (1860), gained control of ninety per cent of all economic activities in the area, so that for commercial, as well as strategic purposes, Gresham wanted the British out. At the same time

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5Proposed entrance to the projected Canal.
he wanted to ensure that the Nicaraguan President would neither use the full Nicaraguan sovereignty gained by termination of the protectorate to obstruct American interests there, nor to revoke the concessions of the Maritime Canal Company. For a number of reasons, President Zelaya planned to do both. British troops had landed to disarm Nicaraguan invaders in early 1894, and a provisional government—including Americans—had been set up. Gresham, however, wished to formally return the area to Nicaragua, both to offset British influence, and to gain Zelaya's goodwill to the Canal Company, and yet retain the substance of an *American* protectorate over the wealthy plantation coast. The British foreign minister, Lord Kimberley, a Liberal, acquiesced in the contrived diminishing of his country's control. At the same time, strong representations to Zelaya on the matter of the Canal—not stopping short of actual threat of war—caused him to rescind his renewed plan to end the concession; while in August 1894 Gresham showed Zelaya who was ultimate boss of American interests by securing the release of two Americans who had led an Indian revolt against the new Nicaraguan sovereignty.

The matter was not ended. The Zelaya authorities had deported the British Pro-Consul for complicity in the same revolt. By November, British warships were steaming to Bluefields to secure an indemnity. In February 1895, Britain broke relations with Nicaragua, and in April landed troops at Corinto. Convinced his whole policy would be jeopardized if
the British used the crisis to re-assert its position in the area, Gresham refused to invoke the Monroe Doctrine, and advised Zelaya to pay. This was done: but only after a hue-and-cry was raised in the United States against Gresham, led, not surprisingly, by Senator John Morgan of Alabama, proponent of a plan whereby the Maritime Canal Company would have been practically capitalized by the government. 6

Both the Pilot and the Citizen followed this latter aspect of the crisis with almost inflated concern (as did the country). But in this, as in other matters, there was the usual distinction between Roche and Desmond. The former wished to see the affair used to its fullest possibilities to discomfit the British; the latter, although indulging in forcefully anti-British language, did not doubt an accommodation would be easily reached. The exact same pattern was to be repeated of the Alaskan and Venezuelan boundary disputes. More significantly, each was to draw from his own temper quite dissimilar interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine.

Throughout 1894 the Citizen ignored the issue. The arrival of British warships at Bluefields (combined with the outbreak of the Cuban insurrection) drew its attention. It then also cast an early eye on what was going on down in Venezuela. Its mode of argument offers revealing insight into the whole way Americans then regarded Latin America--both as a jealous preserve for their projects and commerce, and as

6 An account of this affair is given so fully since it is relatively unknown. See La Feber, New Empire, 218-29.
a family offering scope for the exercise of benevolence.

Blazoning forth the relevant passage\(^7\) of Monroe’s message of 2 December 1823, it demanded that the U.S.A. now apply it to England to thwart her attempts both to control the future of the Nicaraguan Canal, the true object of ‘her Bluefields game,’ and to dominate the Orinoco River commerce. The Monroe Doctrine was apt to be called into ‘active application,’ and any administration failing to so assert it where need be would have a sorry place in American history.\(^8\)

A month later, Desmond returned to the theme, with a lawyer historian’s eye for the governing past principles. The (London) *St. James Gazette* denied the reality of the Monroe Doctrine, arguing England could act in the Americas on the basis of International Law. Even Senator Hill of New York had said Congress never actually affirmed the doctrine. In reply, Desmond quoted Secretary of State Frelinghuysen’s describing it as ‘a cardinal principle of our continental policy’ and instancing Seward’s response to the Maximilian affair (1866) in support of this.\(^9\) He continued himself in his best fashion:

> Not only is the Monroe Doctrine popular, fixed, and rooted, in the United States, but it is also popular

\(^7\)of independent American states: “we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power, in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition to the United States.”

\(^8\)Citizen, 30 March 1895.

\(^9\)In a communique to Minister James R. Lowell at London, 1882.
throughout Spanish America; in fact the Spanish Republics are disposed, especially when they are in trouble, to ask for an extreme interpretation of it.\textsuperscript{10}

But he himself had little taste for such constructions upon it. The following week he detailed the Nicaraguan crisis, insofar as the available information allowed. The crux of the matter lay, he felt, in Britain's insistence on dictating the terms of the arbitration procedure (to which Nicaragua had in principle agreed), which should assess the indemnities for insults to other Britons than the consul, and losses to British property. He further argued that the Canal question made it urgent that the United States prevent any territorial indemnity (something of which Gresham too, in his own letters, was afraid\textsuperscript{11}). The \textit{Pilot} too was concerned with this. However, he yet showed his moderation by pointing out that even American citizens had been ill-treated by the Nicaraguan authorities, thereby implying Britain had a case; and by boldly siding with the judgment of the Berlin \textit{Vossche Zeitung}, that if the United States protect unruly neighbours, it must assume international responsibility for them. This was a clear anticipation of the Roosevelt Corollary; and his very language, in disowning any uncritically anti-European reading of the doctrine, illustrates his character:

\textit{\textquote[While sustaining it] we must avoid all extreme or unreasonable interpretations of it; or its utilization for the purpose of protecting turbulent petty republics, or getting bankrupt South American...}

\textsuperscript{10}\textit{Citizen}, 27 April 1895.

\textsuperscript{11}La Feber, \textit{New Empire}, 226.
governments out of the hole.\textsuperscript{12}

A fortnight later, the \textit{Citizen} welcomed the end of the question as far as the United States was concerned. It praised the administration for getting through with a minimum of bluster, which the country should avoid by cultivating firmness instead. In a tart reference to papers of which the \textit{Pilot} was undoubtedly one, it noted the bluster was much less than the partisan newspapers, aiming to utilize what ought to be a question of patriotism, and not of partisanship, could wish for.\textsuperscript{13}

The \textit{Pilot} had followed the affair, unlike the \textit{Citizen}, from the start. In spring 1894 it noted the first landings of British troops on the Mosquito Coast (to throw back Zalaya’s invasion), and termed them a contravention of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which it interpreted as guaranteeing non-intervention in Central American affairs by either Britain or the United States.\textsuperscript{14} It then called on the United States to stop the intervention.\textsuperscript{15}

Later, when General Cabezas suppressed the combined Indian-American revolt, re-occupying the Mosquito Coast, and ordered the remaining British forces, together with American marines, to withdraw, the \textit{Pilot} showed itself more keen on the expulsion of the British, than praising Nicaragua on restoring its territorial integrity (which could work also against American interests).\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Citizen}, 4 May 1895. \hfill \textsuperscript{13}\textit{Ibid.}, 25 May 1895.
\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Pilot}, 17 March 1894. \hfill \textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, 7 April 1894.
\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Ibid.}, 22 September 1895.
Congratulating Gresham--after earlier mistrust of him--for securing England's expulsion, the Pilot suggested, "Surely she is the original and only thief in the world." But no sooner had the thief renounced her protectoral rights to the Coast, the existence of which the Pilot had astutely ignored until then, than she returned to snatch a hefty indemnity--$75,000, more than the Consul in question could earn in several lifetimes. Awaken, Gresham, and prevent it! Then, to the Pilot's relief, bold Admiral Meade's squadron swung south in the Caribbean, and the cruiser U.S.S. Monterey headed for threatened Corinto; which facts caused the paper to turn expectation into fact, and report that England was foregoing her demands, thus proving she 'will keep the peace as long as the policeman's eye is on her.'

But a week later, the English disproved this sanguine argument, occupying Corinto on 27 April. Simultaneously the Pilot was aware that all was not yet over, and protested (like the Citizen) against any cession of any Nicaraguan territory--such as the suggested Corn Island, in settlement of the dispute. For the United States will not tolerate any more Gibraltars, or Adens, or Maltas in these waters (the implication being that Nicaragua's wishes were irrelevant, if inconvenient). Noting itself the discounting of the Monroe Doctrine

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17Pilot, 12 January 1895.
18Ibid., 26 January 1895. It noted the consul's salary--$60 p.a.--sarcastically on 15 June.
19Pilot, 20 April 1895.
by the *St. James Gazette*, the *Pilot* retorted

England must learn that on this continent the children have a big brother,

--and drop her insolent proviso that no United States representatives sit on the proposed arbitration court. 20 A week later, however, the *Pilot* was viewing the State Department's failure to live up to such a forward stance; its refusal to apply the Monroe Doctrine was enabling British forces land in Nicaragua and appropriate property to the value of the first indemnity. And the British press was praising the United States for judiciousness in the matter: 21

But was not the Clayton-Bulwer treaty broken, with its pledge against any "occupying, fortifying, colonizing or assuming or exercising dominion over Nicaragua, & etc.," asked the *Pilot*. Taking issue with the State Department, it pointed out that whereas America was permitting Britain to take an indemnity for the expulsion of a consul who had, after all, incited insurrection, the same America, under, indeed, the same president, Cleveland, had expelled a British Minister, Lord Sackville-West, for the lesser crime of mucking about in American politics. Yet the British had not then seen fit to correct American 'boorishness' with battleships, however much its press raged against the O'Reilly's and Collinses and other Irish demagogues believed responsible for Cleveland's intransigence. The point was clearly a good one: what was sauce for the Nicaraguan gosling would be unpalatable on the American

gander. In frustration the *Pilot* cried: No Americans will stand for the robbery of Nicaragua; let the administration beware, it would cause a war! Somewhat more lamely, it grumbled if the United States cannot legally intervene, why did Seward bother about Mexico?22

The next week, the *Pilot* was still vainly attempting to get America mad, quoting the more belligerent tidbits in the English press, and reaffirming General Grant's warning that European involvement against Mexico and the Union during the Civil War proceeded from jealousy at their trans-continental power. At the same time, the paper was dutifully and gracefully commending Leo XIII's Encyclical Letter *Innominato*, on the conversion of England.23 The image it sought to convey of that nation however, was scarcely designed to elicit in its readers a prayerful solicitude for the souls of Englishmen--although there are, of course, those who are most moved by the plight of a real sinner!

If the paper could not provoke Gresham to a more forward policy, it found consolation in defending the forward strategic initiatives of Admiral Meade, which were widely criticized by those wishing a low-keyed handling of the Anglo-American Caribbean disputes.24 And that same month Gresham, the Secretary of State, whose conciliatory policies evoked the *Pilot*'s mistrust, died; he was not, however, to be deprived of glowing editorial praise from one attuned to the humanity of Victorian

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22Ibid.
23Ibid., 11 May 1895.
24Ibid., 18 and 25 May 1895.
etiquette. 25

However, by now the grumbling about the Mosquito Coast was merging into anxiety about the integrity of Venezuela. With the advent of Richard Olney as Secretary of State, and of a Conservative ministry under Salisbury by July, Anglo-American relations entered a more critical phase vis-a-vis hemispheric affairs. If the Pilot's agitation about this former crisis seemed at first ineffectual, it probably swelled that tide of mistrust of England, led by publicist-politicians such as Senators John Morgan and Henry Cabot Lodge, which ensured that the next crisis be not so constrained.

The Venezuela Boundary Dispute 1895-1896

Unlike those of the Mosquito Coast affair, the details of this celebrated confrontation are too familiar to require a full summary. Intimations of the dispute trickled into the American press from early 1895; by late summer the United States was squarely involved, and matters came to a head by the end of the year. Two motives were thought to underlie this British attempt to greatly increase the area of British Guiana at the expense of Venezuela. The first, to gain a share of the gold recently discovered in the Orinoco basin, at a time the rapid expansion of British commerce and investment produced an insatiable appetite for the metal: forward policies toward the Transvaal, Alaska, and Ashanti (all rich in gold) had the same motive, among others, and were pressed

25 Ibid., 1 June 1895.
at the same time. The second, the possibility that Britain was quite deliberately testing the Monroe Doctrine, not perhaps as part of an articulated strategy, but in the normal opportunistic manner of states. Had America been found indifferent to it, shrewd contemporaries believed Britain would turn her imperial ambitions toward Latin America, having already gathered to herself as much of Asia and Africa as her armies could control and her rivals would permit. 26

But the force of the American reaction cannot be interpreted in solely defensive terms; the fact was, as we have seen, that the United States was pressing for a controlling interest in the expanding markets to the South. The depression of 1893-97 intensified her concern. Commerce and press were hence super-sensitive to any British policy which might jeopardize the project. The Nicaraguan and certain smaller issues created a general jitteriness in those circles, and among an increasingly sensation-hungry public, which only a resounding re-affirmation of the Monroe Doctrine could assuage: but a Monroe Doctrine subtly expanded. Richard Olney, in one of his first notes on the matter, spoke of the 'practical benefits' which should result from its application. His meaning was clear. Not jingoistic self-satisfaction, but the strategic and commercial position of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, was at stake. 27

26 Citizen, 28 December 1895, directly stated this connection between events in Africa and America.

27 La Feber, New Empire, 242-83—a convincing account, substantiated, one feels, by the tone of the Catholic press;
In general, the Catholic press, as the secular, took a very firm line on the dispute. Although again Humphrey J. Desmond stood out for his hope for eventual accommodation, the more belligerent attitude of James J. Roche seems to have been more characteristic. The former's moderation fore-shadowed the final settlement—which was to cause the latter to swallow hard.

Desmond, never an alarmist, took real note of the question only when it had been agitating the country several months; and when he did, it was to strike a note of caution. He candidly admitted the contention of the *Westminster Gazette* that many Americans were ignorant of the proper scope of the Monroe Doctrine, allowing that it popularly 'denoted a guardianship of the South American states devolved upon the United States.' He went on to give its history and text, and quoted its first 'moderate' interpreter, John Quincy Adams—speaking to Congress on the occasion of the inter-Americas Panama Conference—as saying that an agreement might be found advisable by which

> each (nation) will guard, by its own means, against the establishment of any future European colony with its borders.

He further pointed out that Congress had never formally resolved the Doctrine, and had in fact twice rejected resolutions strengthening it; and also that the European powers never

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accepted it. His drift became clearer when he used these points to attack "expansionist" constructions of it as unwarranted. He thus showed himself as aware as Olney or Cabot Lodge that the Monroe Doctrine had reached a cross-roads, that the limited, or protective interpretation of it was being broadened to very different ends. His fear of this followed consistently from the stand he had taken upon the indemnity aspect of the Nicaraguan crisis.28

It followed also from concern lest a doctrine of foreign policy, too rigidly interpreted, lead to major wars over minor issues (a point contemporary Americans, anguished at the ramifications of the Truman Doctrine, can sympathetically understand). The Monroe Doctrine, he warned

allows for a wilderness of opportunities for war between Uncle Sam and John Bull. . . . Nicaragua, Panama, the Venezuela boundary, are only the beginning of the procession.

He suggested that if the United States strike a pose of restraining powerful Fenian demands for Canada, it would have a diplomatic advantage in dealing with Great Britain, wryly adding that the Spanish republics "disposed to depending on Uncle Sam" ought to be made aware of their probable debt to Fenianism! Since he himself never took Fenianism too seriously (his comments on Colonel Finerty of Chicago, and other Irish extremists, provided much of the comic relief in his editorial columns), his intent can only have been to lighten an over-heavy situation. Yet he clearly felt that the

28Citizen, 26 October 1895.
maintenance of the doctrine was a matter for diplomacy; on
the specific issue of Venezuela, described as

practically whether the South American Republic will
be held up and robbed of its territory by force, or
whether England be obliged to submit the matter in
dispute to arbitration.

He agreed with Senator Cushman Davis of Minnesota, who argued
that intervention by diplomatic initiative should be suf-
ficient. For as Desmond wisely noted, England had given to
the United States in Canada, 'a hostage of peace' more valu-
able than anything she could gain by conflict. 29

However, his attitude hardened somewhat, particularly
when those same nativist sentiments which had nourished Anglo-
Saxonism and the A.P.A., now backed Britain. Desmond cited a
remarkable example (from the Milwaukee Sentinel, organ at that
time of reactionary business opinion in the city):

"Great Britain's career of aggression has nevertheless
been a beneficent career . . . as the world has been
benefitted by British conquest in India, so it might
be benefitted, in a lesser degree, if all the South
American republics should be made British colonies and
over-run by the Anglo-Saxon race. A man contend, with-
out being either a coward or a fool that Great Britain
is a nation against whom the Monroe Doctrine should
not be enforced."

To which Desmond retorted that if robbing South America should
ever seem a Christian duty incumbent on the English-speaking
race, he trusted that religious mission would devolve upon
Yankee, not Briton:

* The Monroe Doctrine exists to curtail not only Spanish
and French, but British highwaymen as well. Darkest
Africa may be plucked and torn asunder by European

29 Ibid.
cormorants; but South America is Caucasian and Christian and civilized, and not a subject for enlightened British rapacity.\textsuperscript{30}

Thus the rhetoric of the \textit{Citizen} became more anti-British, but its judgment remained practical and sound. It welcomed Cleveland's ringing message to Britain, as a rebuttal to Tories there who regarded the doctrine as a scarecrow, and a set-back to their greedy designs. But it noted there was little real likelihood of war, and suggested a way out: Cleveland's proposed Boundary Commission could allow a small British claim from the start, so that Britain could arbitrate the rest (without loss of face).\textsuperscript{31} It published Michael Davitt's views on the need for America to act as protective policeman toward her sister states, and to stand up to the bully, Salisbury; and it reprinted an editorial of the Springfield \textit{Republican} hailing Cleveland's stand as 'real Americanism.'\textsuperscript{32}

British reluctance to back down, combined with a fresh understanding of the extent and implications of Britain's territorial ambitions, caused the \textit{Citizen} to spell out the issues more clearly, and speak no more of moderation, as the year closed. The \textit{Statesman's Year Book} (a British publication) gave the area of British Guiana as 76,000 square miles, in its annual editions from 1869 to 1885; but the 1886 edition, just published gives it as 109,000 square miles, the additional

\textsuperscript{30}Both the quotation (undated) and reply, \textit{Citizen}, 2 November 1895.

\textsuperscript{31}\textit{Citizen}, 21 December 1895. \textsuperscript{32}\textit{Ibid.}, 28 December 1895.
area, noting Desmond, being equivalent to that of the New England states combined. If Venezuela does not submit, there exists the danger that England will 'Egyptize' her—control her customs, collect her taxes, and pay British officials with the receipts. Cleverly playing on the wording of President Monroe, Desmond argued that this would be England 'extending her system' to, and 'controlling the destiny' of Venezuela. Abandoning his earlier agreement with John Quincy Adams that the American republics look after themselves in the normal circumstances of European aggression, he warned that the United States would be 'exceedingly unshrewd' to let Great Britain away with it. His reasons are interesting, suggesting that as long as it was just Latin American interests at stake, the matter was not as urgent as when those of the United States were involved; for it now appeared that the Orinoco commerce, and control of the Nicaragua canal were imperilled by the issue.

Thus did the Citizen move to a more forceful and popular position. Perhaps, too, as it emerged, England was backing down—Cardinal Vaughan of Westminster had joined the pleas for peace, and the Jameson raid crisis had made her aware of her isolation—the inhibiting fear of war evaporated, permitting the Citizen to join in the American growl once assured

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33 Ibid., 28 December 1895. The same issue carried news of England's consternation at the message on the front page. Rarely was secular news so displayed.

34 Ibid., 4 and 11 January 1896.
there would be no cause to bite. It noted that a Catholic--
Frederic Caudert of the New York Bar--was one of the five
American appointees to the proposed Venezuela Commission; he
had already served on the Bering Straits Commission. And
it noted the editorials of its more 'warlike contemporaries':
the Colorado Catholic (Denver), Providence Visitor, Michigan
Catholic (Detroit), Western Watchman (St. Louis), Catholic
Universe (Cleveland), and Catholic Record, among others, and
reproduced an ode glorifying the coming war (as it was depicted)
by the very prominent Catholic journalist, Conde Pallen (ex-
editor of Church Progress, St. Louis). All the former paralleled
the Citizen in arguing that the conciliatory, and even pro-
British, stand of the A.P.A. press demonstrated the hypocrisy
of its patriotic claims, and those of a segment of the Protes-
tant intelligensia, to find Catholics guilty of un-Americanism,
when they were in fact prominent in the present pro-America
agitation. This opportunity to disarm nativist criticism
by loud huzzas for the national interest may also have
strongly influenced Desmond's move toward firmness.

At any rate, in February, the Citizen came out clearly
in favour of a broad construction of the Monroe Doctrine, such
as was propounded by Professor McMaster of the University of
Pennsylvania, who had rebutted Salisbury's contention that it
had only 'situational' force (i.e., relevant solely to the
circumstances of the 1820s when it was propounded). Indeed,
it went further than the professor:

\[35\text{Ibid.}, \text{11 January 1896.} \quad 36\text{Ibid.}, \text{also 11 January.}\]
America is the judge of her own interests. The world has had 73 years notice of what this country regards as her interests on this continent. What the President of a republic of nine million people declared, a mighty nation with nearly seventy million people is not going to minimize. Rather let us meet British aggression by going beyond the lines of Mr. Monroe.37

At the same time the Citizen was stepping up its attacks on intolerant Protestantism, and on Anglo-Saxonism,38 and finally matched the stridency of the day in an editorial attacking the mangy spirit of narrow gauge politicians, and praising the bold expansionism and hemispheric vision of Jefferson, Monroe, Adams and Clay 'leaders of a broad kind of statesmanship that properly characterized a youthful, vigorous and Titanic nation.' But now finical minds have sabotaged Blaine, oppose coast defenses, and thwart prospects of taking Canada;

Many good things await America. But the cross-roads statesman looms athwart them with his distressing discretion, and a nation is held to the range of an intellect that could feel roomy in the emoluments of a village squire.39

The romance of expansion, whether of power or commerce, had thus momentarily entranced Desmond; but it did not warp his judgment, for the very next week he was opposing the acquisition of Hawaii as unwanted by the Hawaiians.40 And he found no fault with the final arbitration treaty signed by Olney and Sir John Pauncefote (the British Minister at Washington) on 12 November 1896 noting, in more characteristic manner, that compromise is often the dictate of peace and

37Ibid., 1 February 1896. 38See above, 146-52.
39Citizen, 22 February 1896. 40See above, 229-30.
sound policy. It is symbolic however that the tribunal thereby set up included no Venezuelans, and that this provoked no comment. When Desmond finally came to concern himself with the issue, it was as an American: merely Latin affairs should not endanger the United States. The Cuban question led him gradually to a broader sympathy, one less Americo-centric. The final result of the arbitration needled him: the Orinoco had been saved by a hairs-breadth, the old thievish Schomburgk Line (named after a British surveyor's work of 1841) was practically ratified. American 'bluff' had led to 'collapse.' Future mistakes could be avoided only if hard-headed Yankee lawyers were appointed to such tribunals, not 'fat-headed wine bibbers with social aspirations abroad.'

In this crisis the Pilot, if more genuinely concerned for the Venezuelans, was certainly another 'warlike contemporary' of the Citizen. Had it a broader readership, one could only describe it as consistently hostile and against all compromise, to the degree of war-mongering. Its general approach was less sophisticated than the Citizen's, and can be the more rapidly dealt with, although one must recall it was considerably more influential.

41 Citizen, 14 November 1896.
42 La Feber, New Empire, 277.
43 Citizen, 7 October 1899. The recent outbreak of the Boer War probably explains the bitterness of his reaction to any English gain.
It eyed the crisis from its origins, and, perhaps not without wisdom, attributed its rapid development to the failure of Cleveland and Gresham to stand firm on the Nicaraguan indemnity question. It viewed British pretensions in the framework of an alleged attempt to encircle the United States with naval fortresses and generally to make itself dominant in the Western Hemisphere. It instanced arbitrary British seizure of a small Brazilian island for use as a cable station as a preliminary step. But since it was, at this early stage, championing Cuban independence, its concern at such British encroachments sprang from a broader sympathy than United States nationalism would permit.

However, since the avowed purpose of the Pilot was to so convince America that England was its single inveterate enemy, and thereby to help create a consistently anti-British policy, much of what it said may be ascribed to propaganda, rather than sober conviction. Thus, perhaps, its thesis of 'encirclement' (always a potent cry); thus certainly its strident warning 'Suppose it means Alaska!' although the more moderate contention that 'the Alaska boundary may be determined by the Venezuela survey' had some practical meaning. Its alarmism is well illustrated by its carrying no less than eight editorials on the crisis in the same issue.

44Pilot, 13 April 1895. 45Ibid., 15 February 1896. 46Ibid., e.g., 18 and 25, January 1896. 47Ibid., 3 August 1895. 48Ibid., 4 January 1896. 49Ibid.
Before Olney deeply involved America, the Pilot was egging on Venezuela to go to war with Britain, suggesting that American-built cruisers, manned by Yankee sailors, but flying the Venezuelan flag, pirate British commerce; if Britain outlawed such privateers, why then Venezuela could impound all British property within its borders, and hold all British residents hostage! Venezuela, it noted, was a mountainous, easily defended country. It made much of the more belligerent Venezuelan statements, such as those of General Ybarra.

It stressed the cowardice of England's demanding arbitration of her Yukon claims, when faced with a great power, but refusing it in this case when faced by a lesser power. It too cleverly pointed out the un-Americanism of the formerly super-Americans where a case of English aggression was involved: not merely the A.P.A. organs, but also the Pulitzer chain, and Godkin's Nation. It tried to discount 'Anglo-Saxonist' and Protestant criticism of Latin Americans as not worth aiding, by describing their character and culture, or succinctly defending them against prevalent scurrilities. It of course backed Cleveland's forceful message, and ascribed the British capitulation to the carven instinct of shopkeepers;

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50 Ibid., 27 April 1895. 51 Ibid., 18 May 1895.
52 Ibid., 27 July and 14 December 1895.
53 Ibid., 2 November 1895 and 4 January 1896.
54 Ibid., 28 December 1895 and 15 February 1896, etc.
yet one gains a clear impression that Roche and his associates were disappointed at this outcome, for the whole crisis has offered great scope for anti-British agitation, and might have led to a war which they bluntly termed 'Ireland's Opportunity.'\textsuperscript{55} How seriously they took this latter possibility may be doubted; for they earlier ridiculed a (London) \textit{Times} hint of a European coalition joining England to prevent United States interference, on the grounds of England's diplomatic isolation and the danger of an Irish revolt.\textsuperscript{56}

The effect of it all was to cause the \textit{Pilot}, too, to call for a firmer Monroe Doctrine, such as that proposed by Senator Baker:

"That the United States will regard it as an unfriendly act for any foreign power without our consent, by war, treaty, purchase or otherwise to extend its territorial limits in the Western Hemisphere, on either of the American continents, or to, or over, any of the islands adjacent thereto, which this country deems necessary or proper for its self-preservation. And the United States of America reserves the right to be sole judge of this necessity."\textsuperscript{57}

Indeed the \textit{Pilot} itself would have gone further than this seemingly ample guarantee— it wished for a doctrine which shall declare that the presence of any hostile fort or fleet or possible rendezvous for either in the vicinity of our coasts, is a danger to America rights in this Hemisphere

—and it saw in Cleveland the man to enforce such a doctrine.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 4 January 1896. \textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 26 October 1895.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 18 January 1897.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 25 January 1897; it repeated this wish during the second Venezuela crisis: see 3 January 1903.
Although the *Pilot* disclaimed that its attitude was due solely to Irish hatred of Britain, arguing that it would be as consistently jealous of British intrigue in the hemisphere if Ireland itself were pacified and liberated, yet it seems obvious that in this case, as others, hostility to Britain warped its better sense, so much so that it wished for another crisis "which unlike the present cannot be averted by any concession or humiliation on her part."\(^5^9\) Its attitude on the Nicaraguan and Venezuelan disputes, wilfully calculated to increase the mistrust and hatred in the world, combined with its own urgings for a large navy and military preparedness,\(^6^0\) flatly contradicted the lead given by Leo XIII in an Encyclical *To the Rulers and Peoples of the World*, of July 1894, in which the Pope spoke of the dangers and burden of 'this armed peace,' and called for disarmament, arbitration of disputes, and a return to the sense of the religious unity of men.\(^6^1\) But then, the *Pilot* was but true to its generation in ignoring the letter, however much its stance as a Catholic paper should make it appear more blameworthy. And one must try to enter the minds of its editor and staff, to whom England epitomized all the injustices and inhumanity of armed pride and racial complacency. As it retorted to 1,600 English literary figures who signed an appeal for Anglo-American

\(^{59}\)Ibid., 4 January 1897.

\(^{60}\)Ibid., e.g., 28 September 1896.

\(^{61}\)Ibid., 14 July 1894. And also contradicted the joint appeal for moderation and arbitration made by Cardinals Logue, Vaughan, and Gibbons in 1895.
understanding at the height of the crisis: We shall believe you if you apply your pacific pens to arguing against British colonial wars in Mashonaland, Ashanti, Burmah, and Egypt.\(^62\)

The *Catholic World* largely ignored the crisis, as it did the Nicaraguan--it paid more attention to the concurrent Armenian massacres, and interpreted Anglo-American, and Anglo-German 'squabbles' (the latter over the Kruger telegram) as an avoidance of this, the real moral duty of the hour. However, it too attributed them to the "inordinate rapacity of Great Britain in the pursuit of new territory," and welcomed Cleveland's message as "the blast of a war-bugle." However it correctly judged that while the press of both countries was war-like in tone, the Jameson Raid imbroglio, with the subsequent Anglo-German crisis, would lead to greater tractability by Britain on the Venezuelan issue.\(^63\) It is possible that, the Catholicity of Latin America notwithstanding, it judged the crisis to be solely another depressing outgrowth of the vanity of rulers!

**The Isthmian Canal**

Behind much of the concern over Venezuela, Nicaragua, and indeed the future of Cuba lay the question of the projected inter-Oceana canal. If contemporaries spoke of it with exaggerated expectation (most of them had it rivalling Suez), this was understandable. For it would create direct sea-routes


\(^{63}\) *Catholic World*, 62 (February 1896), editorial.
between America's industrial East and Asia; between the Far West and Europe; and would bring Chile, Bolivia and Peru closer by some thousands of miles to the American east, where previously they had been equidistant from there and Europe. Strategically, an American canal would ensure control of the Caribbean; it would also help consolidate American business interests in Central America.

If the issue was not directly one of relations with other peoples, it clearly had long-range implications of such, quite apart from the immediate problem of manipulating the political situation in the Caribbean to enable the project. Pre-occupation with the canal, in the 1890s, seems to have been a barometer of national self-interest; and its culmination in the Panama revolution (to be dealt with in a later section), was in fact to cause the Pilot to recognize the dangers inherent in such an approach to non-national affairs.

However, in the 1890s the Catholic press shared enthusiasm for the future canal without any such realization. Both the Pilot and Citizen spoke of the need to secure it, as a major reason for involvement in Venezuela and Nicaragua, as we have seen. Elsewhere they gave it more explicit attention, as also did the Catholic World, with its avowed desire to cater to intelligent public interests. Undoubtedly the rhetoric of much of this writing upon it confirms that to Catholics also was it a symbol of American destiny, and was to

64 See below, p. 409.
be, when completed, a monument to her enterprise.

One Patrick Sarsfield Cassidy, while one of the many Canal Commissions was investigating possible routes and costs, anticipated the body by choosing the Nicaraguan route, and trenchantly defending it and the whole project. First he dealt with its history in some detail, going back to Clay's interest (in 1825), in the idea. Touching on its investment profitability (Suez shares had appreciated by five hundred per cent), he then argued that nonetheless the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, "the most important question of international relations" was the real issue; an American canal was vital to this. If England controlled it, she would discover financial and 'protectional' excuses to control all Central America, while South America would be parcelled out among the European powers, as Africa had just been. Therefore 'unqualified and absolute control' by the United States could alone save her from constant broils, and even wars, and from the maintenance of a large fleet and standing army. Commercially, the canal would chop 10,732 miles off the New York-San Francisco sea route, and thus would be "the industrial salvation of California," which, without it, could not compete with Argentina's developing fruit industry, so much nearer European markets. Nicaragua itself was truly boosterized (doubtless to offset well-founded misgivings as to its political reliability): it was stable, law-abiding, and progressive in every field—commerce, industry, education.65

These, then, were the current arguments, as seen at some length by a contemporary layman. The Pilot and the Citizen enthused along similar lines, if not without some minor contradiction: for example the Pilot argued that by increasing America's hemispheric interests, the canal must be accompanied by the building of a large navy (where Cassidy thought it would offset such a need). The Pilot agreed with Mahan that the question of the canal demanded solution; that, 'as Washington foresaw and Jefferson ignored ... America must be a continental power'; both issues were inseparable, it implied thereby.\(^66\) One of its contributors was even more forthright: 'the manifest destiny of the United States must be worked out'; to which end an American-controlled canal must be constructed, and guaranteed by American control of the whole Central American Isthmus, together with seizure of certain posts in the West Indies--Cuba, St. Thomas and Jamaica. Only thus could a vital East-West trade axiom be secured. But narrow-minded trading circles desire their rewards without taking these responsibilities for security. Much of this article, carried prominently on the front page, owed its ideas to Mahan's recently published *Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future* (Boston, 1898), and indeed one of its sentences aptly catches the whole teaching of that historian-publicist: "To compel destiny, America must control the seas."\(^67\)

\(^{66}\)Pilot, 28 September 1896.

\(^{67}\)J. S. (probably Joseph Smith, a frequent contributor), "Sea Power and Its Lessons," Pilot, 29 January 1898.
Roche himself was not so cavalier toward Central American independence as 'J. S.'; welcoming the approval by the Senate of a Nicaragua Canal Bill, and its appropriation of up to $115,000,000 for the construction work, he noted that the measure scrupulously conserved the sovereignty of both Nicaragua and Costa Rica, apart from over the projected waterway itself and the attendant fortifications. He too, however, spoke in grandiose terms: the canal would put the United States in its proper place as the paramount authority on this continent, especially over any work of its own undertaking. The Canal, American-controlled, would be a visible sign of the Monroe Doctrine, and the one great hope of the New World. The terminology seems at times theological, such was the gravity the whole issue evoked; yet Roche did preserve a nice balance between American interests and authority, as against local sovereignties and general hemispheric welfare. Intuitively, if not explicitly, he recognized that the rhetoric of the canal agitation was in danger of reducing the sister American republics into appanages of his own country's well-being.

But Roche, too, was violently jealous lest the British have any part in the building or control of the future canal; or even lest the American government could not fortify and close it unilaterally. For these reasons he welcomed the Senate's repudiation of some Anglo-American accords, and emasculation of others, whereby John Hay (bête-noir of Irish America) and

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68 Ibid., 28 January 1899.
Sir Julian Pauncefote attempted to salvage some of the joint control, or at least the mutual reassurance, contained in the old Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. As for the canal itself, he suspected the Pacific railroad interests would sabotage the passage of the requisite Hepburn Act through the Senate, and warned that talk of the Panama route was merely a ruse by those interests to block the whole idea; for had not the great De Lesseps proved Panama impassable?

The Citizen, too, was fascinated by the whole project, although not as wary of the Panama route; in fact it early published the views of a prominent army engineer, General Henry L. Abbott, who argued that route was best. It expressed itself for a nationalized scheme, rather than one privately financed. And of course it, too, wanted any inhibiting remembrances of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty brushed aside. It argued this could be done so on the grounds that Britain had herself abrogated the treaty by the establishment of British Honduras during the Civil War (actually the colony had been well-established, without American objection, before ratification of the Treaty, which was not retroactive). However, although it noted much opposition existed toward the impending Hay-Pauncefote accord, it also broadmindedly published a contrary view (from the Philadelphia Manufacturer)

69 Ibid., 29 December 1900, 6 July 1901, 4 October 1902.
70 Ibid., 18 January 1902.
71 Citizen, 19 November 1898.
72 Ibid., 10 December 1898.
which argued that an 'open' canal, such as was Suez, would be more beneficial to trade than one fortified by the United States.\(^{73}\)

The next week Desmond, ever open to rational persuasion, himself came out editorially in favour of a neutral and unfortified canal. He thus showed impatience with the strategic one-up-manship of Captain Mahan and his admirers at the Pilot. Defending his view, he cited the prime purpose of any such waterway to be the facilitation of commerce, and the maintenance of the peace necessary for it. Furthermore, fortification would lead to increased defense spending, neutralization to arms reductions. Anyway, a neutral canal would permit passage of war-ships in time of war, whereas the British would be sure to blockade a fortified canal at such a time. However disputed the details, building the canal was "the great current question."\(^{74}\) Nevertheless, the Citizen maintained a spirited opposition to any agreement on the question with England: John Hay, who wished for one, might have been private secretary to Lincoln, but was nonetheless devoid of political training and acumen. A wiser man, John W. Foster (Secretary of State to Harrison, following Blaine) had assessed the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty to be our greatest diplomatic blunder, negotiated by a man without talent, and a surrender of the Monroe principle. Hence the Senate deserves praise for

\(^{73}\) Ibid., 17 February 1899 and Bemis, Latin-American Policy, 102-103, 106.

\(^{74}\) Citizen, 24 February 1900.
repudiating its contemporary counter-part, and reaffirming American control of the Canal project. 75

Naturally, too, the Citizen also welcomed the Senate's passing the emasculated Hay-Pauncefote treaty, which as amended, guaranteed that control; 76 and also welcomed the Hepburn Act for construction of a (Nicaraguan) canal. 77 However, when the Federal Commission subsequently investigating routes chose the Panamanian as the better, the Citizen deferred to the experts, and published an informative article contrasting the two proposed routes and their histories. 78

At no time, however, did the Citizen discuss the implications of the Canal project on the Latin American countries, even if, in its stress on neutralization, it did not completely ignore non-American factors. But then the Catholic World saw the issue solely in American terms. Looking to the "carving up" of China, the probable retention of the Philippines, and the permanent annexation of Hawaii, it demanded cutting of the canal as a necessity; it laconically added that many Easterners were not aware America had a Pacific Coast, and this would convince them. Without it, with growing interests in the Pacific, the nation would be forced to maintain two expensive fleets. 79 These arguments against

75 Ibid., 22 and 29 December 1900.
76 Ibid., 16 November 1901. 77 Ibid., 4 January 1902.
78 Ibid., 25 January and 8 March 1902.
79 Catholic World, 67 (June 1898), editorial.
military expenditure found receptive hearing in a Republic of anti-militarist tradition, and were common to all those who rejected the Mahan-Roosevelt-Lodge propaganda, and were wary of inflicting upon America the cliched effects--high taxation and insecurity--of the European arms race. They were scarcely based on the circumstances of the time, however. As the Pilot recognized, maintenance of hemispheric supremacy in a militarized era demanded defense investment: the arguments over fortification of the commanding Isthmian canal emphasized this.

It was only with the Panamanian revolt, however, and the Roosevelt corollary, that the full tendency of American power, toward non-colonial imperialism in the western continents, became clear. When something is remote from our intentions, we can be excused an element of blindness toward those elements in our conduct promoting it. This was true of the Catholic commentators of the eighteen-nineties on Latin American affairs, if it seems less understandable after the catalyst of 1898.

As a tail-piece, it should be mentioned that it was not only the major crises that drew Catholic press attention; minor issues involving European and Latin American powers did also. The Citizen worried when an Englishman was reported to have bought all Nicaragua's railways, existent and planned.\(^8^0\) In late 1897 both the Pilot and the Citizen criticized German

\(^{80}\) Citizen, 11 January 1896.
gun-boat diplomacy against Haiti (occasioned by the beating up of one Emil Lueders, the mulatto son of a German merchant). The Citizen had little doubt Germany was using the matter as a pretext to get a stopping-off place in the Caribbean; and noted that Germany papers, including semi-official Berlin organs, supported Britain's positions on Latin American questions;--both were interested in limiting the Monroe Doctrine, in which Germany too needed a lesson.81

The second Venezuelan crisis, although in the early twentieth century when outlooks had changed radically, yet evoked a similar pattern of protest. Involving a coordinated attempt by Britain and Germany to force Venezuela to repay certain debts, and a much disputed naval initiative by Roosevelt to forestall them (an initiative historians until recently held he never actually took), the dispute formed part of the background of the famous Monroe Doctrine Corollary of that President.82 The Pilot's Joseph Smith fulminated against the 'foul conspiracy' of the Powers, and the shady involvement of United States trust interests with them. The Monroe Doctrine, and not the 'eccentricities' of the Venezuelan government, was really what was at stake. Roosevelt must stand for arbitration, as demanded by the common people, and not for the trusts.83 When the Germans and British backed down, the

81 Ibid., 4 December 1897, 26 February 1898; Pilot, 18 December 1897.

82 Bemis, Latin American Policy, 151-55; Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt . . . , 399-432.

83 Pilot, 20 December 1902.
Pilot attributed it to the presence of Admiral Dewey's fleet (the very fact disputed by some historians); it repeated this assertion at least twice. Its interpretation of the origins of the crisis was predictable: Britain put Germany up to it to provoke a war between her two principal rivals. Lord Lansdowne, British Foreign Minister, had all the blustering Pamerston's international ill-manners, and none of his ability. But at least the rogues had been forced to go to the Hague (the international arbitration court).

Some time later, the Pilot had a contributor, Walter Stephens, devote the front page of two issues to a full defense of the Monroe Doctrine against a sophisticated attack, this time made by a German, Professor Hugo Muensterberg of Harvard. Muensterberg was to become one of the chief apologists for Germany from 1914-1917; that the Pilot was forced, despite inclination, to criticize fully a German, not a Briton, was prophetic of a very different challenge to hemispheric security than that posed in the high noon of British imperialism.

Canada and Alaska

Dramatic though they were, the conflicts in Latin America were fairly quickly solved; while those with Britain and Canada in the Northern continent were diplomatically more

84 Ibid., 27 December 1902 and 3 January 1903.
85 Ibid., 7 February 1902. 86 Ibid., 14 February 1902.
87 Ibid., 18 and 25 February 1905.
88 Much of his work was carried in the Milwaukee Journal, 1914-1915.
troublesome, potentially more dangerous, and seemingly interminable. They seriously threatened developing Anglo-American understanding, and they contributed greatly to the growth of a distinct Canadian nationalism. At the heart of all the trouble was the American proclivity to regard the whole continent northwards as her most natural manifest destiny, given its (largely) English-speaking people, and its endless resources. Americans found it difficult to understand the existence of Canada in any terms other than of the survival of a European power, Britain, in the continent. The Republican platform of 1896, for example, included a plan for the union of the dominion with its neighbour, granting its people's consent. The depression of 1893, the opening of Canada's prairie provinces around the same time, the discovery of the mineral wealth of both Alaska and the Canadian north, gave economic impetus to the previously chiefly patriotic cries for union. Yet the conflicts over the Alaskan boundary, together with increasing tempo of Canadian politics over such matters as the Manitoba School Question, the role of the Catholic hierarchy in public life, and the beginnings of French Canadian nationalism under Bourassa, helped convince Americans of the reality of Canadian distinctiveness, as something other than residual imperial loyalty.

As might be expected Catholics--particularly Irish-Americans--took great interest in these matters. For the Irish, it was peculiarly difficult to understand why a free people would voluntarily remain British. Hence leading
spokesmen, such as Archbishop Ireland, and Bourke Cockran, looked toward union. Yet their leading organ—the Pilot—did not share the general naivety: John Boyle O'Reilly had learned his lesson by participating in the abortive Fenian invasion of Ontario years before; Roche, born and brought up on Prince Edward Island, had thus long experience of self-consciousness of eastern Canada. At any rate, when anti-imperialist orators were attempting to deflect expansionist ambitions into the more traditional paths of incorporating contiguous territories of white pioneers, the Pilot did not once share this strategy of distraction. Of course it would welcome Canada gladly if she came willingly; but the principle of "no Sabine wives" applied also to her. Canada, as Cuba, would be welcomed to the privilege of United States statehood, but neither is worth the firing of a single shot in battle.

Of course the Pilot exploited the existence of Canada, as it did every potential source of trouble, to intensify anti-British feeling in America—with the hypocrisy of all true propaganda, Roche presumably knowing well how tenuous were the military links between dominion and homeland. But Canada, with the bases at Esquimault and Halifax (pistols pointed at the hearts of San Francisco and New York, it argued), and the Ontario canals system, was interpreted as part of the "circuit of a carefully prepared electric battery of offence."

89Pilot, 13 December 1902 (Ireland) and Citizen, 28 January 1899.
90Pilot, 29 February 1898. 91Ibid., 9 June 1894.
Yet quite inconsistently, and more realistically, it was recognized as utterly vulnerable during the Venezuela crisis. Sure of eventual Anglo-American war, the Pilot would have widened the Monroe Doctrine to force the complete demilitarization of Canada, by the British. 92

The Pilot, too, made the most of the numerous diplomatic conflicts with Britain, over the Alaskan boundary, and the Bering Straits fisheries. As noted, it tended to interpret all claims by her in the Americas as part of a plot to weaken the Monroe Doctrine, and then dominate the hemisphere. It is difficult to know how seriously Roche can have taken this; on the one hand he knew the reality of American power, and the unreality of the British presence in Canada; on the other hand, the British had complete supremacy of the oceans, and all but dominated three continents, Africa, Asia (apart from Siberia), and Australasia. Perhaps certain of his staff-writers, such as Joseph Smith and Michael Lynch, convinced themselves by their own propaganda. And all alike were then vulnerable to Mahan’s questionable contention that he who rules the waves, is arbiter of the world.

Naturally the Pilot did not like arbitration of the issues involved; those who are prepared to arbitrate have sincerely pacific intentions. Ironically in the first case, that of the Bering Sea fisheries, the principal British counsel, Sir Charles Russell, was Catholic; he had sisters who were nuns in America. The British government was later to send him,

92 See above, 263 and note 58.
most astutely, to America, as unofficial spokesman for Anglo-American rapprochement; for by this time, as Lord Russell of Kilowen, his status as undoubtedly the most distinguished Irishman of his age (and a champion of Home Rule) spiked the guns of the Irish-American press. For the Americans, there was also Catholic counsel, in Frederic Coudert. And at the very time of the Bering Sea arbitration, Leo XIII issued his peace encyclical, recommending arbitration. Yet the Pilot's spirit was intransigent: America should stand firm against any judgment going to Britain. Fortunately America had more sense. 93

The discovery of mineral wealth in Alaska coincided, by accident or design with Anglo-Canadian claims to parts of the Yukon and the Alaskan panhandle. The Canadian Yukon Territory was formed in 1895—within it the rich Klondike was to be opened up the next year. The Pilot argued that the "English" had no right to any mining area in the Yukon; no doubt Canadians would have agreed, but the richest mines were in undisputedly Canadian areas! The Pilot suggested Britain was cowardly in submitting the dispute to arbitration, and that her claims in the (Alaskan) Yukon were typical of her avarice. 94

93 Pilot, 21 August 1897 praised Secretary of State John Sherman for adopting a harder line on the issue; it must have taken Blaine to task for his conciliatory one, from 1888-1893. The question was really over by 1897, however. Citizen, August 23, 1896 for Russell's visit. He had, of course, made his reputation defending Parnell. He later took a major role in the Venezuela arbitration.

94 Pilot, 14 December 1895.
It went on, as previously noted, to identify wider British claims in Alaska as an attempt to steal the territory altogether, in association with encroachments on Venezuela. However, more pressing matters caused it to ignore Alaskan issues completely from early 1896 until 1901, when Theodore Roosevelt's accession highlighted even slumbering tensions. By this time however, Salisbury was quite conciliatory, as the *Pilot* noted; the Boer War had made him especially so.

However Irish-Americans remained distrustful of arbitration. The *Pilot* reprinted in full the resolutions of the United Irish American Societies of New York against the Hay-Herbert Alaska Arbitration Treaty of January 1903. The societies hoped the Senate would block the treaty. In the event, the arbitration went America's way, principally because Roosevelt loaded the board against Canada (whereas the treaty pledged him to choose impartial American delegates), and because he threatened to use force. The *Pilot* was most satisfied. But in an unusual spirit of detachment it noted that the feeling in Canada of betrayal by Britain was causing a political outcry; this, it warned, should not lead to a call for independence by her "intelligent, brave, law-abiding and fairly prosperous people," for Britain's offense was too small a matter. It may have been the *Pilot* recognized that a Canada declared independent on a wave of anti-American, as well as anti-British feeling, would be less amenable to eventual

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95 Ibid., 4 January 1896. 96 Ibid., 19 October 1901.
97 Ibid., 14 February 1903. 98 Ibid., 31 October 1903.
union, than one left subject to a vague British authority. The paper derided as irresponsible, those Canadian politicians who warned of American designs.\footnote{Ibid., 14 November 1903.}

Strangely, the \textit{Citizen}, reasonable in so many things, was less so on Canada. Of course midwestern Canada and the United States plains were geographically one, and their populations inter-migrated much. The prairie provinces had little or no distinctively Canadian tradition, as the eastern provinces had; they had in fact fostered several revolts against the Ottawa government in which \textit{metis}, under Riel, had been joined by some Irish and Americans. This, then was the Canada proximate to Humphrey J. Desmond whose own grandparents had been Irish Canadian migrants who had happily Americanized in Wisconsin. Why could not all Canadians?

In the 1890s, therefore, Desmond took much interest in Canada, and confidently expected eventual union. At times his enthusiasm got the better of him, and he wished to see the narrow-gauge politicians thrust aside, and Canada annexed.\footnote{\textit{Citizen}, 22 February 1896 and 20 November 1897.} He correctly saw that Canada (and also Australia) must change their relationship with Britain as they were progressively developing their own interests, their own race (what with immigration admixture) and their own spirit of nationality.\footnote{Ibid., 21 August 1897. He thought that they would the empire.} As a liberal Catholic who could characteristically remark...
"The Catholic Church is God's Democracy," he was aware of the import of the Manitoba Schools crisis: the local legislature had secularized the publicly-supported Catholic schools; the Catholic hierarchy throughout eastern Canada, especially Quebec, ordered voters to vote for the Conservatives, who had promised to restore the old dual system to Manitoba, while the Liberals, hoping to achieve a compromise, appealed to Rome. The Vatican surprisingly upheld the brilliant Catholic Prime Minister of Canada, Raymond Laurier, in his defense of secular schools, and his determination to exclude bishops from political life. Desmond was thoroughly in accord with Laurier: bishops must avoid politics, and Catholics should not be "insulated" from the world when fated to live in a pluralistic society, as was most of Canada, whatever about Quebec, an anachronism "like Ireland." 

The crisis may have confirmed Desmond in the notion that affairs in Canada were similar to those in America. When bilateral talks on the Alaskan boundary failed, and Laurier told the federal parliament that the options were either war, or arbitration, an unusually irrational Desmond declared there would be no border questions if Canada was annexed at once; and he shouted ominously "Delendo est Carthago."

Already, he had joined the chorus of those who argued:

102 Ibid., 14 August 1897.
103 Ibid., 4 July 1896, 9 January 1897.
104 Citizen, 29 July 1899.
There is a difference between the acquisition of contiguous territory to be peopled by white races and the acquisition of distant islands already peopled by a semi-civilized race. . . . 105

Canada fitted the requirements nicely, being one of those "civilized Caucasian communities, such as can adopt our democratic system." 106 He was bold enough to predict:

"Her turn is coming. We want her. We will have her about 1902." 107

Canada had, however, little taste for union. This despite the fact that it was proximate, profitable and assimilable. 108

It may be Desmond was bluffing even himself, in his distaste for the new colonialism. However, he himself had diagnosed the emergent national spirit of Canada, the spirit antipathetic to any plan of union. As the anti-imperialist agitation died away, so did his campaign to have Canada. He did not mention annexation or union after late 1899.

Although captivated by the new frontier that was Alaska, so much so as to publish several pieces in its praise, the most lyrical by a returned Jesuit, Francis Barnum, 109 he was at heart not one to turn its disputed borders into a cause of war. No more than he would exploit the existence of Canada as did the Pilot, would he follow it in dramatizing the Alaskan question to the same end, of embittering Anglo-American

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105 Ibid., 2 September 1899. But he had first looked North when Mahan asked for Hawaii; ibid., 17 July 1897.
106 Ibid., 30 July 1898. 107 Ibid., 18 June 1898.
108 Ibid., 1 October 1898.
109 Ibid., 25 January 1896 and 31 July 1897.
relations. Cardinal Gibbons wrote enthusiastically of arbitration in national periodicals both at the time of the Bering Sea arbitration, and before the Hay-Herbert treaty years later. Desmond, too, liked the procedure. Through its use conflicts could be avoided, man bettered, while

Right ultimately triumphs. The world is moving on constantly towards a better civilization. The optimistic view is the philosophic view. 

Judicial procedures must have appealed to the lawyer, as well as to the old-fashioned liberal. But he was realistic enough, in greeting the final outcome of the Alaska arbitration, to note that if nations wanted peace, arbitration would succeed, but if nations wished for war, arbitration alone could not prevent it. Sarcastically, he threw this reflection as a sop to those Irish-Americans longing for an Anglo-American Armageddon.

Although, unlike Cardinal Gibbons, Desmond based his pro-arbitration stand on grounds of common justice, rather than explicitly on the teaching of Christ's heritage, yet his approach to dispute in the Northern continent, as in the Southern, was conciliatory. The Pilot could have learned from him in this matter, as he could have learned from its silence that Canada was not another potential group of stars to the American banner, not an alternative to colonialism.


111 Citizen, 1 November 1902. 112 Ibid., 24 October 1903.
To judge by the bulk of editorial discussion, Catholics were very preoccupied with the Cuban revolution and the possibility of American intervention. On the one hand, it was a new Ireland, indeed a new American confederation, struggling against a colonial power. On the other hand, its master was Catholic Spain. Catholic opinion divided very sharply on the issue. The world-minded liberal laymen saw Christian duty as being as clearly involved as in the case of Armenia, or of any people unjustly oppressed. Clerics preoccupied with the image of the Church inveighed against the Cubans, or were embarrassed to silence by them: the Catholic World editorially skirted any statement until 1898, when one was inevitable. Nor was this surprising, for many secular journalists found in Spain's activities new propaganda on Romanism as the religion of the Inquisition; and the A.P.A. type wanted America to free Cuba less than to humiliate Spain.

Economic interests, feelings of compassion, strategic concerns, and yet also a desire to keep to peace, gave the American government, whether of Cleveland or McKinley, a consistent and sensible policy. The United States would respect the sovereignty of Spain over Cuba, if Spain could re-establish its authority firmly and swiftly; but it would not do so
indefinitely if endless loss of human life, and devastation of property continued without decisive effect. Americans almost monopolized the island's commerce: disruption beyond reasonable limit would render businessmen impatient, although for the moment they had no desire for a costly war. Cleveland, too, was in a delicate position, having lost support of the silver Democrats; a strong policy could conciliate, or neutralize them; but he could not start a war they or the Republicans would have the credit for finishing. Hence his proposed remedy of rapid repression combined with the granting of a real autonomy to rob future revolutionaries of rationale and wide support. When Spain showed unwillingness to allow the latter, and incapacity to enforce the former, Cleveland had to hint of "higher obligations" than those to Spanish sovereignty. McKinley took over from there. He was not inhibited by political considerations from launching war, if necessary. He was possessed of a severe, but genuine, Methodist conscience. He thought matters out slowly, but logically. When business decided, as devastation continued, that the cost was no longer worth the candle; when Spain continued her course of brutality without efficiency; when America's humane concern turned to anger; and when every indication, and memories of the lost promises of the 1868-1878 revolution, suggested that Spain might make tactical concessions but would never implement meaningful reform (the Spanish monarchy had too many enemies, to right and left, to face, and a throne to maintain);--then McKinley went to war. It was
certainly not a war forced by passions whipped up by the yellow press; nor a war which America did not give Spain fair chance to avoid. For many sober Americans, who despised the lies of the yellow press, felt intervention inevitable by 1898; they included many Catholic Americans, as we shall see, who positively repudiated slanders against Spain, but believed McKinley's course of action right. And many contemporaries, including also Catholics, saw that Spain's internal politics, and national pride, made her, despite appearances, less than truly tractable. Although some interventionists favoured eventual annexation, they were not a majority: even those who were motivated mostly by self-interest tended to see the inconsistency of this (Cuban consent excepted) and held that America, guaranteed the milk of the Cuban coconut, did not need the indigestible shell.¹

Before analyzing opinion upon the Cuban crisis, it is best to give an example of that information available about it, which was formative of probably most American Catholics' views, as of those of Americans at large. Although the Catholic World did not venture an official opinion for three

¹This interpretation is based on La Feber, New Empire, 284-300, 333-406; May, Imperial Democracy, 69ff; H. Wayne Morgan, America's Road to Empire (New York, 1965), and William McKinley and His America (Syracuse, N. Y., 1963 ), passim; Pratt, Expansionists, 209-86; together the evidence cited below. Older interpretations, found in Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit (New York, 1965), M. M. Wilkerson, Public Opinion and the Spanish American War (Baton Rouge, 1932), and Joseph E. Wisan, The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press, 1895-1898 (New York, 1934), naively reflect interwar pacifism and hence find the "devils" in the press. Yet they still influence textbooks.
years, yet in spring, 1896, it published an illustrated survey of the whole problem by a physician of Cuban origin; the account was influential, for the Catholic Citizen reprinted it in full, as perhaps did other Catholic papers, since it was at once topical and persuasive.²

The writer, Henry L. de Zayas, first indicated the revolt to be "a general uprising of the Cuban people" led by mature leaders, and no fitful rebellion; for already Spain was having to oppose to it 200,000 men under forty-five generals. He went on to examine why this was so, and found the cause in Spanish misgovernment. The ten years war of 1868-1878, concluded by General Campos in the Treaty of Zanjon, has caused 200,000 Spanish dead and cost $700,000,000; by the accord, Cuba gained the abolition of slavery, civil liberties, and representation in the Cortes. Yet the liberties were never implemented, the Cuban party at Madrid was powerless because small and unheard (Spanish deputies going to dinner when its members rose to speak), and Cuba had to cope unaided with the dislocations of the abolition. On top of this, Spain saddled her with the entire war debt, without regard to her capacity and trade fluctuations: in 1896, $295,000,000 or ten dollars per capita (against $6.30 in prosperous France).

Despite Zanjon, Cuba was arbitrarily governed, and Spaniards, appointed to all the civil and military posts, pecolated shamelessly, while pension lists were swelled for their benefit with names of the dead. All offices were by

²Citizen, 7 March 1896.
appointment, and Cubans eligible for none in fact, whatever the law. The Governor-General appointed all mayors, and could dismiss aldermen at will. No Cubans sat on the Board of Ultramar in Madrid. Nor were there any on the city council of Havana. The franchise was restricted to three per cent of the population by property qualifications, although loopholes enabled the poorest resident Spaniards to vote.

Government was not only alien; it was also inefficient, and repressive. There was strict censorship; trade unions were suppressed; imprisonment without trial was frequent. Law enforcement was non-existent; brigandage rampant. Next to nothing was spent on public works: Havana's harbour was run down, and the entire country had not a single public library. Yet the latest budget assessed taxes at sixteen dollars a head, as against eight dollars a head in Spain; of course, Cuba had no say in her own taxation or revenue allocation.

The island's economy was spancelled in the interest of Spain. The commercial laws of 1882 allowed Spanish goods to enter duty free; foreign products were taxed out of the market. Yet Cuban products were grossly taxed on entry to Spain. All her tobacco and sugar exports were taxed. Cuba was at present paying for the suppression of the present revolt, as well as for the debt of the last: de Zayas alleged no less than forty per cent of her gross national product was thus absorbed.

Cuba is fighting against the Spanish bureaucracy enthroned in the island; she bears no ill will against the generous
Spanish people. The differences are political; not of blood and religion.  

This final appeal was clearly directed to those Catholics receptive to Spanish propaganda that the revolt was one of Freemasons, atheists and mulattoes. These contrary contentions should be borne in mind in approaching Catholic responses to the crisis. It should also be remembered that Catholics were open to the general arguments from American interest, or from conscience, prevailing at the time.

First reactions of the Citizen and the Pilot were very different. The Citizen noted the new outbreak with detachment, remarking that old Virginius affair (of the previous revolution) and the present Allianca matter, both involving American sailors with the Spanish authorities, could be expected to consolidate United States public opinion in favour of Cuba. It was wary of the danger that early interventionist sentiment tended to be annexationist; and remarked that not only was acquiring outlying islands against American traditional policy, but that Cuba had been a drawback to Spain, and could not be less so to America. The Pilot, on the other hand, immediately saw the revolution as that of a Caribbean Ireland, and championed Cuba with feeling. The principle, it affirmed, was that of self-determination; the cause, "fundamentally just." It denied that the question involved matters of religion,


4 Citizen, March 23 and 30, 1895.
both Cuba and Spain being Catholic; so that it could not be waived aside, as was that of Ireland by pig-headed Tory lords, solely as a sectarian affair. It noted the generous filibusters who in the past had aided Cuba, men both Catholic, like Theo O'Hara, and G. W. Ryan, and Protestants, such as Colonel William Crittenden and Pickett. It believed neither Spaniards nor English could ever be persuaded that the right to absolute freedom was applicable as much to their dependencies as to themselves, and concluded that demands of conservative Cubans were moderate—home rule, equitable taxation, and freedom from arbitrary "Castle" power.

In the brotherhood of man, in the federation of the world, how strange will seem the blind stupidity of those nations which knew no better than to essay the impossible task of remedying discontent by strangling the discontented.

Some of the reticence of the Citizen was undeniably due to Desmond's prejudice on the colour question. Although early Cuban successes convinced him that the revolution had made sufficient headway to demonstrate that most Cubans wanted a change of government, and thereby caused him to advocate the extension of belligerent rights to them by the United States, knowledge of their racial admixture made him backslide to the official government view that

It is sincerely to be hoped that the cruel war will be over before long with some result. Even Spanish oppression is tolerable as compared with the warfare now waging.

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5Pilot, 16 March 1895.

6Citizen, 14 September and 5 October 1895.
For, as he continued by explaining,

Cuba is a little smaller than Wisconsin and about as densely populated. Half a million of her 1,600,000 people, however, are negroes. It seems hardly possible that the insurrectionists can compete with a power like Spain. 7

Clearly the possibility that a largely Negro army could defeat Spain was repugnant to him, although he accepted that possible defeat a few weeks before, when he did not know how numerous were the coloured insurgents. What confirms this, is that once he came to view a Cuban victory as necessary, he was to 'forget' this knowledge quite vehemently.

The Pilot, on the other hand, was no less vigorously pro-Cuban, for this information. Rather, indeed, the reverse: for Roche doubtless saw that not only national, but racial, oppression was to be righted. He sharply criticized those who allowed colour prejudice sway their view. 8 However, so prevalent was prejudice that the Pilot allowed itself regress on this matter, a contributor arguing that under a third of Cubans were coloured, and that while their leader, General Antonio Maceo, was quadroon, his "white blood shows in his face, his figure and his achievements." Roche himself would hardly speak so shamefully, yet allowed himself a concurrent editorial attesting the mixed racial character of the insurgents; he can only have done so to counter conservative

7 Ibid., 11 December 1895.
8 See quotation, from this editorial, above p. 140; Pilot, 23 November 1895.
Catholic arguments about lawless niggers.  

Around the early stages, however, the Pilot upheld Cleveland's policy of non-extension of belligerent rights to the Cubans, explicitly on the ground that war with Spain would ensue from it. Undoubtedly, however, its loyalty to the Democratic policy played a part in this; for it simultaneously praised Irish American volunteers presently embarking for Cuba, and prophetically warned that a repetition of the Virginius tragedy would bring United States action, and the loss of Cuba.  

Throughout most of 1896, Desmond of the Citizen retained his detachment, publishing however, such material as would enable him and his readers to make up their minds: the de Zayas article was the fullest example, and he also drew attention to an article in Donahoe's Magazine by Fr. Charles W. Currier, a priest of the archdiocese of Baltimore and an early and vocal supporter of the Cuban cause. Yet he criticized the Senate for losing its head in the matter of Cuban resolutions and being guided more by passion than logic; and he especially disapproved of the interventionists among that body--Morgan, Lodge, Sherman and Call. Actually it was, if anything, the House which had lost its head, and the

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9 Ibid., 5 December 1896. 10 Ibid., 23 November 1895.
11 Citizen, 11 April 1896.
12 Ibid., 21 March and 2 May 1896--they were Senators Henry Cabot Lodge (Massachusetts), John T. Morgan (Alabama), John Sherman (Ohio), and also Wilkinson Call (Florida)--the last actually a Congressman closely connected with the Cuban Junta; La Feber, New Empire, 290.
Senate blocked interventionist resolutions which it had passed. Desmond was more accurate in reporting (via the Boston Transcript) that American investments in Cuba were worth thirty million dollars, and included ownership of one-tenth of the sugar crop, much of the rest of which was mortgaged to Americans, so that the United States stood to lose heavily by continuing insurrection.\(^{13}\)

By late November, he had made up his mind, and he was never to go back upon it: Spain must get out of Cuba. There is, however, an important distinction between his viewpoint and the Pilot's. To him Cuba was entitled to self-government because Spain was incapable of governing it justly or effectively. To the Pilot, Cuba's self-determination was a right which could not be diminished even if Spain governed excellently. Yet Desmond, when conflicting reports no longer confused him about the real issues, as they once had,\(^{14}\) was so committed to Cuba, that he took issue with conservative Catholic arguments, and was to maintain the de Lome letter, and the Maine tragedy, to be side issues.

There must be a limit to this kind of affair, he argued. Spain has had time enough to compose matters:

We cannot tolerate an Armenia right at our doors. The time has arrived for the United States to intimate to Spain that her withdrawal from Cuba is demanded by American public opinion. The Venezuela difficulty being practically settled it is now in order to liberate Cuba.\(^{15}\)

\(^{13}\)Citizen, 2 May 1896.

\(^{14}\)Ibid., 4 April 1896.

\(^{15}\)Ibid., 28 November 1896.
However, on reflection, he saw the difficulty. In the wake of Cleveland's 'State of the Union' address intimating the "higher obligations" which would move America unless Spain rapidly composed matters (and also expatiating on America's $103 million trade with Cuba and her thirty million dollars in investments there), he admitted that the President's "judicial suspense" was justified by the political bad form which would characterize any major policy change, when he had but three months to remain in office.  

Yet Desmond clearly wished the next administration to intervene in some manner. He scotched Cleveland's contention that the United States must continue to recognize Spanish sovereignty and power, since Spain controlled Cuba's ports, by pointing out that France recognized the American States, and intervened on their behalf, when England still controlled New York, Philadelphia, Savannah and Charleston. Cleveland had postponed American intervention until Spain's incapacity to suppress the revolt seemed indisputable, yet (in the former case),

if France had not intervened, England's inability to put down the insurrection would never have become manifest.  

The frequency of Cuban uprisings proved that Spain could "neither put down the revolution, nor allay its causes." The next week he argued, quite apart from his own analysis, that the volume of American public opinion was so great that the United States could not longer delay some pro-insurgent action.

16 Ibid., 12 December 1896. 17 Ibid.
The death of Antonio Maceo, reportedly by treachery, which he then wrote about, added pathos and force to this argument. 18

The combination of Maceo's death and Cleveland's message, was accompanied by a change in the Pilot's policy also. And again, no doubt, the political factor was operative among others: a Democratic editor would have no worry in moving opinion to favour a course an incoming Republican administration might not wish to pursue, nor indeed, in criticizing an outgoing Democratic one, whose supporters were divided and defeated. But the considerations probably only cleared the way for the expression of a change of view rooted in emotional and humane causes.

At any rate, the Pilot published Cleveland's message prominently on its front page, the next week lamented Maceo's death, comparing it to that of the sixteenth century Irish leader, Owen Roe O'Neill (who was poisoned by English agents), and the following week took the unusual step of permitting an occasional contributor, Michael Lynch, to publish an open letter to the editor dissenting Cleveland's policy; it was carried on the front page. 19 Lynch had previously written an article praising Latin Americans for their lack of race prejudice, worldliness, and competitive selfishness. 20 He now argued that the time was ripe for American intervention, and alleged that Cleveland was motivated, in his delay, by the

18 Ibid., 19 December 1896.
19 Pilot, 12, 19 and 26 December 1896.
20 Ibid., 28 December 1895.
desire of American capitalists to buy up Cuban produce for a
song when the island was sufficiently desolate. The allega-
tion gives a glimpse of how bitterly disillusioned with the
President were the radicals of the time. Lynch went on, like
Desmond, to contrast American inactivity with France's readi-
ness to aid the struggling colonials—an emotionally and
intellectually persuasive point, which was to be repeated
with mounting frequency by interventionists. The authority
of Congress was then little more effective than that of the
Cuban Junta.

The Pilot itself then formally began to chant of Duty
to Cuba, in many arguments, some good, some specious. Pre-
viously, the most it had encouraged was diplomatic pressure
upon Spain, having much confidence in such methods following
Britain's humiliation over Venezuela. It had accepted, if
gracelessly, American interception of Cuban-bound gun-runners,
although it cheered when they got through. Yet, without
being yellow press-ish about it, the editor was clearly
shocked by General Weyler's initiating his callous reconcentrado
policy. Now, he swept aside all objections to intervention
with the impatience of the man of aroused compassion thwarted
by dry custom. The law of nations is most flexible, he said;
reduced to its primary principles, it simply means Might is
Right. Thus were scruples about the international rules of

21 Ibid., 29 February 1896.
22 Ibid., 7 March, 9 and 23 May 1896.
23 Ibid., 5 December 1896.
sovereignty disposed of. Intervention was justified and demanded on the equally curious ground that it was another case of enforcing the Monroe Doctrine. Then the arguments of moral obligation were resorted to, and those of gratitude to those who had once helped nascent America, to prove a duty to a struggling Cuba longing for liberty; does the country, he asked, own any higher standard than the barometer of Wall Street? Moreover

The more all America cuts loose from the rest of the world, the greater is our security as a nation. . . . 24

Thereafter, however, the Pilot did not press this change of front. It was of course very critical of America's anti-filibustering activities, particularly of the arrest of the Dauntless, commanded by an Irishman, Captain John O'Brien, and also of the sentence of two years imposed on John Hart, another arms shipper; but then, it suggested quite treasonably the ways of government are mysterious and seldom represent the will of the people. 25

And it also looked to the possible incorporation of Cuba into America, granting, of course, Cuban consent. 26 This was largely due to its conversion, principally on strategic grounds, to the acquisition of Hawaii. It was also in accord with a principle it stated earlier:

The right of every people to be free and independent carries with it the corollary right of any people to

24 Ibid., 2 January 1897.
25 Ibid., 12 June, 17 July 1897, 1 January 1898.
26 Ibid., 31 July and 14 August 1897.
surrender their independence. 27

But not only did the Pilot fail to constantly agitate its belief in intervention; it also specifically argued that a war with Spain was unwanted, and agreed with Hannis Taylor, ex-United States Minister at Madrid, that a joint resolution of both Houses calling for Spain's withdrawal, would frighten her into leaving Cuba without a fight. 28 The explanation of this inconsistency can only be found in the editor's natural association of Spain with Catholicism; and, in America, the type was most vocal who beleaguered both together. How to advocate United States hostility to Spain, in these circumstances, was a major problem; one could not afford to compromise one's Catholicism, and this was difficult when conservatives maintained one could not do the one without, wilfully or passively, the other. Desmond coped with this problem most ably; others were probably less confident of their conscience.

The conservative view was argued by the Ave Maria, among other journals:

Religious prejudice has much to do with the Free Cuba agitation. . . . Cuban insurgents may prove more despotic than Spain. . . . Most of the Cuban patriots are of a Garibaldi kind; people have little to hope and much to fear from them. . . . (Perusal of the Spanish communiques convinces us) first, that Cuba had no valid

27Ibid., 16 March 1895.

28Ibid., 20 November and 18 December 1897. It espoused (armed) intervention not once between 2 January 1897 and 29 January 1898.
and irremediable grievances with the mother country; and second, that if Spain were not a Catholic country, misrepresentation of her government would not be so general, and there would be less enthusiasm for Cuba in press and pulpit. 

The *New York Catholic Review* had a more sinister interpretation: Liberals throughout the world were acting with their Masonic friends in the United States, in efforts to overthrow the Spanish government. When Bourke Cockran came out in favour of American intervention, another Catholic paper, *Der Herold des Glaubens* commented:

> If he is really a practical Catholic, he ought to know that he has absolutely no right to instigate any nation to rebellion against the existing order and government.

These, then, may be affirmed the roots of pro-Spanish feeling among conservatives: the mentality defensive of anything visibly Catholic, the fear that a free Cuba would be ruled by an anti-Catholic caste, and the paranoid belief that Masonry, Judaism, and Liberalism constituted an international conspiracy against Catholicism. Besides these we can set, as well, the tendencies discussed above making for conservatism among clerics, German Catholics and eastern Irish Americans. Real

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29 Cited in *Citizen*, 11 July 1896.
30 *Citizen*, 30 January 1897.
31 Cited in *Citizen*, 23 January 1897.
32 That this belief was quite real is evidenced by a series of articles in the *Sacred Heart Messenger* by American Jesuits who should have been more realistic, e.g., Charles Coppens (Creighton University), "Freemasonry in the United States," 22 (February 1900), 124-35, and his "The Solidarity of Freemasonry," 22 (May 1900), 531-39; and anti-Jewish editorials, as 20 (August 1899), 756.
conservatives must have felt particularly isolated in the two years, 1898-1899; for to the extent that the editor of the *Sacred Heart Messenger* could hail the harshly anti-American *Civiltà Cattolica* as "the true exponent of the thought and temper of the Holy See," it presumably acquiesced in that periodical's fulminations on behalf of Spain, and its characterizing America's Democrats as Socialistic. 33

Desmond of the *Citizen* dealt forthrightly with such conservatism. He had the liberal Catholic's conviction that the interests of Christian principle are those of true Catholicity; he had no time for those who would sacrifice justice to save the visible influence of the ecclesiastical Church. He had no abject concern with the Catholic "image." Yet while he could ridicule conservatives on the crisis, he could also do what the *Pilot* tended to do; recognize many Catholics had genuine scruples in opposing Spain, and attempt to allay them.

Thus, with intemperate wit, he called the editor of the *Herold des Glaubens* a better species of dunderhead, than of Catholic. 34 More sensibly, he met that priest's arguments, by pointing out that the Church, while naturally leaning toward the established order, usually reserved judgment on revolutions until their outcome, blessing them if they succeeded, anathematizing them if they failed. Court chaplains of despotism could

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33 *Ibid.*, 20 (June 1899), 634-37; *Citizen*, 28 February 1903.
34 *Citizen*, 23 January 1897.
always be found to anticipate the Church's ruling, or owl-like scholastics like Fr. J. N. Enzlberger (the editor), but Catholics need not worry until the Pope condemns Cubans, and he would scarcely do so.35 His sarcasm was re-aroused when enrobed priests joined a conservative revolution against the anti-clerical President Alfaro of Ecuador, while other Catholics were attempting to overthrow a secular constitution in Brazil:

Yet if revolutions may be started for such grievances as a lopping off of church revenues, without theological censure of kind, we see no reason why revolution may not also be started by a people oppressed, ground down, deprived of the right of self-government and generally mistreated and abused as are the Cubans.36

At the same time he laughed at those who said the Cubans were masonic. But General Weyler openly avowed himself a Freemason. Was he to sympathize with him then? Nay, nay, he was for Gomez and against the lodges!37

However, Desmond also attempted to break the identification in his readers' minds between Spain and Catholicism. On the one hand he frequently defended her against slander, particularly early atrocity tales arriving from the Philippines, where an insurrection broke out in late 1896.38 He repudiated the style of the yellow press, noting with satisfaction of the New York Journal and World, that many libraries had ceased taking them, including one at Princeton.39 He argued that under war conditions, no one people had any more innate

35 Ibid., 28 February 1897. 36 Ibid., 15 May 1897.
37 Ibid., 30 January 1897. Maximo Gomez, with Jose Marti, led the Cubans.
38 Ibid., 19 December 1896. 39 Ibid., 27 March 1897.
tendency to criminality than another: history showed none could afford to feel superior in this respect. On the other hand he commissioned a special article from Fr. Currier to answer arguments based on Spain's Catholicity. Cleverly, the Baltimore pastor argued that while Spain was Catholic, her rule in Cuba was un-Catholic; he admitted that poorer Cubans were superstitious, and the upper class among them rationalistic and indifferent. But he maintained that this was because Catholicism was more often imposed on them, than exampled to them. Thus he implied, contrary to the conservative view, that Spain's rule was detrimental to the Church there; only in liberty could Cubans become truly Catholic. And, anyhow, Cuba was now subject to the vagaries of Spanish politics, with its large anti-clerical element; church property there had been widely expropriated.

Desmond himself took Currier's cue, and elaborated upon it. The succession of Praxedes Sagasta, a Mason, as Spanish premier, made his task easy. And his life-long distaste for authoritarian European Catholicism helped. Spain's dynastic constitution produced only politicians, never statesmen. She was deficient in Christian public opinion.

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40 Ibid., 19 December 1896.
41 Ibid., "For Bleeding Cuba," 13 November 1897.
42 Ibid., 22 January, 2 April 1898.
43 Ibid., 2 January 1897.
44 Ibid., 16 April 1898.
She showed little "Christian Catholicity" to Cuba. Indeed her religious image could be questioned:

An altar yoked to a throne is often subjected to a truce with the devil. A people whose women are devotees merely, whose men are bravos, whose politicians are Free Masons, and whose prelates are courtiers, lack much of the vital force of Catholicity.

An archbishop concurred in this judgment: William Gross of Oregon believed Spain could not be truly devout when national passivity permitted anti-clericals to gain power.

Yet for others, it was not easy to break habits rooted in childhood memories of Spain described as champion of the Counter-Reformation. Even Desmond could not do so entirely. Throughout the years before the war, and indeed to its very outbreak, the Pilot published a section of "Notes from Spain" by a pseudonymous 'Juan Pedro.' They described antiquities, scenes and religious festivals; they hinted at a richer Catholic culture, if a sleepier one, than the immigrant communities possessed. Inevitably Catholics retained sympathy for Spain. The Pilot described as bogus friends of Cuba, the anti-Catholics, explaining—to disarm Catholic misgivings—

The question today is not of creed, but of humanity. It generally regretted that the glorious Spaniards be so involved in tyranny and crime. It, too, condemned the yellow press. It, too, gathered Catholic condemnations of Spain,

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such as that by Bishop Santander y Frutos of Havana, as had the *Citizen*. This must again have been to settle doubts. Yet, as seen, these same doubts prevented the *Pilot* from urging its Cuban stand more strongly.

Only the *Citizen* continued to press its view forcefully. Desmond was too confident of himself and American Catholicism to need to entertain any compensating image of a glamourous Spain. He understood that country well; his estimate of it was critical but never contemptuous. He even ventured to lecture it for its own good. As early as January 1897 he was well aware of the Philippine situation, whereas to uninformed Americans it might as well have been nonexistent before Dewey's victory. He warned Spain that she should abandon Cuba to save her populous and wealthy oriental empire, racked by insurrection, and eyed greedily by Russia and Japan. Yet he then reminded himself that Spain, governed by cliques and courtiers, had little political sense. Her obstinate hidalgo pride condemned her to mishandle the Cuban crisis.

Spain fights with a proud fatuity. . . . She is a Don Quixote running up against the windmill of bankruptcy.

Spain's dismal record caused both the *Pilot* and the *Citizen* to warn Cuba to reject the "proferred sop" of Home Rule. Desmond warned that the Spanish residents of Cuba would

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50 *Ibid.*, 20 November 1897; and *Citizen*, 20 November 1897, the latter publishing a letter from a religious superior on conditions in Cuba, on front page.

51 *Citizen*, 2 January 1897, also 4 June 1898.
manipulate it, transforming it into oligarchy in their interest, as the Protestant Ascendancy did the eighteenth century Irish constitution. Maintaining Spain could no longer hold Cuba, Desmond urged American intervention at once (June, 1897), for if she delayed, she would face the expense of massive relief operations, since Spain campaigned "by famine and devastation."

He had few illusions, believing that the Cubans were not fit for self-government, and that scandals and disorders would mark the beginning of their republic. But he believed, too, that anything was better than Spanish rule. "Progress will not begin til Spain goes." In contrast, the Pilot maintained, more admirably, that whether Cuba was to lapse into civil discord following independence was no business of America's, but only her own; and that such a prospect could not alter the obligation to aid her.

Desmond's dubious expectation of Cuban freedom owed partly to his continuing distaste for the Negro role in its achievement. To counter anti-Cuban polemics he took the unconvincing position of minimizing that role, or denying it altogether. Perhaps, too, he was trying to reconcile conflicts within his own heart, between his sense of justice and his residual racism. At any rate, he affirmed the Cubans to

52 Ibid., 9 October 1897, and Pilot 23 October 1897.
53 Citizen, 5 June 1897.
54 Ibid., 9 October 1897; Pilot, 2 January 1897.
be civilized Caucasians, as late as March 1895. However, since he knew this not to be exclusively true by any means, his continued championing of Cuba marks the beginning of his gradual abandonment of colour prejudice. He could still, throughout the next two years, voice racist platitudes mechanically, but he was too sensible and humane to remain blatantly inconsistent. With much less consistency, was an increasingly racist United States to solemnize its painful post-war reunion in a crusade to establish a multi-racial republic on its doorstep, although this was not its intention: the America that wept for Maceo ignored his ancestry.

The Catholic periodical press was very divided on the Cuban question. Many journals, such as the Buffalo Union and Times, sided with the liberals Desmond and Roche in sympathizing with Cuba—probably those edited by men also alive to the Irish experience vis-a-vis Britain. Many others, either vocally, or in silence (such as the Sacred Heart Messenger) sympathized with Spain. The problem became more perplexing, when war between Spain and America itself proved all but unavoidable. Yet, in pursuance of our theme, we must stress the consistency of those who opposed repressive colonialism even when its executor was a Catholic power, and its rebelling subjects reputed unfriendly to the Church. And we must praise

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55 See above, 136-37.
56 E.g., see Citizen, 18 January 1897.
their integrity in proposing intervention when it seemed the sole instrument of redress, although sectarians recommended it as a bludgeon of their faith.
CHAPTER XVI

THE WAR WITH SPAIN, 1898

However widely they disagreed upon the Cuban question, American Catholics were united in wishing that a major war against Spain might be avoided. Interventionary or punitive action, perhaps might be bruited; full-scale hostilities were not. Yet when the war came, even those Catholics most unenthusiastic about it did not deny the duty of all Americans to support it. Conservative Catholic journalists instead acted in a manner consistent with that of their predecessors during the Mexican War (1846-1848). Disliking war with a Catholic power, and distrustful since the war agitation gave prominence to nativist and anti-Catholic elements, in both cases such Catholics made the cursory bow to patriotism and authority, but subsequently published nothing to arouse war enthusiasm or to discredit the enemy.¹

The last minute representations made at the behest of the Vatican by Archbishop Ireland to avert the war, have been well-reported.² Militant nationalist and ardent expansionist, he was however genuinely dismayed at the prospect of war. He made known these feelings to Mgr. Denis O'Connell, and was not


²Moynihan, Ireland, 162-76.
acting solely out of obedience to a Vatican which believed him a more influential Republican than he was. After the outbreak, his feelings became more ambivalent:

I do not, I confess, like our present war: but great good will come from it, in the enlargement of American influence (to O'Connell, 2 May 1898). Well, America is whipping poor Spain. I confess my sympathies are largely with Spain; but the fact is she is beaten. Now Americanism will triumph (to O'Connell, 11 May 1898).³

If Archbishop Ireland could have such misgivings, others who did not share his nationalism nor his eye for advantage in ecclesiastical politics must have been more gravely distressed. Few, however, went as far as the later Cardinal archbishop of Boston, William O'Connell, who forbade his students at the American College in Rome to display any open feeling on behalf of the United States. Yet the Pilot could admit it "quite conceivable" that there were Catholic priests in the United States with Spanish sympathies, adding that it repudiated them as forcibly as it did Protestant ministers who recognized England as a friend.⁴ Certainly the attempted but abortive mediation by Leo XIII, however it might be explained away in terms of his Christian duty as peacemaker, and of his arbitrational role in several previous disputes, brought home the instinctive concern of churchmen in Europe that Spain be not humiliated. Churchmen, and even laity, in America shared, if variably, this concern.


⁴Pilot, 5 March 1898.
As the war neared, Roche and Desmond were both torn between this concern, and their conviction that intervention was a Christian duty. As Roche put the latter

The world has seen Poland dismembered, Ireland enslaved and Greece humiliated, and however deeply moved by the sight, it has ever been able to summon its fortitude and pass by on the other side like a prudent Levite.  

Desmond put it more succinctly: the Monroe Doctrine had "its moral corollaries." These, and not transient excitements nor economic interests, must dictate American policy. The blowing up of the Maine, and the de Lome letter were but side-issues obscuring the "unwritten code of the international Christian comity," that powers must intervene as in Crete, when oppression seems to threaten humanity itself. Judiciousness alone could assess the need for action on this basis. The Iberian chaff of conciliation must be discounted in reaching a decision.  

Indeed, Desmond's attitude in this was so consistent and determined, that by spring 1898 even compassion for Spain could not wish for anything less than her expulsion from Cuba, even if at the cost of war. The Maine case was useful in making people think, but "the logic of the situation" was that Spain had lost all right to hold Cuba on any terms. The eye-witness report of Senator Proctor of Vermont drove home this point. All blame was entirely Spain's for her un-Christian

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5Pilot, 1 January 1898.  
6Citizen, 11 December 1897, 5 March 1898.
rule.\textsuperscript{7} The \textit{Citizen} therefore took the unusual position of so accepting war if it must prove necessary, that it criticized stalling the whole issue by suggestions of mediation, whether made by the American Quakers, or the Vatican itself. The Papal move it defended against Protestant criticism, taking the \textit{Independent}'s cue that it was legitimate. But it criticized it on the grounds that Leo XIII had Spanish sympathies, that the America case must now triumph, that if it did not Catholics might be held responsible, and that the whole intervention was too late. Leo XIII, Archbishop Ireland and Cardinal Gibbons would be better cajoling Madrid than mediating on its behalf.\textsuperscript{8}

Desmond was not the only Catholic to anticipate and justify the coming war; among leading churchmen, Archbishop Kain of St. Louis, Archbishop Gross of Oregon and Bishop Foley of Detroit did so also. Like him, they had no doubts that compassionate intervention might be less to God's honour than continued Spanish misgovernment, however 'Catholic.'\textsuperscript{9} Most others set more hopes by the attempt to maintain peace, most prominently Gibbons and Ireland following the Maine disaster.\textsuperscript{10} But even Desmond recognized clearly the horrors

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\textsuperscript{7}Ibid., 26 March, 2, 16 and 23 April 1898.
\textsuperscript{8}Ibid., 2, 9 and 23 April 1898.
\textsuperscript{9}Ibid., 26 March and 16 April 1898.
\textsuperscript{10}Ibid., 5 and 12 March 1898.
\end{flushright}
which war must bring, publishing words by Carl Schurz and Camille Flammarion to dispel any illusions among his readers upon this; if Cuban suffering could be relieved, and Spain's eviction guaranteed by any means short of war, he should be glad. Only because this seemed impossible did he look to war, not with the irresponsible jingoism then sweeping states such as Minnesota, but in the conviction that there was no alternative. Only from this conviction did he criticize McKinley's war messages as somewhat weak, although substantially correct.

Not all Catholics were immune to the prevalent secular belligerence; probably many more were affected by it than the scant evidence in the reflectively Catholic press would suggest. Within a few weeks of the Maine explosion, the boys of St. Francis Xavier's College, New York, had trained and armed and offered their services to America. Somewhat after hostilities commenced, the boys of Notre Dame followed suit.

To Desmond, the resort to war was nothing to enthuse about; he had advocated it as an instrument of policy, not as an occasion for flag vaunting. Repeatedly he wished that it be a short war; as he admitted that for personal preference he would rather the United States fight England, Spain being Catholic. But, having brought war on its own head, Spain

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11 Ibid., 2 and 23 April 1898.
12 Ibid., 2 and 16 April 1898; Peter Mickelson, "Nationalism in Minnesota during the Spanish-American War," Minnesota History, 41 (Spring 1868), 1-12.
13 Citizen, 12 March and 14 May 1898.
should not be defended by American Catholics sympathizing with her, to the extent of opposition to the war. Desmond himself, however, saw the justice of defending Spain against hatred and calumny.

Let us not vituperate against Spain... let us be magnanimous—she discovered us. If we must chastise her, let us do it deliberately, in sorrow, not in anger. America's mere size and population, relative to Spain's (75 million to 17 million people), should put the States above small minded hatreds, he concluded.

Later he returned to this theme, joining the Wisconsin Unitarians to condemn "Remember the Maine" propaganda:

A war of revenge is ignoble; a war for freedom is creditable. A war cry that appeals to the savagery in the mob elements of American communities should be tabooed.

And of course he again attacked the notion that America was strong, and Spain weak, by reason of the former's possessing true religion, the latter false. In that case as the Springfield Republican remarked, why was heathen Japan so powerful? The whole notion of God being on any side was repugnant to him: wars were determined, in their outcome, by wholly secular circumstances, or, as Napoleon realistically noted, "God is on the side of the biggest battalions."

The soldier with blood on his sword prating about the Almighty... is usually a barbarian spoiled in the

14 Ibid., 23 and 30 April and 6 May 1898.
15 Ibid., 12 March 1898. 16 Ibid., 28 May 1898.
17 Ibid., 14 May 1898.
process of conversion. . . To the real civilized Christian, all this is unutterably hypocritical. 18

Undoubtedly current Protestant propaganda chiefly evoked this statement. But Desmond need not have couched his reaction in such general and noble principles, unless he believed them. For he was one of the minority of articulate Catholics to have no doubts about the justice of the war; and he was one of the few least bothered by bigots, being assured of his American-ness.

Strangely, it was those churchmen formerly unenthusiastic for war with Spain who now voiced sentiments on the divine right of governments in war-time. Archbishop Elder of Cincinnati reminded his flock of St. Paul's words "whoso resisteth that authority resisteth God," and argued that the power to wage war was an essential attribute of society. 19 Cardinal Gibbons and Archbishop Ireland argued that while the expediency of a decision of state might be questioned before it was made, this right gave way to the duty of obedience when the state chose its course. 20 The Vicar General of Wilmington stated boldly:

The duty to one's country is integral with one's duty to God. 21

Fr. Malone, a popular New York pastor, agreed with this, and hailed the new unity which war could bring between the sections and ethnic groups of the nation. He saw it as exhibiting a new

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18 Ibid., 4 June 1898. 19 Ibid., 6 May 1898.
20 Ibid., 6 and 14 May 1898.
21 Ibid., 6 May 1898.
American responsibility to downtrodden peoples. For militaristic Christianity, however, Fr. Walter Elliott took highest honours. Speaking at the Paulist Church in New York to a group of veterans, he maintained

No man can be at peace when his country is at war. . . .
War is the greatest time of all for piety. One dare not take sides against what is right, but one must believe his country in the right until it is absolutely proved to him that she is wrong.

The Catholic service at which he spoke was opened with "Tenting on the Old Camp Ground," re-written for the present war, and closed with the "Battle Hymn of the Republic."23

Indeed there was a widespread report that the Catholic hierarchy had issued a joint pastoral letter appealing for loyalty and service to the country. Julius Pratt takes the report as true, discussing the text of the alleged pastoral on the basis of information provided by a Methodist paper. In fact, plausible though the report was, there seems to have been no such joint appeal. Archbishop Katzer denied any knowledge of it when approached by the Citizen, and none of the standard biographies of Ireland, or Gibbons refer to it. Nor did the Citizen, Pilot, or Catholic World, carry the text Pratt found in the Northern Christian Advocate. Since several individual archiepiscopal appeals were issued, there may have been confusion on the matter; but it is indicative of the uncertainty with which secular America viewed the question of Catholic response to the war, that such a report was widely

22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 11 June 1898.
The change of front by churchmen, from regarding Cuba as an embarrassment, to upholding an American war in its favour against Catholic Spain, merits attention. It is possible that they wished to use the opportunity to prove their patriotism, impugned by bigots for so long. But this cannot have been all. Their statements about authority's due seem authentic rather than expedient. They were speaking in the context of an ancient but vital Catholic mentality, one which only since the mid-twentieth century has been effectively challenged. This is the mentality which, in doubtful questions regards the status of the visible authorities rather than the authority of the actual case, as the touchstone of decision by men, whether as laity or as citizens. God, by this view, is on the side of the authorities and the obedient; presumably dividing His blessings equally between disciplined Spaniards and patriotic Americans, and reserving His censure for the many Spaniards who opposed Sagasta's policy, and the handful of conservative Catholic irreconcilables in America who persisted in holding their country had no rights to intervene. At the root of this attitude was the medieval belief that all authority, temporal and spiritual, proceeds from God; and the man disposed to disobey the state is tempted to question the Church. This attitude has persisted until lately in the Spellmanesque extravagances of clerical conservatism in America.

Pratt, Expansionists, 288; Citizen, 6 May 1898.
The Citizen was unusual in its acceptance of the need for war. Other Catholic journals accepted the war only as an accomplished fact; and, like the Citizen, they wished it to be short, and free of hatred for Spain. They attempted to brake the approach to war by urging restraint and judiciousness over the Maine and de Lome affairs, and by asking that every hint of accommodation be investigated and exhausted.

Thus the Pilot, while on the one hand advocating intervention in Cuba, yet warned against making the de Lome letter a cause of war. Although praising the earthy straightforwardness of American diplomacy in ensuring de Lome's expulsion, which it compared to Sackville West's dismissal, the paper warned it was America's duty to avoid a war with Spain which should only be to England's advantage. The country should conserve herself to fight the real enemy, "this one power which threatens American supremacy in this hemisphere." 25

With the Maine disaster, Roche's editorials became even more confused and inconsistent, varying from warlike rhetoric to caution lest war transpire. He suggested it treasonable to imply the explosion was due to the navy's negligence, and inconceivable to portray it as the work of Cubans desiring war. Indemnity should not be allowed to compensate; explanation should be procured at the canon's mouth. The Spanish fleet should be disarmed before Spain attempted to "Maine" the whole American fleet. In complete contradiction of the Citizen, the Pilot criticized. McKinley for

25Pilot, 29 January and 19 February 1898.
sidetracking the real issue, the Maine, and instead giving prominence to the Cuban situation in his addresses.

Yet on the other hand, it argued that one must await the result of investigation before fixing the blame, and that all wished to avoid war. It again attacked the yellow press, noting that despite reports that vultures were eating the Maine dead, vultures were not diving birds! And whilst it attacked McKinley's reticence as due to his subservience to the money power, yet it welcomed the huge Congress defense appropriations as likely to secure peace by preparing for the contingency of war. It argued that the fifty million dollar allocation, had it been made earlier, and the refusal of Spain's request for a United States embargo on Cuba-bound relief vessels, could have averted the war shadow and saved the Maine. When the result of the court of inquiry was released, the Pilot retracted its previous stand and asked that the United States government take an indemnity, if a huge one. The paper seemed to hope that bluster or a show of strength could secure the fruits of war without the sorrows of it. And, unlike the Citizen, it seemed, in crisis, to be more concerned with America's rights and naval security, than with the Cubans. However, it did continue to make something out of the necessity to relieve the Cuban suffering and starvation, if need be by ignoring international law. Yet on the whole its editorials could not have educated readers to an understanding and a conviction which should assist them make up their minds clearly as the crisis deepened, as to whether peace, or Cuba, were more important. Spain's Catholicity was
probably the chief source of this editorial obscurity.\textsuperscript{26}

Thus, on the same day, the \textit{Pilot} welcomed Leo XIII's intervention as consonant with America's wish, yet repudiated the offer of intermediacy by the European powers. And while hoping for peace, it published an Irish-American war poem on its front page, editorializing upon it:

War or the prospect of war arouses the spirit of real poetry; while the piping times of peace bring forth only pipings.\textsuperscript{27}

A strange judgment from an accomplished poet!

While the \textit{Pilot} was alternately hollering and stalling on the question of war, its more clear-headed contributor, Michael Lynch, who had initiated its turn to support of Cuba, argued that while the Maine case justified war, the real motive must be to rescue Cuba. In this, he was like Desmond; and he resembled him further in forthrightly disproving "the bugaboo of Spanish atrocities" as a cause for enmity.\textsuperscript{28}

When war was declared, the \textit{Pilot} continued its confusion. On the one hand, it gave America full moral credit for saving a people, "five hours sail from our shores" from martyrdom; it contrasted this with the inactivity of the Europeans while Armenians died; and it explained that America would have intervened sooner, were her motives not subject to misrepresentation (whereas in fact "they are the purest"). Yet

\textsuperscript{26}Ibid., 26 February, 5, 12, 19 and 26 March, 2 and 16 April 1898.

\textsuperscript{27}Ibid., 26 March and 16 April 1898.

\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., 23 April 1898.
on the other hand, it disavowed the idea that any real matter, such as the Maine disaster, could be settled through arbitration by men with red, blood in their veins. As the war progressed it attributed America's victories to its systematic application of intelligence to the art of war, to superior naval preparedness and gunnery training, and to Yankee pluck. For over five years the Pilot had agitated for national armed power, and implementation of Mahan's ideas; it would therefore be too much to expect it to attribute the victories of Santiago and Manila Bay to America's vastness of wealth and people, as Desmond humbly did. The Pilot nationalistically enjoyed the war as the showing forth of America; and if Spain was not the best victim, well with luck it would be Britain next time. Not surprisingly, then, it sharply criticized the faculties of Harvard and Cornell for continuing opposition to the war, contrasting their pacifism with the patriotism of their students. 29

In contrast to Desmond, Roche regretted the Secretary of the Navy's outlawing the war-cry "Remember the Maine!" He admitted that while it was right to wipe away the spirit of revenge, the cry was just as a slogan of law-enforcement! However, he did broaden the concept of law involved: the war represented the enacting of binding law (on the duty of restraining oppression), no less than did the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine. 30 Unlike the Citizen, also, and indeed

29 Ibid., 30 April, 4, 14 and 21 May, 25 June, and 23 July 1898.
30 Ibid., 4 June 1898.
other Catholic journals, the Pilot did not appeal for lenience toward Spain until the conflict was well on its way; when it appeared that complex territorial questions were arising, then the Pilot appealed that Spain had nothing to gain by fighting on, and that the heavy land losses on both sides were not justified, for we, who seek no spoils of conquest shall be equally glad when it is all over.\(^{31}\)

The clerical journals were more clearly desirous of a short and lenient conflict. The Catholic World did not editorialize at all on the impending crisis, until the war was on. The note it struck suggested clearly why this was so:

War is at hand. There is no use blinking the reality. President McKinley's course has been wise, humane and patriotic. . . . Undoubtedly the war spirit finds some of its bitterness among the hot-heads in the fact that Spain is a Catholic country.\(^{32}\) . . . Let us first exhaust diplomacy before firing.

Cuba, it continued, must be free; but the Holy Father and Europe will recognize this and persuade Spain of it.

The World also stomached this division of loyalties by changing its image of Spain. Following the hostilities, it argued that there was now hope for Spain, as for a pruned tree. The colonies were but feeding grounds for a rapacious aristocracy and for fast-living officials in civil and military life, among whom Free Masonry was rampant. Needing colonies for its perpetuation, this masonic class precipitated a war rather than let them go:

\(^{31}\)Ibid., 9 July 1898.

\(^{32}\)Catholic World, 67 (May, 1898), editorial.
If Spain was a real Catholic country, peace would have stood, for the Church stands for peace.\footnote{Ibid., 67 (August 1898), 715.}

By such a criterion, Spain ceased being Catholic when she began the Reconquista!

The chief devotional and popular organ of the Jesuits ignored the crisis also until the war was actually on, apart from a \textit{De Profundis} for the \textit{Maine} victims. In June, it editorialized that Good came Out of Evil: the conflict was between two brave and generous foes, and the very experience of meeting Spaniards on the field should correct prejudices against them. In the meantime, let men pray for a speedy peace, and pray for all enemies. Thereafter the trouble was again ignored.\footnote{\textit{Messenger of the Sacred Heart} \ldots, 33 (April, 1898), 370, and (June 1898), 563.}

Both the \textit{Citizen} and the \textit{Pilot}, were concerned to rebut and satirize extremist Protestant interpretations of the war, as much as were the clerical journals such as the \textit{Ave Maria}.\footnote{\textit{Pilot}, 28 May 1898, citing \textit{Ave Maria}.} Both of them made much of the fact that five Catholic sailors died with Lieutenant Hobson, U.S.N., in his heroic scuttling of the \textit{Merrimac} to confine Spain's Atlantic fleet in Santiago harbour.\footnote{\textit{Citizen}, 11 June 1898; \textit{Pilot} 18 June 1898.} The Citizen marked the fact of the disproportionate numbers of Catholics serving in the army, by sending free bundles of its editions to the care of Catholic officers in
the training camps. Bundles were sent also to the Ninth Massachusetts Volunteers, encamped near Santiago de Cuba. The principal Irish American regiment participating, its movements were closely followed by the Pilot; as too was the departure of the First California Volunteers (also Irish) by the Citizen. The chaplain of the latter was Fr. McKinnon, later to play an important liaison role between the occupying forces and the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and an equally important fact-finding role for American and Vatican churchmen. The effect of the return of the Massachusetts regiment on the watching correspondent of the Pilot affords a pathetic commentary on the ignorance at home of the real tragedy of any war. He described how only three months service had changed the survivors, from adventuresome boys, into sick and middle-aged youths. However, while the war was in progress, the Pilot made the most out of every news-dispatch hero with an Irish name.

The prestigious Protestant Independent was cited in impartial criticism of the notion of God on the "Protestant" side, firstly on the grounds that it was creating religious strife in America, and secondly because it was impracticable to punish the Inquisition at this date:

"We shall have our hands full if we propose to be a general retributive Providence to punish the nations

37Citizen, 4 June and 9 July 1898.
38Ibid., 16 July 1898. 39Ibid., 18 June 1898.
40Pilot, 17 September 1898. 41E.g., Ibid., 11 June 1898.
of this generation for what their grandfathers did."\(^{42}\)

Generally, the "British Bostonians" were ridiculed for making the interests of America secondary to those of a Protestant English-speaking alliance.\(^{43}\) In some ways, the lay-minded Pilot and Citizen were less concerned at the effect on the Church's image of the prevalent villification of Spain, than at the real danger that England, herself isolated, would manipulate America into alliance with her, by exaggerating the hostility of continental Europe's reaction to the war.

The Spanish-American War did in fact give great impetus to the propaganda for an Anglo-American entente. Both the Pilot and Citizen feared this even before war broke out. Now they re-doubled their criticism of irrelevant "sentimentalities" as the bases of the idea, and belittled reports of French and Russian anger at America's action. They pointed to Britain's control over the Atlantic cables as the source of such reports, and quoted European officials on the need for continuing friendship with America. While Bismarck's candid disgust at America's regression from peace and high civilization was noted, his attack on Britain's unjustified use of the crisis was more lengthily reported. Michael Davitt again came forward as chief exposé of Britain's nefarious purposes in this regard. It was also pointed out that Britons, in their royalist hearts were pro-Spanish, and still in their minds unalterably prejudiced against America, being convinced with

\(^{42}\) Cited, Ibid., 18 June 1898.

\(^{43}\) E.g., Ibid., 30 April 1898.
the London *Saturday Review*, that "the United States is socially sordid to the last degree." The *Citizen* sensibly noted that it was natural that Germany sympathize with the underdog, a European kingdom, and that this should not be made the occasion of scurrilous anti-German cartoons, such as were appearing in the secular press, for such material unwittingly played England's game. Anglo-Saxonism, whether racial or cultural, was much criticized, as its political dangers were now threatening to materialize. Even the *Catholic World*, under the Irish-American bias of editor Fr. Doyle, spent more time on these dangers than on the war itself, giving free reign to the emotional propaganda of the Irish Paulists. Under the shadow of American imperialism, this preoccupation was to gain added cogency, facing the moral danger of a twin imperialism. To the *Catholic World*, however, this vista transformed Anglo-American accord from a threat, to an opportunity, as shall be seen; to the *Citizen* and *Pilot*, it made it an even more discreditable temptation.44

Still, the Catholic press could scarcely ignore rumours, widely reported in the secular press, that Leo XIII's sympathies were with Spain, that he had given his apostolic blessing to its forces, and that he had been rendered "prostrate" by Admiral Dewey's victory. Such reports were best dealt with by characterizing them as A.P.A. fabrications, or

44*Catholic World*, 67 (July 1898), 2 eds.; George MacDermot, CSP, "The Anglo-American Alliance and the American Irish," ibid., 68 (October 1898), 75-88; *Citizen*, 30 April, 6 and 28 May, 4, 11, 18 and 25 June, 2 and 9 July 1898; *Pilot*, 28 May and 31 December 1898.
(and we would say, more adequately), by citing the official statements of non-partisanship issued by Cardinal Rampolla, Papal Secretary of State; to the Pilot, only "a species of interesting idiot" could see in Dewey's victory the triumph of one faith over another.45

Although unusually moderate, for one who had urged war, the temper of war-time caused Desmond twice to lose his sense of fairness; the first time to note that since Senor Sagasta chose to characterize the war as an affair of honour, American honour must be satisfied in the Atlantic as well as in the Pacific; the second time to urge quite callously the bombardment of the Spanish coast, particularly Cadiz.46 Yet this was abnormal, for although Desmond had been the first to repudiate the idea of Spain's embodying Catholicity, his sense of justice demanded that her character be not villified beyond recognition. As to the chief calumny, he cited Professor Henry Adams to the effect that the Inquisition was regulatory of popular persecutions, rather than causal of them. With his mind probably on his interpretation of current American politics, he argued that Spain became increasingly tyrannical when the influx of American gold made its government independent of the people. The Republic of 1875 had failed because the populace was so largely ignorant and illiterate; but, with education, Spain could have a great

45Citizen, 14 May 1898; Pilot, 21 May 1898.
46Citizen, 6 May and 16 July 1898.
future as a democracy. She was not completely decadent. 47

Desmond would not have been an American did he not partly attribute Spain's impending defeat to her lack of democracy, her being ruled by "an aristocracy of hidalgos and thievish pro-consuls and adventurers"—an argument which also deflected criticism from the state of her religion. 48 The whole tragic war, noted Desmond philosophically, might have been avoided if Spain had not an unstable monarchy, the survival of which depended on the popularity of Sagasta's policies. But this could not be, since Don Carlos (chief pretender to the throne) was prepared to play the card of "Spanish honour" against the ministry in Madrid, and hence

Christine (the Queen regent) had to be foolish for Spain in order to keep the throne for little Alfonso. 49

This interpretation remains singularly more mature than those of many historians of the war, misled into "yellow press" theories of its origins. One again feels that H. J. Desmond mistook his vocation, and should have published more history than he did! Of course he would have shared the peccadillo of most stimulating historians, an over-readiness to generalize, for he concluded "Such is the course of events in effete monarchies."

Catholic American hopes that the trauma of defeat would usher Spain into a new birth were to be cruelly disappointed. While Harper's Weekly could publish an article,

47 Ibid., 25 June 1898.  
48 Ibid., 4 June 1898.  
49 Ibid., 6 May 1898.
much to its credit, demonstrating that there was more social freedom, and liberty of criticism (even for an old Republican and anti-clerical such as Emilio Castelar), existing in Spain than in Germany, the failure of Spaniards to use these freedoms constructively drove Desmond to despair. Popular apathy, administrative corruption and economic stagnation seemed insurmountable, he noted. The accession of the Catholic, pro-clerical, Silvea regime to succeed that of Sagasta promised no relief; Desmond accurately forecast that it would lack the necessary elan to tackle the problems before it. Prophetically, and radically, he warned:

We are accustomed to think that when evils have arrived at the cumulative stage that they now have reached in Spain, red revolutions and red Republicanism are for a time the most hopeful remedies.

No doubt clerical readers shuddered at the seeming indifference of this prescription to the good of the Spanish Church. But Desmond had reaffirmed several times that that Church lacked all vitality, and, if pressed, might have replied that persecution might restore it to the Spirit. For he was one of those who boldly attributed the mounting anti-clericalism in France to the tired complacency of its faithful and its Churchmen, rather than to the familiar trinity of masons, Jews

50The article was republished in the Citizen, 13 August 1898; see also Fernando J. Pico, S.J., "Emilio Castelar and the Spanish Church," Catholic Historical Review, 52 (January 1967), 534-48.

51Citizen, 8 April 1898; for Spanish history since 1898, the works of Salvador de Madariaga and Hugh Thomas; my brother Jim, now teaching in Galicia, discussed the issues with me, Summer 1968.
and atheists, and suggested that the attacks might force the Church there into new life. Indeed, he quoted as the only "rational explanation" of the "continuous attitude" of estrangement from the Church on the part of Latin peoples, the words of Vicar-General Birot, spoken at the Bruges Conference:

"(We) have not understood how to take part in the noblest movements of the century. We have not loved enough. The modern world had come into existence without us, and, in fact, in opposition to us."\(^{52}\)

Yet however they might disagree upon the state of European Latin Catholicism, to which the war had brought their attention, both church-minded and world-minded American Catholics welcomed the peace with Spain, finally concluded by the Treaty of Paris, 10 December 1898, but practically existent since mid-summer.\(^{53}\) The Citizen rejoiced that the war had been, in brevity and the small loss of life involved, like "a second-rate Indian war"; and attributed this to the skilfull playing of the large forces involved, by commands from the directing superiors. Both it and the Pilot agreed that while the organization in the navy was excellent, that in the army was scandalous: the Pilot suggested punitive investigations of the Department of War; the Milwaukee paper, attuned to German experience, advocated the creation of a general staff, and army reorganization along the lines adopted by von Moltke.\(^{54}\)

\(^{52}\)Citizen, 2 and 9 February, 2 March 1901.

\(^{53}\)Catholic World, 67 (September 1898), editorial; Citizen, 6 August 1898; Pilot, 6 August 1898.

\(^{54}\)Citizen, 20 August 1898; Pilot, 13 August 1898.
However, there was little gladness in the peace and victory. The enthusiasm in which Catholics joined the nation following Dewey's success had soon wilted with realization of the problems war was bringing in its wake. Even in June 1898, Catholics were beginning to divide sharply over the question that would divide their country: the question of colonial empire, or no. So agitated did they become upon this that the Treaty of Paris was ignored as a symbol of peace; to Pilot and Citizen it was a symbol of division.
PART IV

FULFILLMENT OF OLD THEMES

1898-1905
CHAPTER XVII

AFTERMATH:

EMPIRE FOR THE CHURCH, OR TOWARD A JUST WORLD

Part One

The outcome of the Spanish-American War brought into the open the persistent tension between those who would utilize the existent order of unequal relations between peoples and races to the advantage of the Church, and those who felt that the time had come for a radical reconstruction of that order, to promote justice and peace. Feelings intensified; contemporary Catholics, if at all informed, were aware of the conflict as it was embodied in a host of specific issues; church leaders said diametrically opposed things; and probably harsher things were said in private than in the public statements available to the Catholic press. Contention first centred on the general question of whether America ought to

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1 This section is a summary of material gathered for eight projected chapters on the period 1898-1905 entitled The Debate on Imperialism; Filipino Problems: Church Interests against National Aspirations; Cuba and Porto Rico; Rejection of Past Assumptions: Commercialism, Racism and Militarism; Attack on the Proposed Anglo-Saxon Imperium; The Big Stick: Revulsion Against Hemispheric Suzerainty; Boxer Uprising and Russo-Japanese War: A New Deal for Asia; Conclusion: Tentative Prophecy of a New World Order. I have therefore used footnotes only in the cases of quotations, and of contentions and facts so important, as to require them. Otherwise references would out-space text. I much regret this abbreviation, as it affects precisely those issues in which the central contention of this thesis was most clearly exemplified.
have a colonial empire, and then ranged over a host of more specific matters. At times it reflected, and at others confused or up-ended, the simple division of American Catholics into liberals and conservatives.

Almost all lay Catholic opinion makers came out strongly as anti-imperialists when it began to dawn upon Americans that they had the chance to retain the Spanish Empire. Finley Peter Dunne's influence was national, rather than just denominational: his anti-imperialism was rooted in compassion for the weak and oppressed, and in a lively sense of the absurdity of the land of liberty enslaving other peoples. His column probably reached many more than did the boring grandiloquence of anti-imperialists like Senator George Hoar; in a phrase, he could contract their paragraphs to an unforgettable image, as when he punned upon Napoleon III's praise of imperialism: "L'empire, c'est la paix?--L'empire c'est l'épée!" No more need be said on the militarism required to maintain power, although much more was. The chief interpreter of the anti-imperialist movement, Frederic Harrington, singles out eight men of letters as prominent examples of the alienation of that group from McKinley's policy, and Dunne is the only journalist among those listed.

The Irish-American political leaders were also prominent anti-colonialists; the Irish tradition viewed America's

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2"Cited in Pilot, 10 December 1898.

experiment in Britain's sin with horror, and were determined to deflect America before she caught the habit. Patrick Ford and Patrick Collins both became vice-presidents of the national Anti-Imperialist League. Bourke Cockran was one of the eight members of Cleveland's cabinet who publicly took issue with the new national policy, and was one of the first to come out against it. Michael Davitt spoke much upon it in America, expounding a traditional theme of all Irish-Americans on the matter: imitation of Britain would necessitate an alliance with her to secure maritime protection for the new empire, which could not but evoke international jealousy, as did all empires. Not only would America thus forego the values and traditions of isolation; she would also be morally compromised, due to the gravity of England's crimes, newly revealed in the Boer War. Patrick Egan repeated these objections. Undoubtedly, some of the readiness of these Irish Democrats to attack the administration's policy sprang from a desire to discomfit the Republicans, as the Catholic Citizen itself acknowledged. Yet such was the tide of chauvinism at the time, that anti-imperialism was never popular among the masses; with the exception of a few leaders like Gompers who were fearful of Asiatic competition, labour favoured colonial expansion. Contemporary papers, which were anti-imperialist, had

4 Ibid., 219, note.
5 Ibid., 218; Citizen, 28 January 1899, 7 July 1900.
6 E.g., Citizen, 28 July 1900. 7 Ibid., 25 June 1898.
8 Ibid., 2 July and 17 December 1898.
to admit their policy ran counter to the national trend, as set by "the younger and 'hurrah element of the population." There was hence little political advantage to be gained by disregarding such sentiment. The Anti-Imperialist Movement was a coalition of very different groups—independent Republicans, reformers, some conservative Republicans and Democrats—who were united by conviction rather than expediency. Few Bryan Democrats followed their leader with fervour; indeed, many Populists were expansionists. Similarly the Irish labouring class, in this matter, did not follow their traditional leaders. These spokesmen, whether politicians or editors, expressed a true agitation of the heart; for they could not rouse an agitation in the Irish wards and precincts.

In passing, we might note that non-immigrant stock Catholic politicians were divided: Frederic Coudert was pro-imperialism, Charles Bonaparte against.

However, the Catholic journals largely followed the Irish-American spokesmen, rather than the sentiments of many of their readers, or the leadership of the majority of the hierarchy. And their editorials reinforce this interpretation of anti-imperialism as an affair of conscience, and of consistency with their previous view of European imperialism. The

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9 Ibid., 18 June 1898.

10 The popularity of imperialism, even among many reformers, is reflected in Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement," 211-30; in William Leuchtenberg's "Progressivism and Imperialism," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 39 (December 1952), 483-504, which proves an identification (at leadership level) between the two; and in Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York, 1955), for the Populists.
editors faced the obloquy invited by dissenters from any national enthusiasm. They also faced the anger of churchmen who claimed that the new order was Providential. The Catholic World solemnly declared that to oppose it was "constructively treasonable," and left no doubt that press dissent constituted such treason.11 Yet Humphrey Desmond declared it his judgment that scarcely an important Catholic paper was imperialist (clerical journals apart), and cited many editorials, drawn from the whole conservative-to-radical spectrum, to prove this: from the Catholic Standard and Times, Irish World, Freeman's Journal, Western Watchman, Catholic Telegraph, Midland Review, Catholic Transcript, Chicago Citizen, Sacred Heart Review, The Pilot, and Providence Visitor. During the 1900 presidential campaign, he said more strongly "all the Catholic periodicals (except the Catholic World), which touch the matter, are against Imperialism."12 Among these periodicals, perhaps the most sophisticated exponent of anti-Imperialism, as expressed in the work of Bryan J. Clinch, was the American Catholic Quarterly Review, whose arguments were noted in the press at large.

Only two liberal bishops stood with the Catholic press against the consensus of their fellow bishops and the policy of the Vatican. They were close friends and long-time associates: John Lancaster Spalding of Peoria, Illinois (who was

11Catholic World, 69 (September 1899) editorial.
12Catholic Citizen, 17 December 1898, 12 May and 3 November 1900.
sprung from colonial Maryland stock) and James Ryan, an Irishman, born in Tipperary in 1848. Ryan had worked in the Peoria diocese for many years, and was consecrated, by Spalding, bishop of Alton, Illinois, in 1888. On Sunday May 1, 1899, Spalding joined Jane Addams and other prominent liberals on a platform in the Central Music Hill, Chicago; he denounced colonialism as contrary to America's policies and principles, and demanded independence for the Philippines.13 He again publicly criticized imperialism at the opening of a boy's college in Peoria the following winter, warning that the United States was "joining the company of evil nations."14 A month later, with a noble disregard of racist distinctions, Ryan argued that free America must speak out in thunder tones in behalf of Boer and Filipino, "equally fearless of death for liberty, but not equally skilled in arms." His implication that there was a free America, as distinct from the official America then annihilating the insurrectionaries of the Philippines Republic (the legality of which he allowed by comparing its forces to those of Washington at Valley Forge), anticipates the view of the radical left on the Viet-Nam crisis of the nineteen-sixties.15

It is notable that both men spoke in terms of secular morality, perhaps to gain a wider audience, perhaps to avoid the difficulty, even scandal, which would ensue, if they spoke explicitly as teachers of God, when other bishops, in America,

13Ibid., 6 May 1899. 14Ibid., 16 December 1899. 15Ibid., 13 January 1900.
England and elsewhere, were upholding what they condemned. Yet some Catholics recognized that the issues were grave enough to require authentic prophecy, and turned to those so courageous as to deliver it, although these were outside their own Church. One such was Bishop Henry C. Potter, who addressed the Protestant Episcopal Convention of New York thus:

"Americans . . . dizzy already with the dream of gains . . . expect to repeat in distant lands some such history as our conquered enemy wrote long ago in blood and plunder in her colonies here and in South America. At such a time the Church of God is called upon to preach the words of truth and soberness, and to reason of righteousness, temperance, and a judgement to come."

He concluded that America needed not more scope for corruption, but greater insight into its own ills.\(^\text{16}\) The \textit{Pilot} praised the Baptist \textit{Watchman} for like witness.\(^\text{17}\) However, as Julius Pratt noted, neither the views of the \textit{Watchman} nor of Bishop Potter were representative of the general attitude of their churches, the latter being particularly criticized by other episcopal churchmen.\(^\text{18}\) The Protestant Churches were as prone as Catholic churchmen to the Imperialism of Righteousness.

The anti-imperialist arguments of the Catholic press varied in style, emphasis, and development from paper to paper, but were similar in content, and can be summarized as a body, rather than individually ascribed. In part they were reflective of the general rhetoric of the anti-imperialist movement,

\(^{16}\text{Ibid., 8 October 1898.}\)

\(^{17}\text{Pilot, 10 December 1898. The \textit{Watchman} also sharply criticized the influence of the Protestant missionary lobby in creating support for imperialism.}\)

and were tainted with its moral ambiguity. On the one hand it was argued that the Filipinos, as a coloured people, were unfit for American civilization and citizenship, and on the other hand they were viewed as men who had won the right to self-determination by their organized revolution for independence. However, such Catholic papers as did oppose the acquisition of the Philippines on racist grounds, abandoned them as more information came through on the character of their peoples. The Catholic Citizen was a conspicuous example of this. Long before the problem arose, Desmond had taken a dim view of these, said to be depraved half-castes and anti-Christians, who were running the revolt there against Spain; inevitably, in summer 1898, he chanted "No new negro problem! No Malay annexation policy! No coolie citizens!", arguing that the nation had adopted the Chinese Exclusion acts to preserve democracy, and that the blacks clogged and hampered the working of government in the southern states. Indeed some Catholic papers carried racism to absurdity, Fr. David Phelan speaking of "ten millions of the worst savages that every worshipped devils or devoured missionaries," but then he made a career of sacrificing fact to phrase! Colonel Finerty, the old Fenian, typified the absurd inconsistency of many anti-imperialists when he wrote that "these rebellious unintelligent

19 "Citizen, 20 February and 3 April 1897 (describing the first revolt as "a conspiracy against civilization"), 30 July, 27 August, 3 and 10 September, 10 December 1898.

20 Ibid., 17 December 1898, citing the Western Watchman.
savages, as yet in the lowest stages of barbarism, may ask us what has become of Lincoln's grand old maxim, 'Government by the people, for the people.'21 Gradually, however, a more mature and sympathetic view of such well-informed barbarians caused the Catholic press to take its chief stand on their human and political rights. Since relatively sophisticated information had been already available to Catholic writers upon the Filipinos,22 one must conclude either that their racism was an ingrained hysteria invulnerable to reason, or that they exploited popular racism in their desire to turn readers from imperialism. At first it was both, probably; and one of the good effects of their anti-imperialism was its gradual education of them away from instinctive colour hatred.

Other common arguments widely reported by Catholic editors, were that retention of the Philippines would entail an abandonment of hemispheric isolation, embroilment in international rivalries, and the creation of a huge and financially crippling military establishment which might endanger civil government. The Philippines were also seen as a potential pool wherein might spawn in masses those corruptions (endemic in situations of government not responsible to its subjects), to which Americans had a fatal attraction, as

21 Ibid., citing the Chicago Citizen.

22 A long article in the Pilot, 7 May 1898, characterized both Malay and Chinese Filipinos as gentle and capable of progress and prosperity. A lapse Catholic, Joseph Mannix, published an article sympathetic to them and their revolt in the Review of Reviews, June 1898 (Citizen, 18 June 1898); see also Citizen, 2 July 1898.
evident during and since Reconstruction. As Desmond recalled the ante-bellum senator from Ohio, William Allen:

"You might as well expect to keep a powder magazine from exploding in hell, as to run an honest government with a large surplus in the treasury."

And preliminary dreams of the Pacific El Dorado had it that the archipelago's revenues would be an unending bonanza. Other related positions were that since the Filipinos could not become citizens, and hence participate in the federal system (even on a territorial basis), the growth in executive power required to govern them threatened the delicate balance of the constitution. "Empire" hence evoked historical images of Rome and Revolutionary France, of the collapse of constitutions, of Caesarism and tyranny. Next to concern for the Filipinos, this was the chief theme of the Pilot (as of New England anti-imperialists in general, such as Senator Hoar). When once even distant subjects are denied the right of consent to their form of government, the right of all subjects to it, even of those citizens long in possession of it, is endangered. Indeed as Senator George Vest noted, the constitution made no provision for the organization of dependent

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23 This was, of course, the era when the myths of carpet-bag and scalawag took root.

24 Citizen, 10 September 1898.

25 This was a possibility, but only such; democracy in nineteenth century Britain had come to fruition even as her empire grew. Edmund Burke had elevated it from contingency to dogma during the debates on the Stamp Act Crisis and American Revolution. Humphrey Desmond found its most succinct expression in John Fiske's The American Revolution, Vol. 1, p. 26; "It is impossible for a free people to govern a dependent people despotically without endangering its own freedom," cited, Citizen, 13 May 1899.
colonies, and Humphrey Desmond argued that the Dred Scott decision outlawed them, although he recognized the problem would be decided in terms of political expediency, not of legality.

America, it was further argued must look to its own ills first. They were serious enough to guarantee that its colonial rule would not be benificent. The probability was that the Philippines would be exploited, rather than uplifted; that American business ethics would decline further as shoddy goods were mass-produced for Asian consumers. The first arrivals on any new frontier were always the selfish, the shiftless, and the greedy, never people with a mission. Americans were too racist to avoid offending and humiliating Filipinos. As reports came back of Emilio Aguinaldo's insurrection, and its seemingly endless suppression, the Catholic press waxed sarcastic on the theme of civilization by extermination. The very length of time, and thousands of troops, needed to suppress the three year revolution brought home to many editors that the rebels could not be a small, despotic and unpopular group of self-seeking Chinese half-castes, but must embody the will to resist of a whole nation, this notwithstanding Spanish, American, and also clerical propaganda. As for Christian mission: it could be questioned, with W. J. Bryan, whether "wars of conquest are in line with Christian precepts." Nor were the arguments of the Imperialists for God valid; a people were liable to reject a faith the adherents

26 Cited in Citizen, 1 July 1898.
of which had waged war on them, paternalized them, and treated them as "niggers." This applied to Protestantism (and prominent clergymen and editors were cited in support of the view\textsuperscript{27}), but also to Catholicism: although the Filipinos were long Catholic, they should turn against their faith if it were associated with renewed white supremacy, in the form of an alliance between imported American churchmen and the new administration, or in the form of American restoration of the Spanish friars to their past authority, even to their parishes. Anyhow, to officially support Protestantism, or Americanist Catholicism would be unconstitutional, a violation of the principle of the separation of Church and State.

Furthermore, by continuing in an imperialist policy, America would be compromised morally in the eyes of the world, and could not exercise its great influence to restrain other powers from amoral policies. The Boer War was an example, and a most poignant one, of the result of this: Britain could argue, and radical Americans conceded, that their suppression of the Afrikaans nation was no worse than what America was doing. The \textit{Pilot} lamented that a capitalist-imperialist understanding between Britain and the Republican administration prevented diplomatic intervention on behalf of the Boers, while the State Legislature of Iowa voted down a resolution of sympathy for them, only because it might be construed as

\textsuperscript{27}Among them, Reverend James L. Burton, secretary of the American Board of Foreign Missions, \textit{ibid.}
violating the international neutrality laws. All Americans, asserted the Citizen, were pro-Boer. The Boer War, with its attendant atrocities (the British adopted Weyler's concentration camp idea), redoubled arguments by anti-imperialists about the immorality of an Anglo-Saxon alliance.

Finally, analysts of world politics who held it inevitable that America depart from her isolationism, even if only to court understanding with certain powers, rather than alliances, held that the acquisition of the Philippines must alienate the very friends she ought to cultivate at a time when other powers, notably England and Germany, were becoming nervously jealous of America's growth. Men like Joseph Smith and Jeremiah Curtin had Russia and Japan particularly in mind, the one a great counter-balance to British power in India, Persia, South-East Asia, and China, the other a naval country which could rival, and eventually supersede, Britain's maritime hegemony in the Pacific. Neither would welcome America's entrance into their sphere of influence (or ambition), at a time when America's commercial interests demand that she have strong friends in Asia.

28 *Pilot*, 26 April 1902; *Citizen*, 27 January 1900.

29 Some of the most significant anti-imperialist editorials: *Citizen*, 18 June, 20 July, 6 and 27 August, 3, 10, and 17 September, 1 and 8 October, 5 November, 3, 10, 17 and 24 December 1898, which last proved statistically that, with Philippines trade only $31 million, its administration would cost $34 million, and up to $100 million if Filipinos remained in revolt; also *ibid.*, 14 January, 11 February, 15 April, 1 July, 2 September, 21 October, and 23 December 1899—in which year, while the possession of the Philippines was grudgingly recognized as irreversible, the ignominy of it, and the threat
These, then, were the general grounds on which the Catholic press opposed imperialism; the ground intrinsic to this thesis, concern for other peoples as such, will be elaborated when we contrast the preoccupation of the church-minded with the world-minded. However, apart from the broad issues, it was difficult for any Catholic, reared in the last century, not to become emotionally involved in the Church aspects of American expansion. The fact that the new territories were Catholic, and that official America was still very largely a Protestant preserve, complicated the search for new principles of international relations, since religious difficulties of endless complexity overlay the more basic issues. Yet Catholic papers managed to retain a consistent stance despite this.

This stance was, however, recognized neither by contemporaries nor by subsequent historians. The Catholic hierarchy and clergy effectively gave the impression of a united front, Ryan and Spalding notwithstanding; and since outsiders have long viewed the Church as monolithic and authoritarian, this stand has been taken as characterizing that of American Catholicism as a whole. To summarize quickly, they held that American Catholicism would be greatly strengthened, both in its relations with the Vatican, and in its position in American society, by the acquisition of territories with a total of the 1900 election, were used to warn against further ventures in colonialism; on September 1900 it noted that McKinley conceded of his administration "Imperialism has no place in its creed or conduct," and on 10 November attributed his victory to this late policy, and prosperity. For Pilot editorials, especially see 25 June, 16, 23 and 30 July, 20 August, 3 September, 12 and 26 November, 24 December 1898.
Catholic population of nine to ten millions (seven millions in the Philippines, the rest in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Carolines). Even the anti-imperialist Catholic Citizen conceded

From a strictly Catholic standpoint, we should of course favour the acquisition of the Philippines as much as Italian immigration.  

Less selfishly, the clerical establishment believed that the somewhat insipid, formal, and traditionalist faith of Cubans, Filipinos and Puerto Ricans could be transformed into an activist personal piety under the direction of American bishops and seminary professors. Americanists, in particular, saw this as an opportunity to vindicate their theories to the Vatican. All the clergy were also fearful, lest independence be achieved under the leadership of the present revolutionaries, who were for the most part anti-clerical (although both Aguinaldo and Cuban leaders had tried to reassure Catholic world opinion that it was ecclesiastical abuses, such as the monopolization of positions of authority by Spaniards, that they opposed, not Catholicity). Racism also played a very ignoble part: churchmen believed that Christian churches could only flourish under the direction of white men, coloureds lacking the necessary self-discipline and other-worldliness, as the stereotype had it. Finally, national pride played a part, and churchmen were often too uncritical of how vulnerable they were to it. Liberal Catholics like Cardinal Gibbons, advocates for so long of Catholic participation in America's

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30 17 December 1898.
public ventures, did not want to be left out of this latest mission. Indeed if they did stand back, America would in all probability annex the territories with little regard for the delicacy of their religion, which might thereby suffer from an over-hasty enforcement of official secularism in the separation of churches and administrations long closely associated, and from an influx, of enthusiastic Protestant evangelists, who left little doubt that they longed to enlighten the superstitious Romanists of the islands, and who could count on a measure of support from certain army officers and civil officials. By supporting the administration's colonial ambitions and policies, Catholic churchmen could gain an appreciable influence over their execution, to offset these dangers; whereas by fighting the administration, they would only alienate it and lose these advantages. Finally, there was the thought, horrible to contemplate, that Japan might soon absorb a weak Philippine Republic, with gravest consequences to its faith.

One must sympathize with these calculations; they were church-minded, but not unmindful of the welfare of Filipinos, particularly of the integrity of their religious traditions in face of evangelical or non-Christian threat; they were also realistic and purposeful. For as Frank Reuter has so ably demonstrated, prominent Catholics did play an important role in shaping American colonial policies. Men such as Archbishop Ireland, Cardinal Gibbons, and Bellamy Storer (United States diplomat, and a Republican) achieved sympathetic settlements
of the questions of ecclesiastical property, of religious instruction in the new public schools, of the vexed matter of Friars and Friar-lands, of the repeal of a noxious civil marriage law in Cuba, of the discouragement of Protestant evangelist invasion, of the recomposition of the Philippines Public Education Department to include Catholics and exclude bigots, and of the retention of control over such institutions as Manila University and the Manila Meteorological Institute. 31 President McKinley showed early sensitivity to the Catholic position in appointing Associate (later Chief) Justice Edward D. White, a Catholic, Democrat, and Spanish scholar, to the Peace Commission; unaccountably, White refused to serve. 32 President Theodore Roosevelt was even more sympathetic, secretly ordering the Philippines School Board to hire as many qualified Catholic American teachers as volunteered, and receiving a stream of Catholic correspondence (collected and interconnected by Frederick Zwierlein), to which he assiduously replied. 33

Several considerations underlay this entente from the administration's side also. In an age of sectarian tensions, both McKinley and Roosevelt sincerely desired to combat nativism, and to stress the legitimacy of a Catholic American citizenship. Both condemned the A.P.A.; both made epochal

31 Reuter, Catholic Influence, 36-159.

32 Ibid., 15-16; Catholic Citizen, 3 September 1898.

33 Reuter, Catholic Influence, 128-30; Zwierlien, Theodore Roosevelt and Catholics (St. Louis, 1956).
Catholic appointments. As McKinley told a Catholic Summer School, the accomplishments of the times were the achievement of all the people;

"Our patriotism is neither sectional nor sectarian."

Indeed, the A.P.A., which had earlier supported him under the illusion that he shared their views, ran a third party candidate against him in the 1896 election. Both McKinley and Roosevelt were also well aware that securing Filipino acquiescence in American rule would be considerably less difficult if the de facto alliance of the Catholic Church were secured; Vatican officials and American churchmen also recognized this, and used it to secure a stronger bargaining position in the complex issues following the transfer to church-state separation. However, there can be no doubt that many American clergy, for nationalist reasons, were as fully enthusiastic over the idea of the Church aiding Americanization, in Puerto Rico as well as the Philippines, as was the government.

Finally both Roosevelt and McKinley were aware that the anti-imperialism prevalent among many Catholics would spread amongst them all, become a deciding factor in their political conduct, and perhaps cause German American Catholics and the Republican Irish, such as Patrick Ford, to defect from their party, if the impression were given that Americanization meant Protestantization. The New York Sun, strongly

34Citizen (reporting his visit to the Cliff Haven conferences), 19 August 1899.

35John Higham, Strangers in the Land, 84, 86.
imperialist, early warned that the Mugwumps (who were anti-imperialist to a man\textsuperscript{36}), were fostering this notion for their own ends, and retorted that America had no state church to impose, only the fullest religious freedom. In words that could have been written by Archbishop Ireland, it continued

"The Roman Catholic Church will have in the Philippines and the other islands the same free field which it has always had in this republic, and has cultivated so vigorously."\textsuperscript{37}

Yet although this was the reassurance both of the Republican press and party, and of Catholic church leaders aware of the disquiet among their flocks (to whom they could not communicate fully for fear of embarrassing McKinley and Roosevelt before Protestant America), nonetheless such fears were very strong. They were reinforced by reports of desecration of churches in the Philippines by American troops, and of bigotry and support of Protestant missionaries on the part of United States officials. One J. M. Miles of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, while recognizing that the Church officially supported America's presence in the islands, was yet so convinced that the Philippines' faith was under siege, that he decided to vote for W. J. Bryan "sil or no sin."\textsuperscript{38} To allay such fears, McKinley and Roosevelt were further prompted toward a policy

\textsuperscript{36}See the excellent new essay, Robert L. Beisner, \textit{Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900} (New York, 1968), 5-137, which unfortunately appeared too late to be used to illuminate this whole thesis, which it should well do.

\textsuperscript{37}Cited in \textit{Citizen}, 13 August 1898.

\textsuperscript{38}\textit{Citizen}, 3 November 1900.
scrupulous of Catholic interests.

Yet to outsiders, the hierarchy so set the image of Catholic views that the Baptist Watchman could retort that the war would have been waged more efficiently had the planning of it been left to America's Catholics, since it notably increased their influence at the Vatican as well as evoked their patriotism. Very early Denis O'Connell sent a cablegram to Archbishop Ireland "Help hold Philippines," and this set the character of American ecclesiastical policy. Yet if the reasons for it were good, the rhetoric was shabby, reflecting all the worldliness and frank un-Christianity of the times' new nationalism. When the same rhetoric was used to justify the retention of Cuba and the "pacification" of China, it was not saved by good reasons: there were no convincing ones for those policies.

However, such "Christian imperialism" was propagated by others than American Catholics. Cardinal Vaughan of Westminster was perhaps the most illustrious of these. As early as September 1896, Humphrey Desmond criticized him as less of a true Christian than the statesman and writer John Morley (an agnostic), since he was rallying British Catholics to Salisbury while British troops were slaughtering their way up the Nile, whereas Morley was defending the Sudanese. After America's victory was unquestionable, Vaughan revealed

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39 Farrell, "Ireland and Manifest Destiny," 292, citing a letter of Ireland's reporting receipt of the message.

40 Citizen, 19 September 1898.
his mind by declaring for an Anglo-American alliance, to achieve a world-wide hegemony; the Kingdom of Christ could thus be secured

"under the aegis of their racial strength, and common sense, and maxim of religious liberty for all, (rather) than under the dominant influence of any of our more despotic competitors." $^{41}$

John Morley saw the evil of such an alliance, which he termed a meeting of jingo minds. $^{42}$ But there was no clerical criticism reported. Vaughan elaborated his ideas in an address to London's American Society for the Fourth of July 1899: an Anglo-American condominium over barbary would be that of a liberty loving people and of a Christian people, as against looming Asian despotism. $^{43}$ And he pursued the plan to its logical conclusion when he issued a pastoral in praise of the Boer War, arguing that the British Empire, for all its faults, was a precondition of the expansion of Christianity. $^{44}$ He was now at odds with the overly reticent, but nonetheless clear, statements of Leo XIII, as to the illegitimacy of spreading Christ's word by means of war; and his pastoral evoked much criticism in Britain (given front page prominence by Desmond) on the part of several well known priests, such as the novelist Father William Barry of Dorchester. $^{45}$ Yet it would not be just to Vaughan to ignore the fact that he acted vigorously on the second part of his vision, founding the Mill

$^{41}$Ibid., 11 June 1898.  
$^{42}$Ibid., 18 June 1898.  
$^{43}$Ibid., 15 July 1899.  
$^{44}$Ibid., 13 January 1900.  
$^{45}$Ibid., 27 January 1900.
Hill Fathers to do mission work in Africa.\footnote{46} Archbishop Ireland was the most enthusiastic American protagonist of Vaughan's views. He ignored the obvious fact that America's imperialism could scarcely be the prelude to an enterprise for Christ already accomplished. Either he and his associates had a gloomy and essentially perverted theology of the incapacity of the Holy Spirit to sanctify fully coloured hearts without American aid, or he was selfishly concerned to vindicate his own strong racial (or cultural) pride, and his type of Catholicism. In London, he praised British imperialism in an address to distinguished English Catholics, who included the Duke of Norfolk, in which saw it as offering great scope to lay activity on behalf of the missions.\footnote{47} The address, made around the same time as Vaughan's Fourth of July oration, must have been seen as additional vindication of it by an Irishman with no reason to love the British Empire. His thoughts ran excitedly together

"America became through the civil war a nation; it will become through the Spanish War an international power. Our whole condition changes. By the logic of events we must have colonies, make new laws to enable us to have colonies, to keep a large army and a large navy. Americanism is the coming power. Will the Vatican understand facts and act accordingly?\footnote{48}"

He acknowledged his mixed feelings and his debt to O'Connell's ideas:

\footnote{46}Dr. Ralph Weber brought this important point to my attention.

\footnote{47}Citizen, 15 July 1899.

\footnote{48}Ireland to O'Connell, 28 May 1898, cited in Farrell, "Ireland and Manifest Destiny," 300.
"I agree with you. The new America is upon us. . . . the Anglo-American alliance displeases my heart—but not altogether my mind. . . . My chief reason for agreeing with you is that the new America will open the eyes of Rome, as nothing else can. . . . As to what monarchs and moralists think of our war, it matters little practically. . . . Providence over-rules wars,--and this war is Providence's opportunity to make a new World. And He is putting the opportunity to profit. So, let us go in for New America: I will preach the New Gospel." 49

More succinctly he noted

"I am not much of an Anglo-Saxon: but, Anglo-Saxonism is to reign. . . . The manifest destiny of the world is Americanism as you explain the world." 50

In September, 1899, the archbishop kindly explained to a representative of the Congregationalist Outlook that Catholics could not cooperate with Protestants in the religious reconstruction of the new empire, since it was already Catholic, since America was non-religious officially, and since by associating a foreign religion with the coming of the United States, acceptance of her flag and administration would be undermined; thus cleverly he ensured that intelligent and patriotic Protestants leave him his new fief. 51 His most noted gesture, however, was the writing of a public letter to the Duke of Norfolk in which he spoke of "the mission imposed by Providence upon English-speaking Catholics," explaining:

"As God intends to make the moral world his own, we must assume that He intends to sway to his purposes the great English speaking multitudes." 52

49 Letter of 18 June, 1898, cited, Ibid., 300-301.
50 To O'Connell, 2 May 1898, cited Ibid., 292.
51 Citizen, 9 September 1899. 52 Cited, Ibid., 5 May 1900.
Ironically one of the worst famines in her history was devastating Western and Central India, affecting sixty-one million people, even as Ireland wrote; Desmond could justly ask "whether the white man is bearing his burden, or attempting to bear it, when his civilization and his government, established in India for a hundred years," failed to prevent such awfulness.

Archbishop Ireland left America in no doubt as to his views. Speaking at the Chicago Peace Jubilee, in the presence of President McKinley, he described the late war as "holy":

"What we witness is a momentous dispensation from the Master of men. . . . So today, we proclaim, a new order of things has appeared." 53

He also took the leading role in reassuring American Catholics of the good intentions of the American government with regard to colonial Catholicism, early seeing McKinley, and affirming that the transition to voluntarism from state support would be good, if an initial puzzle to the people. 54 Later he so minimized or remained silent on the real difficulties which arose (if from tact during delicate diplomacy), that many suspected him of subordinating his churchmanship to his Republicanism. 55 He also assumed that Cuba would be retained, and constituted with Puerto Rico into the fifteenth ecclesiastical province of his church in the United States. 56

53 Cited in Citizen, 22 October 1898.
54 Ibid., 27 August 1898.
55 Especially the AFCS (see below).
56 Ireland to O'Connell, 28 May 1898, in Farrell, "Ireland and Manifest Destiny," p. 300; Citizen, 27 August 1898. That he believed so shortly after seeing McKinley suggests
took the major role in mediating between the Vatican and the American government, in gaining concessions from Roosevelt and McKinley, and in initiating the Taft Mission to Rome, which settled the difficult friar lands problem. The combination of his ideas and his contacts made him ideal for these tasks. Yet the Catholic anti-imperialists, having no time for Godly colonialism, criticized all these activities as being those of a chauvinist and a Republican partisan.

There was, however, a peculiar, if perverse, consistency and integrity in his statements and activities. There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of his Providential understanding of the late war; and the rise of the English-speaking peoples was the most evident fact of the age. God was either behind it, or He was not. To contemporary (mid-century) Christians, the second seems as plausible as the first; or rather the revival of Augustine's belief in the irrelevance of the fate of the City of Man to the fortunes of the City of the President may have been thinking over keeping Cuba at that time.

57 Reuter, Catholic Influence, 71, 73, 100, 114, 125, 129, 132, 138; Moynihan, Ireland, 177-210; and an important study not used by Reuter, James T. Farrell, "Background of the Taft Mission to Rome," Catholic Historical Review, 36 (April 1950), 1-32, and 37 (April 1951), 1-22.

58 Humphrey Desmond admitted such misrepresentations of Ireland to be unjust; Citizen, 12 May 1900. Among those who so attacked Ireland was ex-Congressman John F. Fitzgerald in The Republic (Boston), the Pilot's chief rival for circulation in New England; see Citizen, 16 August 1902. By his anti-imperialism, "Honey Fitz" gave precedent for that principle so succinctly stated and ably pursued by his grandson, President John F. Kennedy: "There cannot be an American solution to every problem of our world."
God has caused us to view such questions as largely irrelevant, the case of militantly anti-Christian regimes excepted perhaps. Yet Ireland, Vaughan, and many of their contemporaries were less gung-ho neo-imperialists, than latter day proponents of an ancient Christian tradition first formally recognized in the West when Charlemagne's armies subdued and baptised Saxons and Slavs. The wars of the Counter-Reformation had been its last open expression in Europe; and the Enlightenment had largely discredited the notion that fellow Europeans be crusaded against. However, the tradition waxed even more strongly vis-a-vis non-Christian, non-European peoples; European societies were conceded the right to develop freely along secular lines at the very time development along Christian lines was being forced upon coloured societies. Only when deistic or atheistic societies suppressed freedom of worship for Christians was some of the old crusading rhetoric invoked against Europeans; indeed one has the anomaly of a man agnostic in his inner beliefs, Winston Churchill (who was a young man in the 1890s), defending militarism against Sudanese Indians, Bolsheviks and others on grounds of their repudiation of the Christian God. It is understandable, therefore, that Christian bishops with a deep personal faith in Him, and a sense of responsibility for the place accorded Him by men, should be not less but more vulnerable to a still vital tradition.

What is less understandable and more reprehensible is ecclesiastical parroting of worldly justifications for empire,
and their association of these with the Providential reasons. Perhaps bishops and priests did this in the manner of Urban II launching the First Crusade in his Clermont address (1095), with its shrewd recognition that many men would fight for Christ only when their baser appetites were whetted. Their language, however, suggests that they had no such saving motive, but that they genuinely confused sacred and profane, their ecclesiastical aims and their very human notions. Thus Bishop John J. Hogan of Kansas City, in declaring himself a firm expansionist, spoke of manifest destiny, Asiatic commerce and the need for an American merchant marine, as well as the duty to save the Philippines from Russian Orthodoxy! Cuba, too, should be retained. However, he did show some justice in suggesting that both be early accorded the status of States of the Union. 59 Archbishop Placide Chapelle of New Orleans, appointed by the Vatican Apostolic Delegate to Manila, told reporters after a visit to Secretary of War Elihu Root, that

"The anti-imperialists are devoid of the actual meaning of the expression 'national honour.' To retreat under fire is unAmerican and absolutely out of the question."

The islands offer a strategic position in the Pacific, vital because America has a West coast; are commercially valuable; and above all furnish the key to the China trade. The archbishop was not anything if not comprehensive:

"The islands should be ours on moral, legal, commercial,

59 Citizen, 19 August 1899. Surprisingly, Hogan was born in Ireland (at Bruff, Co. Limerick, in 1829) and educated there. He became bishop of Kansas City in 1880.
sociological, and religious grounds. 60

Archbishop Ireland's closest friend in the hierarchy, Bishop Thomas O'Gorman of Sioux Falls (the couple had been chosen as the first two seminarians in the new diocese of St. Paul, and sent to Europe together for their education years before), echoed these ideas, and was chief instrument of the American Church during the delicate Taft negotiations. 61

Priests who visited the territories also returned using very mixed rhetoric. Most notable and most influential was Fr. William D. McKinnon, chaplain of the First California Volunteers (Irish) in Luzon, confidante of General Wesley Merritt, 62 and appointed by him first secretary of the Manila Public School Board. McKinnon did liaison and fact-finding work far beyond the requirements of his status, familiarizing himself with the problems and attitudes of Spaniard, Filipino and American there; and hence he became an important adviser to Chapelle and Ireland on his return, and a major spokesman for American policy and its compatibility with true Catholic interests. 63 McKinnon, being Californian, was alive to the advantages of Pacific expansion for his section, as was

60 Ibid., 4 November 1899.


62 First Military Governor of the Philippines.

63 Reuter, Catholic Influence, 73, 83, 96; Pilot, 7 October 1899; Citizen, 5 August, 4 November 1899, and 1 December 1900. There is a study of McKinnon (of whom there is a public statue in San Francisco) which is at once over factual and somewhat hagiographical, and completely unalert to the issues of this study: Edmund McDevitt, The First California's Chaplain (Fresno, California, 1956).
Archbishop William Gross of Oregon, who issued a pastoral commending the values of expansion to America. Other priests who visited the territories returned convinced expansionists, largely, one suspects, for the reason that their racist preconceptions forbade them envisioning either a church or a state run by coloureds. Returning from Cuba and Puerto Rico, Fr. Thomas Sherman, S.J., of New York, apologized for the low state of morality in the latter island, and ascribed it to the inter-bred, or half-caste, nature of its people; he used the example of Haiti to point to the dangers of indigenous rule in the Caribbean. Similarly, Fr. Edward A. Kelly, pastor of St. Cecilia's, Chicago, claimed on his return that 'Cuba Libre!' was the cry of hybrids who desired permanent anarchy, while the educated white creoles of Havana desired continuing American rule. And indeed the bishop of Havana, Manuel Santander, had issued a pastoral saying the church in Cuba had nothing to fear from American occupation; but he also added that it would be equally safe under an independence regime, the revolutionaries having only political, and not anti-religious, aims. The Vatican appointed an Italian who knew no Spanish to succeed him as bishop, Donatus Sbarretti, a man however who got on very well with Americans.

64Pilot, 3 September 1898.
65Citizen, 26 November 1898, 15 April 1899; Pilot, 28 January 1899.
66Citizen, 16 March 1901. 67Ibid., 19 November 1898.
68Reuter, Catholic Influence, 52-54; Citizen, 13 January 1900.
prominent layman, Dr. Henry Austin Adams, who was born in Santiago, and oftentimes visited there, maintained that Cubans were unfit for self-government by reason of their long repression, and that the church would flourish better under the new (American) administration. 69 Cubans must have been agitated by the emergent de facto accord between alien churchmen and another alien administration; despite talk of church-state separation it looked much like a revival, in new form, of the Spanish system. General Gomez protested against the appointment of Sbarretti, who had blithely admitted he knew little or nothing of Cuba, but was a personal friend of General Leonard Wood, the island's governor. 70 Fr. A. P. Doyle of the Catholic World visited Cuba, and told the press on his return that the inhabitants desired the United States to remain. 71 Another Paulist, Francis Brooks Doherty, told the Catholic Club of New York that America must retain the Philippines because the very act of war had made her too great for her "old coat"; he had just returned from the islands, to which he had been invited by General Merritt to help combat rumours that America was bent on destroying Catholicism, a task to which he was suited both by his priesthood and his

69 Adams was a sometime professor at the Catholic University of America, edited Donahoe's Magazine and was one of the chief movers of the Catholic Summer School Movement. Citizen, 5 November 1898.

70 Since Secretary of War Root disliked Sbarretti, the Vatican revoked a later appointment of him to Manila; Citizen, 13 January 1900; and 24 January 1900 for Maximo Gomez's attitude; Reuter, Catholic Influence, 131.

71 Ibid., 29 April 1899.
fluent Spanish. Fr. James H. Blenk, secretary to Chapelle, stated on returning from Puerto Rico and Cuba, that their mission must be not only to Americanize the church there, but also to help reconcile Cubans to United States administration, as they had already reconciled Puerto Ricans. The Vatican shortly afterwards appointed the priest to the see of Puerto Rico.

Others with no experience of the islands favoured their retention. Fr. Thomas Malone, editor of The Colorado Catholic (Denver) and organizer of the Inter-Mountain Catholic (Salt Lake City) was as enthusiastic as Archbishop Ireland. At a public rally he spoke of "our God-given destiny as world saviours"; he later became a bitter opponent of those who would jeopardize this manifest mission by creating Catholic suspicion of 'Protestant' America's purposes. Apparently on authority he released a message from Chapelle to the candidate proposed by suspicious Catholics to investigate charges of Philippines' discrimination and proselytism, Rev. Dr. P. A. Baart of Marshall, Michigan; the message disapproved the idea and stated that in so doing "I am expressing the mind of the Holy Father." Malone was a radical, as indicated in the

72 Ibid., 9 July 1898 and 11 March 1899.
73 Ibid., 11 March and 10 June 1899.
74 Ibid., 3 September 1898, and above p. 136.
75 Chapelle's letter was dated New Orleans, 9 October 1899 and Malone's, Denver, 5 November 1900; Citizen carried the latter, 17 November 1900. Reuter, Catholic Influence, seems unaware of these important documents. Although Malone was a real journalist, he would scarcely have fabricated so
introduction to this study; he seems, however, to have had no fear of cheap Asiatic labour, either as immigrants, or workers who might draw United States capital investment (in manufacturing for the Asian trade), from the West to the Philippines. He offers a Catholic example of the imperialism of the Populist mind, noted by Hofstadter. Another radical similarity inclined was Rev. Dr. Edward McGlynn of New York, who prophesied the English-tongue to be the one of the future, and informed a Presbyterian audience in a church at Matteawan that this was a sign of the providential destiny of the English-speaking peoples, and should cause Americans to retain all the Spanish colonies. The examples of these men should remind us that for Catholics, understanding of America's ills was not an absolute preventive of expansionist thoughts, but only one contingent upon overall assessment, or of conviction, as the Pilot put it, that capitalists would be the only gainers from expansion; otherwise, as Leuchtenberg and Hofstadter have shown, radicals were as susceptible to the lure of national glory, and the therapy of expanding markets, as conservatives.

major a statement, one which should evoke immediate disavowal were it false because of the delicacy of United States-Catholic Church negotiations at that stage. Malone, too, specifically desired retention of Cuba, it might be noted.

76Citizen, 4 February 1899. One of his few clerical supporters in the East, Fr. Sylvester Malone, agreed.

77Yet I should still retain the argument of Chapter Ten, America! America!, that those critical of America's nationalism, and life-style, tended inevitably to anti-imperialism. The distinction is between those who see America just as one human community, and those (such as McGlynn) who see it as the human community, to which the interests and freedom of other societies
The most consistent exponent of American expansion, again in terms mingling interests of church and nation, was the Catholic World, notwithstanding Isaac Hecker's conviction that Asiatics were incapable of the life of true freedom. An early editorial, while warning of the dangers which might arise from the racial thirst for global conquest, yet decided that since

The dominant Anglo-Saxon trait is the acquiring of new territory, and the principal race tendency is to expansion, the United States should take at least some Pacific territory, more especially to be well positioned for the imminent "carving up" of China and the transformation of the Pacific into the principle theatre of world naval activity for years to come. America's instinctive desire for conquest was now rearoused "like a tiger's thirst for blood." It seems difficult to imagine that a priest was writing this. However, a subsequent effort was made to reconcile this harsh view with a flickering knowledge of God. Within the Providential vocation of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority, America was now given a Christ-role to modernize the colonial subjects of Spain, and to rekindle the fervour of their faith. The very revolutions among them (to anti-imperialist Catholics a sign of their political maturity) evidenced their unfitness to govern themselves. If there was some apprehension as to the effect of the introduction must be subordinated, whether to bear witness to its strength, or remedy its weakness. La Feber in The New Empire, notes such thinking in Brooks Adams and Josiah Strong, 72-85.

Catholic World, 67 (June 1898), editorial.
of Church-State separation, its grounds were being exaggerated by those who would convert it to political capital. In the Philippines and the Antilles (Cuba and Puerto Rico) the assistance of the Church was to be necessary to Americanization, and should be gladly given. The Filipinos, "a mongrel class" were originally "little removed from savagery"; but the Church had made something of them, elevated them, so that its continuing assistance was vital to America's civilizing mission. Since the Tagals were rebelling against the close association of Church and State, embodied in the theocracy of the religious orders (which excluded natives as priests), the new American dispensation was "providential," and they would welcome it.

The composite origin of the Filipino offers only types of a humanity presenting descending degrees of degradation, yet we had evidence they were, if differentially, receptive to all such European civilization to which they were exposed, so that 'mission' was meaningful, vis-a-vis them. The archipelago had an Athenian future as an axis of trade, but relations with it must be regulated by and protected by priests at once sympathetic to the natives and to Americans. If there was a Filipino insurrection, it was a minority movement, caused by Protestant administrative insensitivity to this, and sparked off by the anti-imperialism of unpatriotic Congressmen. Religious papers which rant against imperialism while American

79 Fr. George McDermot, "English Administration and the Ceded Possessions," *ibid.*, 68 (March 1899), 723-32.
soldiers die for it were guilty of treason; anyhow expansion
was a part of our history, and was never conducted before by
plebiscite: the American principle of consent of the governed
could be easily affirmed in the Philippines after the islands
were pacified. 80 As for Cuba, the United States should also
retain control there, to preserve its commercial interests;
it was "an investment of war." Anyhow, only a small and
selfish clique desired independence. Urban renewal, sanita-
tion programmes, public health and welfare policies and
equable church-state relations had convinced its "docile"
people that American administration was conducive to their
well-being. The same was true of Puerto Rico. If all these
arguments failed, there was the fact that "expediency creates
duty"; or, as was more specifically said of the Philippines,
"the baby that was left off on our doorstep has now been
adopted into the family." 81 What the Pilot described as "the
thief's argument all the world over" 82 rounded out this idea:

We cannot permit the Antilles and the Philippines to
be gobbled up and fought over by European kingdoms
with the rationalizing rider

Our love of those historic realities—liberty, progress
and democracy,—will not permit it. 83

80 An inconsistent and absurd argument yet not unfamiliar
to Americans seventy years later; ibid., 70 (October 1899) ed.
81 Ibid., 68 (January 1899), editorial.
82 Pilot, 3 September 1898, characterizing the "if we
don't, someone else will" (its phrase).
83 Rev. H. E. O'Keefe, "A Word on the Church in the New
Possessions," Catholic World, 68 (November 1898), 319-22, an
ironic title in view of the article's contents. For other
Nonetheless, these Paulists imperialists were disturbed sufficiently by the most serious objection to their cause, that which held the ruling of a people against its will, or without securing authority from them, to be illegitimate and un-Christian. Hence they commissioned a series of articles from a professor in the Catholic University of America, Edmund B. Briggs, D.C.L., to deal with such arguments. Briggs' articles probably represent the most sophisticated and the most sustained defense of American policy ever made by a Catholic. They evoked replies both furious and laconic in the anti-imperialist Catholic periodicals. He particularly exercised himself to deny that the analogies of the American Independence movement applied to the islands; for the Filipinos were not a juristic society, lacking substantial unity of social and civil ends, common knowledge of these ends, common desire for their fulfilment, and conscious conspiration.


84 Two articles on "The Consent of the Governed," ibid., 70 (November 1899 and March 1900), 253-60 and 794-801; and "The Philippine Insurrection and the Voice of the Courts," ibid., 69 (July 1899), 544-48. Surprisingly Reuter, who used many Catholic World materials, missed these, perhaps the most significant.
of the multitude for their attainment. In sum, the Filipinos were not yet a defined society of people in a clearly delineated territory. Coping with Catholic criticism of these views, Briggs became more assertive and more technical. In jurisprudence, he argued, the term The People was synonymous with an organic political society, "and does not include forms of society inferior to the nation or state." A vulgus cannot become a source of sovereignty, lacking the channels of consent characterizing a populus. Emotionally, this patrician asked

Did the Fathers of the Republic really proclaim to the world the astounding and essentially anarchistic doctrine that civilized states are inhibited from imposing upon savage and barbarian men civilized government without his consent, albeit it to rescue civilization from anarchy and disorder.85

His articles make refreshing reading amidst the essentially mindless polemic offered in defense of America's position. They fastened upon a truth admitted by a recent and judicious Filipino: the lack, or weakness, of a common Filipino identity, even now only in process of construction.86 However, Briggs ignored the vital point that the union and identity of nations are not a priori and timeless entities, but are created existentially, often in precisely such revolts against conquest and oppression as that led by Aguinaldo. The Filipino revolution ranged throughout the islands, from Samar

86 Onofre D. Corpuz, The Philippines (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1965); Dr. David Gardinier, an acquaintance of that writer, testifies to his scholarship and originality of mind.
to Luzon, among Tagals, Visayans, Ilocanos and others; only the Muslims of the South, bought off with a treaty guaranteeing them virtual autonomy, did not join it. If a nation here did not exist, it was certainly coming to be. And it is very doubtful, in the light of more recent studies, whether the American revolutionaries could have satisfied the stringent criteria for the legitimacy of revolution, and the constitution of new sources of sovereignty, in the manner prescribed by Briggs. 87

Like the merchant imperialists, the clerical expansionists had wider horizons than those of Antilles and archipelago: there was the vision of China. The Catholic World welcomed the seizure of Kiao-Chow by Germany and looked to the country's imminent partition:

The light of Christianity will be let in to illuminate the darkness of paganism there. 88

It feared the extension of Russian power in North China, since where "the Cossack rules, Western Christianity meets but scant respect." 89 American involvement in the Far East begot a spate of articles on the missionary prospects of Asia. 90 The

87 Indeed Humphrey Desmond noted this at the time, citing a recent judgment that only one third of colonial Americans supported the Declaration of Independence.


89 Editorial, Vol. 67, May 1898.

intervention of the great powers during the Boxer Uprising was essentially just, since Christians were being persecuted, these argued. The interpretation of these events by an ex-missionary to China, whose slanders of Chinese character were widely quoted, is really quite horrifying, illustrating the alliance of cultural arrogance, exclusive theology, and the conviction of white imperial mission at its worst:

the stern morality taught by the church, especially the things forbidden by the sixth and seventh commandments, militate against the passions of the heathen, and since the Chinese are so shrewd, so cunning, so false, it would only be natural to see them attacking the Church and persecuting her.

If China were Catholic, Providence would not abandon it to the fury of the nations. Only in Christianity could the nation regain its secular well-being.

Sin causes catastrophes and repentance disarms the justice which punishes it.

For all China's "faults" were viewed as inter-related

China is poisoned in her spirit by her intense pride, refusing to believe that the world has moved around her. She is poisoned in body by the opium of England. She is supremely irritated by the aggression of the Western nations, against whom she nourishes an intense hatred and manifests ... an unwise and disordered rage. She shows her obduracy by persistently shutting her eyes to the light of the Gospel which alone can save her.

More important figures agreed with this man of God.

The bishop of South Shantung, Monsignor Anzer, demanded the

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91 *Citizen*, 27 October 190, quoting an article by Bertrand Cathonay in *Dominicana*.

92 *Cathonay, "A Missionary's View..."*, passim; Paul Varg, *Missionaries, Chinese and Diplomats* (Princeton, N. J., 1958), demonstrates such views as Cathonay's were ascendant, too, among Protestant missionaries, and similarly rooted in cultural arrogance and narrow theology.
concerted action of the powers, remarking with revealing simplicity

"If the powers shall proceed in united action they can save not only the Christians, but their commerce as well."93

The usually mild Cardinal Gibbons gave his assent to the intervention; speaking at a seminary he said, that while America must eschew the thought of a land empire in Asia

"China must be pacified, and we must help to pacify it."94

In what was more than coincidence, surely, he continued

"We must go on with the work we have begun in the Philippines; we stand committed to the establishment of a stable and proper government in the islands. Then our mission ... will be finished."95

Gibbons had thus publicly avowed belief in the essential basis of imperialism, the notion that the Western nations know what is best for the rest of the world, although for conservative fear for the character of the American Republic, he had earlier expressed grave misgivings about expansion in a conversation with President McKinley,96 and later wrote passionately against the dangers of further adventures.97 If Gibbons

93Citizen, 21 July 1900, also 23 June.

94 Ibid., 4 August 1900. Ironically, around the same time Gibbons published a widely noted article on the uses for peace of arbitration (The Independent, 13 October 1900),--the very procedure desired by Chinese diplomats to settle the persecution problem! See Pilot, 20 October 1900 for its text, and also Citizen of same date.

95 Ibid.

96Ellis, Gibbons, Vol. 2, 98.

97"May God so guide our legislators and statesmen that may never be betrayed into imitating European governments by the establishment of formidable standing armies. God forbid that we ourselves, flushed with recent victories, should
disliked imperialism, it was as an American, not as a churchman: he was well aware of the advantages of holding the Philippines to the American Church. He gave no evidence, such as Spalding did, of concern for the peoples of Asia themselves, their souls apart.

Even more church-minded, the Catholic World changed its policy from support of the partition of China, to support for its unity and the Open Door, since, as it cynically remarked, its people would be more amenable to Christianization when they see that we are actuated by no desire for dominion.

On China, on the Philippines, on Cuba, why did churchmen so confuse ecclesiastical and profane arguments for imperialist policies? Partly because the churchman's conviction of a special calling from God often blinds him to how completely a part of his age he still is, subject to its prejudices, its national interests, its spurious doctrines. He is less critical of these elements than the layman aware of a disjunction between his own milieu and deeds, and the Christian vision. Furthermore, however, the peculiarly restricted theology which caused these churchmen to identify the interests of Christ with the sway of an institution which was intertwined

become intoxicated with the wine of imperialism or militarism, but may always follow the traditions of the Fathers of the Republic." Cited in Citizen, 12 January 1901. Not cited in Ellis, Gibbons.

98 Reuter, Colonial Influence, 138, 141; Ellis, Gibbons, II, 96-140; note especially 136-37.

99 Editorial, Vol. 72, November 1900.
with the white man's world, made them less than critical, even aware, of the dangers of letting this situation continue. Coloured Christians were those who accepted the values and dominance of the West, and thereby gained salvation, for the white Church was spread under the "aegis" of the white powers. Hence there was little need to be alive to the un-Christian implications of the new world order: the churchly Christian was most aware of the marvellous spread his church. Hence Churchmen were particularly needled when critics pointed this disparity out. Cathonay's article on China was evoked by the accusation of the Rev. A. H. Smith (in *Outlook*) that the Boxer Uprising was largely prompted by the situation whereby Catholic Christians ceased to be real subjects of the Pekin government, but instead became, in effect, subjects of France. With incredible blindness, Cathonay replied, "this protection will help them extend the kingdom of God." The appeal to consuls for such intervention, on the part of bishops, was "a necessary extension of their pastoral duty." Smith's argument was attributed to his Protestant jealousy of Catholic missionary successes!

But of course Smith was right, although the Chinese consul to Washington, Wu Ting Fang, might laugh off the interpretation by pointing with warmth to his friend, Bishop Favrier, who spoke Chinese, and dressed a la Chinois. Favrier was the exception; and the Chinese masses feared and resented Christians, who worshipped a naked child and held 'love gatherings'

100Cathonay, "A Missionary's View ...", 416.
which excluded outsiders, according to a pamphlet circulated among them. Particularly resented was the 1899 agreement negotiated between Cardinal Rampolla (Papal Secretary of State) and the Chinese government which gave Christians status within Chinese society according to an agreed scale, bishops being granted the dignity and rank of viceroys; Christians (i.e. Catholics) were to have access to Chinese law courts, previously denied to them; local bureaucrats and Catholic clergy were to learn about one another and attain mutual understanding. The agreement really constituted a formal acceptance of Catholicity as a Chinese religion, something not yet accorded Protestantism. Among more informed Chinese there was of course the very real fear that China would be divided and reduced to colonial status; particularly, as argued by Kang Yu Wei, that if Russia were the victor in such a scramble, she would exterminate China culturally as she was doing her Polish and Jewish minorities. Yet although the Catholic Citizen could hence more realistically interpret the Boxer uprising as "a misguided movement of Chinese patriots," yet it too found it difficult not to get a fixation on the rights and fate of the country's one million Catholics and


102 Citizen, 24 June 1899; for the full text of it, ibid., 28 July 1900.

103 Citizen, 7 July 1900.

104 Ibid., 30 June 1900.
twenty-five vicariates and episcopal sees. For even the Pope specified Christians in defining which Chinese good Catholics everywhere should pray for. The normally un-prejudiced Pilot had long excepted the Chinese from the victims of imperialism deserving sympathy, because of their "arrogant" disregard of the culture of the West; although its attitude was changing markedly, it could not resist the temptation to join in turning the tragedy into an occasion of sectarian recriminations, charging, on the basis of reports in the (Protestant) Boston Herald, that Protestant missionaries had also helped rouse Chinese hostility by being very much out for their own comfort, and by interfering in temporal affairs. The vast and vital problem of an awakening China was too often seen through the narrow lenses of a very sectarian Catholicism, and a very virulent cultural-racial antipathy, the one joined to the other to cripple Christian vision.

The same was true of the affairs of the ex-Spanish territories. Incredibly those very churchmen who visited the islands came back most enthusiastic about retaining them. One can only surmise that their journeys were not open-minded; they reached the conclusions they did because they associated

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105 Ibid. 106 Ibid., 11 August 1900. 107 E.g., enthusing over Japan's victories in the Sino-Japanese war, the Pilot saw them as proof that China, that "arrogant unwieldy monster," must follow the former's example of "Europeanization," or perish; she would know emancipation either through Japanese supremacy, or reaction and revival following defeat; 29 September and 20 October 1894. 108 Pilot, 2 March 1901.
only with those whose company they found most congenial: American army officers and administrators, and cultivated Spaniards and creoles fearful of the social revolution which might, indeed would, follow the political changes following independence, unless fellow whites—Americans—could be persuaded to keep the lid on by refusing it. Neither of these groups could give any other than a distorted impression of the views of the local people, nor a fully sympathetic picture of those people themselves. The same was even more true of a favourite source of news to journalists in America: the Spanish priests and bishops who came to San Francisco or New York before proceeding home.¹⁰⁹

The same church-mindedness that led Archbishop Ireland and Cardinal Gibbons to support imperialism, caused many conservative churchmen to oppose it. Minds convinced that Church-State separation was wrong, and certain that official America was aggressively Protestant, could not contemplate American seizure of Catholic territories with ease-of-mind. The same conservative minds were open to the general arguments as to the Caesarist implications of overseas Empire. Father L. A. Lambert of the Freeman's Journal fell into that category. So did more eminent figures: Bernard McQuaid, bishop of Rochester, argued that the health of America was at stake, and he would hence pray for W. J. Bryan's victory in

¹⁰⁹E.g., Citizen, 5 November 1898, quoting eight Spanish Augustians on Aguinaldo as "an ungrateful renegade."
the impending election. Archbishop Michael Corrigan said nothing publicly, but tacitly approved anti-imperialist sermons. The Catholic Encyclopedia, published under conservative influence some years later, deplored the separation of church and state in the Philippines. Sectarian mistrust engulfed all but the most optimistic liberals. John J. Keane, returning from Europe, spoke of Rome's apprehension lest the paternalistic, ordered Catholicism of the territories be endangered by too hasty an importation of American practices, a course Keane himself believed would be imprudent. Privately he told Ireland he would prefer to see America engage in a moral, rather than a force, imperialism. Like Gibbons, he feared the militarism that could ensue from the new policy. Ignatius Horstmann, bishop of Cleveland, at first reluctantly acquiesced in imperialism because of his long friendship with fellow Ohioan, President McKinley. Later however he joined Archbishop Elder of Cincinnati and Bishop Messmer of Green Bay on the platform of Bishop James McFaul's American Federation of Catholic Societies; he gave a pointed

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110 Pilot, 3 November 1900; Bilski, "The Catholic Church and American Imperialism," also notes this; however, he takes conservative anti-imperialism at face value.

111 Bilski, 189n.

112 Philip Finegan, "The Philippines," Vol. XII, 10-17.

113 Citizen, 15 October 1898.


115 Michael Hynes, History of the Diocese of Cleveland (Cleveland, 1953).
address on the achievements of the Catholic Centre Party of Germany.116 As reports came in of desecrations, of pressure to remove the friars, of bigotry and discrimination in the new school systems, of arbitrary anti-Catholic orders given by military command from Guam to Puerto Rico, and of Protestant preparations to evangelize the new territories (all the reports fairly well-founded), these anti-imperialists, organized by McFaul, launched a wide-ranging movement—the Federation—to shame or embarrass the Roosevelt administration into doing the right thing by the Church in those areas. Many prominent Catholic organizations, such as the Ancient Order of Hibernians and the Knights of St. Columbus, refused to back the movement, believing with Ireland and Gibbons that outright political agitation by Catholics as such was un-American, and the quickest way to alienate the administration.117

But these church-minded anti-imperialists, especially strongly represented among German Catholic organizations, and eastern clergy, acted from no sincere solicitude for Filipino, Cuban or Puerto Rican rights, their right to the Roman path to salvation excepted.118 Their agitation came to a violently abusive climax as the Taft negotiations approached and again

116Citizen, 21 December 1901.

117 Ibid., 9 August 1902. Their conferences decided simultaneously!

118 Neither Bilski nor Reuter (Catholic Influence, 110-19), makes any distinction between the moral anti-imperialism of Spalding and Ryan on the one hand, and the nationalist and church-minded anti-imperialism of McFaul and McQuaid on the other; indeed Reuter seems to half-believe Spalding and Ryan had the same ecclesiastical and political motives as the latter.
when the Citizen published a report that Protestant proselytizers controlled the Philippine's Department of Public Education (a report passed on to it by Archbishop Katzer). Even the Boston Pilot was swept into it, as was most of the clerically-edited press. Like an infection from which the scab has been torn, the accumulated mistrust of American society, Protestantism and politics stood revealed as a most bitter and living poison. Editorials on the friar question alone numbered hundreds: most interpreted it as an attempt of the government to deprive Catholicism in the Philippines of pastors, and to discredit the Catholic faith.

Such minds clearly believed the Filipinos and Cubans continued in need of white spiritual tutelage; although few said so openly, they felt Spain should have been best left in charge of the former. Church-mindedness, and worse, the injection of sectarian obsessions into contemplation of the problems of the territories, made for a spirit closed to the real dignity and needs of their peoples. American Catholics constantly addressed the government as though they knew what was best for the Filipino or Puerto Rican, and warned that the continuance of the old friar system was what the former desired. The government, however, knew better.

American liberal churchmen, like Archbishop Ireland, were no better. Like the conservatives, they assumed that a paternalistic guidance of Filipino and Caribbean Catholicity was what the local people really wanted; if only because, a

119 Citizen, 3 May 1902.
priori, they were believed incapable of providing their own ecclesiastical leadership, and because it was taken for granted that the deepest need, and hence most inalienable right, of those people, was Catholicism and its free practice. Conservatives saw Aguinaldo's revolt as a revolution for the faith, endangered by incoming Protestant Americans. Indeed, there was, at first, this element in it, but only because ignorant Spanish bishops, particularly Archbishop Bernardo Nozaleda of Manila, at first encouraged Aguinaldo to remain in arms lest forced Protestantization follow the American arrival. But the revolt was essentially nationalist and anti-foreign, and was sustained by the refusal of Americans to make clear that the hated all-Spanish orders of friars would not return to their lands or parishes. American liberal churchmen, to assist Americanization, were prepared to see them go. But they staunchly supported the view that the seminaries and bishoprics should be restaffed with Americans. To Filipinos, this was the exchange of one alien domination by another within their most distinctive bond of national unity, Catholicism. The strong schism of Gregorio Aglipay's movement was occasioned by it. Archbishop Ireland had boasted that Cardinal Rampolla thrice turned down relations with the insurgent Republic of the Philippines. On the eve of schism, educated Filipinos petitioned Pope Leo XIII

Not only the Filipino priests, but all Filipinos, consider it essential to the national honour that all ecclesiastical dignities in those islands should be given to the native clergy.

They went on to protest the retention of the Spanish friars.
The issue of national rights within the Church was crucial to Filipinos, where it was largely but an irritant to Cubans. However, even liberal Churchmen were not prepared to see the friars ordered home, although they encouraged their gradual withdrawal. For centuries, Protestant anti-Catholic propaganda had fastened on monks and nuns as the most appropriate objects of salacious scandal and calumny. The tradition had been continued into America, as Ray A. Billington's *The Protestant Crusade* demonstrates. Hence Catholics in America could not think rationally when all the authorities on the Philippines, starting with University of Michigan's Dean Worcester, strongly criticized the Spanish friars in the islands. They attributed native revolt against them to masonry and anti-Catholicism. True stories about worldly, wealthy, and authoritarian monks were too good a weapon for Protestant editors to ignore, or for Catholic editors to concede. Catholics, in fact, attributed more violent attacks on the friars to the former, than they actually made: few non-Catholic Americans spoke of vice-ridden friars. It is indicative of Catholic susceptibilities that they spoke as though the chastity of the friars was what was in question.


121 Editorials on this issue were too frequent for notation. A polemic by Friar Ambrose Coleman (Boston, 1901), summed up the view.
There was, however, an even more sinister reason why Catholics wished the friars to stay, and American bishops to succeed Spanish in the archipelago, Puerto Rico and Cuba. Replying to Humphrey Desmond's query as to why Filipinos should not run their own church, an irate priest wrote:

Only for political effect or some other equally unexplainable vagary of human genius, does a white man advance the natural and social equality of negro and Indian with Caucasian, besides his merely legal and maybe political equality. Such was the conclusion reached, too, after many years of sorrowful experience with his Malaysian cleric... by the famed Archbishop Sancho of Manila about 150 years ago. There for ages the Castilian has styled and treated the native (nor unrightly) as merely a big grown child, muchacho grande, easily controlled, if humoured, and very easily spoilt, if given his way.122

Thus could an ordained college professor write. Racism and sectarianism made church-minded American Catholics less than just to the aspirations of a people, and blasphemously distrustful of the power of the Holy Spirit to impart His gifts where He will. They supported, or opposed, American policy on American grounds, and on grounds of their restricted interpretation of the interests of the Church. Hence they invariably criticized violently those, like Humphrey Desmond, who

122 Rev. Thomas C. Middleton, Villanova College, Pennsylvania, 24 March 1903, to the Editor; Citizen, 4 April 1903. There is a case for finding in the question of coloured vocations to the priesthood the touchstone of theological racism. Certainly to Fr. J. R. Slattery, it was the heart of the matter, and he was quite aware of what he was up against in canvassing for a Negro clergy; yet he argued--long before its time--that a mission church could not survive as a church of the people, without its own priests, citing the failure of Jesuits to "nativise" the Japanese Church as the cause of its destruction after 1690. More significantly, he discussed the matter on a theological level. See especially "Native Clergy," Catholic World, 52 (March 1891), 883-93.
attempted to assess the political and ecclesiastical situation only in terms of the needs of the subjected peoples.

Nor were they consistent in political morality; the Catholic World went so far as to appeal for United States intervention to halt the Boer War, even as it hailed the suppression of Aguinaldo. A prominent Milwaukee free-thinker wrote that it was "the climax of absurdity" for Pope Leo XIII to sympathize with the Protestant Boers while supporting the American war against the Philippines. 123 Humphrey Desmond pointedly printed this query beside a letter from a priest characterizing the revolutionaries as "a gang of cut-throats, butchers and freemasons," which asked

Can an intelligent Catholic in conscience vote the national ticket for the party one of whose main issues is to give the Philippine Islands to a secret society whose leading war-cry is the confiscation of Catholic Church property and the expulsion of the religious orders from the islands? 124

Indeed conservative Catholics had to exaggerate rumours of desecrations and proselytism to convince themselves, as one correspondent wrote, that the war in the islands was one between the United States and the holy Catholic Church, as is plainly seen; ... a war for the destruction of Catholics, and to the disgrace of Catholics. 125

German-American Catholics especially thought this; their general prejudice against Caesarism and militarism, expounded by Carl Schurz, and rooted in their distaste for the Bismarckian

123 Frederick von Cotzhausen, 27 October 1900.
124 "A Priest" to editor, ibid.
125 Edward Doran, Hollandale, Wisconsin, to editor, ibid., 7 October 1899.
form of national unity, was reinforced by the over-ready assumption that Protestants were bent on uprooting the church in the islands by force. Very early one of their prominent journalists warned they might defect to W. J. Bryan as a result;¹²⁶ at the same time they formed a united organization to protest anti-Catholic policies.¹²⁷

Presumably to off-set this trend, churchmen convinced of the value of American policy, permitted themselves quite scurrilous diatribes against Aguinaldo; the Catholic World published lurid war propaganda. Doubtless they succeeded in convincing their opponents that Aguinaldo was no champion of the Church. Conservatives, however, particularly James McFaul and the German Catholic Organizations, seemed determined to flay Protestant America quite regardless of obvious ecclesiastical interests and discretion. Having found common voice to express resentments, they found it difficult to surrender the pleasure, so long frustrated except in private. One has to conclude that the liberals were genuinely more concerned for the Filipinos, although in a churchly way, than these carping souls.

Both sides, however, were missing the real point, of the question of faith, even as both claimed to battling over that point. Humphrey Desmond saw this:

We may admit the Church fares better under the United

¹²⁶Joseph Bruecker, a Republican, cited ibid., 2 September 1899.
¹²⁷Ibid., 19 August 1899.
States than under the anti-clerical Aguinaldo,—

though, too, as Catholics, we may doubt whether, on

the whole, a policy which saves the property of the

Church and shoots down the members of the congrega-

tion is going to be much advantage in the long run

to the cause of religion in the Philippines. How-

ever, the narrower view of churchmen too often regards

first the brick and mortar interests of religion, and

the body and soul interests afterwards.\textsuperscript{128}

One half suspects that many Catholic editors, tied to

a traditional lip-service to the Church so conceived, exagger-

ated reports of American acts against churches and priests

not only out of innate sectarian instinct, but to justify to

themselves and their readers their determination to support

William Jennings Bryan. Conceiving anti-imperialism as an

American interest, rather than a moral duty transcending

ecclesiastical loyalty, they had to argue what was, precisely,

good for the church. The election over, they no longer sup-

ported the idea of a 'Catholic' Aguinaldo, and instead pressed

policies abhorrent to the Filipinos. The liberally church-

minded, determined though they were to crush the nationalist

revolt, and keen on retaining Cuba, were yet prepared to admit

that Filipinos were educable to a more mature and personal

faith; the conservative church-minded were convinced the

islanders required permanent spiritual tutelage, and that

their Catholicity was so shallow as to be endangered by the

first boat load of Methodist evangelists. Ironically, there-

fore, the anti-imperialism of churchmen like L. A. Lambert of

the \textit{Freeman's Journal}, or Bishop James McFaul of Trenton, was

bogus and racist, while the imperialism of Archbishop Ireland,

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 20 October 1900.
for all its condescension, hyper-patriotism, and insensitivity, was sincere and non-racist. Ireland and the Paulists had a genuine faith in the future Filipino, if they lacked confidence in his contemporary ancestor. Their worldly prejudice was tangible; they dignified white supremacy with terms such as "Providential," and "vocation." But they construed this superiority to be one of "mission," one of service, to be relinquished when all men had been led to spiritual majority, and modern civilization. Since they sanctified a mission rather than a permanent group interest, one cannot accuse them of corrupting theology, although they did mis-apply it, and cover many sins with it. Those conservatively church-minded, who believed coloureds incapable of a maturity of faith, did corrupt Christian dogma; they produced a real theology of racism. Doubtless their image of the City of God resembled an icon of Christian Byzantium, with stunted little figures

129 I distinguish between the two on grounds of the formal protestations of Ireland and some of his associates; this is only just. Clearly, however, there were some, such as Placide Chapelle, who supported United States government policy as favourable to the Church without agreeing with Ireland on the spiritual potentialities of Cuban or Filipino. Gibbons, who in 1913 wrote an article warning that the Jones Bill (which envisaged Philippine independence) would, if enacted, lead to the triumph of barbarism and infidelity, was as theologically faulty as his earlier statement of the Negro suggests. For many, there must have been ambiguity in their minds. It is notable that Ireland, to remind ourselves again, had a mixed record on the Negro question, yet one most promising for his time. That he associated Filipino and Negro questions is proven by an address he gave to the Lincoln Club of Chicago in 1903; in it he defended the political rights of the Negro, then under attack, together with the right of Filipinos to full civil and legal rights. Indeed he maintained the late expansion could only be justified by the purpose of awarding eventual statehood to the territories. See Citizen, 21 February 1903.
of lesser peoples huddled eternally under the protection of the civilized and the imperial, whose bodies arch high before the robes of the all-encompassing Pantocrator, God-Creator. A white and regal Pantocrator, most distant from the littlest, from the barbarian.
Part Two

In all the arguments we have dealt with, there was little hint, on any side, that the Cubans and Chinese, the Filipinos and Puerto Ricans, were peoples with their own wills. The anti-imperialists were essentially conservative; their fear was for America's future; their aim was the preservation of the white, democratic, continental, and civilian Republic. Humphrey Desmond embodied this nationalist sense of priorities in constantly urging that voters vote not as Catholics in 1900, but as Americans; that they defend "the high ideals hitherto upheld by the American Republic."¹ Anti-imperialists who, unlike him, falsely maintained the faith of Filipinos to be endangered, as the Freeman's Journal put it, by a government composed "of infidels and heretics," were as little concerned for what the Filipinos thought; the Freeman's Journal adopted a consistently racist argument to exclude them from American's benevolence.² They opposed the manifest will of the Filipinos on their desire to make the Church there more fully of the people. Indeed, the Wisconsin Democrats, panicking on reports that Bryan would lose, were not above formally using sectarian anxieties about the Filipino

¹In this Catholic anti-imperialists were no different from the nation's at large, as described by Harrington and Beisner; quotation, Citizen, 1 October 1898; exhortation, ibid., 7 October 1899.

²See citations in Citizen, 3 September and 17 December 1898, 12 April and 26 July 1902; and in Reuter, Catholic Influence, passim.
church as an election gimmick. It is difficult not to conclude that an imperialist like Edmund Briggs took the Filipinos, and the concept of the consent of the governed, more seriously than many who pleaded them and their rights only as preservations of the old America. Men like John J. Keane explicitly maintained belief in the basis of imperialism, "moral" mission, while fearing its implications for their own country. This nationalist way of judging all matters was so pervasive, that one as honest as Humphrey Desmond could yet say that the United States must defeat Aguinaldo first to save its national honour, and then at once get out of the islands. He did so, however, only because press dispatches portrayed Aguinaldo as a traitor to agreements with the United States, and changed his mind when it became evident his revolt was for national liberation. The imperialists were so convinced of the righteousness of their cause that they were quite opaque to the idea that lesser peoples could have their own will, and the rights of will: much uplifting was required to develop in them these boons.

Nationalism, sectarianism, racism, and cultural

3Citizen, 17 November 1900.

4Briggs later went to the islands, and argued for a halt to arbitrary military despotism, and for the initiation of the rule of law and implementation of administration promises of educating Filipinos in local government for future more general responsibilities. He was clearly very impressed by the character of a people he had once maligned at second hand. See his "Impressions of the Philippines," Catholic World, 75 (May 1902), 141-49.

5Ibid., 1 February 1898.
complacency hung as a thick fog over the eyes of Catholic Americans. To recognize that the fates of whole peoples should not be disposed according to convenience or convictions of the white world was to take a step which might be of great moral simplicity, but which meant no less than to step out of the assumptions of the age. Stow Persons maintains the ability to do this to be the essence of genius. Under the influence of John Boyle O'Reilly, and of the whole Irish issue, J. J. Roche had long ago done so. It is fascinating to watch the process actually happen in Humphrey Desmond. Clearly it also happened in two anti-imperialists of purest motives, Bishops Spalding and Ryan; used to thinking in moral terms, probably they achieved their stance through an outright realization of ethical imperative; one would need to discover and examine correspondence between them upon it to ascertain this. In Desmond there was a slow awakening, fulfilled only by piecemeal rejection of each of the corrupt rationalizations that sustained expansion, whether informal or imperialist. He dealt with these only as they were brought to the court of his mind. He viewed them as bearing on the case only as more information became available to him on the character of the defendants. Thus the case was broadened. When he pronounced decision, it was construed by him to be as binding as a precedent established by the Supreme Court: its application was universal, and must be carried out forthwith.

How rare such thinking was anywhere is discoverable from the sensation of amazement evoked by the contemporary
"Little England" movement. It, too, however, was principally concerned with England's own soul. I have found but one example of what we seek amidst the summaries carried after 1900 by the Catholic World of the articles of all Europe's principal ethical and theological (Catholic) reviews. And this was a secular thinker who recognized the whole business to be a moral matter. H. R. Marshall contended in the International Journal of Ethics (July, 1901), that the "imperialist" assumptions behind present inter-racial relations were frankly wrong. If modernization were to come, it must not be by coercion, but mutually-willed contact:

"Let the bonds between the higher and the so-called lower races be multiplied and strengthened by peaceful commerce, and interchange of thought; by education and religion, but without any attempt to crush the weaker."6

The Pilot had the principle straight long before 1898; now, perhaps alone among American Catholic papers, it gave it priority. Even before the war was over it reaffirmed:

We do not believe in Imperialism. We do not believe in the right of any nation to govern another.7

Again, it denied the validity of using Western criteria to judge the character of other peoples, and went to the moral heart of the problem.

Natives are unfit for self-government if they refuse to accept or adopt every Yankee notion offered them—an excuse which has been offered for a thousand national crimes. Our equally manifest duty and destiny is to pitchfork our institutions down their throats,

6Cited in Catholic World, 73 (August, 1901), review section.

7Pilot, 25 June 1898.
or failing that, to govern them ourselves. . . . Spain knew the cliches of native unfitness, but her former American possessions yet started misgoverning themselves with at least as much happiness as they enjoyed under her iron rule. We have an excellent opportunity for proving our own fitness for self-government by not denying the same right to (others). . . . Imperialism has no place in a Republic of honest men who believe in the Golden Rule and not in the rule of gold. 8

It had little time for the sophisticated distinctions of Edmund Briggs. "The Philippines are not states, and may not even be territories, but they are communities." Thus humanizing the question, it could ironically praise as accomplished in their task only such politicians as knew how to plunder communities. 9 The whole notion was bold that peoples and group interests do towards each other as they would be done by; since Machiavelli, it had been formally admitted that the rule had full application only in relations between individuals. With great skill, James Jeffrey Roche tried to get the principle across by subtly suggesting analogies not only with the case of Ireland, but also the more immediate and emotive issue of organized capital against weak and disorganized communities of workers and farmers. Chauvinism and imperialism, instead of healing the dissensions of the Populist revolt, could in fact be used to underscore the continuing and universal character of the oppressions of wealth and power. To the reader, it was all but too plausible that the plutocrats who had sabotaged the grasp for social justice in 1896 by creating anxiety about the prosperity of all, through

8 Ibid., 30 July 1898. 9 Ibid., 20 August 1898.
economic rationalization too abstruse to follow, would now enslave whole peoples for their own benefit while beclouding the issue with sophisticated talk of mission and racial superiority. And the same Archbishop Ireland that played lackey to wealth in 1896, and has condemned the Pullman strikers, to the anger of many Catholic editors; was it not natural that he should again try to confuse Catholics and protect his friends with talk of Church interests? 10

The way out was as simple as free silver:

How would it do to deliver the islands over to their lawful owners and so set a novel example to other conquering nations. 11

The irony of consummating a crusade for the liberty of one people by denying it to another was unspeakable; and the practicality of uplifting the Filipinos was set at nought by America's continued inability to deal with the Indian and Negro except by the brutalities of racial supremacy. 12 The known facts of racism and capitalism as they existed among Americans made a myth of the protestations of philanthropic imperialism. 13

One could read all of this as very effective political

10 Editorials supporting Bryan, criticizing Ireland, and making strong innuendos as to an alliance of intellect and capital were carried in the Pilot, August-November 1896; as also in the Western Watchman (Fr. Phelan), the Colorado Catholic, and the Freeman's Journal (quoted in the Citizen at the time). The clearest alignment of Filipino and United States poor; Pilot, 4 August 1900.

11 Pilot, 27 August, 1898.

12 Ibid., 30 July, 15 October, 12 November 1898.

13 Ibid., 26 November 1898.
propaganda; but something of Roche's anguish at the new course of events comes out in his contemplation of the results of the war: concentration camps were not likely to be domesticated for use by imperialist Americans, since there are no longer any "reconcentrados":

They, for whom we went to war in the name of humanity, are all dead. 14

Reflecting on the year at its end, he contrasted the present state of the Republic with the peace, prosperity and sinlessness which had once characterized it. Inverting the message of a prideful Irish revolutionary ballad, he thought despondently that America's children, and children's children, would Fear to Speak of Ninety-Eight. 15 The erstwhile navalist turned violently against the militarism which had brought about the new situation, lamented the coinage of the hideous word "preparedness" as appropriate to the times, and criticized his one-time teacher, Captain Mahan, with bitterness. 16 His old faith in a power that could right the injustices of the world, humble Britain, and free Ireland, was gone in his heart. He now saw power as inseparable from the oppression of peoples.

Unlike Desmond, he had no doubts that America was responsible for Aguinaldo's revolt. Unlike bishops Ryan and Spalding he was unafraid to warn that God would exact repayment if the conquest of the islands were not called off. He

14 Ibid., 3 December 1898. 15 Ibid., 31 December 1898.
16 Ibid., 3 December 1898, 21 January 1899, 31 May 1902 etc.
called upon McKinley "to save the anguish of American hearts," by simply recalling all the troops. He had no thought to the "national honour" hallowed by Archbishops Chapelle and Ireland. Since the Reverend Peter McQueen, a Protestant of integrity who early admitted that his assumption that Filipinos were shallow and superstitious in faith was false, reported that native priests supported the revolt, the Pilot had no time for propaganda that the insurrectionists were anti-religious.

The continuance of the revolt, as testified by Taft himself, was due to the irreconcilability of Filipinos to American rule. The Pilot published much to show the education and good character of the Filipinos, even writing up the little known colony of Tagals in Louisiana. Peaceful, industrious, and conservative, these inhabitants of the Piaquemine, Jefferson and St. Bernard parishes still spoke Tagal, enjoyed cock-fights, and were quite isolated, being away from any railways. They had introduced rice-cultivation to the South, after being settled by Baron de Galvez during the Spanish administration.

A former ROTC instructor at St. Louis University, who had become a provincial governor in the Philippines, admitted in an article in the college's Fleur de Lis (St. Louis, 1899).

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17 Ibid., 25 February 1899.
18 McQueen was correspondent of both the Congregationalist and the National Magazine; he was much respected by Catholics, and cited widely in their press, e.g., ibid., 8 July, 16 September, 1899. He eventually completely went over to the Filipino (independence) cause, ibid., 10 May 1902.
19 Ibid., 15 March 1902. 20 Ibid., 21 December 1901.
Mo.), that their simple and pious people might someday develop

"American commercial dishonesty, American profanity, American irreligion, and possibly American anarchy."

For himself

"I should love to live among the Tagals or Vicols--; and if all Europeans, or American citizens, could be excluded, they would be almost a perfect people."21

The combined image of a good people being corrupted by an alien power against which they were in national revolt made one-time supporters of American policy change heart. Jacob Gould Schurman, President of Cornell University, and formerly chairman of the First Philippine Commission, was noted by the Pilot as one of these. He put the matter succinctly.

"Any decent kind of government of the Filipinos by the Filipinos is better than the best possible government of the Filipinos by Americans."22

The Pilot published another remarkable account of the origins of the Filipino revolt by another Catholic officer with a bad conscience for his country. Well-travelled, he compared their civilization to the Ceylonese or Egyptian, praised their morality, and noted

"The United States has not many friends in any class of Filipinos. . . . The burning of towns, the occupation and desecration of churches, the mingling of our soldiers with the women--while, as I say, our army was as humane and decent as any ever organized--necessarily left a trail of hatred."23

He recommended that since the islands were now American, his

21 Ibid., 16 November 1901, citing one Captain Johnston, USN.
22 Ibid., 1 February 1902.
23 Ibid., 6 September 1902, citing Major Maginnis in the Anaconda Standard.
country make the best of it, give them full territorial status, forbid any tariff or constitutional discrimination against them, and appoint a maximum number of native office holders.

Roche, in his shame and anger, stripped himself of both nationalist and narrowly Catholic preconceptions to do justice by the Filipinos. He denied the army was humane and decent; indeed, he published full accounts of atrocities, and exposed the responsible generals, without compunction. Both he and Humphrey Desmond shared the same response to Roosevelt's assertion that those who wrote thus were "enemies of the American Army." If the honour of the army, was America's honour, so too the disgrace of the army was America's disgrace. As Joseph Smith noted, America was morally wounded by having treated war criminals as heroes. The administration must halt Weylerism in the Philippines; Generals Chaffee, Hughes, Smith and Bell were singled out for opprobrium. Jacob Smith had ordered his subordinates, as came out at a court martial, "to kill, and burn; to take no prisoners; and to make Samar a howling wilderness." No one over ten was to be spared. General Bell was quoted as remarking that all Filipinos not actively for America were to be treated as against her, and arrested many such accordingly. Clearly, as a Colorado Senator indicated, if the Filipinos were Protestant Christians "the cruelties practised on them by the American authorities

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24 The wording is Desmond's; see Citizen, 10 May 1902. He was replying to the chant of Senator Lodge, on the occasion of the storm over General Smith's notorious order.
would have to stop," because the Government could not with­stand the national outcry. "Catholics have no rights in our Oriental and West Indian possessions," he concluded. A Boston Congressman even more violently denounced the atrocities. Since Irish-Americans liked Theodore Roosevelt, and expected much of him, there is little doubt such frank criticism of the 1902 Luzon and Samar campaigns sprang from genuine revulsion, not partisan politics. One finds in it none of that timid apologetic nationalism that has often been associated with all Irish-Americans. 25

The self-emptying of apologetic Catholicity was no less a test of Roche's sincerity. At first he instinctively tended to support the friars, who had run the rural areas of the archipelago for Spain. Soon, however, he learned to disconnect recognition of their past cultural and religious achievements, and of their present moral character, from their unwanted and political role as landlords, and administrators, and as a caste preservative of white supremacy in the Filipino Church. 26 This took much detachment, and he wavered a little, particularly as Protestants made blanket accusations against the friars, and thus by implication questioned the faith of their congregations. But he took, with thanks, the assistance of Humphrey Desmond, Fr. A. P. Doyle, and Fr. Herman J. Heuser

25 Ibid., 4 January, 1 March, 15 March, 19 and 26 April, 3 and 24 May, 7 and 28 June, 5 July 1902.

26 The first hint of a change came when Roche reprinted an article by a Filipino, and cited a chaplain, Fr. J. P. McQuade, on the case against them; principally their racism.
of the American Ecclesiastical Review, in conveying to sensitive readers the fact that the administration was not oppressing priests, so much as settling a land question such as Ireland had known, and requesting the withdrawal of clergy unacceptable to a people, just as the Irish would try to have their priesthood nationalized if it had previously consisted solely of Englishmen, who worked with the alien authorities. Nonetheless, and despite the Vatican's relative satisfaction with the Taft negotiations, the *Pilot* incurred the accusation of the Sacred Heart Messenger, that it had allied with Katipunan, Protestants and Republicans to oust a priesthood from service to their flocks! The accusation was probably rooted in the (to conservative Jesuits) more blameworthy fact the *Pilot* consistently interpreted the revolt as nationalist, rather than as anti-Catholic simply because Aguinaldo opposed the friars. The devotional magazines, doubtless because they were so other-worldly (or run by religious orders), refused to see the point of the anti-friar arguments, even after such inveterate pro-friar journalists as Fr. David Phelan and Fr. Peter Yorke did. While consistently maintaining the American government could not legally expel the friars, Roche felt it could expropriate them with compensation, and pressure their superiors to withdraw them.27

27Ibid., 4 February, 15 April, 20 May (change), 22 July, 19 August (reversion), 1899; 2 March (final conversion, under Desmond's influence), 15 June, 1901; 25 January, 29 March, 17 May, 12 and 19 July, 2, 9 August, and 6 September 1902. Feelings were high again, however, at the time of the Taft negotiations (in Manila) until the actual settlement: *Ibid.*, 12 and 26 December 1903.
In all then, Roche not only affirmed the Filipinos had a national will; he took pains to discover what that will was, and the character of the people possessing it. Furthermore, he then defended that will to the extent of alienating conservative churchmen, and risking the anger of a President who but two or three years later was to appoint him to the consulship at Genoa. His criticism of the President was harsh: he did not deny (as did Desmond) that the Republicans meant what they said about educating the Filipinos toward democracy. He just bluntly denied the morality of the policy:

Literally it merely says that when we, not they, think they are fit for self-government, we not they will see about it... It holds out no hope of better treatment of the unfortunate Filipinos now, or hereafter.\(^{28}\)

And he doubted whether Roosevelt and Taft could fulfill their promises, in view of the intransient imperialism of Senators like Beveridge.

If, as it had long held, it was wrong forcibly to develop a people, the constructive question remained: how were the Filipinos to modernize their society unless annexed? The answer it received from the *Boston Herald*:

'Instead of us strenuously assimilating them to our way of life, let the Filipinos experimentally assimilate our ways, as Japan has done.'\(^{29}\)

Anti-imperialism, then, could be more than a moral crusade. It could be a creative programme.

That the defense of the Filipino was prompted by principle

\(^{28}\textit{Ibid.}, 7\ June 1902.\)

\(^{29}\textit{Ibid.}, 10\ May 1902,\ citing the \textit{Herald}.\)
was borne out by Roche's sympathy with Puerto Rico, and his hostility to any suggestion that Cuba be retained. Roche spent March, April and May of 1900 in the Caribbean, contributing travelogues warm with understanding and bright with notations of the unusual from Puerto Rico. He also sent back editorials lashing the proposed tariff discrimination against the former. Such discrimination was rendered callous and inhumane by reason of the need for economic recovery occasioned by a hurricane of August 1899 that killed two thousand seven hundred people and uprooted the island's coffee trees. The island also suffered chronic mass unemployment and poverty. The United States could not afford to create a Caribbean Ireland; military government must be quickly replaced by local territorial government, and the island integrated into the union, with all the rights following normally thereon. Retention of Puerto Rico could only be justified under such conditions. Roche also criticized the racist "Spanish Club" which had formerly run the island, and demanded that the United States curb the powers of the creole alcaldes, still despotically controlling the interior. On returning he attacked government anomalies and injustices in the treatment of the island. Its citizens were subject to military service, but had to apply for entry to America as aliens; it was thus "a part of America so far as responsibilities go, but a foreign country so far as privileges are concerned."30 This was particularly so since the "outrage" of the Supreme Court

30 Ibid., 1 June 1901.
tariff rulings, in the insular cases. Roche pointed out that McKinley gave federal offices to sons of two of the court's justices while the case was under process. As F. P. Dunne's Mr. Dooley acerbically noted "No matter whether the Constitution follows the flag or not, the Supreme Court follows the election returns." The result was the beginning of an era of judicial and legislative absolutism superseding Constitutional guarantees once safeguarded by the courts. Even more sinister was the conviction by an American court, using Spanish law, of Santiago Iglesias, president of the Workingman's Federation of Puerto Rico, for conspiring to raise wages. He was sentenced to three years, despite the backing of the American Federation of Labour. The "diabolical humbug and hypocrisy" of this revealed the real mind of America's governing caste, Roosevelt excepted; they would deprive both workers and colonials of all rights.

Roche sent another Pilot staff writer, Thomas Lawler, to Cuba in spring 1900 also. Thus the paper's defense of Cuban aspirations, and its knowledge of the good and bad points of the interim military government, was based on sound information. It had no time for clerical and Republican propaganda

31 Ibid., 15 June 1901.

32 Ibid., throughout March-May for travelogues; chief editorials, 24 February, 31 March, 21 April 1900, 5 January 1901, and those cited.

33 "The ideal state in their minds is one under which the raising of prices where-ever possible, should be a laudable and lawful action, and the attempt to advance wages a felony punishable by death," ibid., 21 December 1901.
which confused even Desmond), that maintained all "good" Cubans desired permanent annexation. Even as the peace conference preliminaries opened, it said Cuban freedom must be a precondition to any settlement. Yet within months it was having to champion Cuban freedom against Americans, not Spaniards. The Cubans, some say, produce neither saints nor fighters; yet the courageous Spaniards lost one hundred thousand lives trying to subdue them. How can they be unfit for self-government, when they have rebelled, in all, fifty years to attain it? And are America's Platts and Hannas and Quays and Carpet-Baggers going to train them in such fitness, by their example? The government's ambiguity on Cuba's future justified the decision of Cuba's army to remain under arms, despite American inducements to disband. However, the popular education and law reforms of military governors General John R. Brooke and General Leonard Wood were to be commended; especially as these men worked with full Cuban cooperation. Indeed, it was regretted that American industrialists were slow to recognize the urgent need for capital and expertise to reconstruct the island's sugar industry and transport system. Clearly the Pilot was not so anti-capital as to fail to see its better uses.

The Pilot attacked the mode of transfer of authority when it came. The decision of Washington that Cuba's Constitutional Convention be held only after the American elections

34 Ibid., 6 August and 12 November 1898; 29 April and 3 June 1899; 7 April and 19 May 1900.
implied intentions of interference by the United States. The Springfield Republican demonstrated that the War Department's orders meant that the Cubans were to "adopt" rather than "frame" a constitution in all that pertains to United States-Cuban relations. This, concluded the old Mugwump journal, "is a transparent fraud on self-determination." More alarming was an authoritative article in the Independent (March, 1901), in which Albert G. Robinson analyzed rapidly worsening Cuban-American relations, ascribed them to Yankee inability to treat the Cuban frankly and fraternally, and charged that the only reason America called the constitutional convention was from fear of upheaval, for her commitment to Cuban freedom was gone. The Platt amendment sabotaged what was a model constitution. The Pilot asked in dismay, cannot we return to the disinterestedness of our war? More bitterly, it greeted Cuba's acceptance of the amendment by arguing she had lost the substance of independence in having its achievement conditional upon American judgment that she had attained stable government.

Stable in a vague word. In Cuba's case it suggests the proverb about locking the stable after the horse is stolen.

A year later the Pilot celebrated the initiation of Cuba in "Liberty, the daughter of God," and the following year hailed the first anniversary of its independence by chronicling national achievements since then; it set it beside Argentina,

35 Ibid., 1 September 1900. 36 Ibid., 30 March 1901.
37 Ibid., 22 June 1901. 38 Ibid., 24 May 1902.
Chile and Mexico as proof that Latin Americans, and all peoples, were fit for self-government. Vindicating the Republicans, it continued:

Our just dealing (with Cuba is) the one bright page in the Spanish-American imbroglio.39

As with the Philippines, so with Cuba and Puerto Rico: the Pilot focused on the matter of just treatment, and avoided getting bogged down, as did many Catholic papers, in questions of Church property, jurisdiction and education, or charges of anti-Catholicism against American officials.40 Indeed it defended Senor Palma's government against charges of anticlericalism, even as it earlier boldly attributed much of the conflict between the military authorities and the clergy in Cuba and Puerto Rico to the fact of the latter's being Spanish, and naturally resentful of the new order. Separation of Church and State was all to the good everywhere, and had worked out well despite initial doubts.41

One could argue, however, that despite its apparent broadness of mind, Roche's anti-imperialism was due to his solicitude for the Catholic peoples of the territories as, concurrently, for those of Samoa; and that his relative carelessness of institutional Church interests was due to his

39 Ibid., 6 June 1903; Samuel Flagg Bemis (Latin American Policy, 137-141), clearly agrees with this verdict. However, one feels he confuses American good faith in the 1930s (see pp. 278-82) with the more murky intentions of 1898-1905.

40 Reuter, Catholic Influence, 36-59.

41 Pilot, 20 June 1903, 28 January 1899, 16 May 1903.
learning from Humphrey Desmond of their irrelevance to a living piety. However, Roche could never accept Desmond's contention in this matter, and he always granted perfunctory, but no less loyal, defense to such visible interests. His sense of priorities becomes the more convincing because of this. Real proof, however, that his hunger for international justice knew no qualifications of creed is furnished by his response to the Boxer uprising.

Roche's one lapse of vision had been his contempt of China. As businessmen and missionaries planned to make the Philippines a base for the spiritual and commercial transformation of the Middle Kingdom, his blindness left him, and he saw the hypocrisy and arrogance of their design. He opposed the nation's China policy on the grounds that the "Open Door" was but disguised imperialism. In this he anticipated critics like William Appleman Williams. Unlike those anti-imperialists who yet desired a forceful markets' expansion policy, he denounced commercial ambition as irresponsible aggression, when directed against Asia. He interpreted the Boxer Uprising as partly caused by such policies, and, as we have seen, recommended that the Asian peoples must be left free to develop themselves, if race war was to be avoided.

42 Pratt, Expansionists, 260-74; especially 266; La Feber, New Empire, 352-62, 408-11, 415, 417; MacKenzie, Robe and Sword, 83-84, 88, 105, 111, and 114.

43 Pilot, 31 December 1898, 16 June 1900.

44 Ibid., 14 July 1900.
He argued that John Hay's policies involved passive acquiescence in the practical dismemberment of China (although its outward shell might survive), saying that even complete conquest of her by Russia or Japan would be better, for it would preserve her national unity. He gave prominence to men whose opinions refuted the assumptions of the missionary imperialists: Sir Robert Hart, who warned that China must inevitably, and within its rights, carry through a nationalist, xenophobic, programme, since the Boxer Spirit had caught the national imagination, and that the Chinese government could survive only by harnessing this spirit; Bryan J. Clinch, the prominent American Catholic theorist of anti-imperialism, who argued the amorality of "infidel" governments claiming to assist the conversion of China by un-Christianly invading and planning to divide her; the editor of the Westminster Gazette, who summed up:

"The worst blow Christianity has received has been through the conduct of the allied soldiery during the late invasion. These men have crucified it in China as truly as the soldiers of Pilate crucified its Founder. And even the Christian missionaries raised no protest against the crucifixion."

46 Sir Robert was the director of China's harbour custom's service; he prophesied "In fifty years, there will be millions of armed Boxers at the call of the government." With incredible stupidity, the (London) Times said his views were warped by his knowledge of, and sympathy for, China! Pilot, 3 November 1900, citing London Fortnightly Review and the Times.
47 Pilot, 19 January 1901, reprinting his "The Western Powers and China," from the American Catholic Quarterly Review.
48 Pilot, 22 June 1901; Roche of course was also appalled by the "barbarism" of the Allies, ibid., 6 April 1901.
Some of the opposition to Open Door and intervention sprang from the traditional Irish-American desire for Russo-American friendship, a goal only recently re-enunciated by Michael Davitt, Jeremiah Curtin and others to counter-balance Anglophile propaganda. John Hay's policies epitomized, to sensitive Irish-Americans, a drift in American policy toward playing England's game, and alienating Russia. Yet, once again Roche's grasp of principle cannot be ascribed to mere political opportunism, such as was to animate his successor. And even in the politically motivated, rhetoric may reveal profound insights; as Joseph Smith's on the need of Asian nations for individuality and integrity:

Japan . . . bids fair to be rotten before she is ripe. She has abandoned her old peculiar civilization, with its beauty, art, and intelligent paganism, for that mixture of mad militarism, shoddy industrialism, and soulless materialism which she imagines is Western civilization.

And as for China

This so-called 'open-door' policy is all poppycock as far as she is concerned; it will last as long as China is too weak to make head against the greedy powers, and as long as the powers are unable to overreach one another no longer.

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49 Thus for example, the Pilot asked, 2 May 1903, why Hay felt he had any more right to protest a Russianized Manchuria, than Russia would have to protest an Americanized Philippines; and ascribed his action to servility toward Britain's Asiatic ally, Japan. The next week Joseph Smith published a full article in the paper, entitled "Baiting the Russian Bear--Dangerous Folly of Mr. Hay." The Pilot had taken sides in the Russo-Japanese war before it broke out.

50 Ibid., 9 May 1903 (Same article).

51 Ibid.
The *Pilot* had come a long way on Asiatic affairs since its recommendation that Japan forcibly Westernize China at the end of their conflict of 1894-95. Roche gone, however, and it was to spout nonsense about evil yellow industrialized barbarians, although it did recognize in fear, rather than hope, that the victory of Port Arthur would carry a message of hope to those Orientals who have whispered that Asiatics must be permitted to work out the destiny of Asia.  

O'Reilly and Roche had at least educated their staff to see the essential issue, and even to transcend their political prejudices to grasp its moral import: Japan, by her discipline, patriotism and temperance had humbled Anglo-Saxonism.  

Where political prejudices were inoperative, the anti-imperialist tradition could shine more brightly. The *Pilot* was bothered at the way Roosevelt arbitrarily "created" Panama at the expense of Colombia; it printed extensive quotations from the standard Colombian account of that country's refusal to accept the Hay-Herran convention. However, it was inclined to agree with the President's inconsistent disavowal of, and justification for, what had happened; and was partly seduced by his stirring nationalism, his characterization of America's role as "mandatory of civilization." It urged everyone to vote for him on that score, and on grounds of his

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52 Ibid., 7 January 1905; for anti-Japanese propaganda, e.g., 30 January, 20 February, 12 March, 23 April 1904, etc.

53 Ibid., 17 June 1905.

54 Ibid., 26 December 1903, 9 January and 23 April 1904. It also demanded full indemnity for Colombia, 14 November 1903.
character and tolerance for all;\textsuperscript{55} it welcomed his new message to Congress, with its emphasis on "preparedness," navalism, Oriental markets expansion, and protection of nationals abroad. Deference to such Palmerstonian irresponsibility was the negation of all that Roche had taught, especially since 1898.\textsuperscript{56} But when the President went to affirm the new spirit by propounding the Roosevelt Corollary, the \textit{Pilot} saw the matter clearly and drew back:

The United States cannot deny other powers the certain rights beyond its own jurisdiction, certain methods of conserving its own dignity, and preserving and protecting the property and persons of its citizens. It claims no privilege in international relations that it denies to others; and it has never pretended to make the strength and authority of the Republic a barrier behind which the international brawler will find a refuge. . . . The United States cannot be debt-collector to foreign powers.\textsuperscript{57}

The European powers have no right to collect debts at gun point; corporations and individuals invest at their own risk; and America will continue to protect, not police, Latin America.\textsuperscript{58} The weak were to continue in the rights of the strong.

Humphrey Desmond's editorials reveal an eventual and philosophic grasp of the same principle. Since he was a more formal thinker, we shall evidence this by his explicit

\textsuperscript{55}\textit{Ibid.}, 3 November 1904.

\textsuperscript{56}\textit{Ibid.}, 17 December 1904. It is possible that Roche, although sickening, instructed that these editorials be written as the price of his Genoa appointment. He did not leave America until 25 January 1905. Yet it would seem out of character. He had not been actively editor for some time.

\textsuperscript{57}\textit{Ibid.}, 14 January 1905. \textsuperscript{58}\textit{Ibid.}
statements, where with Roche one has to detail his practical responses to events to convey his vision adequately. The Milwaukee editor began handicapped by a qualified nationalism and a residual racism; his advantage was a complete freedom from that narrow church-mindedness which decided all questions by reference to ecclesiastical interest:

The only safe investment of religious work and energy is not in temporal wealth but in laying up spiritual treasure in the minds and hearts of the people.\(^59\)

Whence this radicalism: Much of it was natural to a highly intelligent and devout Catholic layman, committed to rousing active Christianity in his readers, who yet had to watch his efforts criticized and his envisaged role for the laity questioned.

The layman we surmise is too frequently regarded as useful only in the light of a contributor.\(^60\)

Considerably more was due to his discipleship of Newman, Acton and Lacordaire, who articulated his feelings and observations. The first had denounced the alliance of the church with "de-funct" polities, and while this was not a problem in the United States, Desmond yet felt that Newman's essential principle, that the church lives truly only in and through its society, was endangered by the tendencies of the age:

Our prelates nowadays are not as close to the common people as they were in the missionary days (1840-70). Archbishop Corrigan in his marble palace criticises and denounces the movements of the people, but never actively sympathises with them.\(^61\)

\(^{59}\text{Citizen, 3 August 1901.}^{60}\text{Ibid., 2 December 1899.}^{61}\text{Ibid., 22 March 1902.}\)
Catholics must "aggressively" answer the irreligious developments of modern culture—in history, science, even language itself. His own critique of the postulates of imperialism evidenced this determination in himself. He could also apply his ideas in the practical realm: inspired by Jacob Riis' accounts of the poor, he demanded (for such was the urgency of his tone) that the Catholic sisterhoods abandon institutions to the more efficient state, and instead go into the slums, to help maintain the homes of poor through social settlement work, rather than to wait for families to break up, and then serve "love-starved children" in orphanages and hospitals.

Hence he despised those bishops "of noble families," who had made to "de-Christianize" France and Italy; they needed "prodding and correction, reform and regeneration."

Desmond visited Britain and France in 1901 and concluded religious decline was in fact due to the outmoded presentation of the faith, as well as to a belligerent partyism within the Church which obstructed those who would change this. In a pluralistic society, in the modern age, "insulation" was not feasible as it had been in Quebec, Bavaria and Ireland; the faith could only be implanted in love and in intelligence, not by catechism. Anti-clerical manifestations in France, Spain Austria and Italy should not lead to despondency; the Church

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62 Ibid., 9 September 1899. 63 Ibid., 1 November 1902.
64 Ibid., 16 July 1898. 65 Ibid., 13 September 1903.
66 Ibid., 7 July 1900.
in those countries had got bogged down in temporalities, to 
preserve this insulating faith. Conflicts were over Church 
property, freedom from taxation, political ascendancies and 
temporal power.

The attack is not directly on faith or virtue or the 
Church as a place of prayer and worship. . . . we 
should not cease to be hopeful that the clear sun of 
pure religion will shine forth at last.67

The condemnation of "Americanism" had only confirmed Desmond 
in the rightness of the American way.

Inevitably, therefore, Desmond was alone among American 
Catholic journalists (if his own quotations and Reuter's study 
are true), in consistently seeing the fullness of the tree, 
rather than the endlessly concentric circles of the churchy 
wood, when America arrived in the Philippines. Even before 
the peace, he conceded that the friar system made the Church 
there "a partner of the state in responsibility for the mis-
government of Spanish officials"; and, going to his library, 
noted that to admit so was not to deny Sir Henry Ellis' 
testimony of their past role in civilizing and Christianizing 
the islands (as given in An Account of an Embassy to China).68

Later candidly admitting "that we don't know what the real 
facts are," and awaiting fuller information than the jour-
nalistic ones available, he yet warned that the Church there 
had been a part of the colonial establishment, and pointed 
out that the friars were all Spanish and governed from Spain,

67 Ibid., 2 March 1901.

68 Ibid., 18 June 1898, inspired by Joseph Mannix's "A 
Catholic in the Philippines," Review of Reviews, June 1898.
and hence must inevitably be opposed in a national revolt. He continued in a manner that could be an appropriate judgment of the conduct of the Catholic press, and the conservative Catholic societies, from 1898-1905.

Here is a situation which somewhat endangers the cause of the Church in those islands. We are to meet it by recognizing its true nature, rather than by blindly setting ourselves to vindicating the Church under the mistaken impression that such is our invariable task. There must be more judicious deliberation, and less special pleading in the Catholic press.69

Therefore Desmond himself early set his course, sacrificing any vulgar desire to exploit sectarian Catholic anxieties to promote anti-imperialism. As his editorial correspondence, where published, reveals, it was a courageous and little understood distinction.

Since church and public property merge in the Philippines, the new sovereignty will have to determine new delimitations. We can safely leave these issues to American jurisprudence. Let them not lead United States Catholics into difficulties with the state,—the game is not worth the candle.70

It would be irrelevant to our main theme to detail the consistency with which Desmond thereby approached Church-State questions; begging trust in the American authorities; going out of his way to seek adequate and truthful information; warning his readers that most Catholic press opinion was formed in response to the news releases of the International Catholic Truth Society agency, located in Brooklyn, and stamped with the church-mindedness of that diocese. He frankly called the news he received "biased," since the society

69 Ibid., 8 October 1898. 70 Ibid., 3 September 1898.
was presided over by priests; it should drop the title "Catholic," since it was committed to cause rather than truth! Many Catholic papers openly accused him of betraying Church interests; thus did the San Francisco Monitor, and New York Freeman's Journal, while some went further: the St. Paul Der Wanderer accused him of "playing the role of Judas." Yet he acknowledged the duty of defending Catholic interests where they were truly challenged, and indeed launched an investigation into the Philippine's School System following charges that it was aggressively Protestant. The Catholic press took it up with the zest of a campaign field day, and the War Department ordered an investigation. Ironically, Desmond alone had kept his head, repudiating his source's charges by means of his own investigation. For this he was praised by the Independent. And Secretary of War Elihu Root, with whom Desmond had corresponded, congratulated him for "fair and reasonable treatment of the subject."

He constantly opposed the efforts and relevance of

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71 Ibid., 26 July 1902.  
72 Ibid., 19 July 1902.  
73 Ibid., 3 May 1902. Reuter, Catholic Influence, 124-25, noted this from other sources. Reuter then looked up the Citizen for May-July 1902, thus getting a most lopsided view of its policies.  
74 Participants included the Pilot, Union and Times (Buffalo), Sacred Heart Review (Boston), Catholic Universe (Cleveland), New Century (Washington), Catholic Transcript (Hartford) and Irish Standard (Minn.); see Citizen, 17 May 1902.  
75 Ibid., 17 and 24 May 1902 and following.  
76 Ibid., 19, and 26 July 1902.
Bishop McFaul's Federation, and showed up its lack of basic support; he argued that of 75 bishops and 14 archbishops in America, only five--Messmer, McFaul, Horstmann, Maes and Elder--saw fit to publicly show distrust of the Roosevelt-Taft policies, on schools, church property, and friars. He played an educative role among his fellow editors in reconciling them to those policies, and countering the propaganda flooded out by the American religious orders, the German Catholic press and associations, the Catholic Truth Society, and the Federation. This was acknowledged by government officials, as by Catholic papers whether implicitly (by change of policy) or explicitly (e.g., the Pilot). His objection to narrow church-mindedness was not a matter of internal religious politics. He saw it as warping any attempt to understand the real problems. And well it could. Fr. David Phelan, who in the wake of Testem Benevolentiae called the Priesterverein "the hog in St. Patrick's cabbage garden," was three years later praising it for leading the attack on administrative anti-Catholicism.77 Within weeks he had turned about, and was praising American expulsion, with consent, of the friars, since "the work of Americanizing the archipelago would be vastly advanced by a change in personnel."78 He had once been anti-imperialist!79

77 Ibid., 9 September 1899 and 24 May 1902, citing Western Watchman.
78 Ibid., 19 July 1902, again citing Western Watchman.
79 See above, p. 339. Phelan argued the islands were too difficult to civilize or govern; cited in Citizen, 17 December 1898.
What were the real issues, the valid principles?

Desmond had once written:

The time will come when a timely and Christian expression on proper political matters will not be the criterion of a journal's Catholicity, but its right to the name of journal. 80

For him, such Christian expression on non-American affairs meant recognition of the rights of others. Answering the *Freeman's Journal* question, "Is there a Catholic Philippines Question?" he replied yes; it was to see that Washington was directing Philippines affairs toward self-government without hedging, since this was what the natives wished. As to questions of the Church: the compensation for the sale of the friar lands must go to the Church of the Filipinos themselves, not to the religious orders. 81 Two weeks later, as the Federation of McFaul was trying to rouse the Catholic nation, he declared in an editorial entitled "The Real Philippines Question," that it was not friars or any such consideration, but centred on the contempt for the Taft Commission (the islands' civil government) shown by military: the real issue was racist dictatorship. The facts were being suppressed by Roosevelt, but as an Irish-American contributor to the *Nation* noted (somewhat incoherently)

"But if the scene on the other side of the globe which tempts, invites and almost compels to tyranny and rapine, be not inspected with the eye of a severe and unremitting publicity, shame and destruction must result." 82

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80 Ibid., 29 September 1900.
81 Ibid., 12 April 1902. 82 Ibid., 26 April 1902.
Over the next months, as the Catholic press waxed indignant over Church influence and temporalities, Desmond accorded Philippine military and civil administration such severe publicity, remarking bitterly that if news reports were true it is nearly time for Spain to interfere in the interests of humanity.\textsuperscript{83}

Again and again he exposed the racism and brutality he believed to be inherent in American rule.\textsuperscript{84} He contrasted the claim of the military that the islands must be ruled by force for fifty years, with Jacob G. Schurman's belief that American rule had failed because it had not adequately demonstrated its commitment to their eventual self-government, and noted with Schurman (who had recently visited Ireland), that the national leader John Redmond held "there are only two methods of governing Ireland: that of freedom, and that of force." Schurman maintained the former must become the principle of Philippines government, but could not be until Americans stopped regarding the Filipino as an Apache or Sioux, but instead saw him as a Christian Japanese.\textsuperscript{85} To Desmond, the end of coercive rule was the core of the matter, and he defended constant small-minded carping at American conduct as hastening the time when the American public would sicken of the business, and leave off.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{83}\textit{Ibid.}, 3 May 1902.
\textsuperscript{84}E.g., publishing testimony to this effect, as by Rev. John Staunton from the (Episcopal) Living Church (Citizen, 10 May 1902), or from the court-martials (\textit{ibid.}, etc.).
\textsuperscript{85}\textit{Ibid.}, 17 May 1902. \textsuperscript{86}\textit{Ibid.}, 14 June 1902.
This however, was in 1902. Desmond's anti-imperialism, unlike Roche's, had been the traditional kind: concerned first with America. But he showed growing interest in the Filipinos despite his own racism. As early as June 1898 he recognized that the anti-Spanish insurrection was an inevitable result of the political evolution of the islands as they had become growingly educated and civilized, and hence resentful of Spanish contempt.87 This sophisticated analysis of the genesis of any self-rule movement among colonials he did not recall during his own anti-imperialist crusade, 1898-1900, perhaps because it was too sophisticated for use as propaganda. But he did note in passing, (ironically in a very editorial holding Filipinos incapable of American-type citizenship):

We must take the Filipinos into consideration. They have won their independence. They have an army of 70,000 men. They have a leadership of their own. They may decline to be "managed" after the style of American politics.88

What turned him against racism and its corollary of white authority, was reflection upon the inconsistencies between reports from the islands as to the education and character of the Malays,89 and the crude assertions by official apologists of expansion. Such was Senator Albert J. Beveridge, who proclaimed

"The Filipino was the South Sea Malay put through a

87 Ibid., 18 June 1898. 88 Ibid., 10 December 1898.
89 E.g., Fr. F.P. Doherty, admitting the President of the (insurgent) Republic to have spent eight brilliant years at the University of Salamanda, and saying of the people "We are not dealing with a lot of common uneducated savages," ibid., 11 March 1899.
process of three hundred years of superstition in religion, dishonesty in dealing, disorder in habits of industry, and cruelty, caprice and corruption in government"

and denied that their independence was being taken away simply because,

"They are not a self-governing race--they are Oriental."\(^{90}\)

The strong implication that Orientals could not know self-government, because they could not learn personal self-control; and the assertion that Catholicity certainly had not helped them gain such self-control, irritated Desmond's common sense and awakened his understanding of creative Providence. He at once grasped the truth Roche had long preached:

There are different, equally valid, notions of self-government, not just the Anglo-Saxon. ... If this great boon is reserved by God for a certain blood and race, as Senator Beveridge seems to believe, our policy as respects Cuba is one of illusion and fatuity.\(^{91}\)

However he praised Beveridge for his frankness; his speech stripped away the false and hypocritical cant of mission with which McKinley justified the war against the Philippines, and revealed the administration's true motives: racial arrogance, commercial greed, and the lust for power. Speaking in Milwaukee some months earlier, Attorney-General J. W. Griggs had been equally revealing, beli-ing recent speeches of the President.\(^{92}\) In July 1899, General Charles King had returned

\(^{90}\)Cited, ibid., 13 January 1900. \(^{91}\)Ibid.

\(^{92}\)McKinley (Minneapolis, 12 October 1899), "They will not be governed as vassals or serfs or slaves,--they will be given a government of liberty, regulated by law, honestly administered...."; at Milwaukee, 16 October 1899, "Responsi-
from the islands and stated that the Filipinos, nine-tenths literate, were capable of self-government, and possessed a cultured upper class, educated abroad, to serve them. 93

Desmond had reported this on his front page, and it clearly marked a change in his thinking: he demanded an honourable peace with Aguinaldo, and attacked imperialism on new grounds.

In this latter sort of expansion there is an implied colonialism, a denial of self-government and also the odious idea of a "subject race." 94

The speeches of Beveridge and Griggs within the next six months clarified this new thinking.

He also disowned the Darwinist rationale for expansion, as succinctly expressed by Secretary John Long: "Expansion is the natural law of vegetable, animal, and moral life." 95

Darwinism played on his mind, and produced eventually a most original rejoinder. In an editorial "The Struggle for Superiority," Desmond argued that true superiority must be conceived as a spiritual one, and the struggle as a moral one.

Nationalities, like men, tend toward self-indulgence, and, like men, their potential for good is dictated by the ends which they set before themselves. . .

bility born of duty cannot be avoided with honour"; Griggs, same meeting: "If imperialism means . . . fleetfootedness in the race and rivalries of business and trade, if it means a vast domain governed by an imperial people with an imperial and imperious will . . . welcome imperialism." All cited, Citizen, 21 October 1899.

93 Ibid., 8 July 1899.
94 Ibid., 2 September 1899, also 22 July 1899.
95 Long was also speaking in Milwaukee; ibid., 21 October 1899.
A great people cannot be made without training. There must be some conviction and some self-restraint. 96

This was the core of Mugwump anti-imperialism expressed in (greatly modified) Darwinist terms.

Desmond did not labour this point. Yet his conversion from racist imperialism was absolute; indeed from all forms of racism there was a marked turning. No longer does one read racist pieces in the Citizen about the American negro. Desmond even denied a myth in affirming

Justice Taney in the Dred Scott case did not say that a black man has no right that a white man is bound to respect. 97

In opposing the retention of Cuba, he criticized particularly the racist rationale for annexation offered by the Republican press. 98 And although, as we saw, his anti-Negro prejudice remained rooted in him, as it was in the times, 99 yet he now defended the Negro against the worst abuses of the Southern system, lynching and mob attack. Indeed, following the New Orleans riots in which black Americans died, he gave prominence to the views of a Catholic columnist and novelist, Maria T. Elder, who said that the rioters were all poor Catholic whites; that hence it was no wonder Negroes were indifferent to her faith. 100 Desmond himself found the root

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96 Ibid., 6 April 1901. 97 Ibid., 7 April 1900.
98 Ibid., 23 February 1901.
99 See Chapter Eight, above.
100 Ibid., 11 August 1900, p. 1.
of the trouble in pure irreligion, and affirmed

The New Orleans affair ... exhibits a state of feeling which can find no pretense of justification: this is race hatred pure and simple, directed not by intelligence of the South, but by its hoodlumism, and on a par much below the boxerism of Pekin.

The comparison is vital. Like Roche, Desmond was coming to see in racism an international phenomenon pregnant with danger and productive of hypocrisy and cruelty. The very same day, he openly dissented from the "pacification" of China. Commenting on Kaiser Wilhelm's farewell address to the German Expeditionary Force, he noted:

The commission to spread Christianity and to open the way for civilization by "sparing nobody" is significant of the times in which we live. These landgrabbing hypocrisies will occasionally break into candor. ... This combination of bloodshed and devotion, is not modern 'civilization.' It is pagan barbarism.

In a mood of great despondency, he concluded that neither civilization nor Christianity could avert such a "bloody business," rooted as it was in commercial and territorial greed. Believing America tainted by the common temper, he felt that despite Hay's policy and the public feeling, the United States might soon be stuck with a Chinese province.

Occasionally his belief that Christian journalism could affect the course of the world wilted before evidence of the world's

101 Ibid., editorial.
102 Ibid., 4 August 1900. It was not long afterwards that Desmond demanded a federal anti-lynch law: Ibid., 9 February 1901.
103 Ibid., 4 August 1900.
104 Ibid., 28 July 1900.
obsession with force and power.

His fears were not unique. At the same time Cardinal Gibbons warned:

"War having for its object the acquisition of territory by this government is not to be thought of. We want no empire in Asia." 105

And a month before, Desmond roundly declared the Republic platform's "Philippine self-government plank is a fake." 106

Clearly then, contemporary anti-imperialists, judging the temper and rhetoric of the Republican press, expansionist senators, and current government policy, believed that America was endangered by the temptation to large-scale empire. Hence the judgment of the major historians of anti-imperialism that the movement was a failure because the United States retained the Philippines at the cost of a determined war effort, 107 goes wide of the mark. The significant points were that Cuba was surrendered, despite strong hankerings and (with the projection of the Panama canal), strong arguments in favor of its retention; that the Republican party platform and political speeches of the 1900 campaign disclaimed further imperialist ambitions, and promised the Philippines education toward independence; and that China's national unity was preserved, if emasculated, partly through American influence. America did not join continental Europe in projecting a huge

105 Ibid., 4 August 1900. Gibbons meant, of course, mainland Asia.
106 Ibid., 30 June 1900.
107 Especially Harrington and Beisner.
and expanding tropical empire, although current Anglo-Saxonist propaganda was suggesting such a move into Latin America.

This was the interpretation of contemporaries. In an editorial the context of which made it a clear reference to the change in public feeling from 1898 to 1900, and a caution against too hasty a national loss of temper with China, Desmond argued that the radical reversal of the feeling of the northern states on the slavery issue, from the execution of Elijah P. Lovejoy in 1837 to the Emancipation Proclamation, held a major lesson:

The pulses of the nation do not always beat in harmony with the canons of logic or the dictates of sober second thought. . . . We must await the due seasoning of public feelings—the trial of a little time—to be that God's purpose is in it. 108

Reflection on a national scale; sober second thought that influenced the administration, because as a group of politicians, it had to heed the nation: these were the fruits of anti-imperialist agitation. It had made it impossible, Desmond argued, for the Republicans to formulate a long-range imperialism, as many of them desired, and yet win the 1900 election. 109 As early as May 1899, he could write "Imperialism is dead: now we have to muddle through its consequences." 110 The rhetoric of later Republican speeches (fall 1899) suggested that it might not be so dead after all, so that

108 The Providentialism may seem dated; the advice is not. How Desmond would have hated government by opinion poll! ibid., 28 July 1900.

109 Ibid., 15 April 1899. 110 Ibid., 13 May 1899.
following the Milwaukee addresses of Griggs and Long, the Attorney-General and Secretary of State, he warned there would be involvement in a growth of colonialism, unless the people exercized a veto. They exercized it by a change of opinion, and hence were not required to exercize it by ballot in 1900. In September of that year, McKinley defended "the liberal and honourable purposes" of his government toward the Philippines against those who distrusted it, and averred "Imperialism has no place in its creed or conduct." Desmond commented in answer:

Here is the usefulness of a good opposition party. It obliges a wabbling administration to wabble away from its evident hankering after Imperialism.

Yet he looked for deeds by way of proof, as had the Pilot. The fair treatment of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, and the evacuation of Cuba became touchstones for his judgment. He recognized that the tariff against Puerto Rico, passed by both houses (against the recommendation of seventeen major Republican dailies) was here to stay, and begged that amends be made by pouring American funds into the island. He hailed "Cuba Libre!" with praise of its vitality, and tribute to the Roosevelt administration, and argued the grant of independence must be a precedent for the

111 Ibid., 21 October 1899. 112 Ibid., September 1900.
113 Ibid., 7 April, 1900. He of course condemned the insular cases result; ibid., 1 June 1901. Other Irish-American papers were equally disgusted; Patrick Ford's Irish World was prompted to such irony (United States flag, symbol of 'conditional liberty'), that it was banned in New England; ibid., 13 July 1901.
Continuing, he argued that Leonard Wood, who had done such a good job of preparation for it, be sent to the Philippines to do similar work there. This was ironic: Leonard Wood's Philippines administration (in the 1920s) was the most regressive and racially tense the islands knew since the end of the insurrection.

Seeing anti-racism and anti-imperialism as essentially moral issues, it was inevitable that Desmond criticize, as harshly as convention allowed, those bishops and Catholic editors who supported government policies. He too denied the central thesis of missionary and ecclesiastical imperialism, by showing that an identification of the Church with either alien rule, or territorial and commercial exploitation, could only be detrimental to Christianity in Asia. He drew a distinction, as we have seen, between the true interests of Catholicity, which were embodied in anti-imperialism, and the narrow interests of the Churchmen; he frankly charged that the latter were not unaffected by religious bigotry, characterizing the American Federation of Catholic Societies as "a quasi-political movement founded on sectarian lines." And he had long held one the best features of his church to be its cosmopolitan character; unlike Lutheranism and Presbyterianism,

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114 Ibid., 24 May 1902.
115 E.g., during the Boxer uprising, ibid., 25 August 1900. It was, of course, the underlying principle of his opposition to the Philippines' friars.
116 Ibid., 16 April 1902.
it had "escaped localization and nationalization." 117 Yet he warned that American prelates, being human, did not; policies which they formulated apparently apolitically, reflected this. When Vaughan of Westminster issued his pro-Boer War pastoral, spelling out the Christianity-in-imperium thesis, Desmond retorted, that bishops often had resource to "moral sanctions" to uphold "essentially political attitudes."

The spirit of nationalism must be reckoned with as respects the attitude of the highest churchmen. We must not make essentials out of inessentials, nor circumscribe a wholesome liberty of opinion in the Church. Cardinal Vaughan is a Catholic prelate, but a thorough Englishman. 118

Later attacking "Editorial Unreason," which failed to see the real Philippines questions, or the social issues of the time, he appealed for

restraint upon the tendency to write partisan Democratic editorials with a religious color; and of the tendency to let nationalism, rabid in its rhetoric, substitute itself for a well-informed and effective patriotism. 119

Of course he was correct: nationalism contaminated the whole spectrum of American Catholicism, from the quasi-modernist Walter Sullivan at one extreme, through Archbishop Ireland, to Archbishop Corrigan and the very conservative Jesuits. Their Sacred Heart Messenger, having opposed the expulsion of the friars for apologetical reasons, then changed its mind for nationalist ones; it saw American priests

assimilating the Filipinos to our ways and ideas. Our bishops and clergy will go forth as missionaries to help nationalize our new possessions . . . (the more effectively) by working through three centuries of

117 Ibid., 8 February 1902. 118 Ibid., 13 January 1900. 119 Ibid., 16 February 1901.
Catholicism. 120

As Gibbons, Ireland and the Vatican pursued this policy, oblivious to the fact that a majority of America's Catholics were anti-imperialist, and insensitive to their need for information in face of the rumours spreading of administrative anti-Catholicism, Desmond finally lost patience:

The Catholic laity are not so many Jacks... the Catholic democracy dislikes a game of diplomacy, pre-latical or papal, which fails in candor. 121

Desmond had conceptions of the Church and of the world years ahead of his time; the frustrations this brought were many. He hoped to see the modern Catholic influence society toward national, and, increasingly, international justice. But he could only exert his own influence to this end through his Church, for otherwise his voice would be lost amid the compromises and selfishness which he saw characterized society. Yet the Church itself was largely deaf to his plea.

Those others with his vision were oftentimes less heard by the American Church than him, particularly if, as Finley Peter Dunne, they were more truly Christian than functionally Catholic. Dunne's mind grasped the imperatives of justice in the Chinese situation as few others did. His Mr. Dooley told

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120Cited in Pilot, 16 May 1903; for its earlier opinion, Sacred Heart Messenger, 34 (April 1899), 363. Of course there remained those unconvinced by nationalism or the Vatican: Notre Dame's Ave Maria, 19 July 1902, declared the whole secularization principle wrong for the Philippines. The Sacred Heart Review sensibly pointed out that American priests would take years to learn their languages and cultures and could do nothing until then (July 1902).

121Citizen, 24 May 1902; he also referred to "the managing committee"--the bishops! 9 August 1902.
"Hennessy"

"If I was Hop Lung Dooley I would tuck my shirt into my pants, put me braid up in a net, and go out and take a fall out iv th' invader if it cost me me life. . . . The allies say 'We're the represeatives iv Western Civilization, an' 'tis the business iv Western Civilization to cut up th' belongings iv of Eastern Civilization.'"122

Hennessy thought about it, and later expostulated

"'Twill civilize th' Chinymen"

"'Twill civilize thim stiff" said Mr. Dooley.123

Addressing a Yale commencement on "The Lawyer in the Twentieth Century," Bourke Cockran, with an Irish capacity for getting away from the point, warned that if the Supreme Court decided that the constitution did not follow the flag, there would open up the grave and probable danger of colonial expansion into Mexico, and even China, for the chief obstacle (loss of America's identity through a swamping by peoples of alien race, and culture) would be gone.124 Able minds, then, joined Desmond in the fear that Asia was promising to be the next Africa, and saw the need to rouse all, from churchmen through Eastern sophisticates to the common man, to the moral and political dangers of this.

A church-minded silence on the Chinese question seems a more significant lack of moral leadership, than the tortured ramifications which ecclesiastical Philippines' manoeuvres

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122 Cited in Citizen, 28 July 1900.
123 Cited, ibid., 1 September 1900.
124 Ibid., 7 July 1900; Cockran was obviously fascinated by the power of the contemporary lawyer—if he became a Supreme Court Justice! He, too, was a lawyer.
involved. The Filipinos' Catholicity made a strong case for the morality of church-mindedness as the determinant approach to their problems. No such excuse could be offered as to the Church's condoning racist imperialism in China: not even, as Desmond and others noted, the interests of the Church herself.\textsuperscript{125} The development of the world since 1900 makes her insensitivity to China's pride and human and political rights the more tragic, and the vision of Desmond, Roche and Dunne the more significant a rebuke to her official stance. Desmond, during the Boxer uprising, recounted the story of the Church's condemnation of the one effort that could have rooted Christianity in China:--that of Matteo Ricci in the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{126} He reflected upon the fact that a much higher percentage of Asians were Christian in the wake of the work of Francis Xavier, Robert de Nobili, and Ricci, than were in the present era, when Christianity was identified with imperialism.\textsuperscript{127} Any little reflection would show that Asia was beginning a renaissance; the Church could only participate

\textsuperscript{125}Mark Twain's polemics on this point are classics. Yet it might be noted that in the short term, Cathonay's prediction, not his nor Desmond's, proved correct. There was a sharp rise in conversions as Chinese, stunned out of complacency, grabbed for the secrets of Western culture. In the long run, however, the Boxer Rising begot an anti-Christian nationalism. Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, 86-89 and passim. China's Protestants increased by +350%, 1900-1920.

\textsuperscript{126}Ricci conformed Church custom and worship to Chinese language and usages; his rite was condemned by Pope Clement XI in the Bull "Ex illa die." Citizen, 14 July 1900, "How China Was Lost to the Church."

\textsuperscript{127}Ibid., 18 August 1900.
Even apart from Christianity's prospects, had not Catholics a duty to proclaim justice among peoples, even regardless of calculating concern for Church interests? Desmond himself felt so. His view of the Russo-Japanese War must be classed as a prophetic witness to this, a witness of great moral power, and of self-emptying of all preconceptions: nationalism, narrow Catholicity, racism. He was quite aware he was so emptying himself. In a burst of awareness he repudiated nationalism, which he had once felt ineradicable from man's heart.

Burns' invocation to a power for the gift
To see ourselves
As others see us
is sometimes repeated by individuals, but rarely by nationalities.

No vanity is so stolid, so hopeless and so injurious as national vanity. A nationality simply does not want to be told its faults. It declines to admit the philosophy of the Christian regimen which employs confession, contrition, and the purpose of amendment, as the methods . . . of reform.

He went on to argue that since a nationality consisted of a body of individuals, only through a similar process of the perception of faults and a conscious effort to be rid of them, could it progress. This was the reverse of Roosevelt's faith, that progress came through national self-glorification, followed by the attempt to conform social practice to the national ideal. Desmond then went on in a spirit of understanding and solicitude, so different from the hand-rubbing delight of the great powers at her weakness, to apply this to China,
specifically disclaiming racism in the process.

Certain nationalities have been making prodigious blunders, because they are blinded to their mistakes by reason of national self-sufficiency. It is not because there are vast differences in intelligence or love of country, but it is altogether because of . . . a blind glorification of existing institutions.128

Studying in London, Sun Yat Sen had thought out the same idea. Desmond's concern for Asia was prescient; it now knew no bounds. Before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war, he warned that in event of conflict, Japan might win, contrary to popular opinion. For she had an intelligent parliament and public opinion, a modern school system, religious toleration, and a very influential Christian minority.129 When the war broke out he noted that he could not condemn American imperialism only to condone Russia's:

Looking at the matter from the standpoint of a citizen of the world, is it not probable that the plundering of weaker and semi-civilized peoples in the name of civilization, and in behalf of commerce, has gone far enough? Commerce may benefit by this policy; we question whether civilization is served by it; but we are certain it does not glorify humanity.130

Japan and Russia were similar in the state of their civilization and commerce; indeed, Japan was probably more advanced politically. So neither civilization or commerce would gain if territory were wrested from her by Russia. Moreover Japan was trying to annex peoples of similar race and religion.

May it not on the whole exercise a wholesome restraint in the process of landgrabbing if some European nation meets with a decided setback inflicted by one of the

128Ibid., 11 March 1905. 129Ibid., 9 and 16 January, 1904. 130Ibid., 20 February 1904.
Asiatic nations?\textsuperscript{131}

Moreover, Russia was surfeited with vast empty territories. Did not Japan deserve an Asian outlet for her surplus people? One may quibble, with the benefit of hindsight, that Japan proved a cruel master of the Koreans. Yet Desmond had grasped principles of racial and national integrity quite at odds with prevailing prejudice. And the victory at Tsushima did in fact shake the structure of colonialism and racism from New Delhi to Chicago. Desmond also stood outside the partisan arguments of the church-minded and the Irish-minded. John F. Fitzgerald's \textit{Republic} warned "Imagine a yellow peril plus a brain and you have a prophecy of what would be" (if Japan won); Russia with all its "duplicity and domestic evils has at least a tincture of Christian ideas." Michael Davitt characterized the Japanese as "heathens" incited by Britain. The German-minded \textit{Pittsburg Catholic} warned that a Russian victory would endanger all Europe, and wished Napoleon's 1812 campaign had destroyed her Empire; clearly it was also concerned with the fate of Catholic missions. The \textit{Catholic World} was explicitly concerned for them. The \textit{New World}, on the contrary, saw the Russians as "schismatic Catholics," and looked to them, after victory, to convert China. Desmond, noting these disagreements as characterizing all Irish-Americans, and embodying political or ecclesiastical motives, explicitly disowned any opinion based on "Irish antipathies," or any crude Mongolian-pagan versus Caucasian-Christian dichotomy. In a

\textsuperscript{131}\textit{Ibid.}
long article, he investigated the merits of the case of each side.\textsuperscript{132} Let us, he implied, understand other peoples for themselves.

Welcoming Japan's victories, he applied the same principle to America as he would apply to China: let us learn, from Japan's eclecticism, openness, and progressivism, and yet avoid her materialism. Let us learn from her, because nations decline, and eternal vigilance is the price of continuing progress.\textsuperscript{133}

Even as he wrote, Russia broke into revolution. He had long attacked the "negativism of most Catholics" on constructive socio-political reforms.\textsuperscript{134} Hence he was delighted to see the insurrection led by a priest (Gapon), even as were revolutions in Mexico, Italy and Ireland.\textsuperscript{135} The suppression of the insurrection and its attendant reaction caused him to prophesy

"ultimately the enactment of too sweeping remedies by an aroused and uncurbed majority."\textsuperscript{136}

Clearly he had moved now to an all-encompassing outlook: each people must work out its own destiny in autonomy, but with eyes for the experience of other peoples. And the direction of this movement must be toward democratic government and common welfare, as secured by a modernized and disciplined economy. Peoples could regress; no nation, even America,

\textsuperscript{132}Ibid., with citations, 20 February 1904.
\textsuperscript{133}Ibid., 14 January 1905. \textsuperscript{134}Ibid., 28 November 1903.
\textsuperscript{135}Ibid., 28 January 1905. \textsuperscript{136}Ibid., 25 February 1905.
could take itself and its progress for granted, or sneer at the failings of other peoples. He welcomed Theodore Roosevelt's new stress on domestic reform, and his under-emphasis of foreign involvements in the same year as Japan's victory and Russia's rehearsal for revolution. It was part of the same view. 137

Let us not leave with the impression that all creative thinking fell to two laymen of great intellectual ability. Five years before, an anonymous priest, reviewing a book on world affairs, had reached most sophisticated conclusions from very different premises: the premise of the medieval Church standing above all nations. It is fitting to conclude this study by quoting extensively from him, and wishing that he had been in a position of influence and authority. There were priests, to their nationalistic age quite anachronistic, to our age precursors of Vatican II, whose church-mindedness was not contingent upon an idea of the Church limited by and imprisoned in, historical circumstance, but who understood that the true ecclesia must embrace all the diversity of the mundus. They could speak to their world. In formal premises different, in instinct Desmond and Roche and this priest were one.

The ferment that has been going on within the body of humanity during the past three centuries has worked off every vestige of the medieval ideal of a unified world empire, and has left in each nation the one dominant idea, and the one supreme struggle for political individualism. Whether we call it by this name, or label it with a mere euphonic appellation, the principle of

137 Ibid., 11 March 1905.
national imperialism, or whether we term it selfishness, rivalry, lust of gain or empire, is immaterial. The nations now stand with fully developed individualities face to face.138

Refusing to discuss the moral basis of "expansion" except to note its "controlling Machiavellian principles," he went on to see in Asia the inevitable cockpit of the struggle between these powers and peoples.

The great question is which is to prevail, or whether there is to be a peaceful union of the two ancient civilizations, combined into a higher harmony.

The United States had an opportunity to renounce the squalid struggle, and set an example for this fusion, by treating the Philippines constitutionally and ethically.139

The problems and principles remain as he described them.


139 Ibid.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources

A Critical Account of the chief of these is given in Chapter Two. Here I would like again to stress the sheer bulk of the material available, of which the richness of my sources are an indication. A division should be made between editorials and news-analysis on the one hand; and contributed articles on the other, which I should like to list to give an impression of the frequency with which writers addressed themselves to the problems of race, colonialism, missionary imperialism and nationalism. However, such articles, and those more indirectly related to such problems, yet often more illuminating of attitude because unguarded, total 150 in the Catholic World alone, 1880-1905. This hence is but a summary list of periodicals used.

American Catholic Quarterly Review 1898-1901
American Ecclesiastical Review 1896-1901
Catholic Citizen 1892-1905
Catholic World 1884-1905
Messenger of the Sacred Heart 1896-1901
The (Boston) Pilot 1894-1905

Catholic opinion was checked against general opinion on major crises by recourse to the American Literary Digest; and several journals such as the Ave Maria were checked to verify citations made by other papers.

Grasps complexity of American Catholicism.


A penetrating work which should be a prescribed introduction to any study of foreign relations.

Auxier, George W. "Middle Western Newspapers and the Spanish American War, 1895-1898," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* 26 (March 1940), 523-34.

Barry, Colman J. *The Catholic Church and the German Americans.* Milwaukee, 1953.

Although it is widely believed that contrasting conservative (European) and liberal (American) views of the Spanish-American war helped strengthen the hands of those who wished Americanism to be rebuked, Barry unfortunately presents no material on the German-American churchmen's attitude to the War and the subsequent colonialism. It would have been illuminating even for his purposes.


An essential study, particularly illuminating on Roosevelt's thoughts on overseas peoples; Catholic radicals were at once drawn to his tolerant and vibrant personality and excited by his nationalism, which confused them when they tried to forge ideas of inter-national and inter-racial equality unknown to him.

Beisner, Robert L. *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists 1898-1900.*

More profound than the title suggests, this work discovers in the leading anti-imperialists no prototypes of the present-day dissenter, but conservatives cherishing an America which they felt was passing and which they believed could be guided, or corrupted, in its future development; men whose chief concern was national, but not nationalist, and whose consideration of the victims of American expansion was only peripheral. It thus proves Leuchtenberg's thesis as it were, from the other end. Perhaps fortunately it appeared when the present work was largely written, or it should have shaped it overmuch, such is Beisner's power. Its influence can be seen, for example, on my understanding of Cardinal Gibbons. Yet it forgets that there were radical anti-imperialists (Jane Addams, Humphrey Desmond) who presage later developments in America's mind.


An important work, undiscovered until I started on the final section of this paper, and most relevant to it. Bilski's work evidences the weakness of Catholic historiography: its chief concern seems to be whether the Church "figured" on the issue, and particularly with the hierarchy, rather than to critically or morally examine the response to imperialism. Even within his frame of reference, he has no sight of many bishops who had decided opinions--Elenk, Chapelle, O'Gorman, Hogan, etc. The best part is the elucidation of the attitude of McQuaid, Corrigan, and the conservative Catholic press.


Short, hagiographical, and without information on Katzer's and Messmer's views on expansion. Yet the author had a doctorate in historical sciences from Louvain!


A very good example of the way Catholic historiography should be going. One regrets that Ryan, a man of independent mind, has not left opinion on the great debates of 1898-1899, but one would assume they approximated to those of Archbishop Ireland, his mentor.


An essential work on the organization, attitudes and modes of leadership and opinion formation with the Irish-American community, as also on many of the men whose opinions are reported in this study.


A comprehensive and judicious introduction most helpful to a raw beginner. It is yet based on a career of original research.
Cross, Robert D. *The Emergence of Liberal Catholicism in America*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1958.

Indispensable and thought-provoking. Yet he does not notice lay radicals such as Desmond, in the degree to which they could go well beyond ecclesiastical liberalism, and even be critical of it.


Illuminating on the new nationalism (post-Civil War), as also on aspects of the expansionist rationale overlooked by other studies.


A courageous, if depressing study, which illuminates how sectarian Catholicism can still engender instinctive prejudice toward whole traditions and peoples.


Rightly described as a "valuable" study by Reuter.

——. *Chats Within the Fold*. Baltimore, 1901.

A convenient collection of his editorials, evidencing his concern for an activist laity and a Catholicism tolerant of the times.


Even of his father, Desmond could be detached, and yet reveal the rich humanity they had in common.


Perhaps the only study of American Catholic tradition remotely similar to the present one in being interested in how its teaching, on the brotherhood of man and the primacy of morality, was warped by human assumptions which were in turn sanctified. But the work is polemical and unhistorical, doing not only injustice to the fullness of men like Archbishop Ireland, but helping to perpetuate the error it seeks to correct in its gratuitous and false assumption that the mind of American Catholicism is formed by, and embodied in, only its bishops.


Besides Reuter, Bilski, Farrell, and the chapters in Moynihan, the only extensive coverage of problems here at issue is contained in the second volume of this enriched study. It is interesting to note, in passing, Ellis' own distinct distaste for the Spanish-American War! The sympathies of a common Catholicism still, perhaps, affect some Americans.

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Two excellent investigations, the importance and dispassionate example of which have not been widely recognized.


A short modern summary of contemporary thinking on cultural differences as acquired, rather than as racially characteristic.


The section on the Irish in this study of New York's 'unassimilated' minorities is helpful. It suggests that after their initial social rise, the city's Irish stagnated; this loss of upward mobility and consequent concern for status may explain their conservatism, even as I used a similar factor to explain that of the nineteenth-century Germans. The section is somewhat impressionistically written, by Moynihan.


Unfortunately a very short contraction of his dissertation. I think however that the German American Catholics were at the time too sectarian in their anti-socialism, and,--with exceptions like William Bruce,--too politically inactive to be ranked generally as "friends of reform."

Indeed, a friend of mine, Mike Green, is shortly to publish a paper on voter behaviour in Dubuque, Iowa 1890-1904, which shows that while Irish wards supported Bryan, German Catholic wards switched from a preponderantly Democratic to an over 60% Republican ticket to oppose him, and thereafter never fully returned to a Democratic allegiance. Obviously the fulminations of the bishops, of Arthur Preuss and others much affected them. What should be a vital Marquette dissertation would be a study of Irish and German Catholic ward behaviour in the same period for Milwaukee with stress particularly on the rise of Social Democracy in the city.


The most convenient full account of the American takeover, the friar-lands question, and Republican policy subsequently.

A rich background for an understanding of the diverse influences working on the Pilot. Indeed the two elements in the Pilot's anti-imperialism and anti-racism, the patrician influence of Hoar and Garrison, and the Irish heritage of anti-oppression, additionally evidence Handlin's idea of transitional cultures.

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A beautiful work and a formative influence on this study, the more so I find its vision confirmed by my reading and research on the Irish-Americans, as in my own personal experience.


With Biesner the essential context for the preoccupation of Catholics in the latter part of this study. However, the one flaw is a failure to estimate the significance of past and present (1898) images of European imperialism.


A suggestive study on the traditional and continuing autonomy of American Catholicism, and the growth of ultramontanism, or "looking to Rome" as a real yet initially esoteric factor after 1870, embodied principally in the Freeman's Journal (among papers). An interesting background to the themes of Cross and McAvoy, making them more intelligible. Of the present study, it might be said the American clergy were autonomous in potentiality, but not in fact, for the formative theology and prejudices, similar in America to those in Europe, begot similar results.


An illuminating study of the mid-century religions as sources of separate but co-existing cultures, united by common devotion (or subservience) to American values. Also retro-actively valid, with cautioned use.


An important reconsideration, based on Higham's recognition that not all foreigners were subject to the same nativist reaction.

As Higham himself writes, the character and achievement of immigrant groups can be partly understood by examining the patterns of rejection they faced.


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There is an excellent chapter on "Racism and Imperialism"; my own understanding of the time would prompt the view that social Darwinism was most influential in those spheres. Yet one looks in vain for any episcopal repudiation of its un-Christian implications.


A recent searching of the Catholic Church's conscience in the matter of the social gospel, particularly as it should apply to repressed minorities.


A stimulating and convincing reappraisal of expansion, finding its chief dynamic in industrial and commercial pressures in the press and upon statesmen. The weight it gives to many situations hitherto skimped over, such as the Nicaragua crisis, is validated by the amount of material upon them in the Catholic press. La Feber's book has all but guided me through the third section of my thesis and at no point did I discover information which essentially jarred with his views. Indeed furious allegations from the Pilot during the Cuban and Venezuela crises that administrative caution was dictated by capitalists, suggest contemporaries too were aware where real influence lay.


An important study of the consistent imperialism of the younger reform Republicans, finding the source of both their foreign and domestic policy attitudes in the nationalism of "America first." It has however been criticized lately by those who would find only an incidental relationship between reformism and expansionism. See B. J. Berstein and F. A. Lieb, "Progressive Republican Senators . . .," *Mid-America*, 50 (July 1968), 163-205.

That a recent study uses so strong a term as "alienation" to describe the urban Irish-Americans of the East and Chicago when writing chiefly of the last thirty years is additional evidence of the apartness of their grandparents in the nineteenth century. Levine is especially good on their political behaviour, and on their creation of group symbols, religious and national.


The student of nineteenth century Catholic opinion is extremely fortunate in having an almost complete ready guide to sources, in this work and in Willging and Hatzfield. Indeed, the full descriptions and historical notes given in these works constitute a major contribution to the history of United States Catholicism itself, of its diversity, and its close relations to attempts to preserve immigrant group identity.


The crisis dealt with is crucial to an understanding of how clerical viewpoints on American expansion developed: one gets the impression, at times, that for Ireland, discomfitting clerical conservatives was the chief aim of American foreign policy, and from James McFaul and Eastern Jesuits, among other conservatives, that they longed for proselytism and victimization of the Church in the Philippines to prove their point that the liberals estimate of secular or Protestant America was screwed up. It is to McAvoy's credit that he recognized this instinctively, knowing his men.

"Liberalism, Americanism, Modernism," Records of the American Catholic Historical Society, 63 (December 1952), 225-31. McAvoy, I believe, somewhat modestly regards himself more as archivist than historian. This lucid, analysis, together with the interpretative sections of the foregoing work, suggests his powers of historical understanding are much more considerable than those the majority of Catholic American historians--uncritical, factual reconstructors--have possessed in the past.


The commemorative character of this study should not be disguised by its academic apparatus. McKinnon merits a more searching study: to me, he is the prototype of the well-meaning, but nationalist, Christian imperialist of America.

The sort of compilation can only be characterized as pointless, being a stitching together of editors' notes. In fact the Pilot's interpretation of the war was in marked contrast to its previous enthusiasm for Japan, in direct contradiction of the official Church's view (that an expanding Russia in Asia was more dangerous to Catholicity than an imperial Japan), and marked the ascendency of "Yellow Peril" thinking in the Pilot's offices following the resignation of James Jeffrey Roche, who had fought such racism all his life. Brother McDonald misses all this, as also the even more basic and essential point that the Pilot favoured Russia, not because her "medieval Christianity," was "close to Catholicism," but because for a generation Irish-Americans had favoured Russia as the one power that could expel Britain from Asia, and offer an alternative friendship to America than that proposed by Anglo-Saxonists; and that their bitterness against Japan was due principally to that country's recent establishment of rapport with Britain. McDonald reads propaganda as policy.


This book uncovers the useful fact that American (Irish) Catholic schizophrenia when faced with the incompatible demands of a new nationalism, and an old loyalty (represented by a Catholic power), was not new. Nor was their resultant tendency to take refuge in silence. Indeed the grandparents of Mexico's St. Patrick's Brigade (constituted of U. S. army deserters and prisoners) had themselves faced a similar bewilderment when instructed by their bishops to support England against France in the Seven Years', American Revolutionary, and French Revolutionary Wars (Lecky, Ireland in the Eighteenth Century; Corkery, The Hidden Ireland). The fault of this book is that of American Catholicism until today, the meek desire to prove that American Catholics "figured" on behalf of their country.


This work is an excellent contribution to the understanding of the missionary-imperialist mentality. It is also a contraction of exhaustive research into the minutes of every major Methodist (Episcopal) conference, and the editorials of all the official journals and papers published by that faith. Three points I note as in especial agreement with conclusions of my own research; the idea of vocational mission was used to provide a rationale for
secular imperialism; there was a direct correlation between previous and continuing attitudes toward British imperialism, and American expansion (many Methodists were entranced by the world destiny of Protestant Anglo-Saxonism, to the extent even of congratulating Queen Victoria on British victories); and, finally, Methodist, no less than Catholic churchmen, were quite sincere in believing all this to the value of "lesser" peoples. McKenzie's focus is however very different to my own. The son of a missionary to India (where caste religion and fatalism have indeed paralyzed social concern and modernization), he is not concerned to criticize the implications of such thinking, for its acquiescence on the emergence of unequal worlds, and its implicit condoning of racism. Yet he does note, that particularly after 1898, there were dissenters within the official tradition.


The importance of their previous images of European imperialism is somewhat to be expected in the formation of Irish-American and German-American attitudes to American expansion. May, in this reconsideration, convincingly demonstrates that the changing reputation of European colonialism, from a low point in the 1860s, to a high one in the 1880s, followed by renewed discredit in 1898, went far to shape American policy itself.


This work views American imperialism, as the title suggests, as ushering the United States into a permanent (as distinct from fitful) place in the pre-occupations of the great powers of the Old World. It also makes the story exciting, an usual feat among diplomatic historians. May's views can be reconciled with La Feber's if it is granted that America achieved great power status not by pursuing it, but by living out the dynamic of its own expanding interests. Nor indeed is an emphasis upon such interests incompatible with learning Europe's lessons.


If many of Maynard's attitudes seem surprisingly old-fashioned (including his conviction that Negroes have a tendency to rape white women), yet his survey remains satisfying, comprehensive, and well-told.


Scholars have disputed Merk's attempt to extend the validity of these concepts beyond the Civil War, by pointing to the new elements of colonialism (rule over
non-contiguous, coloured, and unassimilated peoples), Darwinism, markets imperialism etc. Yet my own study convinces me that indeed the old concepts of "mission" and "manifest destiny" were still alive in men's thought and speech, and were harmonized with the new ideas, or used to criticize them: much of the debate of 1898-1900 centred on whether colonialism was the best way to perform mission, and whether overseas expansion was manifestly destiny.


A competent case study of the chauvinism which reunited Archbishop Ireland's state by embracing all those classes, faiths, and nationalities recently bitterly divided by Populism and nativism.


In a new introduction to a book first published in 1931, Mills himself admits his interpretation to have been over-cynical. Yet the work remains of great value, for it performs toward that war the first duty of the historian, and one increasingly neglected: the re-creation of events as humanly experienced; and it does so with style.


Cleveland's rejection of Hawaiian annexation has long caused historians to contrast his policies with those of McKinley. This work stresses that McKinley's Cuban policy was perfectly consistent with Cleveland's, and was, indeed, its logical fulfilment. The book is a stimulating survey by one yet an expert.


Portrays McKinley as a man of will and integrity, not of weakness and susceptibility to popular whims. Also stresses inter-connection of internal politics and expansion.


Still the major work, based on the archbishop's papers; however, it is too uncritical, taking data and interpretation from those papers as historical fact, rather than cross-checking them with other sources or even secondary sources. This is particularly so of relations with the
German Americans, the Americanist crisis, the Spanish war, and Filipino problems: insurrection, friar-lands, Aglipay schism etc. Indeed the whole assumption that Ireland was the beacon of the Catholic liberals is misguided: Humphrey Desmond looked on him as obstructing true liberalism by his vanity, partisan politics, and intolerance.

An old work but most informative. To some extent a primary source, for O'Reilly typifies the new papalist American churchman, and was himself attached to the Pope's staff.

Pico, Fernando A. "Emilio Castelar and the Spanish Church," Catholic Historical Review, 52 (January 1967), 534-48. Interesting as a study of an earlier attempt to find an "American" solution to the problems of church and state in Spain and its possessions. Pico holds that Castelar was well-meaning, believing de Tocqueville's assertion that liberty would revivify personal faith, but that he underestimated the difficulties of functionally dividing the two, which had so long inter-penetrated. This was the problem in 1898-1902.

Pratt's method of research seems to have been to dig into records and newspapers at only those places marked by outward events. His work, while important, is therefore neither adequately complex, nor convincing.

Interesting in giving a picture of the Taft mission from the later President's own angle, which was one compounded of cynicism and the recognition of necessity. Taft did not enjoy dealing with the Catholic Church, where Roosevelt did.

Purcell, R. J. "Justice Joseph McKenna," Records of the American Catholic Historical Society, 56 (September 1945), 177-223.


Scholars concerned to prove the orthodoxy of American liberal Catholicism have effectively proven it to have had no intrinsic relations to Modernism; and, indeed, as McAvoy
remarks, Loisy himself felt Americanism irrelevant to his own attempt to liberalize scriptural interpretation. Yet Americanism could lead to fresh, undoctinaire, approaches; so much so that Ratte can characterize a radical Boston priest, one influenced by Ireland, as "modernist." I believe Catholicism in America was more in ferment in the 1890s than scholars like McAvoy and Ellis admit, or than general historians, convinced of its "anti-intellectual" character, will allow. Ratte cites a Chicago priest who upheld reverence for the Saints without believing in it himself; Sullivan became a Unitarian. In 1902 a Paulist thus welcomed Tyrrell's La Religion Exterieure: "Simply unique... these pages convey inspiring lessons, surprising to minds, hitherto contented with passive acceptance of Christianity en bloc; satisfying to Souls that have been longing to live their religion" (Catholic World, 75, September 1902). In the quiet of priests' minds, and the conversations of rectories, there was emerging a greater radicalism than Americanism. It was aborted by Pius X.


The most helpful single volume to me in this. Reuter's preoccupations are radically different than my own. As his title implies, he sets out to discover whether the Catholic Church exercised any influence upon the formulation and execution of American policies concerning Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. He demonstrates this to have been the case, although its influence was informal. He is also sensitive to the divisions within Catholicism, although perhaps not to the complexity of the relations of these to colonial issues; however, he is not studying attitudes and theologies, but influence. As a Protestant, his work is probably fairer to ecclesiastical politicking than a modern lay Catholic historian would be.1


The author of these articles written half a century ago, was editor of The Philippine Islands (Ten volumes, Cleveland, 1903-1909), a mass of source materials on the Spanish

1My detailed criticisms of Reuter's work are contained in the footnotes.
period; he also edited *The Hispanic American Historical Review*. For being written so close to the time, these two articles are remarkable. Catholics found it difficult to be unemotional about the subjects. Robertson was. He shows how mishandling by the American Church was primarily responsible for the Aglipay schism.

Old, honourable and sound. The documentation is prodigious. One understands not only O'Reilly, but his great influence on Roche.

The *Story of the Filibusters*. London, 1891.
Roche's romanticization of the filibusters was part admiration for heroes, part American nationalism, and part pure escapism. This may explain why it did not warp his sense of the limitation of nationalism as a source of morality. Moreover, his filibusters were saviours of the oppressed, and much less egocentric adventurers.

Preseuts a much more conservative view of the question than my own. The two are not incompatible; as has been the fashion with past Catholic historiography, Roohan derives his judgment from a study of clerical opinion. He characterizes this, and rightly, as pragmatic and moderate; concerned not to change the system, but rather to study it closely to discover where it can be made more amenable to the needs of social justice. Certainly this was the approach of Spalding and later, John Ryan.

The urgency of this work cannot detract from the authority of its detailed analysis of the miserable history of the relations between our Western culture and the non-white majority of mankind. Segal sees the world's future as dependent, for stability, upon the abandonment of white superiority as a global ideology. If he much over-simplifies, yet his vision lies behind my enthusiasm for the radical lay Catholics prophets of such a change of heart. Segal, too, confirmed in me the idea, borne out by research, that attitudes toward internal coloured minorities in America shape those towards Asians and Africans.

Like Catholic historiography, Irish-American historiography has usually been apologetic: a celebration and chronicle of Irish contributions to American life. This study foregoes celebration; it criticizes and understands the growth and waning of Irish America.

The background to Humphrey Desmond's life; and one of the best "urban biographies" extant. It is surprising that Desmond is omitted from all but cursory mention. In Milwaukee history, he seems doubly significant, as an original mind in a city inconspicuous for intellectuality, and as a Catholic of much influence sympathetic to Social Democracy, in a city where it came to power.


Together with the encyclicals Mater et Magistra, Pacem in Terris, and Populorum Progressio, these documents present that view of the Church in its relations to the world, and of the relations which should subsist between nations, races and cultures, which this study takes as normative in its attempt to describe nineteenth century Catholic thought, either as hindering, or presaging such views. Ideas of the Church as untied to any culture, of human races as equal, and of all nations and cultures as possessing the rights of autonomy normally associated with individuals, are, as the study shows, revolutionary within the Church when affirmed so factually. I take them as normative, then, because of their intrinsic worth, not because of the authority from which they derive.


The first series deals with the publications of the smaller states, the second with those of major states. The arrangement is by city (within each state), and then alphabetically. Foreign-language publications and papers only incidentally Catholic are covered. Provided essential information on the many papers cited in the Pilot and Citizen.

The first important study to claim that it was the press which launched the war; it does not, however, prove this, for it limits itself to a study of press reporting and
editorials, which cannot be assumed, a priori, to have formed the contemporary mind completely, even less to have stampeded it.


Makes an important distinction between anti-colonialism and informal imperialism: the two were quite compatible. It is remarkable that the Boston Pilot's interpretation of the "Open Door" exactly anticipates Williams' view of it.


Convenient readings for background.


A fascinating investigation into the prevailing rationale of business. Clergy could speak of commerce and Christianity in one breath perhaps because Protestants had long elevated the former as a vocation or Godly stewardship.
Reference Works

The ideas and information of the preceding works entered into my own developing opinion; these subsequent works were used only to ascertain specific facts, or to secure documentation.


Scholarly, exhaustive, but unsympathetic: the authors are Jesuits.


The Dictionary of American Biography.


