A CONSIDERATION

OF POLITICAL REALIGNMENT

by

Dana McKenzie, B.A.

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PREFACE

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INTRODUCTION

In the American two-party system the goal of both parties at elections is to obtain a majority of votes, and thus gain control of the government. "Each party has to rely upon support from all sections of the population, and both parties attempt to appeal to most social groups and interests" (Campbell et al., 1966:247). The absence of strong class identification and class associated programs of political action results in the functioning of the parties as the significant source of political direction for the electorate. The major cohesive force which gives the party system stability and continuity is the psychological attachment of the electorate to the parties. "The strength of these party attachments and the general weakness in the American electorate of ideological interest both serve to maintain the two party system" (Campbell et al., 1966:267). Despite these pressures to maintain the system, change is a constant phenomena.

Change in the political system must be considered in the context of the interrelationships of the various societal subsystems; no system functions in a vacuum. Structural interrelations are such that changes in the social and/or economic systems affect the political system and vice versa.

Manifestations of change, or the lack of it, within the political system include: no realignment, electoral disaggregation, a change in the functions of the party system, or a realignment. Very simply, a lack of realignment would be evidenced by maintenance of the status quo and/or the situation of confused signals from the political party
system. One of these signals is electoral disaggregation.

Electoral disaggregation is existent to the extent that the party attachments of the voting citizens are weakened without being replaced. The electorate disaggregated beyond a certain point jeopardizes the functioning of the political parties and the whole system. This disaggregation is widespread today and has led to speculation about the fate of the American party system itself.

It is possible that the party system as we now know it is changing. The party system serves the function of unifying and clarifying the various demands and interests of the electorate. Choices are organized and presented to the public through elections. Once the parties have lost contact with either the electorate or the government, their functioning is in jeopardy.

In the past, one of the ways political parties have overcome stagnation and regained contact with the electorate is through realignments. A realignment can be defined as an organic change which redraws the line of party cleavage within the electorate (Sundquist, 1973:9). Realignments may be further classified according to the pace of change; organic change in voter alignment which occurs in just one election is referred to as "critical," while similar change occurring more slowly is referred to as "secular" (Key, 1955; 1959).

Possible signs of realignment include particular types of voting patterns, issues, and conditions. A change in group voting patterns might be a signal of realignment; Blacks, for example, in the New Deal coalition supported a particular point on the Democratic continuum. If they begin to support a different kind of Democrat or a Republican,
then some rather significant political change is occurring.

Realignments in the past have taken place in elections where some emotive morally changed issue polarizes the electorate. The parties, then, have been forced to take a stand either for or against an issue, such as the Democratic New Deal programs as solutions to the Great Depression.

In addition, realignments have always taken place in the context of certain conditions. The Great Depression was a disaster which could have led to a political situation in the U.S. akin to that of Germany if some solution had not been implemented. For this reason, realignments have been referred to as mini-revolutions (Brinton, 1965: 250-264; Youngquist, 1976).

Voting patterns, issues, and conditions all contribute to a realignment; however, a certain combination of all three is requisite. There is no exact formula for realignment; the simple existence of one or more of these three components is not sufficient to result in a realignment. Because there have been only five realignments in the U.S., analysts have not been able to generate a definite formula. However, general patterns have been discerned.

Realignments are usually discussed on the national level. A "critical" election, however, usually results in realignment which affects national, state, and local levels of government nearly simultaneously. In addition, state or local governments may realign. In this case, something similar to the national realignment process occurs at the state or local level, and redraws the respective line of voter cleavage. A state level realignment is quite different than the
situation where a state reflects national level trends.

The national level politics in a state may be indicative of pending realignment on the national level. Primaries are important to this type of analysis because a wider range of candidates and issues are presented. This allows the voters a more specific choice of alternatives in the political system than does a general election. Thus, voter choice may be more precisely differentiated.

Recent national politics in Wisconsin as reflected in voter alignment has been congruent with the national New Deal alignment of the 1930's. Wisconsin lends itself well to analysis due to the avant-garde political tradition of the state and because of ready data availability.

The political tradition of the state was largely created by the early settlers. Wisconsin settlers, particularly the Germans and Swedes were accustomed to class oriented politics in Europe. They brought this tradition with them to Wisconsin resulting in an electorate more politically aware of issues than existed in many states. This "issue-oriented" tradition has continued (Fenton, 1966). Wisconsin was the home of the Progressive movement and supported LaFollette's candidacy for President.

Within the present study, the 1968, 1972, and 1976 presidential primaries are compared on the basis of important issues, existing conditions, and candidates. Using only Wisconsin data, no definite change is visible in 1976 when compared to 1968 and 1972; the New Deal alignment appears to remain. When data from primaries after Wisconsin's is considered, Wisconsin's role in certain trends is apparent.
In the 1976 primaries two candidates emerged against the New Deal and were supported: Reagan and Carter. Reagan (Time, 1976b) was campaigning for a repudiation of the New Deal, while Carter potentially moved beyond the New Deal politics. Carter's campaign was based on a "metaissue". The "metaissue" was an issue beyond issues; it stressed character, attributes such as honesty and truthfulness, instead of a specific position on a particular issue (Youngquist as quoted in Time, 1976a). This may indicate the beginning of a realignment. The potential for realignment has not yet been realized at this writing in 1976. Certainty in the evaluation of such political change exists only in retrospect.
CHAPTER I

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

In the context of national realignment theory the question becomes one of whether or not Wisconsin politics reflect any pending realignment on the national level. National politics, in the form of presidential primaries, reveal the potential and possibilities for political change. Realignment is one form of political change.

The last critical realignment occurred in the 1930's as a result of the Great Depression. Other realignments include 1800, 1828, 1860, and 1896 in addition to the 1930's. The fact that previous realignments have occurred twenty-eight to thirty-six years apart has led to increased speculation on the apparent continued existence of the New Deal alignment of the 1930's. The New Deal alignment was named after Roosevelt's programs to solve some of the country's economic problems. The New Deal coalition included Blacks, ethnic groups including Poles, Italians, Irish, Germans and Swedes, blue collar workers, organized labor, Catholics, urban dwellers, and often rural and farm interests. Some of these classifications are not mutually exclusive. The shift of one of these traditionally Democratic-voting groups to the Republican party, a third party, or a different type of issue support, would indicate some political change.

Indicators of realignment appear in voter response to combinations of socio-political conditions, issues, and candidates. These elements must be combined so as to result in a shift in group voting support. In between realignments, certain groups traditionally support candidates
with similar positions on issues and policies. When a shift is evident in the type of candidate a particular group supports, some kind of political change is occurring.

In addition to realignment, there are other possibilities for political change. Realignment can be distinguished from other types of change in the political realm by the fact that the line of voter cleavage is redrawn, and that this change is durable (Sundquist, 1973: 9). Durability of a change in the electorate could only be assessed over time; however, signs may be traced when change is taking place.

Investigation of the central question of change away from New Deal politics included library research on realignment theory and Wisconsin history. More recent political history -- 1968, 1972, and 1976 -- was researched through books, newspapers, public documents and the comments of trained political observers. Analysis centers around voter alignment in 1976 when compared with 1968 and 1972. Comparisons of these three election years was made based on realignment theory, Wisconsin history, and New Deal voting patterns.

Information used to make comparisons was limited, depending on its existence and availability. Study of the 1968, 1972, and 1976 presidential election years revealed that more information was available in each succeeding year at an almost exponential rate. The existence of studies, etc., was not sufficient to make them available: it was not possible to obtain several studies done on the 1972 Wisconsin presidential primaries. In 1976, access was granted to the NBC News voter survey. Precincts were chosen so as to compose a demographically stratified random sample of Wisconsin voters for the purpose of election
prediction. Voters leaving the polls were surveyed, at an agreed
upon rate, as to who they voted for, why, and certain demographic
characteristics were noted. Although NBC's predictions went slightly
awry, minimal adjustment brought the poll in accord with voting
results.

The Wisconsin Primaries
Wisconsin instigated the first open primary in the nation during
the Progressive era. This means that voters may vote in any one
party's primary as they wish; no official party registration is
kept in Wisconsin.
Wisconsin has been classified by Ranney and Kendall (1954) as
a two-party state only by including the victories of third-party
Progressives within their count of total second-party victories.
There has been strong anti-legal bias in Wisconsin against any
organized political agencies; this has been intended to limit the
intercession of any agency between the voter and the elected officials.
In the Jacksonian democratic tradition, many administrative officials
in the state are elected rather than appointed. The value of the
open primary is that the voters also nominate candidates, as well as
elect them.

The philosophy underlying Wisconsin's primaries resembles that of
Jean Jacques Rousseau; the citizen can choose most truly when he acts
as an individual member of the whole community and not as a member of
any group within that community. This highly individualistic political
theory was perhaps initiated for a small, simple society in which
citizens knew each other. Unfortunately, the theory ignores the influence which groups other than political parties may exert if the parties are rendered less effective. Wisconsin law and customs have preserved a strong individualist political tradition (Epstein, 1958; Legislative Reference Bureau, 1975).

The significance of the Wisconsin primary has varied with the year. In 1968, the Wisconsin primary drew national attention because of Johnson's pullout the day before. McCarthy also got his first big win in Wisconsin. In 1972, the Wisconsin primary was considered a benchmark for funding; candidates' positions and strengths were reassessed by their financial backers. The primary of 1976 was once again significant in being the last of the early primaries, and important in funding strategies. In addition, because of Wisconsin's progressive heritage, Udall put substantial effort into the state. Some felt that if Udall could not win in Wisconsin, he could not win anywhere. Crossover voting makes it difficult to break down who Democrats and Republicans want since there is also no statewide voter registration. It does, however, make it simpler to determine some voting patterns. The crossover makes the open primaries more reflective and representative of the mood of the electorate.

Ranney and Epstein (1966) term Wisconsin's primary system as extremely representative, based on criteria set up by the President's Commission on Registration and Voting Participation in 1963. This also means that Wisconsin's election statutes facilitate voting. The Wisconsin primaries, then, are extremely representative of the voting population since there are no artificial boundaries denoted by the
necessity of voting only in the primary declared by previous registration.

1976 Primary

There have been changes within the primary system in Wisconsin. Both Democrats and Republican primaries in 1968, 1972, and the Republican primary in 1976 awarded all delegates from a congressional district to be sent to the respective party convention to the candidate who carried that particular congressional district.

The Democratic National Committee and the Compliance Review Commission has put pressure on the Wisconsin Democratic party and the state legislature to close the primary. This was not accomplished, and at the last minute the Democratic National Committee decided to allow the voters of Wisconsin one more open Democratic primary. Certain changes were made as part of this conditional dispensation; the delegates had to be proportionally allocated to the candidates by congressional district and statewide. Delegates were given to each candidate according to his percentage of the total Democratic primary vote in each district. At-large delegates were assigned on the basis of statewide percentages. The sixty-eight Democratic delegates to the Democratic Convention from Wisconsin were selected as follows in 1976: six in the 1st Congressional District, eight in the 2nd, six in the 3rd, seven in the 4th, six in the 5th, six in the 6th, seven in the 7th, six in the 8th, six in the 9th, plus ten on a statewide at-large basis.

The Republicans in 1976 adhered to their previous delegate selection pattern. Forty-five delegates were selected, five from
each of the nine Congressional Districts. The winner of each district received four delegates, and the fifth delegate in each district went to the statewide winner.

Due to Wisconsin's open primary system there is no official party affiliation registration. It is very fortunate for this thesis that the Democrats were granted their open primary in 1976 since a caucus would not have been indicative of voter sentiment in the state.

**Primary Elections Vs. General Elections**

Primary elections and general elections reveal different things about the mood of the electorate. The spectrum, or range, of political sentiment among the voters is illustrated in a primary election. General elections, however, reveal the voters' choice based on the reality that one of the two or three men running will be governing the country. Individual elections must be studied to determine whether or not votes for a particular candidate are "serious," "spoiler," or simply the "lesser-of-the-two-evils." Another difference between general elections and primaries is that far more people vote in the general elections; those who voted in the primaries also usually voted in the general election. Ranney (1972) found that in the 1968 presidential primary, 49% of the eligible voters voted in the presidential primary, while 69% participated in the presidential general election. This is a difference of 20%.

The beginning of the modern era of presidential nominations is cited as 1936; this was the first year of the fifty percent rule for both parties for a nomination, and the first election to have the
benefit of public opinion polls. Presidential nominations are often more important than presidential elections, as a lesson from 1972. The primaries and conventions become important when no candidate emerges before this with the consensus of the party. Whether a party is in or out of power has more effect than whether it has a Democratic or a Republican label. Yet, to pragmatic politicians, there is no sharp distinction between candidacy and performance in office; only good candidates ever have the chance to be a good president (Polsby and Wildavsky, 1976; Keech and Matthews, 1976).

What contributes to the unpopularity of candidates is sometimes easier to analyze than what makes them loved. The media shapes the public impressions of who is ahead and behind. This has a definite effect on fundraising. The truly influential press is restricted to the political writers and papers; these experts, in turn, influence the other media. Who or what the press decides to cover is often more influential than what is said. Poll standings, which are often reported in the media, are an indication to the conventions of a candidate's popularity (Polsby and Wildavsky, 1976; Keech and Matthews, 1976).

The impact of primary elections on presidential nominations has been variously interpreted. Keech and Matthews' (1976:114) study found that the primary election usually serves either to reinforce existent voter views of the leading candidate, or produces results so mixed as to render the impact slight on the competition. Since 1936 candidates who were viewed as front runners prior to the primary balloting almost always won their parties' nomination. Muskie's failure to win the
Democratic nomination in 1972 was an exception to this.

Primaries, however, can enhance or detract from a candidate's momentum since they are evaluated in terms of expectations. In 1952, Truman's withdrawal was at least partly influenced by Kefauver's win in New Hampshire. The presidential election year of 1968 is another year where primaries had an effect; a Harris poll shows that Johnson's pullout induced Kennedy to run. McCarthy's good showing in New Hampshire could have been the deciding factor for Johnson. "A primary can have a multiplier effect far beyond the borders of the state in which it takes place" (Keech and Matthews, 1975:111). Massive publicity makes it possible for a little known candidate to become a national figure. Jimmy Carter, in 1976, is an example of this.

To a candidate who is a front runner at the beginning, the primaries do not alter his status. When the situation is confused, the primaries don't bring about the emergence of a leader. The order of the primaries does have an interesting effect; the primaries sweep from generally eastern, small primarily rural states, through the middle-sized states to states such as New York and California. New York, California, and Ohio are heavily populated post-industrial states. Scammon and Wattenberg (1970) explain that a candidate must win Quadcali: these are the sixteen key states. The large primaries, in terms of electoral votes, at the end gives a candidate a chance to overcome early defeat. A candidate at the front, at the beginning, however, usually stays on top (Keech and Matthews, 1976).
Crossover Voting

Several theories exist about the significance of "crossover" voting. Voters may be motivated by a lack of action in their own party's primary, by the desire to "spoil" the other party's primary through supporting a weak candidate, or by voting for the candidate they consider most capable.

Voters looking for the "action" often vote in the "other" party's presidential primary elections if it is more contested than their own. Usually presidential primary elections where an incumbent president is seeking renomination are less important than the primary of the party where no incumbent is running. This is due to the fact that an incumbent president is rarely denied the nomination of his party. Voters, therefore, who identify with the party in which an incumbent president is running are encouraged to "go where the action is." This explanation of crossover voting does not reveal the actual voter preference for president.

"Spoiler" and protest voting is often hard to discover. Voters may cross party lines in order to help nominate the weakest candidate of that party, since he would be most easily defeated in the general election. Protest voting occurs when individuals support a candidate's stand on particular issues, but may not really want this person as the president. Neither of these two explanations of crossover voting behavior really expresses the presidential choice of those so motivated.

Voters most often cross party lines to help the candidate they consider to be best qualified to be president. Ranny's (1972) study concludes that in 1968 Wisconsin voters did in fact vote for the
candidate they considered best. Yankelovich's (Legislative Reference Bureau, 1975) study, contracted by the New York Times, found that most voters crossing over were supporting the candidate they considered most qualified. Additionally in 1976, there is evidence to suggest that voters were voting for the candidate of their choice (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 7, 1976; sex. 1:1. "Narrow Victory. . .").

Representativeness of the voting population is dependent upon voting in accordance with their political sentiments. Once this condition is fulfilled, the voting outcome is representative of aggregates of voters, if sufficient information is obtainable (Ranney, 1972; Legislative Reference Bureau, 1975; Meier, 1976; Epstein, 1958).

Completing the statement of the problem, the discussion to follow is divided into four parts. Chapter one introduces the subject of realignment and the questions to be dealt with. Chapters two and three lay the groundwork for analysis; realignment theory is presented, followed by some historical background on the state of Wisconsin. The presidential primaries of 1968, 1972, and 1976 are discussed in detail. The analysis, chapter four, assesses whether or not any realignment occurred in 1976 as evidenced in Wisconsin's national politics. The conclusions and epilogue introduce information after the Wisconsin primary to consider the national picture.
CHAPTER II
REALIGNMENT THEORY

Realignment is a durable change in voting patterns. This change is usually brought about over some emotive issue which polarizes the electorate. A realignment must be distinguished from a temporary shift due to events particular to the election year. Realignment, however, occurs in a particular context of events, issues, conditions, and personalities. The durability of voting alignments is reflected in the party attachments of the voting citizens (Sundquist, 1973).

A political party is constituted by voters and interest groups in coalition. Party identification is held by individuals with a certain amount of permanent or stable attachment as distinct from temporary shifts due to transitory events. Attachment to a political party usually develops over time, and is contributed to by any number of socio-political variables, such as: region, income, race or ethnic group, age, family party attachment, occupation, personality, etc. (Lipset, 1966:184-229.)

In the context of the presidential elections and presidential primaries the effects of the national political party structure have been felt at the state level. For example, a "critical" realignment is evidenced quickly on all levels of government. This is better illustrated through historical discussion of realignment theory and the political system (Burnham, 1970; Broder, 1971).

Political parties in America have had a peculiar status and history. Political parties are not part of the U.S. written
constitution; in fact, the Founding Fathers were determined to avoid their creation. Parties, however, came into being within the first decade of the existence of the United States. Not only do the parties offer differing platforms and candidates for election, but they also function as the means by which American society has coped with social system problems. Thus, political parties fulfill a need.

Their very durability argues that they [political parties] fill a need. That need is for some institution that will sort out, weigh, and to the extent possible, reconcile the myriad conflicting needs and demands of individuals, groups, interests, communities, and regions in this diverse continental Republic; organize them for the contest for public office; and then serve as a link between the constituencies and the men chosen to govern (Broder, 1971:xx-xxi).

When political parties meet this need well, they serve both a "unifying and a clarifying function" for the country. However, the malfunction of the political party system can cause serious problems for the country. The coming of the Civil War was marked by a "failure of the reconciling function of the existing parties" (Broder, 1971:xxi). "Long periods of stagnation, too, can be caused by the failure of the parties to bring emerging public questions to the point of electoral decision" (Broder, 1971:xxi).

The differentiating characteristic of democratic orders consists in the expression of effective choice by the mass of the people in elections. Elections in a democratic society, as broadly defined, differ in their nature, their meaning, and their consequences. "Even within a single nation the reality of election differs greatly from time to time" (Key, 1955:3). Behavior antecedent to voting in an election includes differences in the proportion of the electorate
psychologically involved, in the intensity of attitudes associated with campaign cleavages, in the nature of expectations about the consequences of the voting, in the impact of objective events relevant to individual political choice, in individual sense of effective connection with community decision and in other ways (Key, 1955).

"...what characteristics of an electorate or what conditions permit sharp and decisive changes in the power structure from time to time? Such directions of speculation are suggested by a single criterion for the differentiation of elections. Further development of an electoral typology would probably point to useful speculation in a variety of directions" (Key, 1955:18). Key (1955; 1959) has been extremely influential in the development of election typologies, and suggests a systematic comparative approach focusing on the variations in the nature of elections.

Four different kinds of elections can be discussed using distinctions suggested by Key (1955; 1959), Burnham (1970), and others. These types of elections will be termed "maintaining," "deviating," "converting," and "realigning" elections. A "maintaining" election is "one in which the pattern of partisan attachment prevailing in the preceding period persists and is the primary influence on forces governing the voter" (Gelb and Palley, 1975:130). Examples of maintaining elections include the 1948, 1960, and 1964 elections when the dominant Democrats maintained their control of the White House. However, under certain conditions, a maintaining election can lead to stagnation if certain social system problems are not being taken care of. The "realigning" election is the polar opposite of the "maintaining"
Every election sees some change in the distribution of vote between parties because of transitory factors. If the voter crosses the party line only as a temporary matter, then he is not realigning, he is merely "deviating." Groups of voters doing this might result in a "deviating" election. An example of this is Eisenhower's election in 1952. Eisenhower, however, was elected on the basis of his personal popularity, not the commitment of the electorate to his party. "It is when the political norm itself changes that realignment occurs" (Sundquist, 1973:6). The concept applies to what underlies voting behavior and to its manifestations over several elections. Underlying voting behavior are the basic party attachments of the voting citizens.

Another type of election discussed is the "converting" election. A converting election has taken place when the dominant party is returned to power by a different voter coalition. An example was the Van Buren election in 1836 when the Democrats were returned to power on the basis of a new voter cleavage (Burnham, 1970; Pomper, 1964; Sundquist, 1973).

One of the ways political parties maintain the vital function of offering the voters in society a choice is through realignments, signaled by what is termed a "realigning" election. The possibility of realignment usually exists in conjunction with a moral issue of emotive appeal and particular types of conditions. When the party system cannot cope with a particular issue, realignment can result. "A realignment is a durable change in patterns of political behavior"
The concept of realignment has been variously defined. Sundquist (1973:6) defines realignments as arising from "organic" change. Organic change redraws the line of party cleavage which divides the electorate and is crucial to an analysis of realignment.

...the question of organic change in the party system is so basic to any analysis of realignment that it is of prime importance to find a terminology that distinguishes between shifts in relative party strength that arise from organic change and those that are independent of it. For that reason, I propose to identify as realignments only the former. The term will encompass both the "critical" and the "secular" events arising from the same realigning force. Changes in relative party strength occurring without organic change will be referred to simply as shifts in the party balance (Sundquist, 1973:9).

Two types of "non-organic" change where the line dividing the electorate remains fixed are demographic change, such as the addition of women, Blacks, or youth, to the voting population, or individual conversion.

Sundquist (1973:9) refers to Key's (1955) distinction between "critical" and "secular" realignments. Prior to Key's (1955; 1959) formulations of "critical" elections and "secular" realignments, conceptions of the party system characteristically did not include a time dimension. Change is divided between "critical" and "secular" according to the pace of change. It is generally agreed that there have been five major realignments in American history: 1800, 1828, 1860, 1896, and 1932. Each of these last three realignments was signaled by a critical election; a realigning, or critical election, is usually brought about by a social or economic crisis. "Critical" realignments arise ... out of increasingly visible social maladjustments" (Burnham, 1970:135); these, in turn, are the product of dynamic
transformations in a quite separately developing socioeconomic sphere. Such transformations include the emergence of unevenly distributed social costs. Some sectors of society are injured or threatened with injury far more directly than others, and eventually the pressure upon them "produces stress which makes them particularly available for political mobilization by third parties" or for subsequent massive shifts from one major party's following to the other's (Burnham, 1970: 135).

These social maladjustments that can lead to realignments are similar to those which lead to Revolutions. Realignments have been termed mini-revolutions (Youngquist, 1976): some of the conditions requisite for revolution are present in realignment periods at a slightly lower order of intensity. Brinton (1965:250-264) delineates some uniform conditions in four societies before revolution. All societies under study were improving economically before the revolution came; the origins of revolution were not from the crushed and downtrodden, but rather from the discontented and not "unprosperous." Bitter class antagonisms existed in a more complicated form than simple Marxism would account for. "Revolutions seem more likely when social classes are fairly close together than when they are far apart" (Brinton, 1965:250).

The "transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals" is one of the most reliable symptoms. This is partly due to the state of the government in such a society. "The governmental machinery is clearly inefficient, partly because new conditions -- in the societies we have studied ... laid an intolerable strain on governmental machinery adapted
to simpler, more primitive conditions" (Brinton, 1965:251). Finally, many individuals of the old ruling class come to distrust themselves, lose faith in the traditions of their class, grow intellectual, humanitarian, or go over to the attacking groups (Brinton, 1965:251). "At any rate, the ruling class becomes politically inept" (Brinton, 1965:251). Perhaps the reason that the United States has not had a revolution in the Marxian sense is due to the phenomena of realignments which relieve the social and political tension.

Signs of realignment can be distinguished by certain combinations of events, conditions and issues. Sundquist (1973:28-29) suggests five variables that "determine when, in what form, and on what scale a realignment takes place." They are: "the breadth and depth of the underlying grievance, the capacity of the proposed remedy to provoke resistance, the motivation and capacity of party leadership, the division of the polar forces between the parties, and the strength of the ties that bind voters to the existing parties" (Sundquist, 1973:29).

For an issue to bring about a new party alignment, it must arise from a grievance that a large number of people feel strongly about. The duration of the grievance affects its impact: "The strength of an issue varies with the extent to which people look to government to redress the grievance" (Sundquist, 1973:29). The force for change will not result in a realignment unless there is resistance to the issue or the solution to the grievance. Leaders, however, play an important role in determining whether or not change takes place, and what kind. "The historic realignments of the American party system occurred because the leaders either did not try to mediate and compromise
the issue or tried and failed" (Sundquist, 1973:31).

A "grievance" will not resolve itself in realignment unless certain conditions exist among the parties and among the voters. An issue must polarize the parties in such a way that the force at one pole is greater than the other. The party attachments of the voters are important on two levels: the individual and the group. The individual may develop a stronger party attachment in a realignment period; group(s') ties may be strengthened or weakened, thus, affecting the party alignment (Sundquist, 1973).

Two realignments of the past, signaled by critical elections in the 1850's and 1890's, can be examined. Each of these critical realignments grew out of definite unrest and the buildup of unsolved problems.

In 1854, Senator Stephen A. Douglas promoted a bill to organize the territories of Kansas and Nebraska, and in so doing to "abrogate the provisions of the Missouri Compromise of 1820 that had excluded slavery from those territories" (Sundquist, 1973:63). Douglas proposed "popular sovereignty" to these territories. This increased the dissent of both Northerners and Southerners who saw their beliefs threatened. Slavery and states' rights were issues with moral overtones which became emotively charged. Ties between Northern and Southern Whigs were severed. This left the way open for the formation of a new party.

Ripon, Wisconsin, in 1854, is credited as being the first place that the anti-Nebraska meetings led to the formation of a new party, the Republicans. Republicans were composed of Whigs, Free Soilers, and Democrats. From this point on the strength of the Republicans
grew, as sentiment against the Democrats and Nebraska Act increased in the North. This polarization finally resulted in a Republican president, Lincoln, in 1860. Succession by the South, and the Civil War followed. This realignment resulted in the replacement of the Whigs by the Republicans.

In the 1890's, the Democratic party was polarized. The main emotive issue became free silver and currency expansion by the government; decades of agrarian unrest surfaced. The Democratic party nominated Bryan in 1896; he appealed to the "toiling masses" -- farmers and urban workingmen -- to offset some of the Democratic support he lost. Despite economic problems, Bryan failed to win labor, and, therefore, the election of 1896. McKinley and the GOP were chosen. The realignment of the 1890's followed the pattern of absolution of a third party by one of the major parties. The Democrats attempted to co-opt the agrarian reform movements. Despite the heat of the election of 1896, Sundquist (1973:153) asserts that the new line of voter cleavage did not supplant the old Civil War alignment.

"In a realigning election, popular feeling associated with politics becomes sufficiently intense so that the basis partisan commitments of a portion of the electorate change. A new party becomes dominant as movements take place in both directions" (Gelb and Palley, 1975:130). Key identified two "critical" elections, each associated with a national crisis. In 1896, a new division between parties appeared and many voters shifted to the Republican party, following the economic difficulties of the early 1890's. "The Democratic defeat was so demoralizing and so thorough that the party
could make little headway in re-grouping until 1916" (Key, 1955:11). In 1932, as a result of the Depression, large numbers of low-income people were converted to the Democratic party.

The New Deal realignment differed from its predecessors. Earlier critical realignments had two impressive characteristics; they occurred with extreme rapidity once the process of realignment actually got underway, and they tended to affect electoral politics at all levels within the system more or less simultaneously. The realignment patterns of the 1850's and 1890's can be compared with the critical election associated with the 1929 Depression and the New Deal. The 1929 realignment, Great Depression, and the New Deal, had a "muddier" pattern of electoral readjustment than did the former realignments. The earlier realignments had the impression of "crispness," considering both state and national elections (Burnham, 1970; Sundquist, 1973).

The party processes can be interpreted differently "if one supposes the existence of processes of long-term, or secular, shifts in party attachments among voters" (Key, 1959:198). "Events and communications of political import play upon the electorate continuously; election returns merely record periodic readings of the relative magnitudes of streams of attitudes that are undergoing steady expansion or contradiction" (Key, 1959:198). Analytical effort, starting with a non-historical conception of the party system tends to focus upon such discrete events as campaigns and elections. This static reasoning considers the partisan balance of power, and its shifts, to be "the product of the issues of the moment or of the artful strokes of skillful campaigners" (Key, 1959:198). The fate of the parties,
however, may also be a consequence of trends that persist over decades where elections mark the progression of new loyalties, or the disintegration of old loyalties. "Only events with widespread and powerful impact or issues touching deep emotions produce abrupt changes" (Key, 1959:198). Yet there are forces which work over time to form new party alignments and to build new party groupings. "A variety of factors operate over time either to solidify the group or to erode the ties that unite it politically. How long such a trend should persist to fall within the definition may be left inexact, but a movement that extends over a half century is a more persuasive indication of the existence of the phenomenon in mind than is one that lasts less than a decade" (Key, 1959:199).

Ascertaining the existence, the form, and the duration of "secular" partisan realignments is not readily accomplished. The usually peaceful transfers of power, and the accompanying shifts in public policy can be attributed to the slow rate of movement and the slow build-up of political power. The fact that the U.S. has never had a true revolution of the proletariat in the Marxian sense might be due in part specifically to what Key (1959) terms secular realignment; change is gradual.

The slow build up of the political strength of rising groups, e.g., industrial labor, permits some accommodation by all concerned to the new order before it arrives.... The outs have not usually had to convert a substantial sector of the population to their philosophy to gain power; they have had simply to maneuver into position to exploit a growing stream of sentiment or interest (Key, 1959:209).

If Key's (1959) analysis is correct, changes of a secular nature
affecting major segments of American society are now in process and will, in due time, affect the party system. "The identification and projection of those trends may be a major undertaking..." (Key, 1959: 209).

Although a critical election occurs in just one year, it may be viewed most accurately within a "secular," or long-term realigning period. "The changes leading to the realignment are based more on ideology, polarization, and class than the other types of elections discussed" (Gelb and Palley, 1975:132). Burnham (1970:7-8) has suggested that in a realigning period, an ideological polarization occurs within and between the major parties, and there is an increase in voter participation due to frustration and discontent. In the past, critical elections have been short-lived intense disruptions of traditional voting patterns, signaled by third party revolts and stresses in the socioeconomic system. Party realignment is essential, according to Burnham (1970:132), because it acts as a catalyst for systemic change, permitting the government to respond to mass political demands and to redefine the agenda and the processes of American politics.

Realignment is one possibility for change within the political system. Sundquist (1973) has illustrated several possible outcomes dependent upon the positions of the two major political parties in response to an issue of moral content in a hypothetical society. These outcomes all have one thing in common; they all remain within the present political party system.

In this hypothetical agrarian society, one member proposes to
open a saloon; five outcomes are suggested. This society is cut off from all outside influences, and its citizens engage in a democratic form of government. In almost every respect, except sex, these community members are equal; they own land equal in size and fertility, and are equal in all aspects that social and political analysts have found significant in differentiating people (age, religion, ethnic background, wealth, education, family size, etc.). In addition, all members of this new community are without previous political affiliation or identification (Sundquist, 1973).

By the time the first season's crops have been gathered, one member proposes that a tax be levied on each settler to build an irrigation system, and thus increase the agricultural yields. This would involve some monetary sacrifice in the short run in order to improve their income at some future time.

The community is split; some see this proposal as greatly beneficial to the entire community, while others see it as courting disaster. The community is now differentiated. Other issues arise, and patterns emerge on how each group would deal with each issue. One group is in favor of the irrigation system and other community improvements; they call themselves the Progressive party. Their opponents, the Conservatives, oppose all suggested community improvements. Although in actuality, members of the community form several different combinations based on the number of issues existent at any one time, the discussion is simplified for purposes of analysis. Independents, also, exist who refuse to identify with either party (Sundquist, 1973).

The parties alternate in power. "Whenever the Progressives
overreach themselves and the tax burden becomes too onerous, the Conservatives are voted in" (Sundquist, 1973:13). However, when the voters conclude that the Conservatives are not improving public services, etc., fast enough, the Progressives are voted in again. At each election a few voters deviate and support the opposition while not really giving up their psychological attachment to their original party. "Initially the parties are evenly matched in terms of party identifiers, and the volume and direction of the new deviation and the majority support of the independents determines the election outcome" (Sundquist, 1973:13). Gradually, the Progressives become the party in power. Whenever the Progressive party carries its policies too far, or is involved in patronage scandals, etc., the Conservatives are able to win elections.

The difference between the Conservatives and the Progressives is more than the sum of their differences on specific issues. Each party has a fundamentally different conception of what is best for society. The Progressives are willing to take risks to bring about the greater good of the society, stemming from their activist set of attitudes toward the role of government. Conservatives, however, are tied together by a common concern for the consequences of risks the Progressives would take, and suspect that the new society will not be enough better than the old to be worth the cost.

Now, a rather different issue comes along which adds a new "moral" dimension to the community's political dispute. "One of the settlers, tired of farming and not identified with either party, proposes to open a saloon at the town's main crossroads. This cleaves the community
on wholly different lines.... The stage is now set for a realignment of the party system" (Sundquist, 1973:14).

Three blocks form within each party. A block at each pole of each party is trying to commit the party to a stand for or against the saloon, while a block of centrists is trying to compromise or evade the issue in an effort to hold the party together. Instead of subsiding, the saloon issue is gaining momentum, and causing older traditional issues to fade.

Five outcomes to this conflict can be delineated. Each outcome depends on the resolution of the struggle for power within each of the major parties. Four of the possible outcomes are within the framework of the two party system: "A realignment can be averted or a realignment can occur in which either one or both of the old parties is replaced. A sequence of events that would lead to each outcome is sketched below in scenario form. Two scenarios (two and three) are offered for the second outcome -- realignment of the two existing parties" (Sundquist, 1973:16).

Scenario 1

No major realignment takes place in the outcome of scenario one. The Conservative party, which is in power at the time, is debating the saloon issue. The Progressive party devises a new pro-saloon platform. The primary voting reveals a clear mandate; the saloon is coming, the question is when. "When the Progressives again force the issue to a vote, enough members of the Conservative majority defect to give the pro-saloon wing its victory" (Sundquist, 1973:17). The ground is
broken for the new saloon, and the issue is resolved.

With this issue out of the way, the old traditional questions of tax and spending policy are again relevant. The old line of party cleavage reappears; the factions active on the saloon issue remain, however, and cause some strained relations within each party. This strain gradually fades.

Major realignment was avoided; however, some realignment on a minor scale occurred because the parties accepted the saloon issue at different times. The Progressives become pro-saloon before the Conservatives (Sundquist, 1973).

Scenario II

The second hypothetical alternative to the saloon issue is a realignment of the two existing parties. The Progressive party is pro-saloon. The Conservatives, however, have gone in the opposite direction and have become the opposition in the saloon issue.

Within each party there still remains a faction who disagree with the party's stand on this new issue, while still siding with the party on the old issues. In the election, these voters are under pressure; consequently, some switch and vote for the opposite party, and some do not. Others within each party refuse to vote, or declare themselves independents. There is a new line of party cleavage; within each party dissent remains but each party again moderates with time. The realignment of the 1930's follows this pattern (Sundquist, 1973).
Scenario III

Scenario three results in the realignment of the existing parties through the absorption of a third party. The Conservatives, as in the preceding scenario, reject the saloon appeal. Progressives take no action, and so contribute to the rise of the Liberal party. With the successful formation of the Liberal party and the defection of leaders, etc., however, the Progressives are threatened; they either must yield on the saloon issue or their strength will be drained away by the new Liberal party. Enough Progressives endorse the saloon issue with the result that, at the convention, the Liberals find their one-issue platform co-opted. The third party lingers for a while, and then fades out. Some of the former Conservatives who had joined the Liberal party returned to the Conservatives rather than joining their traditional enemy, although for some former conservatives, the Liberal party turned out to have been a convenient halfway house for Conservative-to-Progressive switchers. More Progressives switch than did in scenario three, out of resentment at the "capture" of their party by radical Liberals. But the structure of the system is the same. Within each party two blocs of dissenters can be identified, as before (Sundquist, 1973:21). The realignment of 1896 follows the pattern of scenario three.

Scenario IV

Scenario four ends with realignment through the replacement of one major party. The Liberal party begins rapid growth causing some of the younger progressives from pro-saloon districts to become alarmed.
The saloon issue cannot be mediated. A saloon is either built, or it is not built. The Pro-saloon progressives realize that their party is decrepit, and a move is made to make a new party that will opt all the pro-saloon forces of the community: Progressives, Liberals, and pro-saloon Conservatives. The new party is called the Action party, and is organized throughout the community. Since the Action party is made up largely by former progressives, it adopts the old progressive ideology on tax spending issues with some modification.

A variant of the above scenario could occur with the pro-saloon Progressives and "dissident" Conservatives joining the Liberal party rather than form a new one. Regardless of the variant, the Progressive party would have still been replaced as one of the major parties. The realignment of the 1850's followed the pattern of scenario four (Sundquist, 1973).

**Scenario V**

Outcome number five hypothesizes realignment through the replacement of both old parties. Instead of trying to avoid the issue, as in scenario four, the Progressive party joins the Conservatives in resistance to the saloon. The most adamant saloon advocates of both parties desert to join the Liberal party. The only alternative left the Progressives and Conservatives is to compromise between themselves to retain any power whatsoever. Control is narrowly maintained. The two parties have a joint committee work out a plan of union. Thus, the cleavage leaves the Liberal party and the Prohibition party.

The old ideological line of cleavage between Progressives and
Conservatives is visible. For a while, the moral issue remains uppermost. On moral issues, the new parties are united; on issues of taxation and spending, party cohesion breaks down and Liberals and Prohibitionists of progressive sentiments cooperate, as do Conservatives of both parties (Sundquist, 1973).

**Alternatives to Realignment**

Realignments have traditionally altered the balance of power between the two major parties in the United States, and have functioned to aid the alliance between the political party system and the government. This is important since an avowed purpose of the political party system is to represent the "people" in the government. It is generally agreed that the political party system in the U.S. is now at an impasse. Burnham (1970) and Sundquist (1973) are of the opinion that "...we are simply in the wrong stage of the political cycle to expect anything but confused and weak responses from the parties" (Broder, 1972:xxiv). Past "critical" realignments have been fixed at approximately twenty-eight to thirty-six year intervals; many observers thought of 1964 as the beginning of a realigning or converting period. No "critical" realignment took place in that one election, in 1968, or in 1972 (Broder, 1972; Sundquist, 1973; Burnham, 1970; Gelb and Palley, 1975).

The possibility of imminent change in the party system has been, and is, debated. Presently, party government is on the decline. "The reason we have suffered governmental stalemate is that we have not used the one instrument available to us for disciplining government to meet out needs. That instrument is the political party" (Broder, 1971:xx).
The governmental system is not working because the political parties are not working. This weakening of the parties has been due to their failure to adapt to social and technological changes taking place in the United States. One of the most severe blows to the party system is simple neglect; neglect by presidents, officials, and voters. The level of political frustration in the U.S. is high; the U.S. is in trouble due to the present impasse of government.

I do not think that we can just assume that people will bide their time and wait for relief to arrive from some new party, or some rearrangement of constituents between the Democrats and Republicans. There is a clear danger that frustrations will find expression in a political "solution" that sacrifices democratic freedom for a degree of relief from the almost unbearable tensions and strains of today's metropolitan centers (Broder, 1971:xxiv).

If we are in a realigning period, it is likely to be a "protracted" one. "Significant forces: ticket splitting, the rise of 'Independence,' continuous vote switching, the emergence of a new political 'generation,' the expression of discontent through a potent third party, and the presence of potentially polarizing political issues would all seem to augur the emergence of a 'sixth' party system" (Gelb and Palley, 1975:163-164). Key groups in society such as southerners, youth, "ethnics," and labor, have expressed dissatisfaction with traditional party loyalties; however, the new issues that have arisen have not created a major partisan crisis. They have not reinforced the existing party system either.

One alternative to resolution of such a potential crisis (new issues arising) is the strengthening of the political party system. "Alternatively, ... party systems weakened by the passage of time can
be reinforced if powerful new issues arise that run along, rather than across, the existing line of party cleavage. In either event, parties become relevant again and new durable party attachments are formed" (Sundquist, 1973:354). It remains to be examined whether either realignment, or the reinforcement of the party system, will stop the present trend toward party decomposition (Sundquist, 1973).

The alternatives may be neither realignment nor a strengthening of the party system. Electoral disaggregation and critical realignment are inversely related to each other; yet symptoms of both are existent in the present time period. "Since at least the mid-1960's increasing evidence has been accumulating that a nationwide critical realignment may be in the making. Yet electoral disaggregation has very obviously undergone immense, almost geometric expansion in precisely the same period" (Burnham, 1970:91). Due to the relation of these two processes to each other, "...electoral disaggregation carried beyond a certain point would, after all, make critical realignment in the classical sense impossible...." (Burnham, 1970:92). This poses an analytical dilemma when the two sets of phenomena are considered together. If realignment were to occur, the present pattern would have its own uniqueness in not being quite like any past pre-critical realignment periods (Burnham, 1970; Broder, 1971; Lowi, 1969).

Crucial components for realignment, however, that would produce America's "sixth party system" may be lacking today. The U.S. party system may be beyond the possibility of critical realignment for two reasons. First, there is a dissolution of party related identification
evidenced by ticket splitting, independence, the decline of machines, etc. "...The party system may have already moved beyond the possibility of critical realignment because of the dissolution of party-related identification and voting choice at the mass base" (Burnham, 1970:197).

Second, there has been the absence of a crystalizing issue, such as a great disaster. The absence of such an issue would result in each future election being dominated by such short term forces as the media, candidate charisma, etc. (Burnham, 1970; McGuinness, 1968).

The influence of the media on America's political system has been debated, but there is no doubt that the media has had an increasing effect on the political process. The media as a short term force on voter opinion has been considered by some (McGuinness, 1968; Burnham, 1970; 90) to contribute to electoral disaggregation. An electorate disaggregated beyond a certain point, would make critical realignment, or "tension management," impossible. Tension management is a requisite for system maintenance. The political party system of the United States is not even geared to take an intermediate range view of socioeconomic transformations and protests before a crucial point is reached; this is the reason for the existence of the phenomenon of critical realignment. The pluralist and dispersed policy structure of the U.S. political party system has every motivation for dealing with problems as they arise and as they are presented by already existent and organized interest groups. In the absence of cohesive majorities, and faced by the complex sequence of policy-making from the initial presentation of political demands to final resolution, "policy makers are constrained both by their consensual liberal-
pluralist ideology and by lack of time to take a short-range view. Thus, demands are dealt with only when they become so intense that it no longer seems safe to defer them any longer" (Burnham, 1970: 136). Managers of parties and organizations are in the position of trying to win elections in the short term through reform that can be incorporated piecemeal.

The contemplation of realignment in this contemporary period requires the identification of "the most important emergent demands on the system arising from change-induced dislocations in the society and the economy" (Burnham, 1970:137). It is important to identify the possible sources of "countermobilization" realigning sequences typically involve waves of mobilization. "A mobilization of protest against the existing structure of politics is followed by a countermobilization of groups hostile to and threatened by these new demands for redefinitions of social allocations through political means" (Burnham, 1970:137).

If political parties were to disappear, the U.S. political system would be radically different. There is a "deep-seated dialectic" operating over the entire history of this country; "...while the socioeconomic system has developed and transformed itself from the beginning with an energy and thrust unparalleled in modern history, the political system from parties to policy institutions has remained astonishingly little transformed in its characteristics and methods of operation" (Burnham, 1970:176).

The decay of the political party as "action intermediary" can be perceived as part of a larger mechanism by which the political
system has preserved its stability under the impact of industrialization and urbanization. Lowi (1969) has pointed out that the response of the system (as a whole) has been in the direction of political disaggregation, especially in domestic politics. A pluralized structure of party articulation has matured in the "welfare/warfare state era of American politics" (Burnham, 1970:186). "This can quite appropriately be regarded as a stable-dominant form of American politics in an era where some central regulation of the economic system has become necessary for minimal political stability, but also where traditional middle-class ideology, as modified somewhat by this constraint, has continued to dominate the political culture" (Burnham, 1970:146). No one is able to predict just exactly where present events are leading. All of the subsystems of society are interrelated, however, so that the fate of one affects all the others.
CHAPTER III

WISCONSIN POLITICAL HISTORY

Classifying states on the basis of their political party system and state government, Fenton (1966) classifies Wisconsin as an "issue-oriented" state, as opposed to a "traditional" state. Traditional states involve political parties that are primarily concerned with obtaining government jobs and privileges. The parties in issue-oriented states, conversely, are conceived to be groups of people "who come together out of some common concern with public policy and a desire to do something about it" (Fenton, 1966:4). For example, the La Follette progressives were a stimulus to Wisconsin issue-oriented party politics. The important distinction between these two types of parties is based on whether or not issues and policy, or jobs, are seen as the means or the end. People in traditional parties are active in politics because they want a job; issues are perceived as tools by which to secure jobs. Programmatic party members, however, are in politics "not for the jobs as such, but because the job is seen as the means of securing the policy goals they regard as desirable" (Fenton, 1966:4).

The history of Wisconsin can provide insights into the reasons behind the political party patterns. Most of the early settlers of Wisconsin were Yankees, from bordering states, or were immigrants from Europe. The reaction of the population during the Civil War was near unanimous support for the Union against the Southern "rebels." "The political result was a virtual one-party system in the three states
(Minnesota, Michigan, and Wisconsin) from the Civil War and until the Great Depression" (Fenton, 1966:6). The one-party character of Wisconsin was strengthened by the tendency of the Scandinavian immigrants to join forces with the Yankees in the Republican party, and the Catholic Germans to join the Democrats. Thus, vigorous two party competition is a fairly recent development in Wisconsin (Fenton, 1966; Epstein, 1958).

This has led some to classify Wisconsin as a "modified-one-party state" (Ranney and Kendall, 1954). In forty-two gubernatorial elections from 1857 through 1940, Wisconsin's Democrats won only four times. After World War II, however, Wisconsin was transformed from a dominantly Republican state into an issue-oriented two-party state. The process by which this change took place represents one of the most interesting passages in the history of American state politics. "Before the Great Depression and World War II, the divisions on economic issues occurred within the Republican party rather than between the two major parties" (Fenton, 1966:44). The division in the Republican party was between the conservative Republicans and the Progressive (La Follette) Republicans. The Progressive Republicans led by Robert La Follette, Sr., dominated the Republican party from 1900 through 1913. The exception to this, of course, was when the Progressive party existed; La Follette carried the state electoral vote in 1924. The Progressive Republican vote in Wisconsin was in large part a vote of protest against "big business" and represented a demand for economic reform. "The vote cast for Progressives came from all elements of the state, but most consistently from Scandinavians and from the Socialist-leaning working
class in Milwaukee" (Fenton, 1966:45).

There are probably two reasons for the development of an issue-oriented vote in Wisconsin. First, the people and land in Wisconsin suffered from exploitation by big business to a degree that was not approached in most states. Second, many settlers in Wisconsin never realized what the frontier promised, whereas the frontiersmen in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois corn belt saw "their most halcyon dreams realized as the corn grew high and the hogs grew fat on their rich land" (Fenton, 1966:45).

After 1874 and until Robert La Follette's election in 1900, railroad and lumber interests of Wisconsin virtually ruled the state; in addition, the same people controlled both interests. Domination of the political parties by these interests was accomplished by money provided for campaigns. "The legislature was intimidated through the press or bought with money and free railroad passes" (Fenton, 1966:46). As a result of their political dominance, the railroads received large land grants from the state government to encourage them to extend their tracks into more areas of the state. In return, they were almost unregulated with respect to rates charged shippers, and were not required to pay much in taxes. The lumber companies received land from both the railroads and the legislatures and stripped the land of its forest cover. Both the lumber companies and the railroads made extensive efforts to sell the deforested lands to prospective settlers in order to maximize their profits. Many who bought "cutover" land in Wisconsin were unable to reap returns from their frontier land, and consequently were bitter toward the corporations which sold them the land. This
bitterness was expressed in their votes (Epstein, 1958; Fenton, 1966: 45; Gara, 1962).

In 1900 La Follette was nominated and elected governor of Wisconsin. "Most important for the history of Wisconsin politics was the fact that they subsequently received a public policy return from their ballots. The La Follette Progressives, unlike reformers and Populists in some other states, translated their political program into public policy" (Fenton, 1966:46). Reforms were made in election laws to lessen the power of the railroad and lumber controlled political bosses. Laws were enacted dealing with civil service, anti-lobbying and corrupt practices. Reform did not stop with economy and efficiency. Instead, it extended to the reform of basic economic problems.

The most important feature of the period for the future of Wisconsin politics was that the people learned that there could be and was a relationship between their vote and their economic and social well-being....the Wisconsin people learned that politics was a means by which they could control their environment (Fenton, 1966:47).

Wisconsin was known as a liberal state during the La Follette period which extended from 1900-1914. Several firsts occurred during this period, the first statewide primary election law, the first complete labor code, the first workman's compensation law, and the first unemployment compensation act in the nation, were all made in Wisconsin (Epstein, 1958; Fenton, 1966).

Many Wisconsin immigrants had learned about class-oriented politics in Europe. German Socialists (in Milwaukee) had turned to government in Germany as a means of securing wage increases and other reforms. There they had not been able to effectively bargain because the class
gap between the worker (union) and the employer (management) was insurmountable at that time in the German culture. The Scandinavians, who settled in northern Wisconsin, had a tradition of class-oriented politics in much the same way (Fenton, 1966; Epstein, 1958).

The Progressives had been trying to reform the Republican party internally since 1900; they split off into a separate Progressive party in 1934. "Over the entire period, 1934-1944, the Progressive vote suffered a secular decline and in 1946 its leaders disbanded the party and recommended to the party rank and file that they return to their Republican home" (Fenton, 1966:48).

McCarthy's defeat of La Follette, Jr., in the 1946 senatorial primary was the last important attempt of Progressives to seize control of the Republican party. The division of the electorate followed traditional patterns, except that McCarthy carried Milwaukee. La Follette's defeat, ironically, is frequently explained by Communists' opposition to him. "The Communist party controlled the Milwaukee and Wisconsin CIO in 1946 and opposed La Follette because of speeches he made which were critical of Stalin" (Fenton, 1966:48; Epstein, 1958; Feuerlicht, 1972).

After 1946 and McCarthy's crusade against the "political left," the more liberal Republican Progressives moved into the Democratic party. This resulted in a viable two-party system for the first time in the state's history. Pre-World War II, the Democratic party in Wisconsin was the most conservative party in the state. In the early New Deal years, however, a "phenomenon of divergence" found its expression in the "Roosevelt Republicans" who supported FDR and the New Deal but maintained their Republican identification and voting
habits in state and local elections. Wisconsin was one of these states which included such voters (Sundquist, 1973).

The historic division between Wisconsin's two major parties was along religious and ethnic lines (Epstein, 1958:36-37). "Consequently, the divisions between the parties had little or no relation to the important economic and other issues which faced Wisconsin's citizens between the Civil War and the Great Depression" (Fenton, 1966:49). The Democratic party was weak in Wisconsin after the Civil War due to the various Union, ethnic, and religious loyalties of Wisconsinites. Competition did occur, however, between factions of the Republican party; some of these factions were aligned along religious and ethnic divisions also. The relatively prosperous and conservative Fox River Valley Germans and the low-income Irish and Eastern European Catholics in the cities were usually united in the Democratic party; high income Yankee Protestants and somewhat less prosperous Scandinavian Protestants were members of the Republican party (Epstein, 1958; Fenton, 1966).

"The period after World War II brought a combination of events which revolutionized the state's political party patterns" (Fenton, 1966:49). Joe McCarthy's victory over La Follette in the 1946 senatorial nomination is associated with the abandonment of the Progressive party. This was their last organized attempt to hold office. The alliance of Democrats and Progressives in Wisconsin was made official in 1949 with the institution of the Democratic Organizing Committee (DOC). The erosion of the Democrat's traditional conservative support from the prosperous Catholic Fox River Valley area has been credited with further promoting the unification of Progressives, Socialists, and liberal
Democrats. The Democratic party, 1936-1942, was a weak third party; this structure was "...easily seized by the DOC and transformed from an aggregation of patronage-hungry conservative politicians into a progressive political force in the tradition of the La Follettes" (Fenton, 1966:41). According to Sundquist (1973:238), 1936-1956 represents a period of deep pro-Republican deviation. "A deviant pattern extending through nine successive biennial elections may seem extraordinary, but that time span is no longer than the period of Democratic decline in state-level voting between the two stages of realignment in the states of the upper Midwest" (Sundquist, 1973:238).

In Wisconsin, the Democratic party needed sufficient time to reconstitute itself so that it could permanently attract the voters who had been converted to the Democratic party in the New Deal era. Once this occurred, there was a greater alignment of the parties on the local and state levels with their national counterparts. This process, however, was not quickly accomplished.

Many changes in party affiliation were induced by the great Depression and World War II in Wisconsin. The Republicans lost a large part of the Scandinavian vote in northwest Wisconsin to Democrats and replaced it with much of the conservative German Catholic vote in the Fox River Valley. The native Protestant voters, however, remained firmly aligned with the Republican party, and the urban Catholic voter continued in the Democratic party. The Democrats, after 1946 and through the 1962 gubernatorial election, received most of their votes (percentage wise) in the northwest Scandinavian counties and in the metropolitan areas surrounding Milwaukee and Madison (Fenton, 1966:53,
As a result, the post-Great Depression and World War II division of the two parties was along ideological, political, economic, and ethnic lines; these were closely related to the issues facing Wisconsin voters. "Religious and ethnic political divisions which were unrelated to twentieth century issues and problems, had little influence on the 1962 two-party divisions" (Fenton, 1966:54). Conservative and relatively prosperous German Catholics and Yankee Protestants tended to belong to the Republican party. Relatively liberal, and in many cases lower-income Scandinavian farmers, the Milwaukee and Madison working class, and the former La Follette Progressives were concentrated in the Democratic party. Most Wisconsin Catholics remained in the Democratic party, however; they were also usually low income eastern Europeans in the cities (Fenton, 1966:54).

Wisconsin's Democratic and Republican parties are headed by extra legal committees. For both parties there is a committee whose members are elected and are essentially part of the state government. In addition, however, for each party there also exists a voluntary committee which constitutes the powerful decision-making and organizational members of the party. The Republican Voluntary Committee, organized in 1925, is the Republican party's governing organization, while, the Democratic Organizing Committee, which appeared in 1949, headed the Democratic party. Currently the Democratic party's voluntary committee is called the Administrative Committee. Both organizations were founded to "...circumvent legislation that the La Follette Progressives enacted for the specific purposes of weakening the
parties" (Fenton, 1966:55). The Progressives, when in power, legislated controls on political party contributions, spending, and organization. Thus, each party has members elected to a Statutory Party. Historically, the Republican party proper was supported financially by the business community. Being rebels within the Republican party, the Progressives benefited by weak party organization. While money to finance a strong party, such as the conservative Republicans, usually came from the business community, the Progressives could work around economic restraints. The Progressives were able to find willing volunteer campaign workers. Limitations on money spent, therefore, worked to the benefit of Progressives (Epstein, 1958; Sorauf, 1954).

The objectives of the 1949 Democratic Organizing Committee went beyond improved campaign and political organization; the DOC wanted to unify the urban New Deal Democrats, the former Milwaukee Socialists, and the Progressive "dissidents." The Democratic party in Wisconsin was fairly successful in accomplishing this goal. By almost universal consent, the most important single person in the building of Wisconsin's Democratic party is considered to be William Proxmire. Proxmire has been, and is, very influential in selling the liberal coalition in the Democratic party to the people of Wisconsin. His win in 1957 was accomplished by this liberal coalition with the important added component of the farm vote. The farm vote has been changeable, reacting to economic squeeze by voting for the party that offers the best solution to its problems. This coalition which aided Proxmire supports Epstein's (1958:53) thesis about the continuation of the progressive tradition in Wisconsin (Fenton, 1966; Dziatkiewicz, 1970; Harris, et al., 1958).
In a consideration of political change in Wisconsin, after World War II and through 1962, it is important to remember that the period begins with a Democratic party which was an uneasy coalition of traditional Democratic elements and the Progressives. During this time period, the Democratic party was a minority party. The voting strength of the Democrats grew gradually until it pulled even with the Republicans in their statewide vote and won the gubernatorial elections of 1958, 1960, and 1962, as well as both U.S. senate seats. Gains in the Democratic party, 1946-1962, were general throughout the state. Reasons for the increase in Democratic voting strength included improved organization, Proxmire's popularity, and Republican factionalism. The most dramatic gains by the Democratic party, 1946-1962 were: the increase in its rural-farm vote, and the continued movement of the Scandinavian and Progressive elements into the Democratic party over the period as a result of disenchantment with the increasingly conservative (economically) Republican party (Epstein, 1958; Fenton, 1966).

In 1964, a somewhat "unpopular" Democratic governor, John Reynolds, was defeated at the same time that Lyndon Johnson and other Democrats were winning landslide victories in Wisconsin. The polarization of liberal and conservative elements continued from that event onward. The Democrats lost most of their conservative German Catholic support and gained the liberal Progressive rural vote. "The end result of this polarization of the Wisconsin electorate was the creation of a two-party, issue-oriented political system in the state" (Fenton, 1966:63; Epstein, 1958; Sundquist, 1973).
1968 Wisconsin Presidential Primaries

Two days before the Wisconsin primary, President Johnson announced that he would pull out of the presidential race. Johnson's name, however, was still on the Wisconsin ballot, along with McCarthy. Kennedy and Humphrey were write-ins. Humphrey had not yet officially announced his intention to run for the Democratic nomination. 1968 was the first presidential primary in Wisconsin in which write-in votes were officially counted. "None of the above" is also an option on the ballot. Nixon, Stassen, Rockefeller, and Reagan were on the Republican presidential primary ballot in Wisconsin.

Johnson's withdrawal from the race caused concern among Nixon supporters about a big crossover of Republican voters to McCarthy. The Democrats were afraid that the anti-Johnson vote for McCarthy would be weakened. Johnson expected to get some votes, but not as many as if he had stayed in the race. The Johnson pullout gave Nixon a much better chance to get a vote that could compare favorably with the Democratic percentages. There was a consensus that Johnson's motivation for pulling out of the race was indeed what he said that it was; he felt that he would have a better chance with peace negotiations if he could prove that he was not politically motivated. James Reston (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 1, 1968; sec. 1:6. "Johnson motivated...") interpreted Johnson's pullout as motivated by the President's feeling of failure to unite the nation. Polls, however, showed Johnson losing badly in the Wisconsin primary. Johnson's withdrawal and efforts at
peace negotiations somewhat changed the nature of the campaign due to
the fact that McCarthy, Nixon, and others had made Vietnam pullout a
campaign platform. All of these developments cast the Wisconsin
Primary...;" Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 1, 1968; sec. 1:5. "US gets...;"

David W. Tarr, of the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, felt
that the immediate benefit of the Johnson pullout would be reaped by
McCarthy. Kennedy, according to Tarr, would ultimately get the Demo­
cratic nomination. This would have raised the fears of Republicans
of a substantial crossover to Kennedy in the presidential election

Despite the fact that there had been concern that Johnson's intent
to withdraw would reduce the voting turnout, primary voting set a
record high. Some were reported to have voted for Johnson as a
sec. 1:13. "LBJ Actions...") did a phone survey of reaction to
Johnson's withdrawal and de-escalation plans; sixty-three out of
one hundred said that Johnson's pullout of the presidency race did not
mean that we were losing in Vietnam. Those telephoned declared them­
selves as to political affiliation and voting; there were twenty-six
Republicans, forty-three Democrats, twenty independents, five others
and five noes. Of those surveyed, McCarthy was favored by 27%, 16%
favored Johnson, 1% favored Humphrey, and 4% favored Kennedy. Those

Weather was good April 2, 1968, the day of the Wisconsin primary. Vote percentages went as follows for the Republican primary: Nixon received 80% of the Republican vote; Reagan received 10%; Stassen received 6%; and Rockefeller received 1.6%. McCarthy received 57% of the vote in the Democratic presidential primary; Johnson received 35%; and Kennedy was a write in for 6%. Wallace received .5% of the vote. It is interesting to note that Johnson received approximately the same percentage of votes in the primary after his pullout, as he had in one previous Wisconsin Poll (Scammon and Wattenberg, 1971; Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 3, 1968; sec. 1:1. "McCarthy...").

Analysis of voting patterns can be made based on available information. Crossover voting is an important indicator of voter sentiment. McCarthy received 33% of the total vote cast, while Nixon received 32% of the total vote. It is reported that some crossover by Republicans took place; however, the degree is difficult to determine. Ranney (1972:33) found that 25.5% of the Republican voters in his sample voted in the Democratic presidential primary; this included 20.9% for McCarthy and 2.3% each for Johnson and Kennedy. This study (Ranney, 1972) also showed 2.0% of the Democrats sampled as voting in the Republican primary. All of these voters were for Nixon.
Traced through Congressional Districts and assessments by political observers, group support for the candidates can be estimated. Johnson's showing in Wisconsin was considered quite respectable. President Johnson carried only the 4th and 5th Congressional Districts, winning eight delegates. The 4th district, where Johnson did the best, is on Milwaukee's south side. The 14th ward, which is in the 4th district, is where Johnson got his strongest vote; this ward has a large Polish Catholic population. Most of the Black population in Milwaukee resides in the 5th Congressional District, although the district is comprised of several groups. The 6th, 7th, and 1st wards are heavily Black and supported Johnson. It appears, then, that Johnson received much of the Black, Ethnic-Polish Catholic vote and some of the labor-worker vote (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 3, 1968; sec. 1:24. "Confusing Omens..."

Eugene McCarthy received the thirty-two delegates as well as the twenty at-large delegates. McCarthy carried only the 3rd and the 15th wards; the 3rd ward is in the 5th Congressional District, and the 15th ward is in the 5th and 9th districts. The 3rd ward, which is largely an academic community, strongly supported McCarthy; this area includes the University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee community. McCarthy carried such affluent Republican suburbs as Wauwatosa, Whitefish Bay, Fox Point, River Hills, Glendale, and Brown Deer. He also carried Bayside, Greendale, Shorewood, and Hales Corners, while Johnson carried Cudahy, Franklin, Greenfield, Oak Creek, St. Francis, South Milwaukee, West Allis and West Milwaukee. These areas that Johnson carried have large populations of blue collar workers and various ethnic groups.
Eugene McCarthy "outpolled" Nixon in the Democratic 2nd, 4th, and 5th Congressional Districts and the 10th district, which was "leaning Democratic." The only Republican Congressional District in which Eugene McCarthy came in ahead of Nixon was in the 8th; McCarthy is an Irish Catholic and the 8th district is heavily Catholic. Nixon was favored over McCarthy in all-Republican suburbs. A crossover existed, however, despite the prediction by Maciver, Nixon's chairman, that crossover is a thing of the past, and apathy is the big problem of 1968. The crossover nowhere approached that of 1964, when Wallace carried affluent Republican Wauwatosa and Brown Deer (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 3, 1968; sec. 1:1. "McCarthy vote...;" Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 1, 1968; sec. 1:1. "Wisconsin..."

Issues of importance in Wisconsin in 1968, as reflected by articles in the Milwaukee Journal included, of course, Vietnam, student unrest, economic problems, racial conflict, and conservation. Student unrest remained; much of it reflected an anti-Vietnam stance. Anti-war sentiment among youth became linked with lifestyle rebellion; this has been referred to as a party of the "social issue." Racial violence was also linked to the "social issue."

Economic issues have some place in every election. Unemployment solutions in Wisconsin in 1968 always favored job-training, instead of just a guaranteed income. The "war on poverty" was still going on. On Thursday, April 3, Martin Luther King, Jr., was killed; this precipitated riots in some major cities. Although violence and tragedy were reflected in the news, so was an incredible mood of idealism, almost as if to say, if all the riots and unrest would only stop,
everything would be all right again (Scammon and Wattenberg, 1971).

The "image" of the candidates interacted with the issues and conditions of Wisconsin in 1968. People talked about the "New Nixon;" this is not the same man who went on the Joe McCarthy-type Communist hunts (or was it?). Nixon tried to appear to be a centrist. Perhaps he was just a pragmatist. It is held by Scammon and Wattenberg (1971) that the person appealing to the center of the ideological and issue scale receives the most votes. There was definitely a lack of strong contest in the Republican party. The Democratic party was where the "action" was in 1968, especially with Johnson out of the race.

Johnson's presidency had consisted of trying to push through fairly liberal "New Deal" type programs. He lost a tremendous amount of favor with the American people through the Vietnam War and the fact that many viewed his programs with distrust. McCarthy appealed to a liberal, antiwar group which included students, and the new technocratic elite. Wallace, an extreme conservative, and a populist in the Southern tradition, was supported by some blue collar workers, on his usual stands against integration, busing, big government, and "pointy-headed intellectuals."

Hubert Humphrey formally announced his candidacy for the Democratic nomination after the Wisconsin primary; labor shifted support from Johnson to Humphrey after the president's pullout (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 4, 1968; sec. 1:14. "Labor's..."

1968 Wisconsin Presidential General Election

A poll done by the American Institute for Political Communication
comparing candidate support in the months of September and October revealed Humphrey gaining in Wisconsin while Nixon and Wallace lost ground slightly. The September-October figures are as follows: Humphrey, 35.6%-47.7%; Nixon, 45.1%-42.2%; Wallace, 10.2%-6%; and undecided or other, 9.1%-4.1%. This study was done to study the effects of various influences on voters during a political campaign. Milwaukee was one of the areas chosen because it closely reflected how the sixty-one largest metropolitan areas voted in 1960 and 1964 (about 44% voted). Interviews were done on the basis of age, ethnic background, religion, and income.

Wisconsin has been an area of Nixon's hard core strength. Glick, director of the study done by the American Institute of Political Communication, claims that in the close race of 1968, three categories are important: undecided, other, and those for Wallace. Between September and October, 41% of Wallace's original supporters shifted; 18% went to Humphrey, and 13.6% went to Nixon. Community leaders interviewed in Milwaukee both in September and October showed 56.6% for Humphrey, 43.5% for Nixon, and none for Wallace. On AIPC surveys, interviewees were asked to rate candidates on certain characteristics: leadership, political philosophy, speaking ability, intelligence, and honesty. In September, Nixon was ahead in all categories except honesty, while in October Humphrey was ahead in all categories. Wallace was a

1In 1964, the Milwaukee metropolitan area gave 63.1% of the total major party vote to Johnson, compared to 63.8% in the largest sixty-one metro areas combined. In 1960, Kennedy received 54.8% of Milwaukee voters compared to 53.5% in the sixty-one urban areas.
poor third in all categories in both months.

Humphrey's candidacy received various reactions in Wisconsin. Maier urged voters to elect Humphrey. McCarthy also supported Humphrey. Humphrey has never quite had the support in Wisconsin that might have been expected from his "neighbor" status. In 1968, Wallace would have drawn votes from either Humphrey or Nixon. Nixon and Wallace were exploiting the all-purpose issue of 1968: law and order. Crime and civil rights had become linked. This was partly due to race riots in major cities, and the reaction by many people that Johnson's integration programs were moving too fast. Louis Harris called 1968 the strangest political year in modern history. Kennedy's assassination in California the night of his victory over McCarthy added to the list of bizarre occurrences (Milwaukee Journal, Nov. 3, 1968; sec. 2:7. "Maier Urges...;"
Milwaukee Journal, Nov. 3, 1968; sec. 5:1. "All Hail...").

Nixon's strength in Wisconsin, once again, revealed itself in the results from the general election. Nixon received 47.9% of the vote, and 44.3% voted for Humphrey. Wallace, running on a third party ticket, the American Independent Party, received 7.6% of the vote (Scammon, 1970:416). Nixon had also carried the state in 1960 over Kennedy. In 1968, Nixon got a fairly strong blue collar vote, while Humphrey got most of the suburbs and the Blacks.

The Republicans had elected majorities in both the state senate and the assembly. The Wisconsin state assembly was comprised of fifty-two

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2 Other vote was 1,338 Socialist Labor; 1,222 Socialist Workers, and 2,342 scattered (Scammon, 1970:424).
Republicans and forty-eight Democrats; the state senate totaled twenty-three Republicans and ten Democrats as of 1968.

1972 Wisconsin Presidential Primary

In 1972, Wisconsin was the last of the early primaries and therefore was crucial in at least one respect; the financiers were to look over the results and make decisions before the next round of primaries. In addition to being the last of the early campaigns, and although significant, no candidate would be able to sew-up the nomination as a result of the Wisconsin Democratic primary. If Muskie had kept up his earlier momentum, he could have secured the Democratic nomination in Wisconsin, but as of April 2, 1972, this was not possible. Traditionally, Wisconsin has been the vanguard of many political movements; everyone in the state believes that the primary tradition is important. Wisconsinites take their voting seriously.

McGovern, not McCarthy, was to carry the Democratic presidential primary in 1972. McCarthy, however, had wanted to mobilize a liberal coalition, starting where he left off in 1968; this was not possible in 1972. He had even considered a third party strategy if there could be no agreement among a McGovern, Lindsay, and Chisholm coalition. McGovern had perhaps the longest campaign in Wisconsin in 1972, starting in January of that year. Proxmire cast an absentee ballot for McGovern, and although he wouldn't endorse him officially, he did not conceal his vote. With twelve Democratic candidates on the ballot, Democrats were hoping for a Republican crossover. The number of candidates in the state made it a kind of "free-for-all."
Mayor Maier added to the "free-for-all" by asking the candidates where they stood on ten issues. The ten issues were: revenue sharing, stopping water pollution, community development, mass transit, welfare reform, universal health insurance, a project to create at least one million public service jobs, elementary and secondary education funded by the federal government to shift some of the cost of schools off the local property tax, law enforcement assistance, and solid waste management and recycling. In their responses to this long list, none of the candidates ever came out against some kind of a program in these areas; the fact that none of the candidates was against these changes does not furnish a realigning issue, or a choice to put to the electorate. McCarthy and Wallace refused to respond to Maier's questions (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 2, 1968; sec. 1: 20. "Candidates Send...;" Sundquist, 1973).

The candidates were, however, making appeals based on stressing certain issues to different groups within the state. Wallace tried to make busing an issue in Wisconsin. Humphrey appealed to rural interests by urging rural growth to keep balance with urban growth and advocated 90% parity for farmers. He tried to portray himself as a fighter for the average man. Due to the Polish ethnics, Muskie was expected to carry Milwaukee's south side. He did not. Muskie support dropped from 39% in January to 23% and finally to 13%. The undecided vote had increased as had the vote for McGovern and Wallace. Support for Humphrey and Lindsay had also dropped according to this poll. Jackson was in accord with Scammon's and Wattenberg's (1970) strategy of centrism; he was trying to appeal to the middle of the

The place of youth in the 1972 election year was debated; Yankelvich (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 4, 1972; "TV Networks..."), in the Times survey said that the radical political involvement with youth reached a peak in 1970 and 1972 was on the decline. Among the young, however, radical life-styles increased. Views on pre-marital sex, tolerance to abortion, the feeling that marriage is obsolete, and the feeling that work will not necessarily pay off, all increased among the young since 1968. Newly enfranchised eighteen to twenty-one year olds were considered by many to be one of the keys to McGovern's campaign. In the general election, however, this group went to Nixon (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 4, 1972; sec. 2:16. "Balance Sheet...").

Six of the candidates appeared on television panels for the purpose of debating the issues for the public. There were two panels: McGovern, Muskie, and Lindsay comprised one; and Humphrey, Jackson, and Wallace appeared on another. Issues relevant to the campaign, however, were not discussed. The political strategy, or circumstance, of not quite addressing the pertinent issues has been often commented upon. "Taking sides in a public dispute automatically alienates large sections of the electorate. If a candidate defines his position on enough issues, eventually he will have eliminated all of his support. To be fair to the candidates, then, is to ignore the
issues" (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 3, 1972; Insight:8-13. "Primary '72").

1.4 million people voted in the Wisconsin primary. Nixon received 97% of the Republican vote; however, only 282,000 voted in the Republican primary. McCloskey and Ashbrook each got 1% of the Republican vote. Nixon won the twenty-eight delegates to the Republican National Convention. Analysis showed a substantial Republican crossover vote into the Democratic primary (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 5, 1972; sec. 1: 1. "It's McGovern..."

In the Democratic primary, McGovern made a very strong showing, winning all but two of the state's nine congressional districts. He had been predicted to win by an AFL-CIO poll. This was McGovern's first big primary win. The Democratic percentages ran as follows: McGovern received 30%, Wallace received 22%, Humphrey 21%, Muskie 10%, Jackson 8%, Lindsay 7%, McCarthy 1%, Chisholm, Yorty, Mink Hartke, and Mills each received less than 1% of the vote. Lindsay decided to drop out, while Muskie stated his intention to continue. Hartke quit and decided to support Humphrey (Barone, 1976:923; Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 5, 1972; sec. 1:1. "It's McGovern...").

McGovern did not win the 5th and 7th congressional districts; one of these two districts is on Milwaukee's north side (5th), and the 7th district is in northern Wisconsin.³ The north side has most of Milwaukee's Black population, and the 7th district is a rural-farm community. Both of these districts which McGovern did poorly in were carried by Humphrey. Apparently Humphrey's appeal to farmers was

³After the 1970 census, Wisconsin had one less Congressional District and the state was redistricted.
convincing, as was his liberalism to Blacks. McGovern had a close call in two districts where Wallace did well. McGovern, interestingly, carried the 8th district which is ordinarily strong Republican territory. In addition, McGovern also won a large victory in Milwaukee County receiving 27.1%. Within the county, Humphrey received 22.2%, Wallace received 18.8%, and Muskie received 13.5%. The 4th district which includes many residents of Polish heritage was also carried by McGovern; Muskie had been expected to win this district due to his Polish heritage. The 3rd district, in which it had been assumed that Humphrey would win also went to McGovern. The 3rd district is in the Western southern part of Wisconsin. This district, occupationally, is about 37% white collar, 33% blue collar, and 15% farm. In addition, there were active student campuses at Eau Claire and LaCrosse (Barone, 1976; Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 5, 1972; sec. 1:1. "It's McGovern...").

The size of the Republican crossover is exemplified by the voting of some normally Republican communities. Whitefish Bay, where the 1968 Republican ratio was approximately two to one, voted two to one in the Democratic primary. In River Hills, the majority of the voters participated in the Democratic primary; Wallace received more votes than any other Democrat. River Hills went five to one for Nixon in 1968. Wauwatosa also voted overwhelmingly in the Democratic primary. In 1968 this suburb voted more than two to one for Nixon. Traditionally Republican communities such as Walworth, Fontanta, Williams Bay, at the West end of Lake Geneva in southern Wisconsin, gave Wallace pluralities. Ranney (1972) found that most voters crossing over do so to support a candidate they consider better. Many voters were
dissatisfied with their party. This could have been a step toward realignment. Humphrey announced that with the Republican crossover vote, there was no indication who the Democrats in Wisconsin really wanted as their nominee.

Scammon said that 50% of the people who identified themselves as Republicans crossed over and voted in the Democratic primary; he further concluded that 60% of Wallace's (22% in the Democratic primary) support was from the Republicans. This crossover was larger than in 1968, when, Ranney reported that 30% of the Republicans voting in the 1968 primary crossed-over and provided 25% of McCarthy's (57% of the Democratic primary) votes. McGovern carried working men and women, the "ethnic vote" including parts of the south side, the farmers, and the upper income bracket. McGovern could have stopped Wallace, Scammon asserted, because they both appealed to the same disaffected voters. In addition, both McGovern and Wallace did not really appeal to Black voters (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 5, 1972; sec. 1:1. "It's McGovern...;" Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 6, 1972. "McGovern won...").

According to the New York Times survey, the Wisconsin Republicans were unhappy with Nixon, especially in the economic sphere. The Republican crossover was estimated at 300,000, or 20% of the total primary vote in 1972. Wallace received 50% (30% of the Democratic primary vote), and McGovern received 25% (30% of the Democratic primary vote) of the Republican crossover vote. This particular survey of voters leaving the polls showed that the votes for Wallace were influenced by his stand on the economy and on crime. The Democrats voting for Wallace were influenced by his stand on the economy and stopping the war. "Stopping the war" was one of McGovern's main
issues, so it was expected that McGovern could stop Wallace, at least in Wisconsin (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 6, 1972; sec. 1:1. "McGovern won...").

McGovern is reported to have won the Wisconsin Democratic primary because "he far surpassed his rivals in articulating the dominant concerns of liberal and conservative voters alike - tax loopholes, high property taxes, inflation and other economic problems" (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 6, 1972; sec. 1:1. "McGovern won..."). This study found that his stance on the Vietnam War won McGovern a strong majority, but it was his stand on the economic issues that gave him his winning margin. "Half or more of the voters interviewed listed six dominant issues; four of them were economic and the other two were ending the war in Vietnam, and reducing crime. Virtually all Democrats and a strong majority of Republicans reported feeling that the Nixon administration's wage and price control program had been a failure (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 6, 1972; sec. 1:1. "McGovern won...").

McGovern appeared to win half of the youth vote, while Wallace received only one-sixth of the youth vote. Wallace attracted most of the voters who called themselves conservatives, and McGovern attracted most of those who called themselves liberals. As might be expected, two-thirds of McGovern's supporters said that they were dissatisfied with the state of the nation while two-thirds of Wallace voters said that they were satisfied. Both McGovern and Wallace supporters expressed strong dissatisfaction with the economy (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 6, 1972; sec. 1:27. "McGovern credited...").
1972 Wisconsin Presidential General Election

In Wisconsin, in 1972, Nixon had his third victory; in 1960 Nixon won over Kennedy, in 1968 he won over Humphrey, and in 1972, he won over McGovern. Nixon's 1972 percentage was 5.5% greater than it had been in 1968. McGovern received 43.7% of the vote and Nixon received 53.4% of the vote. Nixon's gain in 1972 is credited to the Wallace supporters. The American Party candidate, John G. Schmitz, received 2.6% of the vote, as compared to Wallace who received 7.6% in the 1968 general election. 4

A Democrat must have 58%-69% of Milwaukee county vote to carry the state. McGovern carried Milwaukee county, Ashland and Douglas (in the far north), Dane, Jackson, Portage, and Rusk counties. Dane county in 1968 voted 57.8% for Humphrey, and in 1972, 58.2% for McGovern. The University of Wisconsin at Madison students voted 80% for McGovern in 1972. Voters in the Milwaukee metropolitan area supported McGovern in 1972 with 55.7% of the votes and voted 57.8% for Humphrey in 1968. Nixon received 40% of the Milwaukee county suburbs in 1968, and 54.6% in 1972. McGovern received 42.2% of the Milwaukee county suburbs, while Humphrey received 54%. Wallace received 8.6% of the voters in these suburbs in 1968.

Summary

Wisconsin's effective political action did not occur in a vacuum. It required, first, a climate of protest; second, groups which were

4 Other vote in 1972 was 2,701 People's (Spock); 998 Socialist Labor (Fisher); 663 Communist (Hall); 506 Socialist Workers (Reed); 893 Scattered (Scammon, 1973:407).
cohesive and informed, and third, personalities who mobilized the groups and translated their protests into public policy. Wisconsin is a state in which the two parties are extremely competitive. The two major parties tend to take rather sharply divergent positions on issues, and the state government is "...almost painfully honest and has one of the nation's most generous welfare programs, most ambitious conservation programs, and a generally high level of governmental services" (Fenton, 1966:74; Epstein, 1958; Polsby and Wildavsky, 1976).

In Wisconsin, past history and the character of the state's politics has influenced more recent history. The development and existence of voting blocs in the state has been traced; these same blocs figure in the 1968, 1972, and 1976 presidential election years.

As seen in the 1968 and 1972 presidential primaries in Wisconsin, there is no permanent divergence from the New Deal alignment. In 1968 Wallace's third party could have had an impetus toward realignment. No realignment took place in 1968 or 1972; in 1972 and 1976 many of Wallace's anti-Washington and anti-big government issues were co-opted by candidates of both parties.

The political year of 1976 also had the potential for realignment. Events, issues, and candidates will be discussed for 1976 as they were for 1968 and 1972, followed by comparisons. An effort will be made to assess change in the political party system from the voting patterns of these three presidential election years.
Analysis of contemporary political change must begin with a basic understanding of the New Deal and New Deal Politics. The New Deal alignment, as developed under Roosevelt in the 1930's, has been durable; this is surprising for two reasons. Most past realignments have occurred twenty-eight to thirty-six years apart; no realignment occurred in 1964-1968. In the decades since the New Deal, moreover, many changes have taken place in the social, economic, and cultural realms of American society. Since change in each of these areas affects the political system and vice versa, political weathermen have been watching for signs of realignment since 1964. Yet it is a phenomena of critical realignments that change permeates all levels of the political system quickly; the New Deal has been termed "muddy" in this respect. For some states, it has taken years before anything resembling the New Deal alignment emerged.

The New Deal on the national level differs slightly from the New Deal alignment as manifest in Wisconsin. Wisconsin's New Deal alignment has its own unique character influenced by the history and peculiarities of the state.

Possible political change in 1976 will be assessed using the New Deal alignment as the baseline. The presidential years of 1968, and 1972, are contrasted with 1976 to see what political patterns emerge. Focus is on the presidential primaries in Wisconsin in the assessment of political patterns.
There are distinct differences between presidential primaries and presidential general elections. Each type of election is conducive to a different type of analysis. In a primary election a wider range of conditions, issues, and ideological positions are evident than in a general election. General elections face the electorate with the reality that one of these (usually) two people will actually be president; thus, a choice must be pragmatically made based on the limited alternatives.

The primaries will be the focus of analysis for two reasons: the range of candidates reveals important things about the electorate, and more data are available for primaries than for the general elections. An ideological spectrum will be examined comparatively for 1968, 1972, and 1976, based on the New Deal alignment. Groups delineated along such lines as race, ethnicity, occupation, etc., support particular candidates; each candidate occupies a particular position on the ideological continuum within the respective party. In addition, each candidate, through his perceived position on the ideological spectrum, and through his stand on specific issues, draws or fails to draw a particular following. Each aggregate of voters organized around bloc voting lines expresses their mood through the candidate they support.

Analysis will be based on available data for the state of Wisconsin. Although the present situation can be best assessed in the future with the help of a historical perspective, tentative analyses may be made now.
The New Deal

Unlike the realignments of the 1850's and 1890's, the realignment of the 1930's came suddenly. The New Deal realignment was not the "culmination" of protest that had been growing for decades (Sundquist, 1973:183). There were minor realignments in the 1920's, but in the summer and autumn of 1929 "no polar force of significant national dimensions existed" (Sundquist, 1973:183). "The political revolution set in motion later in that year was the product of a single cataclysmic event -- the Great Depression -- which polarized the country. Inevitably, the two parties moved to the opposing poles" (Sundquist, 1973:183).

The polarization of the two parties was not immediate: the stock market was not expected to collapse. Neither party, therefore, had a program ready to reverse the economic slide. "The realignment of the 1930's was precipitated when Hoover placed the Republican party squarely on the side of conservatism as the country polarized. But the form and shape of the realignment were not determined until Franklin Roosevelt placed the Democratic party clearly on the other side" (Sundquist, 1973:184).

Hoover was thought to be a mild progressive when he entered office: in terms of government policy he was considered a "limited interventionist" (Sundquist, 1973:185). It appeared to the populace that Hoover's government was not doing enough to cope with the Depression. At the next presidential election, the nation made a choice for the Democratic party. Roosevelt then solidified the New Deal coalition.

Roosevelt's New Deal coalition was based on class conflict in a
certain sense. Those in the lower economic classes wanted to use the powers of government for the relief of economic hardship and the reform of the economic system in their interests. The class-based rationale for this division of the party system can also be called an activist-conservative line of cleavage. The activists were motivated to alleviate human suffering brought on by the economic conditions, while the conservatives were convinced that the New Deal threatened the basis of the country's laissez-faire economic system and political tradition. The Republican party became the party of the conservatives, while the Democratic party was the major part of the liberal coalition of the New Deal. Many Republican voters switched to the Democratic party, as a result of control of the GOP by militant conservatives; this made the Democratic party the country's majority party for the first time in eighty years. To the present, the Republican party has never recovered the majority position it lost in the realignment of the 1930's (Sundquist, 1973).

Also at issue during the New Deal realignment were policy differences as to the role of government and a struggle between broad class and interest groups for the control of government. Although the party system reflected some degree of class bias nationally before the realignment, the New Deal realignment accentuated such divisions. Tight bonds formed between labor and the Democratic party, and less formal but equally strong bonds formed between the Republican party and business organizations. The New Deal Democratic party was issue-oriented, working-class based, more urban-centered than previously, activist, radical, and devoted to Roosevelt's leadership. Groups
such as Italians, Jews, Poles, and all other new ethnic immigrants of European origin, Blacks, and working-class Democrats of older Anglo-Saxon and German stock began to compete with the Irish for a share of party leadership and recognition. Labor, particularly the industrial union leaders, had a very powerful role in deciding Democratic party policy (Sundquist, 1973).

Some rural areas and major industrial cities were bypassed in the New Deal realignment. Milwaukee and some parts of Wisconsin have been considered as part of this phenomena; "Roosevelt Republicans" voted for the Democratic presidential nominee while continuing to vote Republican for every other state and local office. On the national level, the political base of the northern "Bourbon" Democrats was eroded by the leftward movement of the electorate as a whole. Action-minded Republicans switched to the Democratic party, while most of the remaining conservative Democrats went to the Republican ranks. The demise of the conservative strain of the Democratic party occurred as the realignment of the 1930's took effect. The exception to this, however, was in cases where the realignment was delayed, and the conservative Democrats could hold their political support. In Wisconsin, the Democratic party was conservative, in fact, until much later than the 1930's.

The Republican party, historically, has dominated Wisconsin politics. Prior to 1957, Wisconsin's party system can be variously classified depending on the level of government. In presidential voting, during the 1914-1952 period, Wisconsin displays two party voting patterns; there were five Republican wins, and four Democratic
wins, in addition to the elder La Follette's Progressive Party capture of the state's electoral vote in 1924. In the twenty-one gubernatorial elections of the same period, Republicans won all but four; of these four, one was Democratic and three were Progressive. From 1861 through 1956, Republican governors were elected in forty-two out of forty-nine elections. Additionally, if the 1934-1944 period is considered alone, an unstable three-party pattern is evident in state elections. The three parties were: the Republican, the Progressive and the Democratic (Epstein, 1958; Dziatkiewicz, 1970).

The New Deal coalition in Wisconsin differed from that of the national alignment in several ways. Wisconsin has been influenced by certain peculiarities of historical development, dominance by the Republican parties, and the composition of the state settlers. Part of the national New Deal coalition is the "solid South;" midwestern Wisconsin was settled primarily by foreign immigrants and "northerners" from the Eastern United States. Many midwestern industrialists were part of the Democratic party, whereas nationally, this group has often been Republican. In addition to the old progressives, Wisconsin's Milwaukee Socialists also filtered into the New Deal Democratic party.

During the 1930's, the New Deal alignment existed in Wisconsin only on the level of national politics. Slowly this alignment has become a fact in state and local politics. The strengthening of the Democratic party in Wisconsin has proceeded first from the national alignment base to politics within the state.

Proxmire has influenced the Democratic party in Wisconsin and was instrumental in selling the party to the voters of the state.
Proxmire's win in the 1957 special senatorial election is a significant benchmark in Wisconsin politics. The Republican party in Wisconsin had been the home of the Progressive movement from which much of the New Deal platform was borrowed. More conservative Republicans had retained power in the GOP in Wisconsin, and slowly the old progressive contingent shifted to the Democratic party. The Progressives and Democrats officially merged through the creation of the Democratic Organizing Committee in 1949. For the first decade of the DOC's existence, "issue-oriented" Democrats worked to build the party but were not very successful. The significance of the outcome of the 1957 special election is that Proxmire was the first of these "new" Democrats to win a statewide race.

In the years since Proxmire's win, parties in Wisconsin have gradually become competitive on the state and local level. Since no statewide voting registration exists in Wisconsin, the party's relative strength must be assessed by election patterns. Proxmire still holds one senate seat while, since 1962, Gaylord Nelson has held the other. Prior to 1962, Nelson served as the first Democratic Governor to hold office for two terms.

Democrat John Reynolds followed for one term. After two terms by Republican governor Warren P. Knowles, the Democrats under Patrick Lucey captured the executive mansion again in 1970 for the state's first four-year gubernatorial term. Party control in the state legislature has varied, although for most of the period between 1957 and 1972, the Democrats have controlled the Assembly, and the Republicans the Senate. In 1968, the Congressional delegation of ten was half
Democratic and half Republican; the reduction of one seat after the 1970 census, however, left five Democrats and four Republicans. In presidential elections, the state voted for Nixon in 1960, 1968, and 1972, but for Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964. The influence of the Democratic party in Wisconsin, however, has grown so that in 1974 the Democrats controlled both the Assembly and the Senate. There is speculation as to whether the Republican party in Wisconsin will rebound after hitting its nadir in 1974 (Sundquist, 1973; Epstein, 1958; Fenton, 1966; Burger, 1975; Dziatkiewicz, 1970).

**Ideological Spectrum**

Based on the New Deal, a candidate or leader can be described by a set of coordinates on a two dimensional scale. These two dimensions are: economic liberal or conservative, and moderate or extreme. In order to analyze the range of the political spectrum through candidates as evidenced in the U.S. in recent years, it is necessary to re-examine briefly the origins of this spectrum.

Political and sociological analyses of modern society can be traced back to the days of the first French Republic. The most radical and egalitarian delegates were seated on the left, while the most moderate and aristocratic were seated on the right. The left became identified with the advocation of social reform and egalitarianism and the right became identified with aristocracy and conservatism. Europe became aligned according to the clash between classes. With some variations, Wisconsin settlers of European background brought a tradition of class-oriented politics with them. This is particularly
true of the German, Scandinavian, and Eastern-European immigrants in Wisconsin (Lipset, 1960; Fenton, 1966; Epstein, 1958). In addition to the left to right continuum, another existing dimension of this scale is extremist to moderate. Extremism of the left, right, or center usually ends in a dictatorship. For example, Hitler has been described as an extremist of the center (Lipset, 1960:127-179).

On the dimension of class, New Deal politics were very class-oriented. Politics in 1976 is still within the framework of the New Deal: changes, however, have taken place. In the New Deal alignment of the 1930's, the part of the Democratic party which favored government intervention to solve the economic problems of the nation constituted the liberal pole of the New Deal political spectrum. The liberal democrats were joined by independents and liberal-thinking Republicans. Republicans opposed to the New Deal programs made up the opposite and conservative pole of the spectrum. Conservative Republicans were joined by disgruntled Democrats and independents of a more conservative persuasion. Since the 1930's, however, the entire political spectrum has shifted leftward, or in the liberal direction.

The Republican party, which originally opposed the New Deal in the 1930's, has become much more accepting of government intervention in the economic affairs of this society. For example, social security legislation arose out of the New Deal programs; during the 1930's there was opposition to Social Security. Now, however, no candidate running for president even approximates an anti-social security stance. Although the entire economic intervention spectrum has moved leftward,
differing degrees of advocacy of governmental control still remain. The New Deal spectrum is clarified when applied to recent years when the moderate to extremist dimension is added.

Two candidates may have positions on issues that put them at essentially the same point on the New Deal economic spectrum while differing on the moderate to extremist dimension. For example, in 1976 President Ford and Reagan held fairly similar positions on issues and programs; however, Reagan is more extreme than Ford. Both Ford and Reagan advocate less government involvement than would a liberal Democrat; Reagan is more militant than Ford in his rhetoric and is willing to take more extreme action. Ford's image is that of the compromiser. Thus, a candidate, or leader can be described by the two dimensional scale of liberal or conservative, and extremist or moderate.

This scale, based on the original New Deal coalition, can be instrumental in determining change in the political system. Any deviation off the New Deal dimension, other than the general leftward shift, might be indicative of political realignment.

1968-1972

No realignment occurred in 1968 or in 1972; voting patterns basically concurred with that of the New Deal, modified slightly by the particular election year. Potential for realignment did exist in both years, however, and future historians may date either election year as the beginning of some awakening toward realignment. Ideological centrism was prominent in 1968 and 1972; no realigning deviations from
the New Deal continuum occurred.

The Vietnam situation, the social issue, and Wallace's third party strategy in the general election all could have been impetus for realignment in 1968.

The "social issue" was coined by Scammon and Wattenberg (1971: 20-21) in reference to the 1968 presidential election year. In addition to the older economic issues of the New Deal, voters began to array themselves along different dimensions. This composite issue had as much influence as any traditional issue despite the difficulty with definitions. In 1968, the social issue included such facets as law and order, backlash, antiyouth, malaise, change, and alienation. The pervasive importance of this issue is at least partly attributed to the fact that the average voter is not young -- about forty-seven, not black, and not poor. The politics of the center would win the political battle in the 1968 general election. Harris (Milwaukee Journal, Nov. 3, 1968; editorial sec. 1) calls 1968 a strange political year; law and order and civil rights had become linked. The social issue shifts somewhat throughout later election years.

In 1968 Wallace ran on a third party ticket in the general election. No split occurred in the two major parties because Wallace's issues of anti-Washington, law and order, populism, etc., were co-opted.

By 1972, the economy had worsened, and had become an issue. Nothing cross-cutting the electorate developed however since all solutions suggested were still within the framework of the New Deal alignment, although some of the problems were different.
Socio-political events are complex just as are economic events. No simple linear model would be adequate to explain or predict the workings of the modern political or economic systems; social, cultural, political, and economic systems are interrelated in this society. This is evidenced by the fact that events originally considered economic, for example, effect the social and political aspects of society. Further, power holders in certain other realms can translate their assets into the political realm (Mills, 1956; Burnham, 1970).

In both the political and the economic realm, complex problems have arisen for which solutions which at least partially worked in the past do so no longer (Toffler, 1975; Parsons, 1951). The presidential election year of 1972 became the year when some policy had to be adopted to combat the growing inflation and recession; Nixon's wage and price controls were judged as less than successful. In Wisconsin, state taxes were hotly debated.

Vietnam is linked to the national economic problems of this period; the outflow of money and material was tremendous. The war was still going on. Student unrest had decreased, but resistance to the war in Southeast Asia was increasing among all age groups.

Eighteen year olds received the right to vote in the election year of 1972. Youth involvement in the campaigns, and in the voting booth was somewhat significant, although not a great proportion of the newly enfranchised voters exercised their right. Campus unrest reached a peak in 1970 and was on the decline by 1972, while lifestyle differences increased. In 1972, the social issue could be interpreted as centering around McGovern's three "A's:" acid, amnesty, and
abortion. Law and order was also still a part of this issue. In 1972, realignment was still possible, but the atmosphere had cooled down. Some have felt that if Watergate had not happened and Nixon had not resigned, he might have permanently altered the balance between the two major parties by increasing the electoral base of a Nixon-ized Republican party. With Watergate, any possibility of this disappeared.

In 1968, 1972, and 1976 political events were similar to the climate which led up to the realignments of the 1850's or 1890's. In 1968 and 1972, there has been build-up of agrarian tension, warfare, effective third party movements, almost a depression like the Great Depression, and other devastating crises such as there were in the 1850's, 1890's, or 1930's. Abortive and minor realignments had occurred in the 1920's, but the realignment of the 1930's had not been foreshadowed by tension buildups of decades as had the 1850's and the 1890's. Nixon, in 1972, might have brought about a realignment as a result of consolidation of the Republican party; this was, however, aborted. This makes the questions of realignment in 1976 all the more intriguing.

Wisconsin Primaries 1976

In 1976, Carter, Udall, and Jackson were generally recognized as the main Democratic contenders in Wisconsin. Carter tried to capitalize on his earlier primary victories, one of which was in Illinois. Udall put in an all-out effort in Wisconsin. A win in Wisconsin would have been very significant for Udall, who had been campaigning in the state the longest of any of the Democratic candidates. Jackson had put
the bulk of his resources into the New York contest. Wallace, who won 33.8% of the Wisconsin primary vote in 1964, would have liked to do well in this state to bolster his campaign. Also significant was the fact that the relative strengths of Jackson and Udall had not yet been tested in the midwest, nor had there been a Jackson-Carter contest in the midwest. Wisconsin results were watched closely with other important midwestern primaries in Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio yet to come (NBC NEWS/Election Service, 1976:2-4; Milwaukee Journal, Mar. 6, 1976; sec. 1:1; Milwaukee Journal, Mar. 6, 1976; sec. 1:1. "Democrats Relent..." Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 1, 1976; sec. 1:3. "Democrats to..." Milwaukee Journal, Mar. 30, 1976; sec. 1:1. "State Primary..." Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 3, 1976; sec. 1:6. "Udall sees...").

Each of the candidates running in Wisconsin tried to appeal to a particular constituency; an assessment will be made as to how successful they were.

Listed on the Democratic ballot were: Sargent Shriver, George Wallace, Lloyd Bentson, Jimmy Carter, Morris Udall, Fred Harris, Ellen McCormack, Henry Jackson, Birch Bayh, and Milton Shapp. Sargent Shriver, Lloyd Bentsen, Birch Bayh, and Milton Shapp withdrew after the Wisconsin deadline for getting off the ballot.

Fred Harris

Although Harris started early, his campaign was minimal in the state because of a lack of funds; as of March 31, he announced that he would concentrate on the New York primary. He occupied the liberal end of the New Deal economic spectrum spreading a "new populist"
economic message. This perspective also colored his foreign policy stance: International behavior should be on a more moral footing, and foreign affairs should not be conducted for the benefit of corporations. Harris was critical of Kissinger, saw the need to cut the Pentagon budget by 14.7 billion, and wanted bargaining with Russia on the basis of their need for American technology and agricultural products. To Harris, the basic issue in 1976 was privilege; was the American government interested in the average family, or in the super rich and the giant corporations? He proposed to cut governmental spending by abolishing many federal advisory committees, streamlining federal programs, eliminating subsidies for corporate interests, and reducing the White House staff. Also included in Harris' stance was an immediate full employment program that would include recruitment and training. There should also be assistance for hard-pressed city governments through an urban bank. Harris had the most ambitious employment plan. A sharply graduated income tax, regardless of source, and revenue from the massive employment program would result in a balanced budget. One of the effects of massive employment would be a decrease in crime; he favored rehabilitation of offenders, but felt that repeat offenders should be separated from society. Harris favored busing only as a last resort. The League of Conservation Voters gave Harris a good rating. Monopolies were blamed by Harris for the high cost of energy. He also favored a moratorium on nuclear power plant construction. The Supreme Court's stance on abortion was supported by Harris, and he opposed any anti-abortion amendment to the constitution. The welfare system should be
entirely the project of the federal government and eventually should be replaced by a negative income tax. Health care, and a decent income, should be obtainable for all; some would pay and some would receive. It would be the least demeaning system and would require the least machinery to administer (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 4, 1976; sec. 1:3.

"'76 Rivals Rated...;" NBC NEWS/Election Service, 1976:8).

Harris tried to appeal to the liberal element in Wisconsin; this included those in the old progressive and socialist traditions. Groups and issues were similar to those sought by Udall, but more to the left. Labor, students, and the educated were those to whom Harris aimed his campaign.

Morris (Mo) Udall

Morris Udall campaigned as a liberal, and in Wisconsin he appealed to the state's "progressive tradition." On foreign policy, Udall supported detente, but felt that the U.S. had not bargained hard enough on some of the details. Although foreign policy was not currently big in the minds of the American voter, there was some resentment over higher domestic grain prices resulting from exports.

Domestically, on the issue of "big government," Udall considered the voters to be angry about "crooked," "dishonest," "unresponsive," and "wasteful" government; he did not think that the people wanted a smaller federal government. CIA and defense budgets would be reduced. Funding of existing housing and welfare programs was favored, while the elimination of waste was deemed equally necessary. Federal regulatory agencies to protect consumers needed to be strengthened. Along with
Harris, Udall also favored a program to create five million jobs, and to push unemployment below 3% as proposed by the Humphrey-Hawkins bill. The cost of this job program would be balanced by the revenues produced by the new jobs and accompanying "economic revival." If price fixing among industries is going to occur, then it is better for the government to intervene and give the people some control and protection.

Busing is neither encouraged nor opposed by Udall; local leaders and parents should decide how to reduce racial isolation and achieve equal educational opportunity. Five years would be allowed to phase in a program. Udall opposed a constitutional amendment to ban busing. He linked unemployment with high crime rates, as did Harris. Rehabilitation programs should focus on first offenders; if punishment is swift and certain, deterrence would be strengthened. Udall is rated by the League of Conservation voters as outstanding. On abortion, Udall supports the Supreme Court decision (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 4, 1976; sec. 1:3, "'76 Rivals Rated...").

In addition to the groups Harris appealed to, Udall appealed to Blacks, and the Catholic ethnic groups.

Jimmy Carter

Carter appealed to the center. His appeal in past primaries had been recognized to include a broad spectrum of groups and voters. This did not change in Wisconsin; he tried to attract voters of all types and was successful. Carter favored the reduction of nuclear weapons of all nations to zero as a joint foreign policy goal between the
United States and Russia. The U.S. should maintain friendly relations with Russia for this reason. The people should have more of a voice in foreign policy, instead of only having "secretive experts."

Carter believed that the election will "center on voter confidence, and not on whether or not a candidate is associated with liberal or conservative causes" (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 2, 1976; Voters Guide, sec. 5). Honesty in government is stressed by Carter. Carter was not noted for being specific on the changes he would like to see made in American government. Government agencies, however, should be cut from 1,900 to 200 to improve efficiency in Washington. Aid to New York was not the responsibility of the federal government, according to Carter. Although Carter stated reducing unemployment as a key aim, jobs should come from the private sector. The switch from nuclear to solar energy was the only source of new jobs mentioned by Carter. U.S. energy sufficiency was considered impractical or impossible. Public service jobs should only be a last resort. He did not favor a tax cut, but rather a new system that would treat all income the same.

Carter was not clear on his busing views; however, it seems that he was opposed to both mandatory busing and to an anti-busing amendment. The problem should be solved locally. Carter, along with Udall and Harris, linked unemployment with high crime rates. Emphasis should be on the prevention of crime. Welfare costs should be borne by both the federal and state governments; welfare cheaters should be stopped. Comprehensive, mandatory health insurance, possibly in conjunction with private companies, was advocated. Although Carter did not favor an amendment to the constitution against abortion, he felt that it was
wrong, and that the federal government should do everything possible to minimize the practice. Carter, along with Udall, was given an outstanding rating on conservation by the League of Conservation Voters (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 2, 1976; Voters Guide Section 4-9; Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 4, 1976; sec. 1:3. "'76 Rivals..." NBC NEWS/Election Service, 1976:7-8).

Henry (Scoop) Jackson

Jackson was somewhat on the conservative side of center on the Democratic New Deal ideological continuum, although he considered himself a "liberal." He was the leading senate critic of the management of detente. He challenged Kissinger's negotiation of detente, although he approved of the detente concept. Jackson's changes in "big government" would have included breaking the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare into three separate departments to end waste and inefficiency. The federal government should assume more responsibility in education and welfare. Congress must have more control over rail travel and the highway system. Jackson saw a need for an administration committed to openness to maintain public confidence. Jackson, as all the Democratic candidates, saw full employment as a priority. The federal deficit is caused by unemployment rather than overspending, thus the initial investment of putting Americans back to work would be returned in revenues. Jobs would be created in building new housing, schools, and services. Inflation could be reduced quickly if interest rates were lowered and high oil prices were curbed. Jackson advocated busing to remedy specific instances
of segregation. A three judge court would determine the effect busing would have on the quality of education in an area, and whether other desegregation remedies would be effective. Mandatory sentences should be given to criminals. Violent criminals should be locked up; when we know how to rehabilitate a hardened criminal, then there should be rehabilitation programs.

Jackson favored a national comprehensive health insurance program. He opposed abortion, except where the mother's life is in danger. Opposition to abortion, for Jackson, is a matter of conscience since he believes that life begins at conception. Jackson was rated as "fair" by the League of Conservation Voters (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 2, 1976; Voters Guide, sec. 4-9; Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 4, 1976; sec. 1:3. "'76 Rivals...;" NBC NEWS/Election Service, 1976:9).

Jackson tried to attract workers and Labor, business and industrialists, enlisting the aid of the old style politicians where possible. He attempted to appeal to a broad spectrum of voters, as did Carter, but was not successful.

George Wallace

Although Wallace continued to appeal to a conservative contingent of both Democrats and Republicans, he was somewhat subdued over previous years. He had worked to get blue collar workers, the ethnic south side of Milwaukee in Wisconsin, as well as the anti-urban vote.

Wallace's famous words on U.S. foreign policy and detente were, "detente should not be a one way street" (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 2, 1976; Voters Guide Sec. 4). The United States should continue to seek
military superiority over the Soviet Union, and curtail foreign aid to nations which are not "friends" of the U.S. The federal government had grown too big, and control must be returned to the states. According to Wallace, many people were receiving welfare who were not entitled to it. Wallace rarely got specific about programs; he felt that the "liberals" who have been in charge of the government for so long have not coped with unemployment, inflation, and recession.

In the final analysis, the private sector would have to provide the jobs. The way to increase productivity and help the private sector provide jobs would be to take the strain off the middle class in inflation and taxes that the federal government was putting on them. Inflation was the nation's chief economic problem and attributable to federal spending. Wallace supported "freedom of choice" on busing. He no longer advocated school segregation, but supported a constitutional amendment to ban busing. On crime, Wallace said that there was a "false liberalism that brought us to a bottomless pit of taxation, heroin addiction, and crime in the streets" (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 2, 1976; Voters Guide, sec. 8).

The League of Conservation Voters rated Wallace as hopeless. He thought that there should be a strong voluntary energy conservation program. Wallace opposed legalized abortion, and favored an anti-abortion amendment to the constitution. The federal government should provide alternatives to abortion. In addition, aid to rural areas should be provided to counterbalance the emphasis on urban areas (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 2, 1976; Voters Guide, sec. 4-9; Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 4, 1976; sec. 1:3. "'76 Rivals...;" NBC NEWS/Election
Ellen McCormack

McCormack's prime reason for entering the presidential race was her stance against abortion. She favored a constitutional amendment against abortion. She was also against euthanasia. Her hope was to have bargaining power at the Democratic National Convention. Appeal on this lifestyle, or social issue, was thought by some to be limited to a small contingent of conservative suburban voters, regardless of party preference (Scammon and Wattenberg, 1970).

1976 Republican Primary

Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan were on the Republican presidential primary ballot. A Milwaukee Sentinel poll showed the president ahead of Reagan in Wisconsin early in March, 61% to 26%. Reagan's win in North Carolina has increased interest in the Wisconsin Republican presidential primary.

Gerald Ford

President Ford adopted a pragmatic, rather centrist approach, as measured on the Republican New Deal ideological scale. He attempted to appeal to a broad spectrum of voters by adopting a centrist position within the Republican party. Ford inherited a presidency that included detente with Russia and improved relations with China. Ford was noted as a generous supporter of the military. Credit had gone to Kissinger for Middle East breakthroughs. Congress had opposed Ford on some of his proposals for military aid, as in the case of Angola.
As far as "big government" was concerned, Ford felt that if the U.S. drifted toward bigger and bigger government, trouble would result. To stop inflation, the government must stop spending and borrowing so much. Money must remain in private hands. Ford had taken a more traditional course than Reagan on ways of reducing federal control over social programs. Ford agreed that the welfare system was in need of overhaul, and said that he intended to work to make the programs more efficient and equitable. Ford favored consolidation of fifty-nine separate programs into four block grants in education, health, social services, and child nutrition. According to Ford and his economic advisors, our economy could not be fixed quickly; jobs must come from the private sector. Ford stated that he was opposed to the use of busing to promote racial balance in schools, but supported the decision of the Supreme Court.

President Ford favored mandatory minimum sentences for serious crimes and those which involve handguns. Additional federal prisons and an increase in criminal justice manpower was seen as needed. On energy, Ford encouraged the use of domestic sources of fuel; nonetheless, he was judged as hopeless by the League of Conservation Voters. Although Ford opposed abortion on demand, he also opposed an anti-abortion amendment. Any action taken on the federal level should be limited to allowing each state the power to adopt its own regulations (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 2, 1976; Voters Guide, sec. 4-9).

Ronald Reagan

Reagan appealed to a conservative constituency, even within the
Republican party. He felt that many of the traditionally Democratic blue collar workers belonged in the Republican party. Both workers and management within laisser-faire ideology would benefit by such a conservative approach, according to Reagan. The need for U.S. military superiority has been stressed by Reagan. He has accused Ford and Kissinger of giving in to "detente" with the communist world. Although the original idea of detente made sense to Reagan, presently he views it as a one way street in which the Soviets further their own causes. A strong military makes U.S. bargaining possible.

According to Reagan, government in the U.S. was too centralized. He proposed to return many services to the states, along with the appropriate tax base. Reagan favored the reinstatement of the one-year residency requirement before receiving welfare benefits within a given local area. Social Security, however, should remain at the national level. Such functions as space, defense, veterans' benefits, energy, and environment, which are truly national, would remain in the control of the federal government. Reagan, along with Ford, considered government spending to have been the cause of inflation. Reagan's plan of balancing the federal budget would lead to an intermediary period of economic slowdown. Control over public education should be returned to local schools.

Although Reagan supported school integration, he believed legislation necessary to prevent involuntary busing. On the death penalty, Reagan favored its reinstatement and a change in the permissive philosophies of the criminal justice system that have allowed guilty offenders to go free and prey on innocent citizens. Reagan was rated
as "bad" by the League of Conservation Voters, as compared to Ford's "hopeless." Abortion should be banned by direct constitutional amendment, except where a life is in danger (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 2, 1976; Voters Guide, sec. 4-9; Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 4, 1976; sec. 1:3. "'76 Rivals...;" NBC NEWS/Election Service, 1976:6-7).

Except for busing and abortion, all of the candidates were "for" changes in government, efficiency, etc. Major differences, then, arise over how these common goals would be accomplished, and how extreme changes are to be.

1976 Primary Election Results

Weather was good for the Wisconsin primary, 1976. Voter turnout was 1,311,853; 722,773 for the Democratic candidates, and 589,080 for the Republicans. The total was 38% of the estimated eligible voters. Donoghue, a University of Wisconsin professor in political science, called this turnout low, despite ideal weather. In 1972 and 1968, the primary voter turnout was 47% of those eligible; in 1964, 45% voted, and 50% of those eligible voted in 1960 (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 7, 1976; sec. 1:24. "Narrow Victory... ").

Carter won a narrow victory in Wisconsin, which some of the networks failed to predict. Although Udall began celebrating on the basis of NBC's predictions, Carter was the winner when all of the votes were counted. This miscall was deemed to be the result of the rural vote coming in later, and the higher voter refusal at poll surveys. Carter received 37% of the Democratic primary vote, while Udall received 36%. Wallace received 13%, Jackson won 7%, and Ellen McCormack won 4% of the
Democratic primary vote. In the Republican primary, Ford received 55%, and Reagan received 45% (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 7, 1976; sec. 1:1. "Narrow Victory...;" "Reagan Fails...").

Democratic Primary Results

The voters in the Democratic primary by affiliation were: 8% Republican, 31% Democratic, and 58% Independent. Analysis of the Democratic primary vote and its effects on the candidates considers three men leading in the race for the Democratic presidential nomination as of the Wisconsin primary. These men were Jimmy Carter, Udall, and Jackson. Carter picked up twenty-six delegates in Wisconsin, Udall received twenty-five, Wallace received ten, Jackson received six, and McCormack received one delegate (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 7, 1976; sec. 1:22. "Big Winner...;" Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 7, 1976; sec. 1:16. "Ironies Abounded...").

The vote for Carter, by party affiliation was: 44% of the Republican crossovers, 43% of the Democrats, and 39% of the Independents voting in the Democratic primary. Although Carter received 37% of the Democratic primary vote to Udall's 36%, Carter carried six of nine congressional districts and fifty-two counties to Udall's seventeen. Carter put in considerably less time than Udall in campaigning in Wisconsin. Carter carried all but the first, second, and fifth congressional districts. A coalition of liberal unions backed Carter in the 4th and 8th Districts, and Udall in all others. In the City of Milwaukee, Carter received 39,482 to 38,004 for Udall. Carter has been supported by majorities of black voters in other states; in Milwaukee he carried
the Aldermanic Districts which have the heaviest concentrations of Black residents in the city (1st, 6th, and 7th Aldermanic Districts). Blackwell, of the Journal staff, noted that although Carter did carry the predominately Black wards in the April 6th elections, Udall had the support of most Black elected officials and other political leaders. He further states that the difference in the Black vote for Carter and Udall was not that wide. To Blackwell, this indicates that if the Udall supporters could have held the Black vote and could have gotten out a larger Black vote, Udall might have carried the state. Vernon Jordan, executive director of the National Urban League, said that one of the reasons for Carter's appeal to Black voters is that they are disillusioned with liberals. Carter's win in Wisconsin is at least attributed to three rural districts, and Milwaukee's heavily ethnic south side (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 7, 1976; sec. 1:1. "Narrow Victory...;" Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 8, 1976; sec. 2:1. "In the Inner...").

Carter was helped by crossover Republican voters who voted in the Democratic primary; two of every three Republicans who crossed over and voted in the Democratic primary supported Carter. It appeared that Carter could appeal across party lines. Although Carter led slightly among those identifying themselves as Democrats, Udall led slightly among independents. The Republican crossovers held the balance. Surveys of voters in both Wisconsin and New York revealed two definite poles of the Democratic race. Carter and Jackson were competing for control of the party's center-right constituency, while Udall was appealing to the liberal contingent. Udall had maintained consistent support among those who are liberal on the range of issues
being discussed; however, it was found that support for Jackson and Carter was not so strongly related to voter stands on major issues. In Wisconsin, 57% of those citing the size of the federal government as the main issue voted for Carter (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 8, 1976; sec. 1:1. "Carter's Victory...;" New York Times, Apr. 8, 1976; sec. 1:1. "Jackson, Carter, Udall...;" New York Times, Apr. 8, 1976; sec. 1:1; G.O.P. Crossover..."

Carter had been able to evoke a kind of "electric" reaction from the people in Wisconsin that no other candidate in the Democratic presidential primary has been able to inspire. Carter touched strongly on the anti-big government theme, telling many audiences that if the government were as good as the people in the U.S., things would be OK. On one level, Carter was a brilliant campaigner; he came from a southern small town and came within reaching distance of the presidency. There is an interesting element to Carter and to his campaign: he seems to campaign on trust. He appealed to a metaissue; people were looking for something to believe in. Carter realized "that what national leaders and other candidates perceived as a political crisis is actually a spiritual crisis, and that more symbolic communication is the best way to reach Americans drifting in an atmosphere saturated with instant communications" (Reeves, 1976:28). These spiritual concerns can be called a "metaissue" collectively; this issue above issues involves tone, honesty, decency, truthfulness, morality, and religion. Among voters under thirty years old, Carter held a 48% to 45% edge. In the last six presidential elections, only Eisenhower in 1956 and Nixon in 1972 had been able to swing the under thirty vote into the GOP column
There was debate as to how much Carter's remark on "maintaining the ethnic purity of neighborhoods" affected his candidacy. Carter soothed Blacks for quite some time. Perhaps this incident which could have been comparable to Muskie's "crying in the snow," will be forgotten. Even though Carter won in Wisconsin, he did not build irresistible momentum (Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 8, 1976; sec. 1:1. "Carter Attacked...;"


Udall received 27% of the Republican crossover vote, 40% of the Democratic vote, and 41% of the Independents voting in the Democratic primary. He came very close to winning the Wisconsin primary; there has been speculation as to why he did not win. Udall put more money and manpower in Wisconsin than did any other Democratic candidate. He was also backed by eight top Lucey appointees. A poll taken late in March showed an increase in Udall support when compared with a poll taken earlier that month. Both polls showed Carter receiving 34% of the vote, while Udall went from 17% up to 30%. Support for both Jackson and Wallace decreased; Wallace went from 15% to 11%, and Jackson went from 24% to 14% (Milwaukee Journal, Mar. 30, 1976; sec. 1:5. "Udall moving..."

Some attributed Udall's lack of funds which prevented him from mailing information to farmers in rural Wisconsin as the deciding factor. The farmers only knew that Carter was a peanut farmer. The UAW worked for Udall. Udall received his largest margin in the 2nd District,
which includes the University of Wisconsin Madison community. Udall carried the 1st and 5th districts, also. Udall carried Milwaukee, Ashland, Bayfield, Columbia, Dane, Douglas, Dunn, Eau Claire, Kenosha, Polk, Portage, Racine, Rock, St. Croix, Sauk, Washburn, and Winnebago counties: Carter won all the rest. Although Carter carried the city of Milwaukee, Udall was ahead in Milwaukee County. Udall carried all the Milwaukee county suburbs except Brown Deer, Franklin, Greendale, Hales Corners, and Oak Creek. There was speculation about how long Udall can stay in the race without winning a primary. Udall supporters argued that had Harris not been on the Wisconsin ballot, his 8,000 votes would have amounted to a win for Udall (New York Times, Apr. 8, 1976; sec. 1:1. "Jackson, Carter...;" Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 7, 1976; sec. 1:1. "Narrow Victory...;" Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 9, 1976; sec. 1:2. "Udall Loss...;" Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 2, 1976; sec. 1:3. "8 Lucey..."

Carter was apparently successful in appealing to a broad range of voters; although he just barely won in Wisconsin, he had not put in the time nor the energy as did his major competitor in the state, Udall.

Udall carried much of the student vote, some Blacks and workers. Udall was supported by Black leaders and labor leaders although he failed to carry the rank-and-file Blacks and workers. Since primaries are judged on the basis of expectations, Udall was not really successful in Wisconsin. He had worked hard for support which he did not receive.

Jackson did not do well in Wisconsin at all, but he was not expected to do well by national observers (he thought he'd do better).
He has appealed to Jews and "cigar-chomping politicians" which are not as plentiful in Wisconsin as they are in other states.

The other Democratic candidates did not do particularly well in Wisconsin. Wallace was significantly less fiery this year than in past election years. It appears that the fact that Wallace was confined to a wheelchair was more of a factor with voters than he had realized. Of the Republicans voting in the Democratic primary, 21% contributed to Wallace's 8% of the total Democratic primary vote. In addition, he received 7% of the voters of Democratic affiliation and 10% of the independents. Wallace stated that this was his last run for the presidency unless he were to be nominated and elected. He claimed credit for bringing the Democratic party back to the people by stressing such issues as changing the governmental bureaucracy. Wallace had always made busing and integration an issue in Wisconsin, saying that this is an issue that "polarized" (New York Times, Apr. 8, 1976; sec. 1:1. "Jackson, Carter...;" Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 2, 1976; sec. 1:3; "Send Me...;" Milwaukee Journal, Mar. 30, 1976; sec. 1:4. "Wallace Campaign...;" Milwaukee Journal, Mar. 29, 1976; sec. 1:1. "Wallace Follows..."").

Jackson's non-campaign in Wisconsin netted him 3% of the Republican crossover votes, 6% of the Democratic voters, and 3% of the independent vote. Harris, essentially, had pulled out of the race. McCormack did not reach her objective in the Wisconsin primary; her stated objective was to have bargaining power at the Democratic nominating convention. Her one-issue campaign, centering around abortion, drew votes mainly from conservative Republicans. This would not assure her much bargaining

**Republican Primary Results**

Ford won all of Wisconsin's delegates to the Republican Convention: he won a majority vote in all nine congressional districts, and thus all of the forty-five delegates. Reagan, however, came two hundred and five votes from winning the delegate slate in the 8th District, which includes Green Bay.

Ford's biggest margins came in the 2nd and 6th congressional districts. Ford, of late, has apparently been more successful in projecting an image of coolness and candor, replacing that of the bumbling president. In addition, improvements and confidence in the economy were seen as adding to Ford's votes. Ford claimed his win as a vote of confidence for Kissinger; one of Reagan's activities had been to accuse Kissinger of giving too much to the Russians.

Reagan supporters claimed to be elated at Reagan's 45% in Wisconsin. One of Reagan's strategists said the vote in Brown and Racine Counties, which are Democratic areas, demonstrated that Reagan could draw independents and Democrats to vote for him. Some believed that there was a conservative tide in the country, and that Reagan could appeal to it. The primary battle ground for Ford and Reagan will be in the Western and Southwestern states. The power of the incumbent president, of course, remains as a strong influence. Neither the Republican nor the
Democratic nominations for president were decided in Wisconsin. Ford drew the centrist element of the Republican party, and other voters who were satisfied, or felt more comfortable with his political experience than with the alternatives. In Wisconsin, this centrist element included many suburbanites, business, and some of the Protestant ethnic groups. Reagan, taking a position on issues similar to that of Ford, but more extreme, was appealing to conservatives, in addition to the traditionally Republican groups; Reagan felt that many blue collar workers belonged in the Republican camp (Rusher, 1975; Philips, 1969; New York Times, sec. 1:32; Apr. 8, 1976. "Ford sees...;"
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION AND EPILOGUE

The purpose of this study is to assess whether or not political realignment occurred in 1976, or is imminent, as revealed in the state of Wisconsin. Since the mid-1960's, political analysts have seen patterns which might indicate a new voter alignment. Yet, concurrent with signs of realignment exists evidence of electoral disaggregation. In the past it was believed that these two contradictory sets of phenomena could not coexist; presently, however, they cohabit, somewhat akin to the inflation/depression combination in the economic sphere (Gelb and Palley, 1975; Burnham, 1970; Toffler, 1975).

The fact that equally paradoxical patterns are evident in the economic and social spheres, as well as in the political world, indicates interrelationships between the societal subsystems. Different theories have been put forth to account for these conflicting political, social, and economic signals.

Possibilities include the theory that we are in some kind of protracted realignment period. Perhaps the present balance of realignment and disaggregation signs will be maintained; in this case, the status quo, or a sort of limbo, would prevail. Disaggregation of the electorate might prevail leading to who knows what in the political, social and economic systems. It is possible that the political system as we know it now is evolving or changing; political parties have fulfilled a particular function in our society. Further changes in the uses of political parties, or their demise, would leave a power vacuum
in our society (Parsons, 1951; Toffler, 1975; Gelb and Palley, 1975; Sundquist, 1973; Burnham, 1970; Broder, 1971).

Realignment consists of a lasting change in voter alignment usually brought about by some issue of emotive appeal which polarizes the electorate. There have been five major realignments in American history; each has created a political system peculiar to the times. The fifth and last realignments so far took place in the 1930's and is referred to as the New Deal polarization. The New Deal polarization did not have the "sharpness" of previous realignments which had permeated national, state, and local government roughly simultaneously. This transformation at all levels of government did not occur in the 1930's, hence this realignment has been termed "muddy." In some states, state and local politics do not follow the same divisions as exist on the national level. Psephologists have been waiting for the sixth political system to emerge through another major realignment. Some have interpreted present conflicting events and conditions to give evidence that the U.S. is on its way, slowly, to another major realignment (Sundquist, 1973; Scammon and Wattenberg, 1970).

Disaggregation of the electorate is commonly thought to have symptoms opposite to those which signal a realignment. The breakdown of voter loyalties and alignment without replacement signifies electoral disaggregation. Signs of disaggregation include the growing number of declared independents, the rise of ticket splitting, and the absence of a polarizing issue. Disaggregation beyond a certain point is thought to make critical realignment impossible.
It is possible that the political party system will maintain the status quo; the balance between realigning forces and disaggregating forces might be kept constant. There is, however, also the possibility that our political party system might be changing structurally.

There have been changes in the functions of political parties over time in the United States. Reform measures such as the replacement of patronage jobs by civil service exams have contributed to the decline in power of political parties. Most political analysts agree that the political parties are not fulfilling their functions of reconciling and sorting various interests and needs, and serving as a link between the government and the voter. Many analysts, however, have agreed that it is difficult to tell exactly what is going on at the present time (Sundquist, 1973; Burnham, 1970; Broder, 1971).

Evidence from the state of Wisconsin has been examined in the light of these alternatives. The 1968, 1972 primaries and general elections and the 1976 primaries in the state were compared on the basis of group support, candidates, and issues. Groups or categories examined were chosen for their influence on Wisconsin history and/or their existence in the original New Deal coalition on the national level. The purpose is to see whether the New Deal alignment still remains on the presidential level of voter choice.

Groups influential in Wisconsin history include various ethnic groups, Blacks, Labor, and farm interests. Such category divisions as Urban/suburban/rural, are also made. Age is pertinent due to the rise of youth/student volunteers and the enfranchisement of eighteen year olds just before the 1972 general elections. Business interests, of
course, have made some political impact on every state. These groups, categories, and interests continue to be important in Wisconsin politics.

Groups align themselves with candidates who advocate issues and positions on issues with which they agree. Comparisons were made between the traditional New Deal alignment, which was mainly concerned with economic policy, and the election years of 1968, 1972 and 1976 in Wisconsin. The New Deal alignment in Wisconsin has remained on the national level; it may just be beginning to exist on the state and local levels, taking particularities of the state of Wisconsin into account (Burger, 1976; Legislative Reference Bureau, 1975).

The New Deal alignment reflected in Wisconsin at the presidential level, when compared with 1968, 1972, and 1976 reveals no substantial change. No evidence of critical realignment exists for any of these years. Interestingly, the possibility of a major realignment existed in each of these years. Realignment has been like "waiting for Godot."

Epilogue -- Beyond Realignment?

No clear signs of realignment were apparent as of the Wisconsin primary; however, since then, there have been signs that realignment might take place. After the last of the primaries, but before the nominating conventions in 1976, more information was available from which to discuss what was taking place. Certain occurrences in Wisconsin can be interpreted as part of the larger picture of this election year: events from primaries after the Wisconsin primary reveal a little more about the mood of the national electorate. The
Wisconsin primary was a part of the trends and momentum of the election year.

There has been "action" in both the Republican and the Democratic primaries. Usually an incumbent president is assured the nomination of his party if he chooses to run; many feel that Ford will eventually receive the Republican nomination. The fact that there has been any uncertainty at all is significant. It was expected that the Democratic party would field a set of candidates for the nomination, but it was unforeseen that their numbers would narrow so soon, or that Carter would emerge as far ahead as he did at the end of the primaries. In fact, many observers had originally expected no clear leader to emerge from the Democratic primaries.

The New Deal alignment has been pronounced "shaky" since the radical sixties, yet it has more or less held. In 1976, however, the potential exists for a shift in the traditional alignments. Both Reagan and Carter have mobilized voters on the basis of non-New Deal campaigns. Using the New Deal as the fulcrum, Reagan seeks a partial repudiation of the New Deal, while Carter has the potential of moving beyond the alignment of the 1930's (Youngquist, 1976). This would lead to a drastically different voter alignment.

In the Republican primary, Reagan did surprisingly well. The key would be in the uncommitted delegates, many of whom are for Ford, and the convention negotiations. According to Goldwater and others, there is really not much difference between Ford and Reagan on issues and ideological stance. One possible difference, however, might be explained in terms of the continuum of moderate to extreme. Ford is more moderate and Reagan is more extreme. Reagan is not very extreme; he is simply
a little more extreme than is Ford (Time, 1976b; Lipset, 1960; Bredemeier and Stephenson, 1962).

Some of Reagan's support came from Wallacites; it was generally agreed that this did not constitute all of his support. Both independents and Republicans of the conservative persuasion supported Reagan. Reagan has courted crossover votes where they were available; Indiana, and Georgia and Texas were won by Reagan through crossovers. The strategy to forge a "new majority" of Democrats, Republicans, and independents has apparently been somewhat effective, at least to the extent of forging a new "minority." Reagan did well in some of the Western and southwestern primaries (Time, 1976b; Rusher, 1975; Philips, 1969; 1975).

Reagan benefits from not being a part of the Washington "establishment," since public sentiment is against bureaucrats in Washington. Foreign policy has been, once again, at issue in 1976 largely due to Reagan. Basically, he accuses Ford and his administration of "giving" away American goods and military advantage. A Time-Yankelvich (Time, 1976b) survey showed that if foreign policy issues should arise to the extent of overshadowing domestic economic concerns, then the national mood would have favored the "more experienced veterans," Ford among the Republicans, and Humphrey among the Democrats.

Carter has become a political phenomenon; his appeal has been described as, in part, based on a "metaissue." Problems with Carter's stress on openness and honesty would arise if he was ever found in clear deception. It seems that Carter has weathered his "ethnic purity" remark, but he does not come across as being clear on the
issues. For the Democrats, this is not a year for liberals who are liberal (Time, 1976a; Reeves, 1976; Chicago Tribune, My 10, 1976; sec. 1:22. "Candidates Help...").

Support for Carter comes from groups across the board. Carter is putting together a totally new coalition for the Democrats in 1976, while Humphrey's support lies with the old New Deal coalition. Carter appealed more to conservatives, independents, White Protestants, Jews, and Southerners than did Humphrey. Humphrey's support came from more traditional Democratic majorities among Blacks, other minorities, liberals, and lower income voters (Chicago Tribune, My 3, 1976; sec. 1:23. "Harris Survey: Voters Give...").

Whomever is nominated and eventually becomes president will inherit a certain set of problems and difficulties. In this particular campaign, policy was not always debated; due to the world and domestic situations there is not much flexibility in measures to cope. The result, according to one interpretation, is to be concerned with a candidate's character. If this remains consistent, the election would be determined by whether one nominee had more character, decency, and openness than his opponent, and not by his positions on issues whether they be left or right (Chicago Tribune, My 10, 1976; sec. 1:21. "Harris Survey: Voters Opt..."; Chicago Tribune, My 10, 1976; sec. 2:1. "Politics Gets...").

Carter has capitalized on the post-Watergate concern with the candidate character: The metaissue stresses character attributes. The Republicans have actually strengthened Carter's position. The Republican party as a whole has been forced to move in a more conservative
direction by Reagan's candidacy; Ford has not been allowed to remain
the Centrist that he prefers. Reagan's stand is a repudiation of the
New Deal; this means that those already in the New Deal camp must
go to Carter. There is nowhere else for them to go.

If elected, Carter would be put in the position of being able
to move past the New Deal. Harris (1975) has mapped out a path
according to the desires of the American people: Quality is desired
instead of mere material quantity. In the face of the world military,
economic, and natural resources situations, the American people favor
a role for the U.S. which is oriented more toward peace negotiations
and responsible leadership in the world than formerly. People are
willing to give up short term comforts for long term humanitarian
goals. Carter is able to convey these types of things as his goals;
he has a vision. The nomination will probably go to Carter, but the
1976 conventions have not yet been held as of this writing.

The final primaries give insight into what was taking place in
Wisconsin. It is too early to tell, but in the light of information
available as of this writing it is possible that existing patterns
show signs of realignment. Only in retrospect will the verdict be
passed; it appears that Carter might be able to move past the New Deal
alignment if he is elected.
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