SOME ASPECTS

OF

BRITISH PROPAGANDA DURING THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918

By

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C O N T E N T S

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PREFACE

This thesis on, Some Aspects of British Propaganda During the World War, 1914-1918, is an attempt to show how British propaganda was one of the causes for America's entrance into the World War.

It would be impossible to express appreciation to all who made it possible for me to write this dissertation. But in a general way, I wish to thank those who were untiring in their encouragement and who lightened, by their willing assistance, the weight of my work in order to give me more time and opportunity to prepare this paper.

Among the libraries which I have used, special mention is due to the John Crerar Library of Chicago, the Chicago Public Library, which gave me access to the book entitled, The Secrets of Crewe House, to which I have devoted an entire chapter in my thesis. Special acknowledgment is also due to the Librarian of Stanford University, California, who graciously loaned me material on propaganda.

Lastly, I owe a personal debt of gratitude to Father Raphael N. Hamilton, S.J., and Dr. Herbert W. Rice of Marquette University, for the interest and help given me during the writing of this dissertation.

Sister Mary Cleopha, O.P.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Propaganda and public opinion, were, so to speak, the two hinges upon which England swung wide the door which opened for her the sympathy and help of allied and neutral countries during the World War. Just how important England considered these two means of gaining publicity during the World War, and how effective they were, particularly in the United States, will be discussed in this dissertation.

What determines public opinion? We may answer, propaganda. Lasswell defines it as referring

> solely to the control of opinion by significant symbols, or, to speak more concretely and less accurately, by stories, rumors, reports, pictures and other forms of social communication. Propaganda is concerned with the management of opinions and attitudes by the direct manipulation of social suggestion rather than by altering other conditions in the environment or in the organism.[1]

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[1] H. D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War, 9.

Sir Campbell Stuart defines it

> as the presentation of a case in such a way that others may be influenced. . . . In so far as its use against an enemy is concerned, the subject-matter employed

> must not be self-evidently propagandist. Except in special circumstances, its origin should be completely concealed. As a general rule, too, it is desirable to hide the channels of communications.[2]

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[2] Sir Campbell Stuart, The Secrets of Crewe House, 1.

England used, to her great advantage, the propaganda of words and printed matter. With these weapons she gained friends and destroyed enemies. This propaganda of "words was set up with such perfect scientific technique that it rivaled the military system."[3]

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[3] G. C. Bruntz, Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in 1918, 3.

Although this thesis deals primarily with English propaganda during the World War, it is interesting to note just how far back we can go in history to find how propaganda has been used to influence public opinion. Frederic Lumley states that propaganda was used among primitives; Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans, and that it was prevalent in the Middle Ages and in the post-medieval period.[4] The

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[4] F. E. Lumley, The Propaganda Menace, 5.

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author gives examples for each period.

H. D. Lasswell informs us, that although the word propaganda was not used, nevertheless, its practice dates from the Greek and Roman times. Citing examples of these periods

he says that the walls of Pompeii were covered with election appeals. History notes how anxious Frederick the Great was to influence European public opinion. Napoleon in his time subsidized a London newspaper. Metternich, the Rothschilds, and Bismarck used influential men to spread favorable press comment. The Committees of Correspondence, during the Revolutionary War, spread dislike for England. During the Civil War, important personages were sent to England to plead the Northern cause "and added the dramatic touch of sending a shipload of food stuffs to mitigate the sufferings of the unemployed textile worker."[5]

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[5] H. D. Lasswell, "Propaganda", Encyclopedia of Social Science, XII, 87.

The real purpose of war-time propaganda in every belligerent country was to form and control war-time public opinion for the purpose of maintaining the morale of the armed forces and favorably impress minds at home, to lower the morale of the enemy, and to influence neutrals in the hope of gaining friendly assistance should the need arise. In order to do this effectively, propaganda must be resourceful and alert to the many changes in public opinion. In fact "propaganda which convinces the directing groups of its truth or efficacy becomes itself public opinion."

R. H. Lutz writes that

> accurate information concerning the influence of public opinion in the warring nations upon fundamental war-time policies is essential to an understanding of the war aims of these belligerents, the reactions of their respective peoples to these aims, the determination of governments to attain their objectives, and the resultant possibilities of peace. Public opinion is evolved from the composite reactions of the people at large; their fundamental attitudes, prejudices, passions and aspirations being expressed in the definite opinions of their leaders. Consequently the representation of the state of mind of a given people at any moment of the war requires a thorough study of the intricate, intellectual, emotional, and spiritual web of their ideas and ideals. This study is complicated by the uncertain effect of censorship on opinion as well as by the fact that groups with deep-seated attitudes only have vague notions and ideas which are expressed in stereotype.[6]

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[6] R. H. Lutz, "Studies of World War Propaganda, 1914-1933", Journal of Modern History, V, 496.

The most effective device that governments have used in mobilizing and galvanizing public opinion is the creation of a one-sided version of the war. This version is forced upon the public again and again and any disagreement with it is silenced by force or imprisonment.[7] This must be done because the chief

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[7] J. D. Squires, British Propaganda at Home and in the United States, 14.

purpose of propaganda is to influence opinion and conduct by mobilizing home, allied, and neutral opinion in support of the country's cause and at the same time to work for the demoralization of the enemy.

Official propaganda became a definite policy toward the end of the World War. Prior to 1914, Germany alone, of all the great powers, had set up a definite propaganda system. But at the outbreak of the World War, all the nations, realizing the importance of it, developed a definite government-controlled organization.

The official propaganda in Germany at the outbreak of the war was controlled by the press Bureau of the German Foreign Office, which consisted of the representatives of foreign newspapers residing in Berlin and the foreign press and telegraph agencies. Its object was to spread favorable impressions about Germany and to discountenance any unfavorable comments concerning German affairs.

The object of the home propaganda was to convince the people that Germany was fighting a war of self-defense against an encirclement of the Entente powers. Germany must also know that the enemies were violating rules of warfare, and that, in order to maintain the high ideals and culture of the German people there must be great sacrifices made.

In the enemy countries, Germany spread propaganda dealing with the certainty of a German victory, the disagreement among the Entente powers as to their war aims, and the support of revolutionary ideas and the encouragement of pacifism in neutral and enemy countries.[8]

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[8] R. H. Lutz, Fall of the German Empire, 1914-1918, I, 72.

But Germany defeated her own purpose by depending too much upon the effects her propaganda was to produce. At the beginning of the war, Germany had the field to herself, but the Allies soon began to use counter-propaganda in such a skillful way as to undermine the previous success of the Germans. They accused Germany of imperialistic tendencies and declared that they, the Allies, were fighting in order to liberate the world from the slavery of militarism and greed.[9] From this time until the end

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[9] G. C. Bruntz, op. cit., 95.

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of the war.

> Every luncheon, every dinner became a propaganda party. The British aristocrat and the German professor, the French poet and the Austrian diplomat, all became disseminators of propaganda.[10]

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[10] G. S. Viereck, Spreading Germs of Hate, 31.

We must remember that in the World War there were three fighting fronts to be considered--the military, the economic, and the propagandistic. Germany believed the first to be the most important; the Allies, especially England, with well-trained journalists and politicians, who knew their own countries and could make a very accurate survey of others, placed their hopes of winning the war on propaganda.[11] For they were firmly convinced that this would be the one force which would be able to unite the far-flung millions and turn individual energies into one great national power.[12]

[11] L. W. Doob, Propaganda, 303.

[12] J. D. Squires, op. cit., 14.

How England used this force to enable her to carry on the struggle during the World War the following chapters will narrate.

CHAPTER II

ENGLAND'S ORGANIZATION OF PROPAGANDA

There were two systems of propaganda used by England during the World War--unofficial and official. The unofficial groups were supported by newspapers, periodicals, public platforms, the club, and the street corner. The official propaganda was supported by ambassadors, foreign ministers, frock coats and high hats, secret treaties, and confidential dispatches.[1]

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[1] O. H. Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy, 3.

The unofficial organizations were about ten in number. Of these, the four most important were the following: The Faculty of Oxford University, which issued the Oxford Pamphlets; the Victoria League, which, although antedating the War, was important in disseminating neutral understanding among all English peoples; The Union of Democratic Control--set up in 1914, revealing the falsehood of much of the propaganda being circulated between 1914 and 1918; The Central for National Patriotic Associations, formed in August, 1914, sending literature to

neutral countries and justifying the British cause in the War. The appeal of the latter for funds was signed by Asquith, Rosebery, and Balfour.

> By organizing lectures, patriotic clubs, and rallies in the cities and in the country districts throughout the Empire the Central Committee did everything possible to overcome opposition to the war among the subjects of the British Kingdom. Subcommittees for each of the different parts of the Empire were formed. There was also a Neutral Countries subcommittee, which, though begun on a private basis in August, 1914, was taken over by the Central Committee the following month. The method of this subcommittee was as far as possible one of direct personal approach. Material was sent out, not in the name of the Committee, but in the name of various Britishers, whose acquaintances, colleagues, fellow workers, or business associates in neutral lands received--oftentime unwillingly--propaganda material prepared and sent by the Neutral Countries subcommittee. By this means every possible variety of interests in the neutral countries--philosophical, educational, religious, scientific, philanthropic, artistic, legal, medical, agricultural, mining, banking, and commercial--was reached. Some 250,000 pamphlets, booklets and other publications were thus distributed between August, 1914 and January 1, 1916.[3]

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[3] Report of the Central Committee for National Patriotic Associations (London, 1916), p. 17-22. Quoted in Bruntz, op. cit., 19.

All these unofficial groups lost their identity when official departments took over the work of propaganda; but there is no doubt that they had helped

England's cause by spreading her aims and ideas through the written and spoken word.

The official department for the control of propaganda was organized in 1914 by Prime Minister Asquith and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey. Charles F. G. Masterman was appointed to take charge of the propaganda bureau. At the time of his appointment he was Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Chairman of the National Health Insurance Joint Committee. The offices of the Committee were located in Wellington House and when Masterman became head of the propaganda organization he took over its quarters and staff to aid him in his work. The rather unpretentious offices of the insurance commission served admirably to conceal the existence of any propaganda activity.[4]

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[4] J. D. Squires, op. cit., 27.

Wellington House was chiefly concerned with the

> production, translation, and distribution of books, pamphlets, Government publications, speeches, and so forth, dealing with the war, its origin, its history and all the varied and difficult questions which arose during its distribution of special pictorial papers; assisting in the placing of articles and interviews designed to influence opinion in the world's newspapers and magazines, especially in America; the wide distribution of pictorial matter, cartoons, pictures and drawings, photographs

> for insertion in newspapers and for exhibition; the production and distribution of cinematograph films; helping to provide information and facilities to the London correspondents of neutral, especially American papers; personal correspondence with influential people abroad, especially in America; arrangements for the interchange of visits, of personal tours to neutral and allied countries, and of visits of distinguished neutrals and of representatives of the Allies of this country; the production and distribution of maps, diagrams, posters, lantern slides, and all other possible means of miscellaneous propaganda.[5]

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[5] Ivor Nicholson, "An Aspect of British Official Wartime Propaganda", Cornhill Magazine, May, 1931, 593.

When Lloyd George became Prime Minister in 1917 the work of Wellington House was taken over by the Department of Information, later called The Ministry. This arrangement was necessary because it was found impossible to control the propaganda activities, which had grown to such an enormous extent, unless it was made directly responsible to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office. This department was at first under the direction of C. H. Montgomery, but later the Department of Information was placed in charge of Colonel John Buchan. The entire organization was divided into four departments. The work of each was as follows: Wellington House, which continued producing and distributing material for use at home and in neutral countries; the Cinema department, which acted under Mr. Mair;

the Political Intelligence Division which gathered data concerning public opinion at home and abroad; and the News Division which gave news of the war to the public.[6]

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[6] Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., CIX, August 5, 1918, 910.

Later, because of friction among the different committees, re-organization took place. More detailed and specific assignments were given to members of the Advisory Committee of the Department of Information. Lord Northcliffe became Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, Robert Donald directed the propaganda in neutral countries, John Buchan was made Director of Intelligence, General A. D. MacRae became Director of Administration, Sir William Jury took over the Cinematograph Propaganda, and Sir Roderick Jones was appointed Deputy Director of Allied and Foreign Propaganda.[7]

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[7] Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., CIII, 917.

This new arrangement resulted in the abolishment of the Department of Information and by March, 1918, only two important propaganda departments were in existence under the direction of Lord Beaverbrook; namely, The Ministry of Information which dealt with publicity in all countries

outside the British Empire, and the National War Aims Committee which took care of the propaganda at home.[8]

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[8] The Times (London), March 19, 1918. Quoted in Bruntz, op. cit., p. 24.

Some of the Committees created by The Ministry in March, 1918, are classified as follows:

1. American Troops Local Hospitality, Sub-Committees--Appointed in the chief towns of the United Kingdom, at instance of Ministry of Information, in 1918.
   Object: To organize locally hospitality and entertainment for American Troops in this country.
   Representatives: Local public men, etc.

2. British War Mission--Appointed by Ministry of Information in opening of 1917.
   Object: To visit United States for propaganda purposes connected with participation in the war.
   Representatives: Prominent public men.

3. Crewe House Committee--Appointed by the Government under the Chairmanship of Lord Northcliffe in 1917 or earlier, and subsequently worked in close connection with the Ministry of Information.
   Object: To organize work of publicity in enemy countries.
   Representatives: Newspaper owners, journalists, etc.

4. Information Advisory Committee--Appointed by the Government, December, 1916.
   Object: To advise Information Department and later the Ministry of Information.

Representatives: Leading newspaper owners and journalists.

5. Information, Home Office Bureau--Appointed by Home Office in 1916 or earlier, and absorbed into Ministry of Information in 1917.
Object: To organize information and propaganda.
Representatives: Not stated.

6. Publicity in Enemy Countries--Same as Crewe House Committee.

7. War Aims, National Committee--Appointed privately in June, 1917, taken over later in the year by War Cabinet and subsequently worked in close connection with Ministry of Information.
Object: To organize propaganda relating to British War Aims in the United Kingdom.
Representatives: Prominent public men, the press.

8. War Propaganda Bureau--Appointed by Government apparently in 1916 or earlier.
Object: To organize propaganda.
Representatives: Not stated. Absorbed into general organization of Ministry of Information in 1917.[9]

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[9] N. B. Dearle, Dictionary of Official War-Time Organizations, XVII, 120.

The work of these committees was summarized by the War Cabinet as follows:

> The Ministry was concerned with publicity in neutral and allied countries and in the British Dominions, while the work in enemy countries was carried out by Lord Northcliffe's Committee at Crewe House and that in Great Britain by the National War Aims Committee. But with both of

> these independent organizations the Ministry of Information maintained a close connection.[10]

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[10] The War Cabinet Reports for the Year 1918. Cmd. 325. (London, 1919), 35. Quoted in Squires, op. cit., 38.

One very important activity which worked hand in hand with propaganda, and which England used to her great advantage to strike a death blow at German propaganda, was censorship. Indeed, propaganda and censorship are so closely related that much propaganda may be thought of as a mere fill-up for censored news. If facts and opinions are withheld during a crisis in any nation, it is a very simple matter for those who have been denied the truth to manufacture facts in order to fill up the spaces made by the censor's shears. The job of the clever propagandist then, is to direct the trend of these imaginary legends and myths and "fallacious stuff" into the channels he knows will be advantageous to his particular group.[11]

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[11] K. Young and R. Lawrence, Bibliography on Censorship and Propaganda, 7.

On August 5, 1914, Great Britain cut the cables between the United States and Germany. This put a stop to the most efficient means of rapid communication between the two nations. All news from Germany was suppressed,

and only the English interpretation of the war became the accepted version. Close upon the cutting of the cables followed the censorship of the mails and the press.[12]

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[12] H. C. Peterson, Propaganda for War, 12.

The censorship of the mails began on August 29, 1914, with a staff of fourteen. By April, 1916, the staff had increased to two thousand. Colonel G. S. N. Pearson was chief Postal Censor. Rear-Admiral Brownrigg evaluates its work as follows:

> I remember the early days of the struggle to get the postal censorship imposed first on this country and then on that. The fights were long and many. The idea of censorship was repugnant, I suppose, to many, and it was feared that it would involve us in trouble with neutrals. Well, bit by bit, those who fought the good fight for censorship, and there can be no harm in mentioning them--the Director of Special Intelligence, War Office, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiralty, and one or two others--won the day, and finally the postal censorship was strictly enforced on all mail matter coming into or going out of this country.
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> I much doubt if any more powerful weapon in enforcing the blockade and ruining the enemy's over-seas trade ever existed, and I am confident that no office set up for war purposes was more efficiently and quietly run than the postal censorship.[13]

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[13] Sir Douglas Brownrigg, Indiscretions of the Naval Censor, p. 199.

Censorship of the press was authorized by the Defense of the Realm Act which became popularly known as "DORA."[14] This act "gave control over all statements intended or likely to prejudice His Majesty's relations with foreign powers."[14]

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[14] Peterson, op. cit., 13.

Everything was censored that was published in England. Therefore the only news foreign correspondents could send was favorable news. The home press was controlled in the same manner. When the British censors came upon dispatches from neutrals or the Central Powers, they examined them, and then did one of two things--discarded them entirely or revised them to their own satisfaction.[15]

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[15] G. H. Grattan, Why We Fought, 43.

G. A. Schreiner of the Associated Press gives an example of how news was censored in transit. He was at the Dardenelles when the English tried to get through. After sending eleven dispatches, which had been killed in transit by the British censors, he finally got his story through on March 18, 1915, and then only because the British knew what the outcome would be and that they would soon have to publish it. Because the time element in news publication is of primary importance, it follows that whatever version

of a story appeared first would become public property and that opinions would be set and could not, without great difficulty, be displaced several days later. Although American correspondents did not take English censorship very meekly, and made stormy efforts to get the lines open for legitimate news, the only result they achieved was the British answer that any "relaxation of the censorship would impair the efficiency of the whole."[16]

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[16] Ibid., 46.

Eventually the American newspapers realized that it was useless to fight and, therefore, gave in to the censor's demands. W. G. Shepherd of the United Press relates that he finally got a story through, but only after he wrote it as an Englishman would have written it.[17]

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[17] Ibid., 44.

Finally this restriction meant that

> facts of a military nature were withheld from the public. If the Germans failed to tell their people of their military defeats, the English failed to report all of the ships lost in the sub-marine campaign. If the Germans neglected to inform the people of the actual size of American forces coming to aid France, the French failed to report the full facts of the military situation before the coming of the Americans. In other words,

> none of the warring nations allowed facts that would weaken the people's will to fight to be published."[18]

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[18] Bruntz, op. cit., 86.

The foregoing accounts give a fair idea of the different systems utilized by Great Britain to organize a campaign of "enlightenment" through which she hoped to win the war.

CHAPTER III

THE CREWE HOUSE COMMITTEE

In studying the organization of British propaganda during the World War, one finds many references to the work which was done by the Crewe House Committee. The Secrets of Crewe House by Sir Campbell Stuart is the most valuable book published concerning the work of this Committee. Since great difficulty was encountered in obtaining a copy of the book, the author deems it worth while to devote a chapter to a description of the organization and work of Crewe House as described by Sir Campbell Stuart.

Viscount Northcliffe became Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries in February, 1918. After his appointment he chose a working personnel for his committee. He named well-known authors and journalists who were thoroughly acquainted with European politics and psychology. The most prominent members of the Committee were Sir Campbell Stuart, Director of the Department and Deputy-Director of the Committee, Robert Donald, Editor of the Daily Chronicle, Sir Frederick Jones, Managing Director of Reuter's Agency, Sir Sidney Low, Sir Charles Nicholson, and James O'Grady, Members of Parliament, H. Wickham-Steed, Foreign

Editor-in-Chief of the London Times, H. G. Wells, and H. K. Hudson.[1]

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[1] Sir Campbell Stuart, op. cit., 6.

The headquarters of the Committee were established at Crewe House, the town mansion of the Marquis of Crewe. Its members met fortnightly, reported their progress and submitted plans for the future. The committee was divided into two divisions--one for the production and the other for the distribution of propaganda material.[2]

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[2] Sir Campbell Stuart, Ibid., 7.

The three enemy countries to receive the benefit of this organization were Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria. Northcliffe assigned H. G. Wells as head of the German section with the assistance of J. W. Headlam-Morley. Later, on Wells's resignation, Hamilton Fyfe took charge. H. Wickham-Steed and R. W. Seton-Watson were co-directors of the Austro-Hungarian Section. Propaganda in Bulgaria was carried on directly from Crewe House.[3]

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[3] Ibid., 9.

All sections produced and distributed propaganda literature. For Germany and Bulgaria, it was distributed by

the British military authorities. For the Austro-Hungarian troops, the work was placed on an inter-allied basis, the Italian army taking charge of the distribution.[4]

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[4] Ibid, 11.

As coordination became more and more necessary, daily meetings were arranged between the heads of the administrative branches of Crewe House and those in charge of the several sections of propaganda activity. In this way each section was kept informed of the work of the other sections.[5]

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[5] Ibid, 11.

The success of Crewe House was in no small measure due to the cooperation it received from the other government departments. The Foreign Office, War Office, Admiralty, Treasury, Ministry of Information, Stationery Office, and many other willingly placed their resources at the disposal of Crewe House.[6]

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[6] Ibid, 16.

The most important officials in the entire organization was that of the liaison officers. C. J. Phillips performed this task between the Foreign Office and Crewe House. The Earl of Kerry acted in the same capacity

between the Military Intelligence Directorate of the War Office and the organization of Crewe House. Captain Chalmers Mitchell became liaison officer between the War Office and the Air Ministry. There was always a most cordial relationship with the Admiralty from whom Crewe House received cooperation of a confidential character. Great assistance, especially in the use of its wireless service, came to Crewe House by the Ministry of Information which had been very efficiently organized by Lord Beaverbrook.[7]

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[7] Ibid, 17.

Above all, no trouble was involved in regard to expenditures. The most perfect arrangements were always made through C. S. Kent, who was Financial Controller and Accounting Officer. According to the reports from his department, the expenses for Crewe House from September 1 to December 31, 1918, were slightly more than 31,000 pounds.[8]

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[8] Ibid, 18.

Finally, it was the Stationery Department that lent the greatest aid by taking care of the printing of millions of leaflets and other publications required by Crewe House to be distributed in the enemy countries.[9]

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[9] Ibid, 19.

Of the three enemy countries, the Crewe House committee decided to attack the weakest, Austria-Hungary, first. As we are chiefly concerned here with propaganda in Germany we will give a brief summary of the work done in Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria.

The first objective that Wickham-Steed and Seton-Watson had in mind was to work on the anti-Hapsburg and anti-German sentiment prevalent throughout the Dual Monarchy. The two objectives, one destructive, the other constructive, were first, to give moral and active support to those nations which desired independence, but at the same time they aimed at forming a strong non-German chain of Central European and Danubian States. The second objective encouraged apathy in fighting in behalf of the Central Empires, thus weakening the Austro-Hungarian armies as a fighting force, thereby embarrassing the German Leaders.[10]

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[10] Ibid, 21.

Northcliffe sent Steed and Seton-Watson to Italy as representatives to the Congress of the oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities which met at the invitation of the Italian Premier, Signor Orlando, at Rome on April 7, 8, and 9, 1918. This assembly, which was an important act of propaganda, was represented by Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Southern Slavs, Italians, and Rumanians.

In the proclamation of the right of national unity of these peoples they were resolved upon a common action. They also agreed to conform to the decisions arrived at between the Italians and Southern Slavs of London. Signor Orlando, Signor Bissoluti and other Italian Ministers also publicly expressed their adherence to the resolutions.[11]

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[11] Ibid., 25.

After this Congress the English representatives did not delay to inform the Slavs of Bosnia, Croatia, and Herzegoviana, the Czechs of Bohemia, the Slovaks of the Western Carpathians, the Rumanians of Transylvania, and the Poles of Galicia, that the only way they would win their freedom from Austria-Hungary was in the defeat of the Central Powers and in the victory of the Allies. They were urged to use every means possible to bring about an Allied victory.[12]

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[12] H. Fyfe, Northcliffe, An Intimate Biography, 241.

To bring this about

> A printing press works night and day, turning out leaflets, pictures with a religious or nationalist appeal, a weekly-newspaper, in four languages. Aeroplanes drop these in parcels over the Austrian trenches and in villages where troops are resting. They are shot across No Man's Land in rockets; they

> are thrown in hand grenades. Patrols composed of Slav, Polish, Rumanian, and Czech deserters, all sent out laden with literature to get in touch with enemy patrols and urge others to desert.[13]

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[13] Ibid., 241.

Concerning Bulgaria, Northcliffe outlined four essential conditions to be accomplished. King Ferdinand and his family must be banished. All connections with Germany must be severed. A democratic government must be set up. Under the protection of the Allied Powers and the United States, Bulgaria was to be orientated toward a Balkan confederation.[14]

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[14] Ibid., 141.

In both Austria and Bulgaria, Northcliffe's propaganda was most successful. Commenting on it in May, 1918, Lloyd George expressed the hope that the admirable work done in the Austro-Hungarian army would be repeated in Germany to disintegrate the morale of the German Army.[15]

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[15] Fyfe, op. cit., 241.

CHAPTER IV

BRITISH PROPAGANDA IN GERMANY

For a long time propaganda in Germany made little progress. The campaign had been conducted almost single-handed by S. A. Guest, who had charge of distribution of propaganda through civil channels. Early in 1916, Lieutenant General Sir George MacDonough became Director of Military Intelligence. Mainly through his efforts and those of Brigadier General G. K. Cockerill, a propaganda branch of the Military Intelligence Department of the War Office was established.[1] In the spring of 1916 a sub-

[1] C. Stuart, op. cit., 52.

section of the Military Intelligence Department prepared leaflets in German for distribution among enemy troops.[2]

[2] Ibid., 54.

These leaflets were used to "enlighten" the German people on those facts of the war which were being kept from them by their government through censorship, to cause despair among the German people by pointing out to them that

theirs was a losing cause, and to raise their hopes in the thought that other nations, not their own, would give them the desired peace and comforts for which they longed, and lastly, to use every possible means to break up the unity of the German Empire.[3]

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[3] Bruntz, op. cit., 85.

One of the earliest publications was a weekly newspaper, Le Courrier de L'Air, which contained news in French for circulation among the French and Belgian inhabitants of occupied districts. This newspaper, save for one short break, was regularly distributed by air until the end of the war and was greatly valued by those who otherwise would have received "news" from German sources.[4]

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[4] Stuart, op. cit., 53.

Another publication, the "Truppen Nachrichtenblatt," kept the Germans "informed" about the war. One of the issues had the following headlines: "German General Flees"; "Two Armies Destroyed"; "30,000 Men Surrendered," and "Bulgarians Retreat 160 Kilometers." The final paragraph of the paper stated that only the German people themselves could bring about an improvement by putting an end to

autocracy, militarism, Pan-Germanism, "and the ancient things which other nations have long abolished."[5]

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[5] G. C. Bruntz, op. cit., 88.

On the economic front the German people had been forbidden to talk about the food situation in Germany, but the Allies managed to find out about Germany's growing anxiety in regard to it. One leaflet sent into Germany compared the menu of a German worker in 1915 with that of 1917. The leaflet was entitled:

Slow Starvation

The Workers' menu of 1915 was:

1. Early morning lunch (5:45, a. m.)
   4 slices of bread with butter or fresh lard, cheese or sausage, coffee.
2. Breakfast (8:00, a. m.)
   Bread and cheese sandwich with coffee.
3. Noon meal
   Meat or fish, potatoes (any amount)
4. Supper
   Soup, meat or fish, potatoes, peas, rice or hominy.

In April, 1917, it was different

1. Breakfast
   2 pieces of dry bread and potatoes.
2. Dinner
   Cooked beets one day, and next day cooked seaweeds or beets and a few potatoes.[6]

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[6] Leaflet A. P. 9. Quoted in Bruntz, op. cit., 162.

Again and again the leaflets repeated the same question: "Why are you fighting?" And then the answer was given in the following way:

> They tell you that you are fighting to secure victory for your Fatherland. But have you ever thought about what you are fighting for?
>
> You are fighting for the glory of and for the enrichment of the Krupps. You are fighting to save the Kaiser, the Junkers and the War Lords, who caused the war, from the anger of the people.
>
> . . . . .
>
> You have been promised victory and peace. You poor fool! Your comrades were also promised these things more than three years ago. Peace indeed they have found--deep in the grave. But victory did not come.
>
> . . . . .
>
> Is it for the Fatherland, you say, that you go out as a brave patriot--to death for the Fatherland?
>
> But of what does the Fatherland consist? Is it the Kaiser with his fine speeches? Is it the Crown Prince with his jolly companions . . . . . Is it Hindenburg, who sits with Ludendorf, both covered with medals many kilometers behind you . . . . No, the Fatherland is not any of these. You are the Fatherland, Michel. You and your sisters and your wives and your parents and your children. You, the Common people are the Fatherland.
>
> . . . . .
>
> Arrayed against Germany in battle today stands the entire world because it knows that German rulers caused the war to serve their own greedy ambition. The entire power of the Western World stands behind England and France and America. An army of

> ten million men is being prepared. Soon it will go forth to battle. Have you thought of that, Michel?[7]

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[7] "Air Post", No. 12 (Hoover War Library Files). Quoted in W. H. Cooke and E. P. Stickney, Readings in European International Relations Since 1789., 552.

But hope also was held out to the German soldiers who, the propagandists claimed, were fighting a losing battle and in the end would surely be defeated. The soldiers were urged to surrender to the Allies. They were told that many had done so and were now enjoying good food and fine treatment and above all peace. These appeals were made by words and pictures. In order to obtain a lasting peace the German soldiers must overthrow their autocratic and militaristic government, expel the Hohenzollerns and set up a democratic government. After this was accomplished, they were assured that they would be regarded with honor and respect by the other nations. The Allies promised them peace, freedom, respect and bread. How many German soldiers deserted to the Allies because of the propaganda of hope, no one knows. It is certain, however, that propaganda of hope played an important part in weakening the morale of the war-weary German troops and people behind the lines.[8]

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[8] G. C. Bruntz, op. cit., 113.

That the German Officials were seriously concerned about this method of propaganda is shown from the fact that the German Generals issued orders against these leaflets. The following is an example:

General Order of the 18th Army
August 29, 1918
Army Order

> The enemy begins to realize that we cannot be crushed by blockade, superiority of numbers, or force of arms. He is therefore trying a last resort: while engaging to the utmost his military force, he is racking his imagination for ruses, trickery, and other underhand methods, of which he is the past master, to induce in the minds of the German people a doubt in their invincibility. He has founded for this purpose a special ministry, "The Ministry for the Destruction of the German Confidence," at the head of which he has put the most thorough going rascal (der geriebenste Schurke) of all the Entente, Lord Northcliffe. He has been given billions for use in influencing the opinion in the interior of the country, and at the front by paid agents, the assassination of ambassadors, and all the other ways in favor with the Entente. The method employed by Northcliffe at the front is to distribute through aviators a constantly increasing number of leaflets and pamphlets. The letters of German prisoners are falsified in the most outrageous way; tracts and pamphlets are concocted to which the names of German poets, writers and statesmen are forged, or which present an appearance of having been printed in Germany, and bear, for example, the title of the Reclam set, when they really come from the Northcliffe press, which is working day and night for this sole purpose. His thought and aim is that these forgeries, however obvious they may appear to a man who thinks

> twice, may suggest a doubt, even for a moment, in the minds of those who do not think for themselves, and that their confidence in their leaders, in their own strength, and in the inexhaustible resources of Germany may be shattered. Fortunately, Northcliffe, "the Minister of Destruction of German Confidence," forgets that German soldiers are neither Negroes nor Hindus, nor illiterate French, English or Americans, incapable of seeing through such machinations.
>
> Explain these infamous attempts to your young and inexperienced comrades and tell them what our mortal enemy expects of them and what is at stake.
>
> Pick up the leaflets and pamphlets and give them to your commanders for transmission to the High Command, which will be able to make valuable deductions from them as to the aims of our enemies. You will thus help the Command, and you will also help to hasten the hour of victory.
>
> - von Hutier
> Infantry General and Army Commander[9]

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[9] Summary of Information, American Expeditionary Force, General Staff, III, No. 171, September 19, 1918, p. 1126. Quoted in R. H. Lutz, Fall of the German Empire, Vol. 1, 162.

General von Hindenburg issued a manifesto on September 2, 1918, concerning the leaflets. He stated that since England could not conquer Germany by force of arms, she had begun to wage a war against the German spirit, using for her weapons a "drum-fire" of printed paper. He enumerated the number of leaflets which had been found and turned in on the Western front--84,000 in May; 120,000 in June; and 300,000 in July. He informed the people that

the propagandists, besides assailing those at the front, were striving to poison the spirit of those at home, and that while the balloons were not carrying the leaflets into the homeland area, the enemy hoped that those at the front "would send home the leaflet that so harmlessly fluttered down from the air." He further stated that many people were imbibing the poison. Von Hindenburg warned them that

> if one of these poisoned morsels in the form of a leaflet or rumor comes to your ears or eyes, remember it comes from the enemy and that nothing comes from the enemy that is of any service to Germany. That is what everyone must say to himself, no matter to what class or party he belongs. If you meet anyone, who may be in name or origin German but in heart is in the enemy's camp, keep him at a distance and despise him. Be on your guard German Army and German Home![10]

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10 R. H. Lutz, op. cit., 165.

At first the leaflets were dropped from aeroplanes, but the angry protests from the Germans intimidated the army officers and consequently the British authorities gave orders that the use of aeroplanes for the distribution of propaganda would be discontinued.[11] A substitute,

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11 C. Stuart, op. cit., 54.

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therefore, had to be found to get the leaflets over the

enemy's lines. Hand grenades and the French mortar were tried. Finally free balloons were considered most satisfactory. Designs and apparatus were tested in England. They were taken to France and tried under the actual conditions of war, and gradually "each difficulty was overcome and each detail reduced to its simplest form."[12]

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[12] C. Stuart, op. cit., 55.

The balloons that carried the leaflets to the enemy country were made of paper, cut in longitudinal lengths with a neck of oiled silk about 18 inches long. The diameter of the balloon was about twenty feet, and its height, when inflated, was eight feet. The balloons were inflated to nearly full capacity as they were sent up with 90 to 95 cubic feet of hydrogen. The weight of the balloon was less than one pound and the weight of the leaflets were a little more than four pounds. The leaflets were fastened to a piece of cotton, treated to act as a fuse--similar to the device used in flint pipe lighters. This fuse burned at the rate of an inch every five minutes. A string of leaflets were attached to the neck of the balloon and just before its ascent a small hole was made in the neck of the balloon to allow the gas to escape, and then the end of the fuse was lighted. The weights were so adjusted that the balloon rose quickly into the air

several thousand feet before the loss of gas, due to expansion, destroyed the lifting power of the balloon. The large bulk of propaganda material was distributed over an area extending from ten to fifty miles behind the enemy lines.[13]

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13 C. Stuart, The Times History of the War, XXI, 325; op. cit., 57.

The leaflets sent into Germany may be divided into two classes--"stock" leaflets, which would have an appropriate effect upon the enemy at any time, and "priority" leaflets, which contained material of immediate importance. These were printed three times a week and distributed in editions of 100,000 copies.[14] In June and July, 1918, the

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14 C. Stuart, op. cit., 91.

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number of leaflets dropped over the German lines and behind them totalled 1,869,457 and 2,172,794 respectively. During August an average of over 100,000 a day was attained, the actual number of leaflets issued by the Enemy Propaganda Department in that month being 3,958,116; in September, 3,715,000; and in October, 5,360,000. In the first ten days of November before the Armistice put an end to such activities, 1,400,000 were sent out. Naturally the Germans were greatly disturbed. One German writer

described the flood of leaflets picturesquely as "English poison raining down from God's clear sky."[15] Thus were the German soldiers bombarded with propaganda. It was only the Armistice that saved Germany from being buried under an avalanche of paper.[16]

[15] Ibid., 93.

[16] R. H. Lutz, Journal of Modern History, V. 501.

In 1918, Lord Northcliffe appointed H. G. Wells to be the director of the preparation of propaganda literature to be distributed among the Germans. With the cooperation of J. W. Headlam-Morley, Wells worked out a "Memorandum" in which the purpose and aims of Allied Propaganda were outlined. "Its main object," writes George G. Bruntz,

> was to set up an organization of free nations against Germany and then bring home to the German people the fact that a world organization existed which was pledged to seek the overthrow of the German militarists. He proposed that this organization should control the raw materials and the shipping, and that it should have power to exclude for an indefinite period the enemy, or even neutrals, until they should subscribe to and give pledges of their acceptance of the principles of the 'League of Nations'. . . Though he did not mention the overthrow of the German Government as one of his aims, he implied as much. 'The

> fact has to be faced!' he said, 'that while the present German Government remains, no such economic resumption is possible.'[17]

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[17] G. C. Bruntz, op. cit., 27; Stuart, op. cit., 78. The complete text of this memorandum may be found in Stuart, op. cit., 65-86.

This, then, was the organization England used to conquer the enemy in a battle of words.

CHAPTER V

"HANDS ACROSS THE SEA."

At the Pilgrim's Banquet in London, on June 6, 1913, Walter Hines Page, the United States Ambassador to England, made a speech in which he declared that the friendship between England and America

> is an inspiring spectacle, and history can show none other such: these two great kindred nations, one on each side of the well-ploughed sea that unites them, standing at the end of a century of peace, liberty-loving as of old, and forward looking, confident of the broadening of the bounds of freedom yet; regarding government as a living, ever-changing instrument of human progress, made by man for man's advancement and not for mere maintenance of any political creed, yet none the less cautious in experiment and change.[1]

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[1] Mary E. Sprott, A Survey of British War Time Propaganda in America Issued from Wellington House, 68.

This speech resulted in a "Hands Across the Sea" movement in which Liberty was pictured shaking hands with the British goddess, Britannia.[2] This amicable relationship, had not always existed, but strangely

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[2] Ibid., 69.

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enough, had grown out of disputes and misunderstandings concerning the Northeastern Fisheries, Bering Sea, and Venezuela. Astute British politicians, realizing that it would be to their advantage when future help from America should be needed, brushed aside all quarrels and dissensions and urged Englishmen to "woo American friendship rather than court her hostility."[3] The final

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[3] C. C. Tansill, America Goes to War, 9.

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victory in the winning of America's friendship came when England offered her moral support in the Spanish-American War.

In the meantime what had been the relationship between Germany and the United States? Could the Ambassador in Berlin have given a speech similar to that given by Walter Hines Page in London, declaring that the two nations were closely knit by bonds of friendship resulting in a picturesque handclasp?

In 1870, this question could have been answered in the affirmative. For at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, the majority of the American presses expressed sympathy for Germany. There were many reasons for this. German-Americans had fought on the side of the Union during the Civil War, whereas France had sympathized with

and aided the Confederacy. Then, too, Germany in 1870, was fighting for unification against French imperialism, and, finally, Germany was lauded for overthrowing the despotism of Napoleon III.[4]

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[4] C. E. Schieber, "The Transformation of American Sentiment Towards Germany, 1870-1914", Journal of International Relations, July 1, 1921, 55.

A change in German-American relations became apparent after 1871. The rapid growth of both nations in commerce effected a certain resentment toward Germany in regard to her growth in trade and colonization, in her general imperialistic attitude, and in her policy of militarism. There were differences in foreign relations. In 1889, the American press mentioned the probability of a war with Germany because of the Samoan affair.[5] In 1898,

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[5] C. C. Tansill, op. cit., 8.

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the conduct of Admiral von Diedrichs in the Philippines was considered most unfriendly. American representatives in China at the time of the Boxer Rebellion became gravely concerned about German's occupation of Shantung. In Latin America, Germany was becoming too successful in obtaining markets. In 1902-1903, there had been a decided clash between the United States and Germany over Venezuela. By the opening of the present century, anti-German feeling

had been much aroused in this country. Germany's efforts to counteract this feeling through the visit of Prince Henry in 1902, the gift of a statue of Frederick in 1905, and exchange professorships, were not successful. We were more pro-Entente than pro-German when "Prinsig began his target practice in the spring of 1914."[6]

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[6] Harry E. Barnes, Genesis of the World War, 592.

England took advantage of this anti-German attitude by immediately setting up her propaganda technique in the United States. Sir Gilbert Parker was appointed to take charge of the division of Wellington House which had charge of propaganda in America. The first step undertaken by Parker was to analyze American opinion in the press and in the universities and colleges. A careful scrutiny was made of the American Who's Who from which the names of prominent men were selected and a mailing list prepared. To those whose names appeared on this list, Wellington House sent out propaganda literature.

> Sometimes the books and pamphlets had enclosed with them suave and skillfully phrased letters. The enclosure cards which came with the books carried only Sir Gilbert's name and address, never any mention of Wellington House. The whole appearance was that of a kindly, friendly Englishman, who more or less was doing only his simple duty by his many American friends in sending them this

> literature, and inviting their observations on it or on the war in general. Sometimes to vary the thing, the enclosure cards apparently came from the authors of the books and pamphlets, especially, when the authors were well-known men, like J. W. Headlam, Viscount Bryce, or John Buchan.[7]

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[7] J. D. Squires, op. cit., 52.

At times even American authors were included in this propaganda. For example, Isaac F. Marcossen wrote a book entitled A Visit of Sir Douglas Haig in which he familiarized Americans with the leader of the British forces. A monthly magazine The War, which contained the story of the war month by month, was published with a view to interesting Americans. A copy found in Wellington House for February, 1918, showed many illustrations of American soldiers in England, soldiers with the King and Queen of England, and Captain Kermit Roosevelt.[8]

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[8] M. E. Sprott, op. cit., 67.

Through the ingenuity of Sir Gilbert Parker the cause of England spread from

> business man to business man, from journalist to journalist, from professor to professor, from worker to worker. Behind the scenes, and behind the news and pictures and speeches, there flows a mighty stream of personal influencing. The War was more debated in private than in public. The

> doubters were won by friendship or flattery, logic or shame, to fuse their enthusiasm in the rising wave of Allied sentiment.[9]

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[9] H. D. Lasswell, op. cit., 157.

Many sophisticated Europeans took advantage of some Americans' love for titles and distinctions, and laid plans whereby the wife of an important newspaper proprietor would be hostess to a Count, or the wife of a Senator would entertain a Duke, a Marquis or an Earl. Sir Gilbert believed this to be one of the most effective means of winning Americans to the English cause.[10]

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[10] Ibid., 158.

Much has been written about the different techniques England utilized to bring about America's assistance. Most of the methods used were primarily designed to work upon emotions and feelings. Such, for example, as the atrocious stories of which the Bryce Report was the most effective. But there was one technique which worked upon American interests, and that was the propaganda campaign to gain America's economic assistance.[11] This was accomplished by British agents who skillfully maneuvered

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[11] H. C. Peterson, op. cit., 71.

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the policy that in the event of a victory for the Allies, the United States would secure immense financial gains. This policy included several factors. In the first place, the British naval policy made American foreign trade dependent upon actions of the British Government. This in turn caused the Germans to come in conflict with the American Government, just as England desired it should. Secondly, the merging of American and British economic interests meant increase of purchases in this country, which in turn would mean higher profits. Lastly, there was the British loans which gave Americans vested interest in the Allies' cause. All this was propaganda in its most practical form.[12]

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[12] Ibid., 71.

On February 27, 1908, Sir Edward Grey issued an invitation for delegates from Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and the United States to convene and discuss various questions regarding codification of sea laws governing shipping in war time. One chapter of the Declaration dealt with contraband of war. There were three classes: absolute contraband, conditional contraband, and non-contraband. War materials sent to an enemy were absolute contraband;

materials that could be used in time of war as well as in time of peace and which were sent to armed forces or government departments of an enemy country were considered conditional contraband. All materials that could not be used for war purposes were classified as non-contraband.[13]

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[13] C. C. Tansill, op. cit., 135.

It was over this chapter that the United States was to have serious controversies with England. Although the Declaration of London had never been formally ratified by the governments at the London Conference, the United States was anxious that it should govern naval warfare. On August 6, 1914, a note was sent to Sir Edward Grey asking whether or not England would abide by the Declaration. Grey waited until August 22 before sending a reply. He stated that England was willing to accept the Declaration

> in its entirety--save for one or two slight 'modifications'. They were such, it is hardly necessary to say, as to render the instrument valueless for the protection of American Commerce. At the same time the British began rapidly expanding their lists of 'absolute' and 'conditional' contraband.[14]

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[14] W. H. Millis, op. cit., 85.

On August 22, 1915, raw cotton was added to the list of absolute contraband. In ordinary times Germany's yearly

consumption of cotton was about 430,000 tons which was almost entirely purchased from the United States. At the outbreak of the war it was estimated that she would use more than 300,000 tons each year for the sole purpose of manufacturing explosives.[15] But now that the cotton

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[15] L. Guichard, The Naval Blockade, 1914-1918, 262.

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trade had been stopped between Germany and the United States, the Southern cotton planter faced financial ruin. The Department of State was deluged with hundreds of protests and with insistent demands that the Government do something about protecting American producers and save them from the high-handed methods of the British.[16]

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[16] Robert Lansing, War Memoirs, 121.

Protest after protest was sent to the British Government, but all the replies to the complaints were very evasive and indefinite. But in the meantime Great Britain

> realized the political importance of these complaints and kept a close watch upon them. They used their ambassadorial, economic, and propaganda agencies to obtain reports on American reactions to this economic warfare.[17]

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[17] H. C. Peterson, op. cit., 79.

An example of this was a letter Sir Gilbert Parker wrote to a Southern editor asking him to report to him, confidentially, whether or not there had been, or would be, much opposition to the cotton contraband.[18]

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[18] Ibid., 79.

The comments and reports which reached the British government officials as a result of their inquiries, gave them definite information concerning American public opinion and showed them just how far they could go. As long as the American government did not use much pressure in forcing Great Britain to discontinue her illegalities, she felt safe in continuing them. But, nevertheless, we know that England was anxious to keep in the good graces of America for Sir Edward Grey stated that

> . . . . the question of contraband, blockade of Germany was essential to the victory of the Allies, but the ill-will of the United States meant their certain defeat. After Paris had been saved by the battle of the Marne, the Allies could do no more than hold their own against Germany; sometimes they did not even do that. Germany and Austria were self-supporting in the huge supply of munitions. The Allies soon became dependent for an adequate supply on the United States. If we quarrelled with the United States we could not get that supply. It was better therefore to carry on the war without blockade, if need be than to incur a break with the United States about contraband and thereby deprive the Allies of the resources necessary to carry on

> the war at all or with any chance of success. The object of diplomacy, therefore, was to secure the maximum of blockade that could be enforced without a rupture with the United States . . . . .
>
> It was evident that the first step was to put on the list of absolute contraband all the articles that were essential for armies under modern conditions; the second and more important step was to get the United States to accept that list . . . . . We were at once on debatable ground, but were obliged to put on the list absolute contraband articles that had in previous wars been held to be free, or, at most, conditional contraband. There were articles that in old days had been of little or no use to armies, but were now essential to them. Would the United States dispute our right to put some of these on the list? They might do so on the ground that they were articles of general use for general commercial as well as for military purposes and ought therefore not to be in the same category as munitions of war . . . . . It should be politic for us not to make the list too large at first.[20]

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[20] Sir Edward Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916, II, 107.

If our own diplomats had realized that America held the whip hand and could use it in order to get the required results from England, America's course in the World War would have turned in an entirely different direction. But men like Page and House, fearing a victory for the Central Powers, used all their influence to get their government to concur with the wishes of

England. That England's cause was ultimately becoming America's cause was seen by the reports Sir Gilbert Parker sent regularly to Wellington House. These showed that Great Britain need not be too much concerned about any serious rupture with the United States, in spite of the many protests sent by the State Department concerning the economic situation.

In the reports on American reactions to the British economic warfare, there were many items concerning "what the United States may do."[21] The consensus of public

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[21] H. C. Peterson, op. cit., 81.

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opinion was taken from press reports.[22]

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[22] H. C. Peterson, op. cit., 81.

Britain had such great confidence in winning the United States to her cause, that she gradually tightened her economic barriers. On the 12th of February, 1916, Parker reported:

> But upon the steps which the United States intends to take in order to enforce its views, the press, as a whole, is discreetly silent. (And although strong notes may be written) there is no evidence, in the press at any rate and at present, that more serious things are contemplated.[23]

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[23] H. C. Peterson, op. cit., 82.

At times when reports were not favorable, the British became more cautious, letting little items come through in order to win the good will of traders. But gradually all controversy concerning English naval rights died away and the United States became a "silent partner of the Entente.

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24 W. H. Millis, op. cit., 89.

Thus did British trade restrictions influence the United States. Although the main object Britain had in mind was the crippling of her enemies, nevertheless, the severing of trade relations between America and the Central Powers proved to be excellent propaganda by destroying all "economic relationships which might create good will between the United States and the Central Powers."[25]

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25 H. C. Peterson, op. cit., 83.

The Central Powers retaliated to England's illegal blockade by instituting a submarine campaign against all ships entering certain specified zones near the British Isles. This was done with the hope that the commerce of the Allies would be destroyed. But it ultimately resulted in America's entrance into the war on the side of the Allies and Germany's defeat.

Another important factor which greatly influenced public opinion was the purchase of supplies by the Allies.

There was a decided increase of trade between the allied countries and the United States in the latter part of 1914. One cause for this increase was the need for war supplies. Many disputes arose concerning the munition trade, because to some it seemed not in keeping with our policy of neutrality, and that as long as the Allies refused our requests in regard to our neutral rights on the seas an embargo should be placed on munitions. England's reaction to this proposed embargo is best seen in a letter written by the English ambassador, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, to Sir Edward Grey. On April 1, 1915, he wrote:

> The main question for us is, of course, the question of whether or not the United States Government will place an embargo on the export of contraband . . . . If Congress meets there will certainly be a fight, and a serious fight, over an embargo . . . . There is also the chance that those who suffer by our naval measures will call for an embargo by way of reprisal. It behooves us, therefore, to act with caution. We must remember that, although owing to our present connection with Belgium and France, we are not so unpopular as we were, we are still unpopular, and it is always good politics to abuse England.[26]

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[26] Stephen Gwynn, The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice II, 260.

But this slight flare-up over the munitions trade was never seriously considered by Congress and no restrictions were placed upon the export of arms. Congress acted in this

manner largely to allay the fear that was becoming at this time more ominous every day--an unfavorable balance of trade.[27] War orders began flooding American manufacturers

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[27] Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, II, 181.

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and business garnered huge profits. Allied orders were placed through J. P. Morgan and Company, which had always been closely connected with the British government. On January 15, 1915, Edward R. Stettinius, President of the Diamond Match Company, was appointed to head the purchasing campaign. To assist him, he organized a force of 175 men. The group greatly expanded the manufacture of munitions by those firms already adequately equipped, and built many new plants. Shortly, supplies were being purchased at the rate of $10,000,000 a day.[28]

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[28] J. Moody, The Masters of Capital, 166.

Charles M. Schwab, President of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, was invited by Lord Kitchener, British Minister of War, to go to England to confer with him about contracts for war supplies. An agreement was reached whereby Schwab pledged that the control of his firm would not be sold for a period of five years.[29] The British

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[29] George Arthur, Life of Kitchener, III, 271.

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paid special attention to the cables sent from the Bethlehem Steel Corporation and the British War Office. Brownrigg gives the following account of a meeting with Schwab:

> He was brought to my evilly lighted office one evening just before six o'clock in November, 1914, by Mr. Albany Petch, his agent in this country . . . . We fixed up the method of handling his cables. Every one of his messages, in or out, was coded and decoded in my office, and its contents forwarded to their destination. This method was followed throughout the war.[30]

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[30] Rear Admiral Douglas Brownrigg, op. cit., 228.

It has been estimated that the Bethlehem Steel Corporation shipped to England about $300,000,000 worth of war materials in less than two years.[31] To do this,

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[31] J. Moody, op. cit., 168.

Schwab expanded the firm's facilities to such an extent that it was manufacturing more munitions than the Krupp works in Germany, and his shipyards had a capacity for turning out a larger tonnage than all the shipyards in Germany.[32] "And so this American manufacturer with the

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[32] Ibid.

German name became one of the strongest industrial allies of the British Government."[33]

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[33] Ibid.

In May, 1915, Lloyd George became Minister of Munitions in England and introduced a program of buying high explosives, limited only by the capacity of accessible producers.[34] And now the question arose as to how the

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[34] A. D. Noyes, The War Period of American Finance, 1908-1925, 111.

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bill for these purchases was to be paid. The British Government made an appeal to the people, asking them to bring out their American securities to finance the purchases made in America, but this was inadequate to meet the demand for money.[35] Then the question arose

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[35] C. H. Grattan, op. cit., 155.

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as to what the attitude of the United States Government would be concerning loans to belligerents. J. P. Morgan and Company sounded out the State Department in regard to these loans. On August 15, 1914, Secretary Bryan wrote a letter to J. P. Morgan and Company stating that

> there is no reason why loans should not be made to the governments of neutral nations, but in the judgment of this

> government, loans by American bankers to any foreign nation which is at war are inconsistent with the true spirit of neutrality.[36]

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[36] Foreign Relations, Supplement, 1914, 580.

But this view was abandoned by October owing to the attacks made upon it by "Big Business."[37] This was

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[37] C. C. Tansill, op. cit., 74.

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accomplished by Morgan's friend, Benjamin Strong, Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank in New York, and F. A. Delano, Vice-Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank in Washington, who were successful in getting Colonel House, the personal adviser of President Wilson, to use his influence to bring about this change. As a result, the State Department declared that, although the government had objected to loans to belligerents, nothing had been said about credit arrangements.

> It has neither approved these nor disapproved--it has simply taken no action in the premises and expressed no opinion.[38]

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[38] Foreign Relations, Supplement, 1914, 580.

And that was the end of the State Department's comments on the foreign loans situation.

But what was the feeling of the country at large concerning foreign loans? After all, the success of the

loans depended upon the state of public opinion. It became the business of Wellington House to make a thoroughgoing educational campaign about the soundness of the credit of the Allies, for fear had arisen that in case the Allies lost the war the debt would be repudiated. The press was a great help in "educating" the public to accept the loans. Munition makers were induced to subscribe and the commercial houses of England contacted individuals and firms with whom they traded and induced them to invest in these Allied bonds. The advertising methods used were those of Wellington House. Names of prominent men, such as James J. Hill, Howard Elliot, Henry L. Higginson, Theodore N. Vail and many others, were affixed to the advertising circulars. Besides this propaganda, Sir Gilbert Parker found it necessary to spend large sums of money in order to bolster up English securities and exchange.[39]

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[39] H. C. Peterson, op. cit., 262.

But final success in floating English and French loans came because the Allies, by raising money in the United States, were making enormous purchases. The Secretary of the Treasury reported to President Wilson in 1915 that at that time our credit resources were five to six billion dollars. The exports of the United States to the Allies grew from $824,000,000 in 1914 to $1,991,000,000

in 1915. And the exports to the Central Powers decreased from $169,000,000 to about $12,000,000.[40]

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[40] Ibid., 106.

Wellington House reported in 1916 that the economic connections of the British had tied the United States' financial world to the cause of the Allies.[41] America

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[41] Ibid., 108.

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had become inextricably involved; America had become a vital part of the World War. The "Hands Across the Sea" movement had succeeded beyond all expectations.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

There is no mistaking the fact that England's propaganda had far-reaching effects in the United States. It is not possible to examine the methods of Wellington House and come to any other conclusion. In summarizing these effects we find that the change of attitude in America toward Germany in 1914 was in a great measure due to the fact that all news concerning Germany came to America through anti-German papers controlled by the Northcliffe press. This phase of British propaganda worked so efficiently that by August 6, 1914, there was not a date-line from Germany or Austria in the American newspapers.[1] Then, too, the pro-British sympathy of leading Americans made it impossible for Americans to remain neutral because they unquestionably accepted the British view of the war. Heading this list was Woodrow Wilson.

[1] W. H. Millis, op. cit., 48.

On August 4, 1914, Wilson issued an official neutrality proclamation, and on April 20, 1915, he gave a

speech in which he stated that he would be unfit for the presidency if he were to take sides in the struggle. But when it came to the question of placing an embargo on munitions which were being sent to the Entente Powers Wilson declared that the Allies were

> standing with their backs to the wall, fighting wild beasts. I will permit nothing to be done by our country to hinder or embarrass them in the prosecution of the war unless admitted rights are grossly violated.[2]

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[2] C. Seymour, Intimate Papers of Colonel House, II, 50.

In December, 1915, the Ambassador to Belgium reported that Wilson was "heart and soul for the Allies."[3] Wilson, who

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[3] Ibid.

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throughout his life, had been steeped in the literature and culture of England had been described by Lasswell as the "great generalissimo on the propaganda front."[4] He

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[4] H. D. Lasswell, op. cit., 216.

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became so involved in the meshes of British propaganda that the policy of peace, he at first so earnestly fostered, was ultimately thrust aside in favor of a British victory. His partiality toward the Allies can be noted, step by step, as follows: When Germany's submarine warfare

became a real issue with the United States, Wilson was requested to stop England's illegal blockade, but he refused to "embarrass" the Allies. When an embargo on munitions was suggested, it was discouraged. When the question arose concerning loans to belligerent nations, although Secretary Bryan forbad them, Wilson reversed the decision. He again opposed Bryan in the matter of warning Americans from traveling on foreign ships. And finally, he surrendered to the Allies America's material, diplomatic, and moral support.[5]

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[5] H. C. Peterson, op. cit., 329.

It was the American people's sincere belief in the phrase "he kept us out of war," that re-elected Wilson in 1916. And later when war was declared the Wellington House reports of May and June, 1917, showed that the people on the whole were not enthusiastic. The administration in Washington was somewhat shocked at the apathy of the American people. Secretary Tumulty wrote to Colonel House that the people's "wrath" against Germany had not been sufficiently aroused. Lansing replied that he realized that the American people were not as yet entirely convinced of the real danger of Germany.[6] But Wilson

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[6] R. Lansing's Memoirs, 208.

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changed this apathetic attitude by setting up the Committee on Public Information under the leadership of George Creel. By 1918 the Committee was producing results--the American people were being "convinced." But aside from this it was Wilson's eloquence that was the most powerful "battering ram of the Allied and American propaganda against Germany."[7]

G. C. Bruntz, op. cit., 101.

America had traveled many mileposts between Wilson's Neutrality Proclamation of August 4, 1915, and his War message of April 2, 1917. But the journey, as far as England was concerned, has ended without any serious mishap. The British campaign to bring America into the war had been successful.

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