12. I do not intend to suggest that Paul thinks of the gift of the Spirit and the new status of being justified in terms of a temporal sequence. Gal. 4.6 and 4.29, taken together, caution against thinking of a cause-effect sequence; for whereas 4.6 implies that sonship precedes the gift of the Spirit, at 4.29 the Spirit is responsible for one being begotten as a child of promise. It is better to consider receiving the Spirit and being justified as coincidental.

13. After completing a draft of this article, I came upon a statement of Nils A. Dahl which coincides with the view of justification and the Spirit which I had worked out. In 'Promise and Fulfillment' (Studies in Paul [Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1977], pp. 121-36, at 133) Dahl writes:

the Galatians' reception of the Spirit, and their experience of its work among them, proves that God has justified them, given them a share in the blessing of Abraham and made them his sons and heirs. Justification and the gift of the Spirit are inseparable from one another. Paul makes no distinction between the forensic and the pneumatic. The gift of the Spirit is evidentiary proof of God's acceptance.

The only part of this statement that I would disagree with is the assertion that Paul makes no distinction between the forensic and the pneumatic. Both categories do inevitably imply each other, but he can and frequently does make a distinction.

14. If this is a defensible view, a striking parallel to Gal. 2.7, 9 can be found in Luke's account of Peter's experience with Cornelius in Acts 11 (see especially vv. 17-18). At 1 Cor. 2.4-5 Paul himself declares that his logos and his kerygma rested upon the proven possession of the Spirit and power, in order that the Corinthians' faith might be faith in the presence of God rather than the wisdom of men. On the observable signs of the Spirit's work, see J.D.G. Dunn, Jesus and the Spirit (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1975), pp. 205-58.

15. I believe that a careful reading of passages in other Pauline letters supports the contention that, for the apostle, justification and the Spirit are inseparable and coincidental. The most important texts are Rom. 8.1-11, especially vv. 4 and 10 (compare the Spirit's presence in 8.6 with being justified/peace at Rom. 5.1); Romans 4 and 8.14-17; 1 Cor. 6.11; 2 Cor. 3.8-9.

JESUS AS MEDIATOR

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1. Is Jesus a Mediator?

We begin by asking: Does Paul believe that Jesus is Mediator? An immediate way to find an answer would seem to be to look at his usage of the word μεσότης. True, it is applied to Jesus in 1 Tim. 2.5, though not necessarily in a titular sense: but the more obvious occurrence, especially for those doubtful of the authorship of the pastorals, is in Gal. 3.19f. This is the only other in the pauline corpus, and here it is applied to Moses in an apparently pejorative sense. A mediator is a 'bad thing': the fact that the old covenant was mediated at all is a black mark against it. Surely, to say then that Jesus is a μεσότης would be to deny the point that Paul is making: and this, for some, adequate basis for denying that Paul saw Jesus as mediator. Thus Cullmann sees the concept of mediation as 'only a variant of the concept of High Priest', and restricts his discussion to Hebrews: while Guthrie limits his attention exclusively to 1 Tim. 2. Becker doubts whether we see anywhere in the NT the idea of Jesus as the fulfilment of a mediator concept. Discussing 'other passages where the same thought [viz. mediation] finds expression in other terms' he comes up only with Jn 14.6 and Mt. 11.25-30.

This to me highlights the difficulties of proceeding by means of word studies, venerable through the method is. It raises major problems of method, resting as it does on at least two failacies.

The first is that the form of an isolated piece of discourse is determinative of its meaning. This is nonsense, even supposing that there were objective criteria by which 'form' could be abstracted from total understanding. The clearest demonstration of this, I suppose, is in cases of irony, where form and content are deliberately set against each other. A corollary is that it is not necessary for there to be a formal 'title' for a particular christological belief to be present and even expressed.
The second is that clear definition of words and their meanings is an essential prerequisite to understanding. But beyond a very minimal level, this becomes a vain and counter-productive exercise. It is clearly important that we understand each other; that in some reasonably objective sense our terms, for each of us, do refer to the same thing. But different words mean different things to different people, different things at different times and places, different things in different contexts; they may even have widely differing connotations in different contexts.

Back to the Bible, then, with this in mind. For the OT, it is a singular fact that there is no simple term which could be translated by 'mediator'; wherefore O. Becker actually claims that 'we cannot find the concept of mediatorship in the OT'; despite the fact that he proceeds immediately to point out that prophets and priests, as well as Moses and the Servant of Deutero-Isaiah, were all seen as mediators. The position of Oepe in TDNT is surely more plausible: "Though the word is not used, mediatorship is at the heart of OT religion." This paper argues that the same is true for Paul; that the concept of Jesus Christ as mediator is a central and powerful one for him. Christians come to God 'through him', and act 'through him'; God comes to Christians and acts in them 'through him'; and also acts in the world 'through him'. Further, he is seen as the medium of Christian experience: Christians live 'in him', as part of his body, of his image. Admittedly, at times he is himself seen as the goal of Christian experience: the church is (or is to be) the bride of Christ, to be presented to him at the eschaton. Yet Paul never forgets that ultimately the goal is the Father—even if this actually needs defending in 1 Cor. 15.24-28.

Rather, then, than making Gal. 3.19f. the keystone of our approach to Paul, perhaps we should look again at this passage in the light of more general considerations.

2. The Central Question

I begin with what seems to me to be one of the major issues of pauline christology (or pauline theology). Why did he think it 'good' news to present Judaism with a mediator? From all that we know of Judaism, we get the impression that however much the majesty of God may be exalted and his transcendence stressed, it was always perfectly clear that God was immediately and directly approachable.

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The humblest petitioner could penetrate the ranks upon ranks of heavenly attendants of the divine throne, and be heard by God himself. Although the prophetic Spirit had departed from Israel, the was still sometimes given, and the was the . How would an early Christian be heard, who came to such a society and proclaimed the good news that Jews could no longer approach God directly, but must come via Jesus Christ?

Only in the light of Jewish and early Christian understandings of mediators in general, I deem, will it be possible to reach a satisfactory answer to this question.

It would be possible in principle to distinguish a number of different sorts of mediators in first-century Judaism: earthly or heavenly, personal or impersonal, and so forth. Perhaps the most useful distinction is that between the personal (including angels and various sorts of human mediator) and the non-personal (the various attributes of God such as his Wisdom or Word). Admittedly, any such distinction is pretty rough and ready. Philo in particular is happy to identify Wisdom or the Logos with the Angel of the Lord or with the primal Man of Gen. 1:26. In Gen. 48.16 can even be used as a designation for God himself. Yet in general I think the distinction is valid and useful, and that the groups function in significantly different ways.

It is the question of the relationship between function and status which I think most interesting in studying these figures. In many christological studies a wedge is driven between 'function' and 'status': Cullmann's Chrisology is unashamedly functional (Jesus' status is of secondary significance) while to Pannenberg status is all-important (a focus on function would lead to 'subjectivism'). In fact in the development of new ideas the two are likely to go hand in hand, and we cannot decide a priori which will take the lead in any particular situation.

To focus on mediation is, clearly, to focus on a function. My question may be reformulated: Was Jesus viewed as mediator because of what he was perceived to be, or did the experience of his mediation lead to a new evaluation of who he must be? The answer to that will, I believe, depend on where we see him fitting into the schema of first-century mediators.

3. Mediators in Judaism

3.1 The Need for Mediation

There is a repeated refrain in the OT that God can be known,
personally and individually. Superficially, this would seem to make redundant the concept of mediation. However, this is actually qualified in important ways. First, despite a belief in his omnipresent activity in the world, God was seen as dwelling specifically in Zion, and indeed in the Temple there, where he was experienced through the mediation of priest and offering. This is itself only one aspect of the universal OT stress on the transcendence of God: that no-one can see him and live. Hence in some sense mediation is essential. The important thing is that it never functions in such a way as to make God remote. The various sorts of mediator, and the ways in which they were seen to operate, need further investigation, and meanwhile we deliberately leave the idea of ‘mediation’ as vague as possible.

3.2 Types of Mediator

In terms of the distinction drawn above, the group of ‘personal’ mediators is relatively unproblematic, though it embraces a wide diversity of sorts of being, from the thousands which are created for an instant’s labour and then annihilated, to figures like Michael and Metatron and the רבי חתחך, who is more or less identified with הרוח in himself, and who perhaps stand outside this schema in a special category. Human mediators too cover a wide range, from institutional mediators such as priest or prophet to great heroes of the past like Enoch or Moses, or contemporary martyrs. Melchizedek, perhaps, would be hard to classify! But of any particular figure both function and status are readily open to investigation (again, excepting perhaps Metatron or the רבי חתחך). But it is the other group which I think is likely to cause greater problems: what I called divine characteristics. What do we mean when we talk of the wisdom, the word, or the spirit of God mediating his work in the world? Are these truly intermediary figures (=, more or less, independent hypostases); or simply ways of speaking about God himself (so that the wisdom of God simply means ‘God in his wisdom’ just as ‘the face of the glory’ [改正, 메ות] simply means רוח in the Angelic Liturgy)? In what sense do they mediate between God and his world? What is the relation between their status and their function? These it seems to me, are important questions too often overlooked in the literature. And I suspect that they are overlooked primarily because they are not the easiest questions to answer! Neither their function nor their status is immediately apparent.

3.3. Angels

No systematic conception of angels is to be found in the OT. Linguistically רוח retains its secular meaning of ‘messenger’ throughout the OT period, while also being used as a technical term for the heavenly entourage. Conceptually there was fluidity in thought between the stars and angels (both = ‘the host of heaven’) at least until the time of Nehemiah. However, the OT itself witnesses to a growing interest in the denizens of heaven; and by the beginning of the first century CE beliefs in angels had developed widely, though the majority of angels appear to have been thought of as nothing more than heavenly bell-boys, and not particularly intelligent ones at that.

There was a great variety of beliefs about angels in the first century, as can be seen from the polemical nature of many statements concerning them. Moore affirms that ‘in orthodox Judaism they [angels] were not intermediaries between man and God’. But this is too simple. This very attitude of ‘orthodoxy’ is likely to have developed in the face of beliefs to the contrary, as Box claims:

It seems clear that such ideas were implicit in some forms of popular Judaism, which are reflected in certain phenomena of the Targums, and which the Rabbis had every reason to regard as highly dangerous to the pure conception of God.

Noll even goes so far as to say that

An important emphasis in post-exilic angelology is placed upon the idea of angels as mediators. The idea is rooted in the OT (Gen 28.12), but its increased importance may be due to a certain ‘spiritualizing’ of the functions of human mediators—prophets, priests, and scribes—as well as a certain ‘distancing’ of God from the world in the thought of this period.

The second part of the latter statement may need modification: God does not in general become remote to Judaism. Nor is it clear what Noll means by angels functioning as ‘prophets’: presumably he means that ‘The most important intermediary function of angels is revelation of secret knowledge’ (p. 30). But it is the priestly aspect which may be the most interesting. In the ‘Angelic Liturgy’ of Qumran the leading angels are said to have clearly priestly functions; and to my mind it is likely (though I am open to correction) that Melchizedek = Michael, while still retaining some links with Genesis and Ps. 110. But it must be remembered that this
is not any angel, but a special figure who is only called 'angel' in a slightly ambivalent way. Certain specific angels, then, might be seen as more-or-less equivalent to God. But ontologically or functionally, or what? I confess that I am not sure.

It is also claimed that the Qumran 'the presence of angel...is a substitute for the presence of the Lord himself' would thought this may be a rather unfair way of putting it. It might be better to say, as Noll does later, that the sectarians joined with the angels in the worship of God. Further, the existence of 'a principal angelic creature' was not in question in the rabbinic period, according to Segal, only his 'identity, title and function.' This figure was clearly of greater significance in first-century Judaism than a casual reading of the rabbis might suggest, as their embarrassment itself indicates. This area needs further investigation.

What is it that angels mediate? It may be easier to say what they do not.

One final word. It may be of some significance that the emphasis of 'not by an angel and not by a messenger' occurs in the following contexts: (1) God's redemption of Israel from Egyptian bondage; (2) God's punishment of Israel; (3) God's providing for Israel on its land; (4) God's revelation of the Law to Moses at Sinai; (5) Moses' communication to Israel of the Sabbath as covenant-sign...Let the theologians make what they can of that.

Well, here is one theologian's attempt. First, I think it is overschematic. Segal acknowledges that angels do redeem and punish:

R. Hillel (PA2)...reports that R. Judah (PA2) felt that the repetition [of YHWH in Gen. 19.24] meant that the divine punishment was carried out by the angel Gabriel. Thus he must believe that one of the 'YHWH's in that passage refers to Gabriel. While Gabriel was not considered a separate, independent power by the rabbis, the tradition attests to the existence of exegesis which allowed the tetragrammaton to signify a being other than Israel's one God.

But this only where the boundary between God and angels has already become at least blurred, as is the case with Melchizedek/ Michael at Qumran, or Enoch/Metatron in 3 Enoch. That is not to say that one could not tell the difference between God and an angel. It would be better to say that ἄγγελος /άνελ has become polyvalent, and can function as a designation for a mediator who does not, as it were, stand between God and men but actually manifests the transcendent God. Hence function leads to greatly increased status.

What does all this add up to? I suggest the following points:

1. Belief in angels was not a carefully developed 'system', designed to 'explain' God's dealings with the world. It developed largely folkloristically as a means of dilating on the glory of God, of spiritualizing valued qualities (e.g. priesthood) and no doubt of satisfying vulgar curiosity about the sparse references in the OT.

2. Correspondingly, angel mediators were not permitted to obscure the direct relationship between God and his people. There was a constant and unresolved tension, I suspect, between the model of the oriental emperor, whose work is all done by his minions, and the model of a God who acts directly. At least for the important things, the latter won hands down, as the refrain 'Not by means of an angel... shows.

3. Because this is true even for the greatest angels—the 4 (or 6, or 7)—we may have here an explanation of why angel-christologies never caught on in the earliest Christianity. What, I suspect, early Christianity did get from this area of speculation was an ambivalence over their mediatorial value, or to put it another way, that mediation may be seen in two ways, either focusing on the thing or person being mediated, or on the mediator.

4. But at the top of the spectrum, so to speak, was a small group of figures who stood outside this speculation, functioning in a very different way.

3.4 Human Mediators

Here there is a wide range of possible areas of study, but because I suspect that their relevance to our study is minimal, I shall restrict myself to some desultory remarks only. In what senses could men be intermediary figures? From the literature, it would appear that there might be several options. In the apocalypses, the man becomes the vehicle for new revelations; and in one (Ethiopic Enoch) he appears to be given a new role (as Son of Man); alas we cannot know what significance this had. The apocalyptic seer (notably Enoch or similar ancient worthy) mediates new revelations of God, as in their own way did the prophets or old. Their major function in the literature is that of keeping the faith alive in times of crisis, and encouraging belief in the
presence and reality of God. Priests clearly have a different mediating role which needs to be explored further. But neither priest nor Temple is essential to communion with God in the first century. Moses' unique role merits him a section by himself, but first I want to look briefly at the various ways in which men might be said to mediate redemption.

3.5 Mediators of Redemption

"The most consistent earthly redeemer figure in Judaism is the messiah", says Segal'I—and no clear pre-Christian consensus emerges as to his nature or functions. But even in the OT the anointed king is clearly representative of the people of God, and this fact continues through the inter-testamental period.\(^{33}\) But the sense in which he mediates the redemption is minimal, and is probably not tied to the status of the messiah (other than his status as messiah). That is, reflection on the nature of redemption does not seem to have resulted in the developing of new understandings of the nature of the redeemer-figure. The same is true of other mediators, such as the meriters of the fathers\(^ {34}\) or the Aqedah Yitshaq. In 1QpHab 8.1-3 the faithful are saved 'because of their faith in the Teacher of Righteousness', according to Vermes' translation (p. 237); but I suspect that the phrase בְּמַכְרַתְוֶּל בְּטַמְיָאָהוּ בְּשִׁמְאִים = הַעֲשֵׂי הַכֵּרֶם (Lohse: um ... ihrer Treue willen zum Lehrer der Gerechtigkeit) indicates their faithfulness to his teachings, not their trust in him personally. He is not evidently a redeemer figure, nor is his status shaped by redeemer ideas. For our purposes in exploring what it means for Jesus to be seen as mediator, such figures seem relatively unimportant.

Since Jesus dies a violent death, martyr-figures may be relevant. There is certainly evidence that martyrs were seen as mediators: the classic text is 4 Macc. 6.27-29: 'Let our punishment be a satisfaction in their behalf. Make my blood their purification, and take my soul to ransom their souls'.\(^ {40}\) But again their act does not affect their status.

3.6 Moses

Nowhere in the OT is Moses called a mediator (not surprisingly, since as we have noted the term does not seem to have been developed); but the term becomes at least a quasi-title in the inter-testamental period.\(^ {41}\) It is so used in the Samaritan Memar Margsah.\(^ {42}\) And it is a commonplace in the rabbinic literature.\(^ {43}\) But this need not necessarily denigrate Moses: quite the converse. However, one strand of Jewish interpretation does seem to see this mediation as implying inferior status. Here of course the primary point is that aspect of Jewish belief with which we began: that God has spoken directly to his people; 'not by means of an angel, and not by means of a messenger'. There is evidence that other first-century Jews beside Paul had to wrestle with this apparent contradiction. Josephus (Ant. 3.89) argues that the people were obliged to hear God himself immediately before the giving of the decalogue (through the mediator) so that 'the excellence of the things said might not be impaired'. Callan comments 'This suggests that the mere fact of Moses' mediation diminishes the power of the words he speaks',\(^ {44}\) but it is not so clear that this is what Josephus had in mind. Moses says 'it is not Moses, son of Amram and Jochabed, but he who ... opened for you a path through the sea ... [etc.] ... he it is who favours you with these commandments, using me for interpreter'. We may couple this with Philo's distinction between Moses speaking as God's interpreter things too great to be lauded by human lips and his speaking as an inspired prophet, possessed by God and carried away out of himself.\(^ {45}\) R. Judah, in Cant. R. 1.2.4, is even more outspoken: when Moses became the people's mediator, they tended to forget what they learned. Just as the human Moses is transitory, so is his teaching. The fact that this is elsewhere also explicitly denied (e.g. b. Shab. 30a) indicates the problems seen in this approach. All these writers, in their different ways, want to have their cake and eat it; and this is a constant problem with the idea of mediation in the inter-testamental literature.

There are two specific occasions with reference to which Moses is called the mediator of the people. The less obvious one is at the incident of the Golden Calf. Philo Mos. 2.166:

[when he heard of their disloyalty he] took the part of mediator and reconciler, ... begging that their sins might be forgiven. Then when this protector and intercessor had softened the wrath of the Ruler he wended his way back[.]

In other traditions Moses breaks the tables of the Law, precisely because he knows that the Torah condemns the people. In ARN 2 it is because it would condemn them to death at the hands of God, for the Torah contains the words 'Thou shalt have no other gods before me'. R. Jose the Galilean claims this was done on Moses' own initiative, and compares a betrothed maiden who is unfaithful: by tearing up the betrothal certificate the offence is diminished. But
ARN is not unproblematic here: Jose's position is strongly opposed by Judah b. Bathya, Eleazar b. Azariah, Aqibah and Meir, who all affirm that the tablets were broken by the direct command of God. Callan comments, 'In these traditions the law is seen as something which worsens the human situation', and has no difficulty in seeing a comparable, but more comprehensively negative, attitude in Paul's mind.

The other occasion is of course that of the giving of the Law itself, when the people themselves request that God speak only through a mediator. This is not particularly problematic to Jewish exegetes, since Deut. 5.28 explicitly approves this attitude. But insofar as it suggests fault or weakness, that is on the part of the people or of Moses, not on the part of God or the Law. If anything, it magnifies the greatness of the Law, too great for gross human hearing. 48

4. Divine Attributes as Mediators

In spite of the dirth [sic!] of specific Hebrew texts implying intermediation between earth and heaven by figures other than God, the Greek intellectual and philosophical atmosphere virtually necessitated such an idea. 47

This is particularly true for Philo. But what part do divine attributes play in Palestinian Judaism? Lack of both time and competence preclude a coherent investigation. I select at random some relevant details. I suspect that the development of such concepts as the wisdom, word, name, glory, spirit and shekhinah of God were attempts to comprehend the relationship between a transcendent deity and the world. I rather doubt Judaism favoured the sort of metaphysical speculation which was the bread and butter of the Greek philosophical schools. But insofar as the questions were raised, such terms became useful as tools in developing an answer.

Clearly each derives from a different area of thought, different problems, perhaps different mind-sets. And that itself is not insignificant. Take for instance the shekhinah. Clearly, in origin, the shekhinah of God was unlikely to be in any sense distinguishable from God himself; the shekhinah of God was God: God with us. But we then see a development; we are told that it becomes first a periphrasis for the ineffable Name, then in some sense an hypostasis. But the language of hypostasis is slippery in the extreme. What does it mean to think of the shekhinah of God, as distinct from God himself? Does it make sense to think of the shekhinah as a creature? And how much can one transfer the answers we give to these questions to the other terms: to word and wisdom and spirit?

I have wandered from mediation; but only because I think these are fundamental questions to bear in mind. How then did these things (for want of a better word!) function as mediators? Were they attempts to explain how God interacts with the world, or only to stress the dass?

We need to be very careful in our analysis of this language. There is clearly a distinction between identifying Jesus with a heavenly person 48 and identifying him with an attribute of God. 49 We therefore need to be clear about what Jews thought they were doing when they used this language.

Unfortunately, no-one uses such language self-consciously; no-one actually states that for him Wisdom or Word is just a periphrasis or a piece of metonymy. 50 My hunch is that in this language we are not dealing with independent hypostases, or attributes of God. 51 The words are indirect ways of referring to God himself: the wisdom of God is God's own wise act; or better God himself acting wisely. The Spirit of God is God acting among men; 52 the Dwelling of God is his own presence with his people.

We need also to investigate the question why, if all these were functioning as periphrases for God himself, some but not others were transferred to Jesus. Why not Power, Kingdom, Spirit, and so forth?

4.1 The Word

As far as I am aware no-one has persuasively overturned the conclusions of G.F. Moore in his 1922 study:

It may not be superfluous to correct at the outset any notion that Onkelos and the others in their versions systematically, if not altogether consistently, eliminate or neutralise the anthropomorphisms of the original. 53

אציו 'seems to serve only the purpose of a buffer...but it is always a buffer-word, not a buffer-idea; still less a buffer person' (p. 53). Indeed, according to Moore, it is 'a phenomenon of translation, not a creature of speculation' (p. 54).

No doubt the situation was not identical in hellenistic Judaism, but
even there one needs caution in assessing the data. Wisd. 18.15ff. describes the Word of God in terminology clearly borrowed from the OT description of the הָגַדָּה (Know) and Ringgren in RGG 3 therefore argues that this implies that what he calls 'the philosophy of hypostatization cannot conceive of abstract concepts without a concrete base or carrier, and thus not without individualization and personification'. On this J.E. Fossum comments

The aim of the hypostatization process in the Jewish religion obviously is to safeguard the transcendence of God and weaken a too vivid anthropomorphism. In Ps. viii . . . it is said that God's name is glorious over all the earth . . . hereby, it is implied that God in his essence does not work in nature.\textsuperscript{54}

But this is nonsense. The context of Wisdom 18 is precisely a retelling of the death of the firstborn—little wonder the language is similar. Is 'word' here translationese, or is it roughly equal to 'command'? Either way, Fossum's conclusions are a long way off target.\textsuperscript{55}

Because Paul does not use it, I shall skip here any discussion of the λόγος in hellenistic Judaism, though I realize that it is relevant to the whole picture we are trying to reconstruct.

4.2 The Spirit

Moore points out that Spirit and Presence (Shekhinah) are used equivalently, except that Spirit has connotations of revelation which Presence lacks. Wherefore Schäfer sees Spirit as 'nicht Urheber, sondern Mittler der von Gott gewirkten Offenbarung' — prophetic experience comes הָלָל and the מָשָׁא is 'durch, vermittels'. But this may be an example of that over-tidy mind which Caird gently ridiculed in Language and Imagery. Because we can define two different categories, it does not follow that we shall be able to squeeze all phenomena into them.

Even Dunn finds it difficult to see an independent hypostasis here and instead concentrates on the relative lack of interest in the Spirit in the inter-testamental period.\textsuperscript{56} He surmises that this is because 'very few (if any) were prepared to lay claim in their own right to such experience [sc. of divine immanence and inspiration to prophesy],\textsuperscript{57} or because of the danger of confusion with Greek conceptions of spirit. The former is unlikely since direct experience of the immanence of God did occur in the first century, though it was expressed in other ways. Danger of misunderstanding is likely to make people more careful in their use of language, but hardly to abandon it altogether. More probably, it was because the Spirit was already linked with Age-to-Come beliefs that it was thought inappropriate as a way of expressing individual experience, its place being taken\textsuperscript{58} by other expressions like the הָלָל מְנָע. Yet both in those experiences, and in the expressions of hope for the Spirit in the last days, it is clear that what is experienced is God himself.

4.3 Wisdom

Dunn begins his chapter on Wisdom with four options: Wisdom is

1. a divine being, an independent deity;
2. a [sic] hypostasis;
3. a personification of a divine attribute;
4. the personification of cosmic order.

He then suggests a development from Job 28\textsuperscript{39} to Wisd.Sol.;\textsuperscript{50} from an undeveloped to a highly developed use.\textsuperscript{61}

But all of this is linguistic confusion worse compounded. It assumes that the word always refers to the same concept, and that that concept must fit into one of the four classes offered.\textsuperscript{62} I reject both assumptions. Clearly Philo (to take one example) can talk of human wisdom very much as we might, without any reference to the 'concept' of the Wisdom of God. So when Jews like ben Sira identify Wisdom with the Torah, but also see Wisdom as 'a poetic personification for God's nearness'\textsuperscript{63} this should cause no surprise. It is, as Marbock says, poetic; and that is a category with which theologians are notoriously bad at dealing.\textsuperscript{64} Wisdom can mean a lot of things; and inter alia it can act as a periphrasis for God's name.

5. Jesus and Paul on Mediators

For completeness we mention the few cases in the Gospels and in the pauline corpus where mediators seem to be in view. The very fact that they are so few is itself significant, though in themselves they add little to our search.

5.1 Jesus

In any discussion of the Gospels we immediately run into the problem of distinguishing the various layers of tradition of which they are composed. This is not the place for an exhaustive discussion; nor is that necessary here. For our purposes it is adequate to note what may have been regarded as reasonably consonant with Jesus' own Umwelt.
The Pharisees' efforts to act as the guardians (and so, implicitly, mediators) of salvation (or the 'kingdom of heaven') is condemned in Matthew 23—but not, it appears, on principle. The problem is not so much that they had no right to open (or shut) the gate of the kingdom, but rather that they abused that right: they themselves will not practise what they preach (v. 3). Jesus implicitly accepts (or at least does not contest) that they do indeed shut the kingdom to others. The argument is of course heavily \textit{ad hominem}, yet their authority is implicitly accepted as being real, if not authorized by God.

In the same vein, perhaps, is the use made of the 'shepherd' motif; though this is clearly a motif of the evangelists rather than of Jesus himself. It is interesting that in Mk 6.34 Jesus' response to the lack of a shepherd (in the OT generally a king-figure) is to \textit{teach}: to convey (or mediate) knowledge of God.

In the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican Jesus pronounces justification upon the latter solely on the basis of his penitence. The cultus seems oddly irrelevant. Although the two are in the Temple, they might as well have been in a provincial synagogue. Is this because the story was preserved by a community which had severed its links with the Jerusalem Temple, or does it preserve an authentic reminiscence of Jesus' attitude to the cultus?

Matthew's Jesus also acknowledges the existence of guardian angels in a completely incidental reference.

5.2 Paul
Angels seem rather unimportant for Paul—perhaps because of controversy about their relationship to Jesus. It is God himself, not an angel, who rescues him from dangers. Indeed, angelic mediators seem to get rather a bad press from Paul; and human mediators are not significant for him.

6. Jesus as Mediator
Clearly the early church was attracted by the paralleling, if not the identification, of Jesus with certain intermediaries of Jewish thought—and primarily those which, I have argued, were developed precisely to explain God's dealings with the world. Thus Elijah, and the new Moses, though present, are not very important, and angel-christologies are conspicuous by their absence. But Jesus as divine wisdom is by no means incidental to Paul's thought, and Dunn acknowledges that this might indeed be problematical, compromising pure monotheism:

The exegetical answer seems to be that the first Christians were to some extent conscious of this danger... Thus when Paul attributes Wisdom's role in creation to Christ in 1 Cor. 8.6, he has already prefigured it with the strong Jewish confession that God is one. Thus he must \textit{sic!} mean that the creative and redemptive role of Sophia-Christ is nothing other than the creative and redemptive activity of this one God. That is to say, insofar as we can speak of the pre-existence of Christ, the deity of Christ at this point, it is the pre-existence and deity of the one God acting in the through Christ of which we are actually speaking. Christ is divine in no other sense than as God immanent, God himself acting to redeem as he did to create.\textsuperscript{55}

But the straw at which Dunn grasps to save his thesis may turn out eventually to break its back, if the blend of strawy metaphors may be forgiven. For I have already argued (in an article of which Dunn himself has written warmly!\textsuperscript{56}) that 1 Cor. 8.6, far from establishing a premise of uncompromising monotheism, in fact does the contrary. Paul cannot but be thinking of the \textit{μέσος}, and he radically Christianizes it. He splits it into two parts, as did the rabbis, but to very different effect. For him the one God is the father, but the one Lord turns out to be Jesus himself, who thus turns out to be the means of creation. The link with wisdom is actually secondary in my opinion. And the mediating role is absolute: δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα is strong enough, but \textit{μεσιτός} δι' αὐτοῦ must at least include Paul's awareness that all of Christian life is lived and experienced in Jesus Christ. Having said that, whether or not one adds a \textit{title} of Mediator is largely irrelevant. Except, of course, that Galatians 3 suggests that mediation had such negative connotations for Paul, and so we must end with at least a footnote on that passage.

So finally, we return to that problem passage which so easily throws researchers off the scent: Gal. 3.19f. Could one who really thought of Jesus as a mediator have penned it? Could one who penned it really have thought of Jesus as a mediator?

The passage presents a multitude of problems, and we shall tackle only a few. The first is whether the \textit{δι' αὐτοῦ} is generic or specific.
Harald Riesenfeld argues what I have long believed anyway: that the article before μεσίτης in v. 20 makes the statement specific, and that the sentence is elliptic: we need to supply another μεσίτης. Paul’s statement then becomes ὁ δὲ μεσιτῆς ὥσος οὐκ ἔστιν: now this mediator is not the mediator of one [party]. 67 Riesenfeld takes this to mean: Moses does not represent God, but only the angels; 68 but this is unlikely. We need to assume that Paul expected to be both comprehensible and persuasive. Any opponent clever enough to see this meaning in Paul’s words would simply retort, Moses did represent God: Scripture plainly says so. Lightfoot argued that the thrust was that a mediator implies two equal parties, whereas the sovereign God alone gave the promise. Betz takes this further:

Paul argues that anything that stands in contrast to the oneness of God is inferior. Since the concept of mediation presupposes by definition a plurality of parties, it is inferior and, consequently, renders the Torah inferior. The true revelation of the one God does not need this concept . . . in the revelation of the Gospel, Christ does not figure for Paul as a ‘mediator’. Cf 1 Tim. 2.5; Heb. 8.6; 9.15; 12.24. 69

But again this is hardly likely to persuade the sceptic, especially one who may think already that Christianity is inferior precisely in having a mediator at all.

If we return to the OT text which Paul is using, how can we make sense of ὁ δὲ μεσιτῆς ὥσος οὐκ ἔστιν? 70 I suggest that the most likely way is to stress the fact that in the text this mediator is actually appointed by both sides: it is the people, not just God, who ask him to mediate. 71 This, it seems to me, is adequate to provide a comprehensible and persuasive argument: God alone must choose, and not just approve, the way in which his presence is to be experienced. The problem is not just that of a mediator, but of a mediator who is as it were a third party.

Judaism itself displays an ambivalent attitude to mediation. On the one hand it may be regarded as high honour to be a mediator; so that μεσιτῆς/μεσιτ in becomes a quasi-title for Moses; yet on the other hand the immediacy of God must never be compromised: direct dealing is clearly superior to mediated transactions, and God deals directly with his people. Perhaps one could say that the idea of mediation, then, can be applied in two ways: we could talk of a mediator 1, who acts as a go-between so that the principals do not meet; and a mediator 2 who simply brings the two together.

Herein, perhaps, lies a solution to the problem of Gal. 3.19f. Paul plays on the dual connotations of the term. Moses was a mediator 1: he stood between the two parties, appointed by both of them as a third party so that the people did not see God face to face. I suspect therefore that there is something of a play on words in v. 20. A single party could act as his own agent; but this mediator 2 is not just mediating between God and men (though that might be enough) but is appointed by men to do so—and there is the angel-host as well, whatever that might imply. Now Jesus acts as mediator 2: he is the means by which we enter the presence of God himself. It was left to the later systematians to see that the only one who could properly be a mediator 2 was one who was himself both God and a man; the Man Christ Jesus. 73

NOTES

3. O. Becker, article μεσίτης in NIDNTT I, p. 374.
4. And concludes with a ‘paradox’ which I can only see as a nonsense: ‘He has emptied all our preconceived ideas of mediation’, NIDNTT I, p. 375.
6. In a recent High Court case the jury needed to understand one of the judge’s words:

After an absence of over five hours, they returned to ask Mr. Justice COMYN if they could have a dictionary. He told them that, in law, he must refuse.

The foreman then asked him to define the word ‘imputation’, which he had used in his direction to them.

After consultation with counsel on both sides, the judge ruled that it meant ‘meaning’ (The Daily Telegraph, 1 March 1984, p. 3).

This might strike some as extraordinary. The OED defines ‘imputation’ as ‘The act of imputing or attributing something, usually a fault, crime, etc., to a person . . . The attributing to believers of the righteousness of Christ . . . Attribution of merit (to oneself); the making a merit of a thing’; and my Roget gives as synonyms ‘attribution, assignment, reference to, ascription, ascription, inquiry, basis, reason why, rationale, apperception . . .’ or ‘slur, reproach, censure . . .’. It is unlikely that any dictionary would regard ‘imputation’ and ‘meaning’ as synonyms; but that is not significant here.
What is significant is what, in this context, those involved in this piece of communication agree that is what the word was used to mean. Well indeed, that the learned judge refused the jury a dictionary.

9. Rom. 1.8; 7.25; 16.27; 2 Cor. 1.20; 3.4f.
10. Rom. 8.37; 1 Cor. 8.6; 2 Cor. 1.5(7); 1 Thess. 4.2; 5.9.
11. Rom. 1.5; 5.1; 5.9; 5.12; 16; 1 Cor. 15.57; 2 Cor. 1.5; 5.18; Gal. 1.1; Phil. 1.11.
12. Rom. 2.16 (judgment); 1 Cor. 8.6; Col. 1.16 (creation); 1 Cor. 15.21 (eschaton); Col. 1.20 (reconciliation).
14. 2 Cor. 11.2; cf. Eph. 5.26f.
15. Clearly the passage is picking up previous references to the אֱלֹהִים מִצְרָיִם (אֱלֹהֵי אֲבוֹתֵינוּ אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם...אֱלֹהִים מִצְרָיִם) removes the possibility of any ambiguity such as may be present in those earlier chapters.
16. See my forthcoming paper 'On Debating about the Christ' for a critique of such approaches.
17. R.J. McKelvey, *The New Temple* (Oxford: OUP, 1969), is wrong to suggest that the two were therefore in any sense identical. This is simply an example of metonymy.
18. We are back to the problem noted above; 'mediation' may have acceptable or unacceptable connotations depending entirely on the context in which it is applied. So there is no incongruity in Isa. 57.15.
20. Details in *TDNT* I, s.v. גָּנִים-גֵּרֵשׁ.
22. Cf. the tradition that prayers should be in Hebrew because otherwise the angel who transmitted them to God would misunderstand and garble them, b. *Shab.* 12b. On the other hand, they had greater knowledge than mere men: b. *Hag.* 16a.
25. E.g., Malachi uses ml'k for a prophet (1.1; 3.1b, 23), priests (2.4, 7) or an angel (3.1a)? . . . ' (Angelology, p. 28).
26. Pp. 28f.; but Noll refers to H.J. Wicks, *The Doctrine of God in the Jewish Apocryphal and Apocalyptic Literature* for a caution over the last statement. This goes back to Ezek. 40.4; Job 5.1; Zech. 1.12; 4.6-10; et al.; see R. LeDeaut, 'Aspects de l'intercession dans le Judaisme ancien', *JSJ* 1 (1970), pp. 35-57 (29). See Tobit 12.12-15. 'The most important intermediary function of angels is revelation of secret knowledge' (Angelology, p. 30).
27. Noll, *Angelology*, p. 122, citing Strugnell. Strugnell suggests that this is because the idea of heaven as a temple came into prominence when the earthly temple was no longer available, though a rival expectation focused on a new or cleansed temple in Jerusalem: see also E.P. Sanders, *Jesus and Judaism* (London: SCM, 1985), ch. 2.
34. See my article 'One Lord in Pauline Christology', in H.H. Rowden (ed.), *Christ the Lord* (Leicester: IVP, 1982), pp. 191-203, for further discussion.
35. Perhaps only one for each individual community.
36. See my 'Form of God', pp. 72-80, for discussion.
37. 'Ascent', p. 1336.
39. Or one's own merits, as Aher's in b. *Hag.* 15a.
41. Goodenough argued that Philo portrays Moses as 'a perfect example of hellenism's ideal king' and Meeks goes further, linking the title with the tradition that Moses is clothed with the name of God. Philo three times uses it so: *Mos.* 2.166; *Ass. Mos.* 1.14; 3.12. See W.A. Meeks, 'Moses as God and King', in J. Neusner (ed.), *Religions in Antiquity* (Leiden: Brill, 1968), pp. 354-71.
(555), from which the above references are also drawn.
44. 'Midrash', p. 557.
45. Vit. Mos. 2.188.
46. Philo Post. 143, Somn. 1.143; Exod. R. 29.4[?].
47. Segal, 'Ascent', p. 1354.
48. Perhaps a parallel to the identification of Enoch with the Son of Man in 1 Enoch 71.14.
49. 'Word', 'wisdom' and 'spirit' are clearly important terms for the early church. Indeed, it is generally held that a wisdom-christology was the basis for several other christological developments, for instance the belief that Christ was the mediator of creation.
50. And yet it would appear that that is how this language functioned in Jewish thought. The evidence for this claim is as follows. 1. In the targums and midrash, and other Jewish literature, these terms are used in place of the Name of God; or to denote the presence of God. We have already discussed the suggestion that this stems from a desire to minimize God's direct action: I do not find it cogent. 2. These terms are used to denote the authors of actions which the writers clearly believe are the works of God himself. 3. No clear distinctions are drawn by the writers between the various terms; they act in the main interchangeably. 4. No clear distinction can be drawn between the referent of these terms and God himself.
51. So also J.D.G. Dunn, Christology in the Making (London: SCM, 1980), pp. 132ff. But 'Spirit' (and indeed the other terms too) is a much less fixed idea than Dunn suggests. A Spirit and the Spirit may turn out to be very different things!
52. Though with specific eschatological overtones.
53. 'Intermediaries', p. 45. Assertions to the contrary are still made, though with no attempt to answer Moore.
55. With the LXX ὁ παναθάνατος σου λόγος ἀπ' οὐρανῶν εἰς βρόχων βασιλείων αὐτοτομος πολεμιστής εἰς μέσον τῆς οὐρανίας ἐλατός γῆς ζύρος ὁ ὁ ἀνυπόκριτον ἐπιταγήν σου φέρουν compare the MT of Exod. 12.23,

DE LACKEY Jesus as Mediator
62. Dunn actually acknowledges that the 'concept' is 'fluid'.
64. Dunn uses the phrase 'a kaleidoscope of imagery' but fails to see the significance of this for his thesis.
66. 'One Lord' (as at note 34 above); reviewed by Dunn in SJT 37 (1984), pp. 403-405.
68. See also E.D. Burton, in his commentary ad loc.
69. H.D. Betz ad loc., pp. 171ff. and note 86.
70. Grammatically it would be reasonable to suppose that the order of ἐνός εἰς ἑαυτὸν suggests a translation such as 'now there is no such thing as the mediator of [only] one [party]', but it is difficult to see how then to make sense of Paul's argument.
71. Exod. 20.19; Deut. 5.27.
72. So Riesenfeld, 'Mediator', rightly I think.
73. This paper was first read at a seminar at Tyndale House, Cambridge. I am grateful to all the participants for the discussion which followed.

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