of persons in terms of the cultural code of the group responsible for the
document, according to the group's expectations of an honorable or
shameful person, or both. What do we not learn about persons from this
type of description? We learn virtually nothing about their idiosyncratic
and distinctive individuality, their psychological development and uniquely
personal history, their feelings and their uniqueness. For even their
uniqueness is expressed in such stereotypes as virginal birth, divinity, or
stellar apotheosis. We know nothing about them as distinct and au-
tonomous individuals, precisely because "individualists" were either ex-
tremely rare in antiquity, so as not to be noted at all, or deemed socially
deviant, hence to be discounted as not worthy of attention.

Ancient Mediterranean Persons
in Cultural Perspective

Our journey has taken us through three native sources of information
about how persons were perceived and portrayed in the ancient Mediter-
rean world. The authors of the pro gymnastic, rhetorical, and physiog-
nomic literature serve us adequately as native informants concerning
those features believed to be important to know about a person. Our jour-
ney through these documents, moreover, has more than adequately in-
dicated that their authors lived in and attest to collectivist societies popu-
lated with nonindividualist, group-oriented persons. In contrast, modern
Western societal forms stand at the individualist end of the spectrum, pro-
moting individualist persons who view themselves and others "psycho-
logically." As we have seen, however, collectivist, group-oriented, ancient
Mediterraneans shared a scenario in which they viewed themselves "so-
 ciologically" in terms of generation, gender, and geography, with con-
stant concern for public awards of respect and honor. This scenario sug-
gests that (a) Paul and his audience perceived human beings quite
differently from the way Euro-Americans do, hence (b) they thought
quite differently about who a person might be and what might be the ex-
pected range of human behavior.

This suggestion should not be too surprising because even a number
of biblical scholars who use the historical-critical method of biblical in-
terpretation have regularly raised suspicions about the rather odd per-
sonality types described in biblical books. Those who have adopted liter-
ary methods find an even more esoteric range of persons in those
documents. Yet we would contend that historical-critical and literary
methods alone do not produce fair assessments of the persons depicted
in the New Testament. We submit that to be a considerate and fair reader
of Paul (or any other writer of the period), the modern Bible interpreter
must acquire scenarios depicting what first-century native Mediterraneans considered “good knowledge of their status system and of what it takes to make it” (Ogbu 1981, 420). In this chapter, our goal is to describe such a scenario of the collectivist, group-oriented person of Paul’s time and place (see Elliott 1993).

GROUP-ORIENTED PERSONS

To begin with, we note that all people the world over use the word “I,” and those who use this word with meaning make reference to their “selves.” But the dimensions of this “I” are not the same in all cultures. We follow Triandis in describing the “self” as all the statements a person makes that include the word “I,” “me,” “mine,” and “myself.” This description indicates that all aspects of social motivation are included in the self. Attitudes (e.g., I like . . .), beliefs (e.g., X has attribute X, in my view), intentions (e.g., I plan to do . . .), norms (my in-group expects me to do . . .), roles (my in-group expects people who hold this position to do . . .), and values (e.g., I feel that . . . is very important) are aspects of the self. Thus the self is coterminous with the body in individualist cultures and in some of the collectivist cultures. However, it can be related to a group the way a hand is related to the person whose hand it is. The latter conception is found in collectivist cultures, where the self overlaps with a group, such as family or tribe. (Triandis 1990, 77–78)

Thus “I” can be thought of either in terms of individualist or collectivist cultures. Depending on the type of social system in question, the word “I” will mean quite different things at each end of the individualist-collectivist spectrum.

Individualism, roughly speaking, means that individual goals precede the group’s goals. In contrast, collectivism suggests that group goals naturally precede individual goals. As a cultural orientation, American individualism was, and still is, a way of being a person that is totally alien to all of the scenarios of the ancient Mediterranean world. Even in the contemporary world, individualism can be found only among the affluent, socially and geographically mobile segments of society. Individualist cultures as a whole, moreover, have developed only where Enlightenment values have permeated society and agriculture has become the occupation of the extremely few. The contemporary version of the individualistic self has emerged rather late in human history. It surely was not available in the first-century Mediterranean (see Duby and Braune 1988). Hence, to imagine persons of that time and place in terms of contempo-

rany Euro-American personal experience would be highly inadequate, if not ethically questionable, to say the least. If we wish to be historically and culturally accurate in understanding collectivist models of personality, we must turn to native models of that understanding, which are adequately presented in the rhetorical, progymnastic, and physiognomic literature surveyed in this book. Failure to use the native descriptions of our ancient Mediterranean informants will inevitably result in errors of anachronism and ethnocentrism.

Perhaps to be complete, we ought to note that anthropological comparisons indicate that contemporary hunter-gatherer peoples likewise fall along the individualist side of the continuum, while modern agricultural primitives fall along the collectivist. So Triandis postulates stages in the emergence of individualist and collectivist understandings of person: (1) proto-individualism in ancient hunter-gatherer societies, (2) collectivism in agricultural societies (presumably from sedentarization that began some nine thousand years ago), (3) elite neo-individualism in the post-agricultural societies beginning in sixteenth-century Renaissance city-states, (4) and the common neo-individualism of the individualist cultures underpinning the Industrial Revolution. The primary reemergence of ancient individualism can be found in the neo-individualism that marks the industrialized regions of Europe and the United States. The United States—meaning immigrant, northern European United States—in nearly all examples is emphatically individualist, with all the typical traits of an exaggerated, overblown individualist culture.

In today’s world, Triandis observes that 70 percent of the world’s population remains collectivist, while the remaining 30 percent is individualist (1990, 48). As a matter of fact, individualism seems totally strange, esoteric, incomprehensible, and even vicious to observers from collectivist societies (note the critiques of Pope John Paul II 1993; 1995). Again, Triandis notes that what is of most importance in the United States, namely, individualism, is of least importance to the rest of the cultures of the world (1990, 50). Further, in the face of the modern anomaly of individualism, Clifford Geertz has tried to develop a definition of it as it appears in current U.S. usage. He describes that individual as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social and natural background. (Geertz 1976, 225)

He too notes that this way of being human is, “however incoercible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world’s cultures” (italics added).

Now the point of all the foregoing observations is to demonstrate that
any self that we might encounter in the New Testament, whether Jesus of the Synoptic tradition or Paul or anyone else, should be understood as a collectivist self or as a group-oriented person and not as an individualist self. To understand the persons who populate the pages of the New Testament, we must not consider them as individualists. The personal, individualist, unique, self-concerned focus typical of contemporary North American and north European experience was simply not available in antiquity. And even if it had been, it would have been of no concern to first-century Mediterranean. Given their cultural experience, such self-concerned individualism would have appeared deviant and detrimental to other group members. It would have impaired the group’s ability to survive. Behavior that indicated self-concern might be noticed but disdained and negatively sanctioned. If those people were not individualists, what or how were they?

For people of that time and place, the most elementary unit of social analysis is not the individual person considered apart from others as a unique being. Rather, it is the collectivist person, the group-embodied person, the person always in relation with and connected to at least one other social unit, usually a kinship group. Contrast, for example, how an American and Paul might explain why they regard someone as abnormal. First, the American will look to psychology, childhood experiences, personality type, or some significant event in the past that affects an adult’s dealing with the world. Biographies in the United States tend to consist of a description of an individual’s psychological development in terms of singular events involving a unique person passing through the psychological stages of life. Hence, an “abnormal” person in the United States is assessed as one who is psychologically “retarded” or deviant because he or she is “neurotic” or “psychotic” as a result of “having been an abused child,” and the like. The collectivist Mediterranean person, however, is not psychologically minded but rather anti-introspective. “Character” consists of outward features; hence, a person can be known by external features alone. For elite ancients, as we have seen, basic personality derives almost entirely from generation, geography, and gender—from ethnic characteristics rooted in the water, soil, air, and sky native to the ethnic group. Being “abnormal” for them would mean not measuring up to the social and cultural expectations or stereotypes that constitute the identity of such persons. A Mediterranean such as Paul, for example, would label someone as “abnormal” and mean by that “she was a sinner,” “he submits to Satan,” “he was possessed.” Such designations of abnormality indicate that “the person is in an abnormal position because the matrix of relationships in which he is embedded is abnormal” (Selby 1974, 15). The problem is not within a person but outside a person, namely, in faulty interpersonal relations. There really is nothing psycho-

logically unique, personal, and idiosyncratic going on within a person at all. All people in a family (generation) and in a distinctive polis or region (geography) are presumed to have the same experiences and very similar qualities. If any distinctions hold, they are regional and gender based, as we have seen.

Thus we might paraphrase Geertz and suggest the following definition of a group-oriented or collectivist person as follows:

Our first-century person would perceive himself or herself as a distinctive whole set in relation to other such wholes and set within a given social and natural background; every individual is perceived as embedded in some other, in a sequence of embeddedness, so to say. (Malina 1993b, 89)

This abstract notion of embeddedness has been clearly expressed in the remark of Plutarch, which we cited earlier in this book:

The nurse rules the infant, the teacher the boy, the gymnasiarch the youth, his admirer the young man who, when he comes of age, is ruled by law and his commanding general. No one is his own master, no one is unrestricted. (Plutarch, Dialogue on Love 754D, Loeb)

“No one is his own master!” Further, this might be illustrated by the value placed on concern for others in one’s in-group:

Our sacrifices are not occasions for drunken self-indulgence—such practices are abhorrent to God—but for sobriety. At these sacrifices prayers for the welfare of the community must take precedence over those for ourselves; for we are born for fellowship, and he who sets his claims above his private interests is specially acceptable to God. (Josephus, Against Apion 2.195–96, Loeb)

Plutarch and Josephus aptly illustrate what we mean by a collectivist person “set in relation” to others and “set within” a given social background. Thus we describe such persons as strongly group-oriented or group-embodied persons. These are persons who define themselves almost exclusively in terms of the groups in which they are embedded. Their total self-awareness emphatically depends on such group embeddedness.

When we surveyed the propugnastic, rhetorical, and physiognomic writings and analyzed the presentation of Paul in light of the native models of person in those writings, we worked at a very concrete level. Now we step back from those native models and reflect in a more abstract and general fashion on the kind of person we have identified as typical of Mediterranean antiquity, the group-oriented or group-embodied person. What follows is inevitably less vivid and detailed than the previous, document-based analysis. We still draw, however, on the native models and ancient data about Paul in what follows to provide an anthropological profile of that same group-oriented person.
Embeddedness

We have frequently observed that ancient Mediterranean people identified and defined themselves as situated and embedded in various other persons with whom they formed a unity of sorts. Embeddedness is a social-psychological quality describing that dimension of group-oriented persons of which all members of the group share a common perspective. This means that the individual person shares a virtual identity with the group as a whole and with its other members. The individual does not sense a division or opposition between himself or herself and the group in which he or she came to be embedded, usually by socialization following birth. A group-embedded person may be separated from the group, but that person carries within values and voices that echo many years after the person might be transplanted to some new location. Previously we suggested the following example: the formation and thorough enclosure of the person in the social reality of the group might perhaps be likened to the formation and enclosure of an embryo in the womb, but in this instance, life in the "womb" is a mode of social-psychological being in the group.

If we were to inquire about what held such groups together, we would find that their social glue was a version of what we would call loyalty or solidarity or group attachment ("love"), and was symbolized by blood, birth, or fictive birth. Ancient Mediterraneans considered themselves embedded in a range of in-groups with varying degrees of loyalty: in family, fictive family (teacher and disciple, faction, work group, patronage), village, polis, and the like. Let us look more closely at the range of such groups.

Family

Family (or kinship) refers to that social institution concerned with nurturing and nurturing human beings. As far as we know, all societies deal with the social meaning of the biological processes of reproduction and its outcomes. All societies are much concerned with the subsequent social support humans require for a meaningful existence, from birth to death. "Family" or "kinship" in all of its forms derives from distinctive cultural interpretations of those biological processes and those outcomes. The dominant and focal social institution for most people in the first century was the family, whether the immediate patriarchal household of father, mother, married children, unmarried children, slaves, and servants, or the imperial patriarchal household at the center of the oikoumene, or fictive kin groups such as burial clubs. Males, for example, are known in terms of their father and his extended family. Note that when people are

first introduced in New Testament documents, we commonly read that they are the "son of so-and-so":

Simon, son of John (Matt. 16:17)
James and John, sons of Zebedee (Matt. 4:21)
Levi, son of Alphaeus (Mark 2:14)
Bartimaeus, son of Timaeus (Mark 10:46)

Although Jesus' genealogy serves a variety of purposes, it primarily functions to proclaim his embeddedness in the clans and traditions of Israel (Matt. 1:1–16; see Malina and Rohrbough 1992, 24–26). In fact, one of the dominant self-describing terms of the Jesus of the Fourth Gospel is his insistence on being son of God, who is his Father (John 2:16; 3:35; 5:17; 6:57; 8:16; 10:15; 12:49). Identity, however, resides not just in one's father but in one's father's father, their clan, and ultimately in the etiological ancestor of the extended family (see Hanson 1989). John the Baptist's identity greatly depends on appreciation of the fact that his father is a priest of the division of Abijah and his mother a daughter of Aaron (Luke 1:5). Barnabas is a Levite (Acts 4:36); Paul, a Benjaminitc (Phil. 3:5). The acknowledged father of Jesus, Joseph, is of the house and family of David (Luke 1:27). For different reasons, it is important for Gentiles to be labeled as the "offspring of Abraham" (Romans 4; Galatians 3), as well as for Judeans to claim Abraham as their father (John 8:33, 39). Membership, protection, and other benefits can be rightfully claimed on the basis of such kinship.

Similarly, females are known in terms of another person, generally a male member of their family. First, a female is embedded in her father's family and so is known in relation to him:

Rebekah, daughter of Bethuel (Gen. 24:24)
Judith, the daughter of Beeri the Hittite (Gen. 26:34)
Aseneth, the daughter of Potiphera, priest of On (Gen. 41:45)
Zebidah, the daughter of Pedahiah of Ramah (2 Kings 23:36)
Nehushtah, the daughter of Elkanah of Jerusalem (2 Kings 24:8)

But when married, females then become embedded in their husbands:

Milcah, the wife of Nahor (Gen. 24:15)
Anah, the daughter of Zibeon, Esau's wife (Gen. 36:14)
Abigail, the widow of Nabal of Carmel (1 Sam. 30:5)
Joanna, the wife of Chuza (Luke 8:3)
Aquila, with his wife Priscilla (Acts 18:2)
Herodias is known to us as the wife of two men, first Philip and then Herod (Mark 6:17).

A household in antiquity certainly differed from the typical nuclear family common in the United States. It included married sons and their wives and families, as well as a host of slaves, servants, and retainers. Moving up the social ladder, households would correspondingly contain a greater variety of people needed for its proper functioning. The “household of Caesars” (Phil. 4:22) comprised a host of civil servants, bureaucrats, slaves, and the like. In the eyes of the ancients, a “household” was the normal kinship group. It formed the primary grouping in which persons were embedded. Yet there were other groups patterned after the household, which we might call fictive kin groups or fictive family.

**Fictive Family**

The followers of Jesus described themselves as a household, for example, “the household of faith” (Gal. 6:10). We would call their grouping a fictive family. Such a fictive family is unlike a normal family in that it is not based on “nurturing” or biological reproduction. Rather, it is concerned with “nurturing” or social support, concern, interest, help, and the like. Consequently, “fictive family” in antiquity designates a group that has the structure and many of the values of a patriarchal family: a central person who is like a father, with members who treat each other like siblings. The teacher, faction founder, head of a trade guild, or patron of a club (collegium) had the father role, while the disciples, faction followers, and clients were like siblings. Through discipleship, faction membership, and clientelism, a person entered another, secondary set of kinlike relationships.

Thus, early Christian groups constituted fictive families or fictive kin groups. They were a “household of faith” (Gal. 6:10) and addressed one another as “sister” and “brother” (see Mark 3:31–35). A bishop who could honorably manage his own household was thereby qualified to preside over the household of the church (1 Tim. 3:4–5). Comparable fictive-family identity would describe association in other groups, such as the Pharisees’ **haburah**, a close-knit group of companions. In antiquity, fictive families were significant groupings in which persons found themselves embedded. We consider several more such fictive kin groups.

**Teachers and Disciples**

Teachers and disciples formed another set of fictive kinship relations. For the relation of teachers and disciples was very much like that of father and son. Disciples were subsequently known as the followers of the teacher in question. We saw in regard to the encomium and the forensic defense speech that “education” was really about formation in humanity, and its goal was socialization, one of the chief goals of families. Thus, education constituted an important piece of information about a person, for it indicated whether that person was in fact trained in a group’s understanding and appreciation of virtue and honor. Just as Luke was quick to point out that Paul was a disciple of Gamaliel (Acts 22:3), so other ancient persons were identified in terms of their mentors or teachers. For example, Achilles was the student of Chiron; Alexander, of Aristotle; and Cicero, of Posidonius. The same pattern emerged after the New Testament period in later Pharisaic scribalism, called rabbinism. Not only did disciples study with specific teachers, but they thereby entered certain gatherings or groups of disciples called “schools,” thus taking on the identity, ideas, and behavior of the tradition emerging from such a “school.” By doing this, an individual person’s identity was encapsulated in group identity. To know the teacher or mentor was to know the disciple.

**Factions and Coalitions**

When we consider a person’s membership in a faction or coalition, we consider another area of embeddedness. Richard Horsley and John Hanson have called our attention to groups at the time of Jesus that clustered around social-crisis leaders called “prophets” and around persons with plans for Israel’s social restoration called “messiahs” (185, 190–94, 196–98). Various figures recruited followers to join them, such as Thudas (Acts 5:36), Judas the Galilean (Acts 5:37), and a certain Egyptian (Acts 21:38). John the Baptist obviously gathered a large group of followers, among whom was Jesus. There even seems to have been some competition and rivalry between John’s disciples and those of Jesus (see Mark 2:18 and John 4:25–30). Such groups, recruited by a central person for some specific purpose, are called factions. Factions are types of coalitions that generally disappear once the purpose for which they were formed is realized (Malina 1988a, 14–15). Given different recruiters, or different purposes, or both, we might expect disputes among factions.

We hear of competition between two factions in the synagogues: one group acclaims itself as “disciples of Moses,” in opposition to another group who are “disciples of Jesus” (John 9:28). The New Testament, of course, contains many references to members of groups such as the Pharisees, Sadducees, or Herodians. Although we occasionally know the name of this or that Pharisee (e.g., Nicodemus, John 3:1), the ancient writers thought it sufficient simply to indicate that this or that person was a Pharisee (Mark 7:1; 10:2; Luke 7:36; 11:37; 18:10). The point is that people recruited into factions or other coalitions became embedded in them to such an extent that they took their major identity as disciples or followers of the central personage of the group. Jesus, of course, is a case in point. At times it seems that Paul also expected the members of his
churches to act in the same way, that is, to consider themselves as his disciples. After all, he claimed to be their "father" (1 Cor. 4:14–15; 2 Cor. 11:3) and "founder" (1 Cor. 3:10).

In this regard, it would be interesting to pursue references in the New Testament to "Herodians" (Mark 3:6; 12:13). Were these members of a monarchist group that supported the interests of the Herodian family? What of "the synagogue of the Freedmen, and of the Cyrenians and of the Alexandrians, and of those of Cilicia" (Acts 6:9)? Are these people gathered together and identified in terms of shared language or colonial solidarity or some other specifying feature? The point is that collectivist persons tend to form few but abiding in-group relations and to take their identity from such relationships.

Work Groups, Collegia, and Synagogues

A fourth area of embeddedness might be one's work group or an association of similar tradesmen. This should be immediately evident from the way persons are identified in the New Testament:

Simon and Andrew, fishermen (Matt. 4:18)
Zacchaeus, tax collector (Luke 19:2)
Simon, a tanner (Acts 10:6)
Lydia, a seller of purple goods (Acts 16:14)

As Rohrbaugh has shown (1991b, 125–49), when artisans and merchants were allowed in a polis, they tended to live together in the same quarter and on the same street. Paul, for example, sought lodging with other workers of leather (Acts 18:3). Silversmiths, who presumably lived together in a certain quarter of Ephesus, united as a group against Paul (Acts 19:24–27). These tradesmen and artisans gathered together to form their own associations, such as burial organizations and dining clubs (collegia), ethnic social-aid groups (synagogues), and the like. The ancient world was populated with many types of groups and associations gathered around specific crafts and trade. Sons were socialized to learn their fathers' trade, with its shared viewpoints and social relations. Thus, when we know the trade of an individual, we know a significant piece of information about him. This presumes, however, that we know the cultural meaning of being such an artisan or tradesman.

Patron and Clients

People might also be embedded in a web of patron-client relationships (see Elliott 1987; Malina 1988b). Because a person received goods, influence, or other favors from a patron, he or she became a client and was then known as "the friend of so-and-so." In return for favors received, the client owed loyalty and commitment. The accusation against Pilate in John's description of Jesus' degradation ritual makes mention of this feature: "If you release this man, you are not Caesar's friend; every one who makes himself a king sets himself against Caesar" (John 19:12). The core of Pilate's identity, then, rests in his being known as Caesar's loyal client, that is, his "friend."

The U.S. myth of the Western frontier idealizes American independence and individualism. But nothing could be more foreign to the first-century Mediterranean, where individuals were constantly reminded that they stood in some sort of dependent relationship, whether to parents, landlords, kings, gods, or God. When ancient Mediterraneans speak of "freedom," they generally understand the term as both freedom from slavery to one lord or master, and freedom to enter the service of another lord and benefactor (Malina 1978, 62–76; Martin 1990, 22–35). For example, individuals are reminded that in regard to their own selves, "you are not your own" (1 Cor. 6:19). The sense of actually belonging to another, meaning that another person directs and determines what one does, is expressed in various ways. Paul insists that the Corinthians "were bought with a price" (1 Cor. 6:20; 7:23). This means that through Christ Jesus, individuals are now property of God: they are his slaves. In other places Paul stresses how individuals are freed from being slaves of sin and death and have become slaves of God, slaves of righteousness (Rom. 6:16–22).

Although the language of freedom is used, adherents of Christian groups become free to join the service of a faithful and noble Lord. In fact, the premier confession of the very prophet of freedom is "Jesus is Lord" (Rom. 10:9; 1 Cor. 12:3; Phil. 2:11). A "lord" in the ancient world was a person who had total authority and control over another person and everything that other person had. Of course, to recognize another as lord is to express one's total embeddedness in that person. Moreover, Paul himself is always "slave" or "servant" of God or "steward of God's mysteries." Freed from slavery, individuals become the clients of a new patron; they are embedded in a new set of social relationships, which defines their identity.

This same point can be illustrated by reference to the way ancient biographies describe a person's behavior as fulfilling stereotypical roles with no particular attention paid to psychological developmental stages apart from raw physiological growth periods, such as childhood and adulthood (1 Sam. 2:26; Luke 2:52). What is important is the influence exerted on the persons in question either by their genius, or patron spirit, or by an enemy spirit. A Mediterranean such as Paul ascribes failures in his behavior to the influence of an evil power over him: "Satan hindered us" (1 Thess. 2:18). Other people violate all social norms of behavior because
they are under the power of an “unclean spirit” (Mark 5:2–5). Josephus
tells us that in a battle outside Bethsaida Julias, his horse, stumbled in a
marshy spot, and he broke his wrist: “And my success on that day would
have been complete had I not been thwarted by some demon” (The Life
402, Loeb).

The Polis

For elite males it seems that next to the kin group, the prevailing
awareness of group embeddedness was situated in their membership in
the polis, that is in their being a polítes (a “citizen” of that social unit). Paul
of Tarsus, Philo of Alexandria, and the like, are all instances of such des-
ignations. Obviously the significance of the person in question derives
from the significance of the polis. As we noted previously, nonelite village
people, such as Jesus of Nazareth, do not have the exalted aura of “citizen”;
hence they derive their honor from family or occupation, as previously
described. But others, such as Paul, are to be valued more highly
because they were born in a “metropolis” or in “Tarsus, no low-status
city." For as we have seen, geography is a primary contributor to the iden-
tity of a person, along with gender and generation.

Socialization, Tradition,
and Loyalty

Group-oriented persons must in some way assimilate the code of be-
behavior governing the roles and statuses of the geographic group in which
they were embedded. This process of assimilation is what handing on tradi-
tions is about. In collectivist cultures, tradition is of paramount concern.

Reference to the group, admission of its past greatness, and confess-
ion of the superiority of its ancestors are all evident in the reverence
given to what the Romans called the mos maiorum, the customs of the an-
cestors. Roman ancestors were called maiores nati, those greater than us
by the fact of birth. Romans, like collectivist peoples in general, were cul-
turally constrained to attempt the impossible task of living up to the tradi-
tions of those necessarily greater personages of their shared past. The tradi-
tions handed down by former members of the group are presumed valid
and normative. Forceful arguments might be phrased as: “We have
always done it this way!” Semper, ubique, ab omnibus! (“Always, every-
where, by everyone!”) “The old ways are the best ways.” This would be
true of ideas, social structures, cultural values, as well as crafts and trades.
While there were some significant technical innovations, these were con-
sidered of little social interest in the first century.

Paul appeals to just this point when he prefaces his accounts of the Eu-
charist (1 Cor. 11:23) and the resurrection (15:3) with an appeal to tradi-
tional authority, “I hand on . . . what I received.” He expects the church
to “maintain the traditions even as I have delivered them to you” (1 Cor.
11:2), and he is critical of behavior that flouts them (1 Cor. 14:33–36). The
Pharisees on occasion criticize Jesus precisely because he did not adhere
to the “tradition of the elders” (Mark 7:3–5; see Malina 1988a; Neyrey
1988b; Pilch 1988; Hanson 1993). Hence, we find the exhortation to “stand
firm and hold to the traditions which you were taught by us, either by
word of mouth or by letter” (2 Thess. 2:15; see 3:6). Likewise, the chief
duty of Timothy is “follow the pattern of the sound words which you have
heard from me” and “guard the truth” (2 Tim. 1:13–14; 3:14).

Evidently the group holds the past in great esteem. Anthropological
studies of “time” indicate that people in the United States view time quite
differently from those of other cultures, in particular peasant societies,
past and present (Malina 1989, 4–9). Whereas we tend to be future ori-
ented, they give corresponding value to the past. Rituals and ceremonies,
for example, function in such cultures to confirm the values and struc-
tures of the past and make them relevant in the present (Malina 1986a,
140–43; 1994c; Neyrey 1995, 200–201). The preferred model of time in the
ancient world was one of social devolution, with the distant past imagined
as the golden age, succeeded by a silver age, a bronze age and the like
(see Aratus, Phenomena 36–136). The best of all times existed in the dis-
tant past and everything subsequent has been degenerating, coming
apart. In contrast, moderns might be said to espouse a developmental
model in which everything is evolving toward some future perfection
(“It's getting better all the time,” as the popular song has it).

The value placed on the greatness of the past and on constant tradition
shows up in the repeated injunction that disciples imitate their masters.
Paul tells the Corinthians, “Be imitators of me as I am of Christ” (1 Cor.
11:1). Paul himself imitates Christ by embodying the hymn quoted in
Philippians (2:6–12). Like Jesus who gave up equality with God in obedi-
ence to the deity, he forgoes the former value found in the law and seeks
only to be conformed to the dying and risen Jesus (Phil. 3:7–10, 17).
Clouds of past witnesses in Hebrews 11 illustrate the meaning of “faith”
for imitation, and incomparable Abraham is often held up as a model of
faith in Galatians 3 and Romans 4. And of course, Jesus commands his dis-
ciples to be like him by “denying themselves.” The ancient self was a col-
lectivist self, an individual embedded in a family. Self-denial means leav-
ing one's family, siblings, and land—the dearest features of a first-century
person's life. This is what taking up the cross (or yoke) and following
Jesus entails (Mark 8:34; see Malina 1994b). The disciples must be like
the master, either in acts of service (John 13:13–16) or in imitation of the
master's fate (John 15:18–20). The best one might hope for is to try to live
up to the model presented, that is, the social expectations to which one is
socialized. Group-oriented people, then, tend to be oriented to the past and to hope to embody the traditions of their ancestors. They strive to imitate those great ones and to live up to the expectations created by those past cultural figures.

Sanctions and Rewards: Duties, Piety, and Virtues

The prevailing system of sanctions and rewards, of course, will manifest how individuals are embedded in others and how they are socialized into traditional roles and values. After all, it is sanctions and rewards that protect the process of socialization. What is of primary concern in this regard is the socialization of individuals into the values, duties, and piety of their respective kinship or fictive kinship groups. This area would form the general code of social formation or “education.” Here we take up issues stemming from gender and generation, namely, the social expectations of gender identity and birth into a particular family or clan.

Duties

The majority of persons in ancient Mediterranean collectivist cultures did not have any rights in any modern legal sense. Human rights were a thing of the future, emerging in Western history during the Enlightenment period. But these ancient persons surely did have duties. Where roles and status are perceived as ascribed by God and part of “nature,” these entail reciprocal social expectations. Because family is the dominant social institution of the ancient world, we consider only the kinship obligations into which persons are socialized. It comes as no surprise that sons and daughters, both of whom are embedded in their father, are enjoined to “honor” parents. The importance of this is manifested by its important place in the Ten Commandments: “Honor your father and mother” (Exod. 20:12; Deut. 5:6; Mal. 1:6; Eph. 6:1–3). Honor is manifested by obedience to one’s father (Gen. 27:8, 13, 43; 28:7; Col. 3:21; Eph. 6:1) and by the support given an aged parent (Sir. 3:11–16). Alternately, the biblical authors censure all forms of disrespect to one’s father and record a variety of ways in which this figure can be dishonored: cursing one’s father (Exod. 21:17; Lev. 20:9; Prov. 20:20, 30:11); shaming him (Prov. 28:7); dishonoring him (Deut. 27:16; Mic. 7:6); robbing him (Prov. 28:24); mocking him (Prov. 30:17); striking him (Exod. 21:15); and disobeying him (Prov. 5:13). A father is particularly shamed by a rebellious son (Deut. 21:18–21) and by an unchaste daughter (Deut. 22:21; see Gen. 19:31–35; Lev. 21:11, 19; and Deut. 27:20). It is the duty of children to treat a father honorably—in the specific ways in which that culture defined respect and honor. By the first century, lists of household duties formally expressed reciprocal duties among the various members of a family (Eph. 5:21–6:9; Col. 3:18–4:1; and 1 Pet. 2:13–3:7; see Elliott 1986; 66–73). A husband must treat his wife with the respect owed blood relatives, even though she may not be his kin. She in turn must show loyalty to the male in whom she is now embedded, transferring to him the loyalty formerly owed her father. Children are to obey their parents, in particular their fathers; and slaves must obey their masters. Needless to say, we would expect obedience to be greatly praised, and it is (Mark 14:36; Rom. 5:19; Phil. 2:7–8; Heb. 5:8). Thus duties, especially those that define roles within the primary institution of the family, were clearly articulated and inculcated.

Piety

As we saw earlier in this study in our discussion of what the ancients meant by “justice,” one owed loyalty to the gods, one’s parents, and the dead. Devotedness to these personages was labeled in Greek as eusebeia and in Latin as pietas. These words cover what we moderns generally call “religion.” A religious, faithful, devoted person was eusebes or pious. Scholars regularly discuss eusebeia/pietas in terms of religious loyalty and devotion to the gods, but we focus on what the ancients surely considered of equal significance: religious devotion to elders, parents, and family. After all, ancient Mediterraneans did not learn how to separate family and religion, just as they never separated politics and religion (Malina 1986c, 1994c).

Performing one’s duty to parents and family was no less eusebeia than that directed to the gods or God. This is recognized by authors such as Plato (Resp. 10.615C) and Lucian (Somn. 10), and is recorded in numerous ancient inscriptions (Moulton and Milligan 1976, 265; Foerster 1971, 175–85). In the New Testament, children and grandchildren are instructed to see to the needs of their widowed mothers and grandmothers; this devoted loyalty is called “piety” (1 Tim. 5:4). In a more general exhortation, the author of 2 Peter lists the ideal virtues a pious person should have, including “self-control, steadfastness, piety, brotherly affection and love” (1:6–7; see Neyrey 1993, 154–55). Where family looms as the major institution and where people are known in ways that replicate embeddedness in the family group, their respect for and devotion to the family is celebrated as a major virtue, piety.

Faithfulness, Loyalty, Altruism

We are so accustomed to translating the word pītis as “faith,” referring to religious creed, that we tend to miss its basic meaning of “faithfulness” or “loyalty.” Faithfulness and loyalty are owed to the basic personages in whom one is embedded, namely, God and one’s kin group. Furthermore,
given a person's embeddedness in family and other social groups and the constant awareness of prescribed duties toward those in whom one is embedded, it is not surprising to learn how concern for others, especially group members, is valued here. In this regard, we recall the previously quoted remark of Josephus that 'sacrifices and prayers for the welfare of the community must take precedence over those for ourselves; for we are born for fellowship, and he who sets its claims above his private interests is specially acceptable to God' (Against Apion 2.195–96, Loeb). Faithfulness or loyalty, then, emerges as a distinct value among group-oriented persons.

Group orientation indicates that individuals should always "seek the good of the neighbor" (1 Cor. 10:24) and not pursue selfish objectives. "Selfish" objectives might be those dictated by one's particular group interest (for example, the good of one's immediate family) rather than larger group interests, such as the good of the whole clan or tribe. "Selfishness" here is not individualist selfishness but collectivist selfishness, an unwillingness to put other families before one's own! At Corinth, such group-oriented selfishness, which was rooted in the greater prestige and social rewards that individuals brought their in-group, seems to have bucked the sense of accountability to the larger group, either by an unseemly marriage (5:1–2), by eating proscribed foods (8:1–2, 7–11), or by self-indulgent behavior at the Eucharist (11:1:21–22). Paul points out how the incestuous marriage harms the group by sort of oozing out and permeating the reputation of the whole group, much like leaven permeates and ferments dough (5:6–8). And the unscrupulous eating of meats offered to idols causes scandal to some, destroying the weak person for whom Christ died (8:11). Promoting the interests of one's own in-group or advancing one's own status expectations, then, offends the larger group. Self-indulgent behavior at the Eucharist profanes the ceremony so much that "it is not the Lord's supper that you eat" (11:20). Other people at Corinth luxuriated in their charismatic gifts, a behavior Paul sought to moderate for the sake of the good of the group. Prophecy is better than tongues, for it "builds up" the group, whereas the speakers in tongues "edify" only their own in-group (14:3–4). Yet both prophecy and tongues should be regulated and made subject to controls for the sake of the larger group, its "edification" (14:25–33). Evidently group self-centeredness is the nemesis of the other-centered orientation that looks to the whole or larger group.

Embeddedness and Loyalty

We conclude this section, "Socialization, Tradition, and Loyalty," by recalling that first-century Mediterranean persons were fundamentally embedded in groups, primarily kinship and fictive kinship groups. As such, they were not individualists. Rather they were group-oriented persons living in collectivist cultures. As they went through the genetically based stages of psychological awareness, they were constantly shown that they existed solely because of and for the sake of the group in which they found themselves. Without that group, they would not have any identity (Foster 1961; Selby 1974). Such persons perceive themselves as always interrelated with other persons, while occupying a distinct social position both horizontally (with others sharing the same status, ranging from center to periphery) and vertically (with others above and below in social rank).

Group-oriented persons, moreover, internalize and make their own what others say, do, and think about them because they deem it necessary, if they are to be human beings, to live out the expectations of others. Such persons need to test this interrelatedness, which draws attention away from their own egos and toward the demands and expectations of others who can grant or withhold reputation or honor. Group-oriented persons rely on others to tell them who they are ("Who do people say that I am?" Mark 8:27). Consequently, from this perspective, modern questions of "consciousness" (did Jesus know he was God? did Jesus have faith? see Fitzmyer 1994, 85–87) make no sense. For such questions are posed with the freights of individualistically oriented persons in mind, and not in terms of the group-oriented persons of antiquity, who depend on others to tell them who they are, what is expected of them, and where they fit.

**Thinking in Stereotypes**

Persons socialized into group-oriented societies invariably make sense of other people by assessing them "sociologically" rather than "psychologically." In other words, people in collectivist cultures appraise others in terms of the stereotypes they share with their in-group. As we noted previously, this means that an individual person assesses everything on the basis of reasons, values, symbols, and modes of assessment typical of the group in which the person has been embedded. By contemporary Euro-American standards, such "sociological" thinking is essentially based on prejudice, because one thinks in terms of the prejudices and biases, positive and negative, handed on by the group. One is never expected to question these prejudices, and given social experience, even contrary evidence is selectively overlooked or considered nonexistent because it is absolutely impossible (like a "good Samaritan," a contradiction in terms, as in Luke 10:29–37). Such thinking is stereotypical thinking.

Stereotypes are general categories (such as food, clothing, society, and the like). Thinking in stereotypes is but another form of thinking in generalities, that is in rather inclusive conceptions. Stereotypes, in fact,
condense reality into perceivable units because human beings cannot hold a wide range of details in mind at once. And human beings need to have reliable cognitive maps of the world in order to make sense of and interact with others. The process of socialization outfits human beings with the cognitive maps shared by their groups in order to make meaningful social, human living possible. Of course, with these cognitive maps, humans learn to assess and evaluate the territories involved. Stereotypes indicate that someone or something is honorable or shameful, approved or disapproved, normal or deviant. This is just what we saw in the previous chapter regarding gender expectations and geo-centrism. While we may not wish to share the ancient Mediterranean prejudices inherent in their stereotypes (we surely have enough of our own prejudices), for the moment let us consider how stereotypes function for group-oriented people.

Experiencing life in terms of stereotypes means to approach everyday reality with its persons and things by using general concepts rather than by taking time to construct customized designs. Stereotypes are like maps, recipes, models, or menus. Living by means of stereotypes is like touring a city by looking at a map rather than by visiting the actual city with its distinctive layout and architecture. It is like dining by reading a recipe rather than by actually eating the food prepared from a recipe. Stereotypes simplify real-world persons and groups, while allowing us to prescind from the rich reality that persons and groups actually evidence. Thus through stereotypes we approach persons in terms of what they presumably have in common with others of their group or category, while submerging any individual features they might actually have. We noted how gender, generation, and geography form the basis for stereotypical thinking in the physiognomic literature. Such stereotypical perceptions yield fixed or standard mental pictures that various groups commonly hold of each other. These standard mental pictures represent the expectations, attitudes, and judgments of those harboring the stereotypes. Because individuals find themselves inserted into various groups by birth, family ties, and the wider ranging links already forged by their elders, group-oriented personalities take group embeddedness of human experience as primary. Such people find it overpoweringly obvious that they are embedded in groups, that they always represent the groups into which they have been inserted, and that other people are thus embedded, as well. The stereotypes group-oriented persons commonly use to describe themselves and others relate to that embeddedness. In what follows, we present some basic stereotypes by means of which first-century Mediterranean understood themselves and others. These stereotypes are basically discernible from the negative or positive labels attached to a given group, place, trade, and the like.

Character Stereotypes
The physiognomic writings more than amply illustrate the stereotypical approach to persons characteristic of the ancient Mediterranean. Recall Aristotle’s remark:

Let us now speak of what ought to be the citizens’ natural character. Now this one might almost discern by looking at the famous cities of Greece and by observing how the whole inhabited world is divided up among the nations. The nations inhabiting the cold places and those of Europe are full of spirit but somewhat deficient in intelligence and skill, so that they continue comparatively free, but lacking in political organization and capacity to rule their neighbors. The peoples of Asia on the other hand are intelligent and skillful in temperament, but lack spirit, so that they are in continuous subjection and slavery. But the Greek race participates in both characters, just as it occupies the middle position geographically, for it is both spirited and intelligent, hence it continues to be free and to have very good political institutions, and to be capable of ruling all mankind if it attains constitutional unity. The same diversity also exists among the Greek races compared with one another: some have a one-sided nature, others are happily blended in regard to both these capacities. (Plut. 7.6.1–2, 1327b, Loeb)

Fuller explanation of how the characteristics of various ethnic groups derive from the places they inhabit, the air they breathe, and the water they drink is clearly set forth in the Hippocratic corpus and becomes common knowledge among elites as well as points of honor among nonelites (see Hippocrates Air, Water and Places, 1.70–137).

Ethnic and Other Stereotypes
Over the course of time, certain ethnic groups or subgroups were labeled with some negative or positive trait, and these labels became common currency in the region. For example, Josephus describes the Tiberians as having “a passion for war” (The Life 352), and of the Scythians he says, they “delight in murdering people and are little better than wild beasts” (Against Apion 269). Cretans have become well-known prevaricators thanks to the negative stereotype recalled by the author of Titus (1:12). Alternately, Strabo throughout his Geography identifies characteristic traits of various peoples. Of one ethnic group he writes, “in the seashore of its peoples … the Phoenicians in general have been superior to all peoples of all times” (16.2.23); of another, “this is a trait common to all the Arabian kings” that they do “not care much about public affairs and particularly military affairs” (16.4.24). Individual members of an ethnic group were presumed to share the traits of the group. To know one Greek, for example, is to know all Greeks, for it is quite proper to generalize on the basis of a sampling of one (Vergil, Aen. 2.65).

With their unsurprising ethnocentrism, ancient Mediterraneans divided
the peoples of the world into "us" and "them." Greek writers in general spoke of "Greeks and Barbarians" (e.g., Strabo, Geography 1.4.9), whereas Paul the Judean spoke of "Judeans and Greek" (Rom. 1:16; 1 Cor. 1:24; Gal. 3:28; Col. 3:11) or "circumcised and uncircumcised" (Gal. 2:7–8). Such typing is found extensively in Acts 14:1; 18:4; 19:10, 17; and 20:21. Certain behavior followed from this stereotyping: "Judeans have no dealing with Samaritans" (John 4:9); "It is unlawful for a Judean to associate with or visit anyone of another nation" (Acts 10:28). What of the Latins? What did they think of the Greeks, whose civilization they deemed superior? In his book on slavery in antiquity, Patterson cites with approval the data amassed by classicists:

The Greek classicist Nicholas Petrochilos has made a special study of Roman attitudes toward Greeks, and his findings fully support my argument. The Romans, he shows, soon developed a set of stereotypes about the Greeks, which centered on what they considered to be the six main failings of the Greek character: (1) volubilitas, a tendency to prefer formal facility in speech to substance; (2) ineptia, a proclivity for inappropriate or excessive behavior, a readiness to elaborate on subjects of which they knew nothing; (3) arrogantia and impudentia, related according to Cicero to "irresponsibility, deceitfulness and an aptitude for flattery"; (4) deceitfulness, singled out as a particularly unpleasant trait; (5) a weakness for excessive luxury and ostentation. But it was the sixth quality that the Romans most despised: levisitas. Embracing "aspects of instability, rashness and irresponsibility," it connoted "absence of good faith, honor and trustworthiness" and was "a prominent element in the popular conception of Greek character." Cicero, in a celebrated case, tried to win support for his plea by impugning the credibility of the Greek witnesses on this basis, and Petrochilos comments that "levisitas here is that lack of credibility which is the consequence of subordinating standards of honor and duty to personal and unworthy motives, and it is attributed by Cicero to the Greeks as a people." (Patterson 1982, 50)

Besides ethnic stereotypes, the ancients regularly evaluated others in terms of geography, trade, and social groupings. For example, Jesus and Paul are known by a geographic stereotype, the evaluation of which depends on the public perception of the place. Paul comes from an honorable place—"Tarsus, no low-status polis" (Acts 21:39)—but Jesus from a dishonorable one—"Can anything good come out of Nazareth?" (John 1:46). Poleis, moreover, were the residences of elites (Matt. 11:8; Luke 16:19); Judean peasants were derogatorily labeled by urban elites as 'am ha'aretz (see Acts 4:13). Moreover, polis differs from polis in wealth, prestige, and the like, all of which would accrue to persons who lived there.

Furthermore, persons might be known by their trades, crafts, or occupations. People have fixed ideas of what it means to be a worker in leather, a landholder, a steward, or a worker in stone or wood. Only trouble could arise if an artisan displayed wisdom or performed mighty deeds that do not belong to the role of artisan (Mark 6:1–6; John 7:15).

Moreover, as we noted previously, people were evaluated according to their social groupings or factions, such as Pharisees or Sadducees or as Stoics or Epicureans (Neyrey 1990a, 129–34). Ancient readers would either know the content of this group stereotype or be provided with a brief summary of the term (Acts 23:6–8). Paul presumes such information when he identifies himself to the Philippians as a Pharisee (Phil. 3:5). By way of illustration, the essential information one needs to understand the label Pharisees or Sadducees can be reduced to a single issue: (a) "the Sadducees say there is no resurrection, nor angel, nor spirit; but the Pharisees acknowledge them all" (Acts 23:8; see Acts 4:1–2; Mark 12:18). Alternately, Mark records another stereotype of the Pharisees:

For the Pharisees, and all the Judeans, do not eat unless they wash their hands, observing the tradition of the elders; and when they come from the market place, they do not eat unless they purify themselves; and there are many other traditions which they observe, the washing of cups and pots and vessels of bronze (7:4; see Matt. 23:25–26; Neusner 1976).

When explaining Sadducee and Pharisee, Josephus described them using the stereotypes of Epicureans and Stoics respectively (The Jewish War 2.162–65; Ant. 13.297–98; 18.12–17). Membership in such groups was not a matter of personal, individual choice. Rather it depended on group-oriented criteria such as (1) family or clan (Sadducees), (2) place and/or group of origin (Jesus's faction recruited in Galilee, in and around Capernaum; Pharisee settlements), (3) inherited craft/trade (scribes). Each of these groups, moreover, tended to associate only with its own, thus constantly reinforcing its evaluative stereotype of itself and others.

**Stereotypes and Social Roles**

We should examine one other set of stereotypes, namely, social roles. Social roles deal with recurrent social expectations. It was presumed that people with certain roles in society would carry out those roles in keeping with society's expectations. What roles ought we consider? Let us start with general roles in the broader society. Within the family, father and mother had clearly defined roles: the father was begetter and protector; and the mother, nurturer and provider. Readers are reminded of the brief discussion of the rights and duties of parents and children, mentioned earlier. Within the political arena, we know of the roles of kings, governors, proconsuls, and other municipal officials. Roman elite society was structured into a clear *ordo*, or series of roles and statuses; a comparable structure existed in ancient armies. Each person in these social
structures was expected to fulfill a clearly defined set of social expectations. Likewise, in the temples of the various poleis we find highly differentiated roles, such as high priests, ordinary priests, and asians, as well as a host of attendants who saw to the sacrifices, offerings, and the like. Even within collegia and other social associations, people had clearly defined roles. At a temple banquet for just one such group, the food was distributed in ways that confirmed the various roles and statuses of its participants:

And when portions are distributed, let them be taken by the priest, the vice-priest, archibakehos, treasurer, boukolikos, Dionysos, Kore, Palaimon, Aphrodite, and Proteuhythmos; and let these names be apportioned by lot among the members. (Smith 1980, 16)

When we turn to the specific society described in the pages of the New Testament, we first of all learn of many social roles: scribes, fishermen, carpenters, workers of leather, sowers, fullers, merchants of fine pearls, smiths, sailors, athletes, soldiers, architects, shepherds, potters, teachers, tax collectors, and so forth. As we learn about the classificatory system of the societies around the Mediterranean (Neyrey 1986b, 95-98; 1990b, 33-42; 1991, 286-88), we discover more about the social location of these people, where they stood in relation to one another, and what they were expected to do and not do (Neyrey 1994b, 86-87). For example, the priests and Levites in Luke 10:31–32 are living up to role expectations when they pass by the presumably dead victim of robbers to keep pure (see John 18:28). Martha asks Jesus to reprimand Mary, her sister, for failing to live up to her role (Luke 10:39–40). We might be tempted to think the centurion who builds a synagogue for local Galileans is stepping out of his role as officer of a foreign military force (Luke 7:4–5). However, when we consider that Romans did not “occupy” but saw their task as “civilizing” the Mediterranean basin, then we see that the officer properly acts according to typical patron-client expectations when he calls in his favor to the villagers by asking their intercession with Jesus on his behalf.

Some Conclusions

These are some of the more obvious social niches in which group-oriented people perceive themselves and one another. Conversely it is through such niches that they inform one another of their identities. Group-oriented personalities, then, take their identity from the social groups into which they have been inserted (that is, generation and geography): as son of so-and-so (as first-born, third-born, and so forth), born to such-and-such ethnic group, in a particular village, in a specific region; and this person may belong to a specific craft or party, which is more often than not that of the father. Family, kin, and neighbors would feed back these clues to the group-oriented members of their circle, who in turn take from these clues a sense of identity and social worth, along with the particular roles and expected behaviors based on these positive stereotypes.

Consequently, group-oriented persons perceive themselves in terms of qualities specific to their ascribed status. They tend to presume that human character, as specified in unique groups and their individual components, is fixed and unchanging. Every social entity such as family, village, or polis would be quite predictable and so would the individuals embedded in and sharing the qualities of that family, village, or polis. For unpredictability derives from something or someone beyond the control of the predictable and unchanging human beings they know. Hence, people need not look within individuals for the sources of unpredictability. In other words, there was no reason to ascribe anything to personal and unique individual, psychological motives or introspectively generated reasons and motivations.

Moreover, because human beings have no control over their gender, geography, or generation, group-oriented persons tend to perceive existing roles and statuses within clans and families, as well as of individual members within them, as ordained by God or gods. It is important for U.S. readers to realize that the person responsible for the insertion of individuals into their specific family, ethnicity, village, region, craft, or party is the divinity. Just as a person's insertion into a marriage relationship, based on parental selection of marriage partners, is due to God (“What God has joined together...” [Matt. 19:6]), so too all other dimensions of human social existence into which individuals are inserted are by no choice of their own. Paul, for example, intimates a similar social perspective when he asserts that the body has many parts; it is not all head or eye or hand. But its specific ordering is done by God, for “God arranged the organs in the body, each one of them, as he chose” (1 Cor. 12:18; see Neyrey 1986a). The social body is quite similar, “for there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God” (Rom. 13:1). Not a few modern historians speak of social mobility in the ancient world. Both the reality and possible extent of such mobility are highly questionable. Social mobility, as a rule, replicates physical mobility, and there was little of that in antiquity.

In pre-modern populations, migration over long distances (between countries, or, in historical empires, between provinces) usually had slight impact since populations were largely sedentary. But internal migration over shorter distances, for instance between an urban center and the surrounding countryside, could play a major role in shaping the demographic characteristics of a population. (Bagnall and Frier 1994, 160)
People were tied to the place they were born by means of ties with people who actually "formed" those places. Territorial borders consisted of groups of people who populated a region. Physical location and social order were two sides of one coin. And because the social order, both theoretically and actually, is God's doing, it follows that there will be a built-in resistance to social mobility and to status and role changing. For if it pleased God to create so-and-so as third son of a farmer in such-and-such a place, this identity then becomes legitimated as the order of nature: "Only let everyone lead the life which the Lord has assigned to him and in which God has called him" (1 Cor. 7:17).

HONOR AND SHAME—MALE AND FEMALE

In our estimation, first-century Mediterranean personality cannot be understood without a detailed consideration of the prevailing social sanctions used to gain compliance with social norms. All societies require a degree of conformity, if only to maintain minimal social order. Cross-culturally, the prevailing, internalized sanctions include anxiety, shame, and guilt. The fact is that all human beings are capable of experiencing anxiety, shame, and guilt. Social approval, equally available to all human beings, is experienced in the positive correlatives of this trio: a sense of security, a grant of honor, and a sense of innocence (see Augsburger 1986, 111–35). As a rule, internalized assessments of guilt and innocence are to be found in societies marked by individualist cultures. Mediterranean society has traditionally employed the experience of shame deriving from public disapproval as social sanction. Alternately it awards public praise as reward for laudable behavior. This reward of positive public acknowledgment constitutes a grant of honor. Honor and shame are the anthropological terms used to express the core native values of praise and blame; they mark the general pathways of praiseworthy and censurable behavior. We consider it essential to understand the pivotal role of honor and shame as they relate to one of the most important stereotypes in antiquity, namely, gender and cultural definitions of male and female (see Malina and Neyrey 1991a). Here we expand on the notions of gender discussed in regard to physiognomic literature in the previous chapter and mentioned in passing in this general view of a group-oriented person.

Cultural anthropologists regularly distinguish between sex (biological inheritance) and gender (cultural norms). Put simply, the individual human being learns how to be a gender-specific person, either a male or a female, from the family into which the individual is born and by whom she or he is socialized. To be a fair and considerate reader of the New Testament, one must necessarily discover and utilize the male and female stereotypes current in the cultural world of the first-century Mediterranean. These are the gender stereotypes into which men and women were socialized as boys and girls. For this purpose, we begin by citing remarks from several ancient Mediterranean informants, who consciously articulate culturally specific understandings of gender.

Modern anthropologists usually discuss this somewhat intricate division of the world into male/female and public/private in terms of "the moral division of labor." Modern theory in this case follows and illustrates quite closely ancient discussions of the same phenomenon. The following quotation from Xenophon elaborates on the cultural definition of male/public and female/private.

Human beings live not in the open air, like beasts, but obviously need shelter. Nevertheless, those who mean to win store to fill the covered place, have need of someone to work at the open-air occupations; since ploughing, sowing, planting and grazing are all such open-air employments; and these supply the needful food. Then again, as soon as this is stored in the covered place, then there is need for someone to keep it and to work at the things that must be done under cover. Cover is needed for the nursing of the infants; cover is needed for the making of corn into bread, and likewise for the manufacture of clothing from the wool. And since both the indoor and the outdoor tasks demand labor and attention, God from the first adapted the woman's nature, I think, to the indoor and man's to the outdoor tasks and cares. (Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* 7.19–22, Loeb)

Native Mediterranean informants from Theophrastus (Ps-Aristotle, *Oeconomicus* 1.3.4) to Hierocles (On Duties 4.28.21) keep repeating the same stereotype, thus giving us important clues about the general and constant expectations of gender in antiquity.

Females/Private

We have already seen in the physiognomic literature certain stereotypical understandings of "female" in antiquity. In the interest of showing how extensive the gender roles of males and females were in antiquity,
we develop first the expectations of “females” (= private) and then of “males” (= public). Ancient gender division of labor rests upon an elaborate set of tasks and functions that are likewise gender specific: public, outdoor tasks for males and private, indoor tasks for females. Note that our ancient informer, who is neither Israelite nor Christian, insists that God created the nature of females for certain gender-specific tasks to be done in gender-specific places.

For he made the man’s body and mind more capable of enduring cold and heat, and journeys and campaigns; and therefore imposed on him the outdoor tasks. To the woman, since he has made her body less capable of such endurance, I take it that God has assigned the indoor tasks. And knowing that he had created in the woman and had imposed on her the nourishment of the infants, he meted out to her a larger portion of affection for new-born babes than to the man. And since he imposed on the woman the protection of stores also, knowing that for protection a fearful disposition is no disadvantage, God meted out a larger share of fear to the woman than to the man; and knowing that he who deals with the outdoor tasks will have to be their defender against any wrong-doer, he meted out to him again a larger share of courage. (Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* 7.23–25, Loeb)

The social roles of females, then, had to do with the bearing and raising of children, food preparation, and management of the household. All of these, moreover, should be done in “covered” space, that is, space appropriate to the household and its related tasks. We will treat successively each of these gender-specific tasks in an effort to show what the ancients expected of females and what therefore they awarded with praise and honor. And it is a matter of honor and praise that each gender keeps to its own gender-specific tasks. Finally, although we rely on Greco-Roman informants, we should recognize that ancient Judean informants provide the same information regarding earlier traditional viewpoints. For example, in *m. Kethub. 5.5*, we find a list of tasks appropriate to females, which focus on food production, clothing production, and child rearing: “These are works which the wife must perform for her husband: grinding flour and baking bread and washing clothing and cooking food and giving suck to her child and making ready his bed and working in wool.”

**Childbearing**

In addition to the information gleaned from our ancient informants such as Philo, Aristotle, and Xenophon, the code of household duties in 1 Timothy instructs females that they will find their salvation in bearing children (2:15). In the same document, widows are enjoined to “marry, bear children, and rule their households” (5:14). Conversely it is a great shame to be barren, the relief of which means social salvation and restoration of honor (Gen. 16:1; 30:1; 1 Sam. 1:5–6; Luke 1:7; Malina and Rohrbaugh 1992, 287; Demand 1994, 121–40). Honor and shame, then, are apportioned to the gender-specific role of childbearing.

**Food Preparation**

Females attend the family hearth, see to the grinding of grain and the baking of bread (1 Kings 17:8–15). Hence, females are mentioned in association with leaven and bread baking (Luke 13:21). They are, of course, frequently recorded drawing water from the village well, always in the company of other women (Gen. 24:15–21; 29:9–12; Exod. 2:15–22; John 4:6–15), as well as foraging for the fuel needed to cook the family meal. Females herded goats for their milk; males shepherded sheep. Goats may forage close to home in a yard and around a house, whereas sheep require pasturage far removed from the home (Bloch 1984, 51–70). Praise and blame, then, accord with the fulfillment of the gender-specific role of food preparation (see Demand 1994, 1–32).

**Household Management**

Females are to “rule their households” (1 Tim. 5:14), which involves not only food storage and preparation, but clothing production, supervision of slaves, and the like. Proverbs 30:10–28, from which we offer an excerpt providing a sense of the duties of a household-managing female, rewards this gender-specific role with public praise.

31:13 *She seeks wood and flax,*
and works with willing hands . . .
15 *She rises while it is yet night,*
and provides food for her household
and tasks for her maidsens . . .
19 *She puts her hand to the distaff,*
and her fingers touch the spindle . . .
20 *She makes herself coverings;*
her clothing is fine linen and purple . . .
24 *She makes garments and sells them,*
she delivers girdles to the merchant.

**Males/Public**

If females are socialized to the indoors and the private space of the family, males are expected to be outdoors and involved in public activity in public spaces. It is hardly surprising, then, that the Gospels so frequently describe Jesus as “out of doors” and in public, in particular in the marketplace (Mark 6:56) and talking about what occurs in the marketplace (Matt. 11:16; 20:3; 23:7; see also Acts 16:19; 17:17). He publicly visits John the Baptist, calls fishermen beside the sea, enters public buildings such
as market stoas and synagogues. Seldom if ever does Jesus perform a healing within a house, except when he specifically enters the women's quarters of a house (Mark 1:30–31; 5:40–41). Male roles, which were also scripted according to cultural expectations, centered around food production, commerce, soldiering, and other public activities. We briefly consider the expectations concerning male roles and behavior mentioned by our ancient Mediterranean informants, as we previously did with female roles.

Food Production

Males lead the household's flocks of sheep, donkeys, and the like out to pasture away from villages or settlements (Gen. 37:12; 1 Sam. 16:11; Luke 15:3–5; John 10:1–5). They are the plowmen (1 Kings 19:19; Luke 9:62) and sowers of the grain, which females then grind to make bread. Where hunting is possible, they hunt (Gen. 10:9; 25:27; 27:2); when fish is available, they fish (Mark 1:16–20; John 21:3–8). Males probably attend to the making of wine.

Trades and Commerce

The merchant of Matt. 13:45–46 is surely a male who leaves home to search for fine pearls. The silversmiths of Acts 18 are likewise males, as are sailors, traders, scribes, teachers, tax collectors, and soldiers.

Public Activities

Males read the Scriptures at synagogue meetings (Luke 4:15–19), which are by and large gatherings of males; they might speak, when invited (Acts 13:14–41). They sit and judge in the gate and participate in forensic trials. Outside of the immediate family, public meals are attended by males; the only women who might be present are courtesans or prostitutes (Corley 1993, 25–31). Although males and females may make the pilgrimage to Jerusalem, they travel in gender-specific groups (Luke 2:43–44). Ordinarily such mobility is acceptable for males only.

Furthermore, we can easily illustrate these gender stereotypes in the way the Gospels respect such gender definitions by presenting pairs of activities and places that are specifically male or female. For example, Jesus says, "Do not be anxious about your life, what you are to eat or what you shall drink, nor about your body, what you shall put on" (Matt. 6:35). He tells one part of his audience to look at the birds of the air. We argue that the birds correspond to the males in the audience, for what is said about them reflects male concerns: "They neither sow nor reap nor gather into barns" (6:26). This relates to agriculture and food production ("what to eat, what to drink"). Balancing this is the remark about the lilies of the field who "neither toil nor spin" (6:28–29), which pertains to female activity such as clothing production. The same gender sensitivity occurs in the remarks about those snatched to heaven. "Two men will be in the field; one is taken and one is left" (Matt 24:40); again males are found in public space tending to male-specific tasks, such as agriculture. "Two women will be grinding at the mill; one is taken and one is left" (24:41); females are again associated with the private world of the house, the hearth, and food. Similarly, two parables of mercy are told in Luke 15, one about a shepherd searching for a lost sheep (15:3–7) and another about a woman who sweeps her home to find a lost coin (15:8–10); again, males are about in the countryside pasturing animals, and females are found in houses. Comparably, parables about the kingdom balance similes about males, who either travel as merchants, fish, or dig in fields (Matt. 13:44–50, with those about females, who put leaven into flour (13:33). A parable about maidservants in charge of lamps for the household (Matt. 25:1–13) balances one about male servants entrusted with the master's property (25:14–30). These patterns are further illustrated in the way Jesus' healing of a man in public (Mark 1:21–28) is balanced with a healing of a woman in private (1:29–31; see Mark 5:1–20 and 35–43).

Gender-Specific Honor and Shame

Socialization into these gender-specific conceptions of male and female activity was strengthened by public praise and blame. Public acknowledgment resulted in honor, while public criticism produced shame. The following summary observation by Xenophon illustrates this clearly:

Now since we know, dear, what duties have been assigned to each of us by God, we must endeavor, each of us, to do the duties allotted to us as well as possible. . . . And besides, the law declares those tasks to be honorable for each of them wherein God has made the one to excel the other. Thus, to the woman it is more honorable to stay indoors than to abide in the fields, but to the man it is unseemly rather to stay indoors than to attend to the work outside. If a man acts contrary to the nature God has given him, possibly his defiance is detected by the gods and he is punished for neglecting his own work, or meddling with his wife's. (Oeconomicus 7.30–31, Loeb)

A male's honor rating requires that he be a public person, doing public actions and avoiding the world of women. Conversely, female honor requires women to be private persons, doing home-related activities in that sphere, and avoiding the world of men.

Males, then, are public persons, with a practical sense for maintaining honor, confident in behavior, in risk taking on behalf of their family, in search of honor. At home, males embody the family's authority and
receive the obedience and respect of their children and wives. Females, on the other hand, are private persons, passive, defensive of family honor and fortunes. Except for the males in their husbands’ family, they shun male company, so much so that Plutarch records a saying that the honorable female is she who is unknown to any but her husband: “There ought to be no random talk about fair and noble women, and their characters ought to be totally unknown save only to their consorts” (Plutarch, *Sayings of the Spartans* 217F, Loeb). Thucydides, remarking on the “glory” (i.e., honor) of females, observed: “Great is your glory if you do not fall below the standard which nature has set for your sex, and great also is hers of whom there is least talk among men whether in praise or blame” (*History* 2.45, Loeb). Thus rewards of praise and sanctions of blame attend these widely accepted cultural notions of gender roles.

It is impossible to underestimate the importance of honor and shame in the socialization of males and females in the ancient Mediterranean world. The manner in which these pivotal values were imparted to family members formed the way people understood themselves, perceived others, and developed moral judgments about proper behavior. To know the gender of someone was already to know a whole set of norms to which they must conform if they were to be honorable in that society. Such expectations formed clear cultural norms about what clothes (Deut. 22:5), hairdors (1 Cor. 11:4–14), and sexual partners (Rom. 1:26–27) are appropriate to males and females. We conclude this section with a summary statement by Philo on the honor and shame appropriate to males and females, a remark that will have considerable importance in our investigation of Paul’s self-understanding and his expectations of community behavior:

(God) counsels man figuratively to take care of woman as of a daughter, and woman to honor man as a father. And this is proper; a woman changes her habitation from her family to her husband. Wherefore it is fitting and proper that one who receives something should in return show good will to those who have given it, but one (i.e. woman) who has made a change should give to him who has taken her the honor which she showed those who begot her. For a man has a wife entrusted to him as a deposit from her parents. But woman takes a husband by law. (Philo, *Q. Gen* 1.27, about Gen. 2:21, Loeb)

In conclusion, males and females in the ancient Mediterranean learned about the cultural meanings of male and female from birth on. These notions underpinned a more broadly gender-divided society that classified certain places, times, and things as either male or female. Thus, group-oriented persons were quickly and thoroughly socialized to these gender roles and stereotypes. Moreover, gender stereotypes were backed with rewards of praise and sanctions of blame. On this point, our ancient Mediterranean informers were generally unanimous.

**Morality and Deviance**

For group-oriented persons, morality too was a matter of stereotypical thinking deriving from group-supported values. In their world, meaningful human existence depended on a person’s full awareness of what others thought and felt about them, along with their living up to that awareness. Literally this awareness means “conscience.” The Latin word *conscientia* and the Greek word *syn-eideia* mean “with-knowledge,” that is, knowledge shared with others, internalized common knowledge, commonly shared meaning, and common sense (Malina 1993b, 63–65; Malina and Neyrey 1991a, 76–80). Conscience for group-oriented persons is not so much an internal voice as an external prod deriving from what others say and do. Conscience for group-oriented persons is sensitive attention to one’s publicly assessed ego-image, along with one’s striving to align one’s own personal behavior and self-assessment with that publicly assessed ego-image. It is the group that keeps a person within moral bounds. In such a context, conscience is an awareness of what others say, do, and think about oneself, because these others play the role of witness and judge. Their verdicts supply the person with grants of honor necessary for meaningful human existence.

**How Conscience Works**

To understand how conscience works in group-oriented cultures such as the ancient Mediterranean, we must remember that people continually mind each other’s business. Two New Testament documents censure such behavior, actually using a common Greek word for the term “busybody” (*periiergos*; 2 Thess. 3:11; 1 Tim. 5:3), but by mentioning this phenomenon, even negatively, they attest to its presence. Privacy is a relatively unknown and unexpected experience for the ancients. Because of the constant vigilance of people over their neighbors, along with constant concern for rewards of honor and sanctions of shame, social situations have to be controlled. And that control comes from group members minding each others’ business, not from an individual person exercising self-control and following internalized norms. Anyone who closes house doors to snooping children in the village or anyone who does something in secret (see John 18:20) is considered up to no good. In such cultural contexts, people do not expect others to control their behavior by following internalized norms. Rather, people control others by watching over them, threatening them with shaming gossip, loss of reputation, and public dishonor. We need only open the Gospels to notice how the Pharisees seem to mind Jesus’ business all the time.

Group-oriented individuals are embedded in, and thus represent, some
group. From this perspective, the responsibility for morality and deviance lies not with individuals alone but rather with the social body in which they are embedded. Deviance springs up because something is amiss in the functioning of the social body; the body fails to keep watch over its members. Thus Paul stigmatizes whole groups, all Judaeans and Greeks (Romans 1–3) or all Galatians (Gal. 3:1), because he sees some socially infecting hamartia or sin behind individual sinful actions.

The moral norms we find in the New Testament have relevance for individual behavior. But all such moral listings and descriptions do not focus primarily on individuals. Commonplace moral norms were written from the point of view of the individual-as-embodied-in-something-bigger, namely, the family, fictive family, polis, or tribe. Examples of such moral descriptions would include the various lists of sins (Mark 7:21–22), the lists of virtues and vices (Gal. 5:16–24), and the codes of household duties (Col. 3:18–4:1 and 1 Tim. 2:8–3:15). In this context, we might recall the list of the four cardinal virtues and their varying parts discussed in the previous chapters of this study.

As most New Testament scholars indicate, such norms represent what is generally known and accepted by the culture at large. They aim to keep the family, the group, the village, and the people sound, both corporately and socially. Among the followers of Jesus, the main problem was to keep the Christian group, the individual church, in harmony and unity, that is, in a sound state (e.g., 1 Corinthians 12; Rom. 12:3–21; see Titus 2:2, 8). In such a group, the individual as such was explicable: “It is expedient for you that one man die for the people, and that the whole people perish” (John 11:50). For the sake of the group, individuals might be rather ruthlessly ejected from the group as in the expulsion procedures described in 1 Cor. 5:5, 13 and Rom. 16:17 (see Matt. 18:15–18). The soundness of the group, like the behavior of a group-oriented individual, is heavily determined by its impact on surrounding groups and by the expectations of outsiders (e.g. 1 Cor. 6:6; 10:32–33; 14:23–25; 1 Thess. 4:12; 1 Tim. 3:7). Christians had to be as good as outsiders. In a group oriented society, then, conscience represents the advice, customs, norms, praise, and censure of the fellow human beings with whom one lives.

**Deviance**

Within this framework we now look at how morality for group-oriented persons relates to deviance. Deviance refers to behavior that violates the sense of order or classification that social groups construct and maintain to make a predictable and intelligible society. Deviance thus represents a socially construed label that group members attempt to apply to a person who commits an infraction against socially required norms and the order those norms support. People are “deviants” when they are caught and labeled by persons representing the dominant culture for breaking laws or causing social disorder. Now let us see how this might help us understand morality among first-century Mediterranean people.

To clarify how deviance expresses the social norms of groups, once more let us contrast how an American individualist and a group-oriented person such as Paul attempt to explain why they regard someone as abnormal or as a deviant. To explain the behavior of persons who breach the social order, Americans look to psychology, to childhood experiences, personality type, or to some significant event in the past that affects an adult’s interaction with other members of society. Biography in the United States currently favors a description of psychological development that identifies singular events in the career of an individualist person passing through the psychological stages of life. We assess someone as abnormal who is psychologically “retarded,” aberrant, “neurotic,” or “psychotic” because he or she was “an abused child,” and the like. In contrast, Mediterranean persons past and present are anti-introspective and simply not psychologically minded at all. Consequently, disturbing or abnormal internal states are blamed on personal causes outside the deviant, either human causes (“you made me angry”) or nonhuman ones (“... for he has a dumb spirit and wherever it seizes him it dashes him down,” Mark 9:18). If no external personal cause is at hand, because persons are understood in terms of their embeddedness in others, deviance is attributed to deviant ancestors, parents, and teachers. Moreover, among the grounds for praise we noted a person’s fortune, which included benevolent (but possibly malevolent) influence on a person by demons and spirits, tykhē, Fortune, gods, and God. Thus biography in antiquity consists of a description of the influences on a person due to generation and geography, and the fulfillment of gender and role expectations that derive from the culture.

By way of illustration, when Roman elites described their lives, they catalogued the series of responsible offices they held. They called this their cursus honorum, a sequence of honors bestowed on them. As we noted previously, Mediterraneans paid scant attention to developmental stages apart from raw biology (especially the onset of menarche in girls). Ptolemy summarizes the stereotypical perception of “development” in individuals:

> In all creatures the earliest ages, like the spring, have a larger share of moisture and are tender and still delicate. The second age, up to the prime of life, exceeds in heat, like summer; the third, which is now past the prime and on the verge of decline, has an excess of dryness, like autumn; and the last which approaches dissolution, exceeds in its coldness, like winter.

*(Tetrabiblos 1.10.20, Loeb)*
A Mediterranean such as Paul, for example, would describe abnormal persons by saying: "Who has bewitched you?" (Gal. 3:1; Neyrey 1990b, 181–86, 196–97); "Death was reigning" over them (Rom. 5:14); "When you were a heathen, you were led astray to dumb idols" (1 Cor. 12:2); sinners are subject to "the law of sin and death" (Rom. 8:2); and "sin reigns in your mortal bodies to make you obey their passions" (Rom. 6:12). Paul regularly perceives himself and others as attacked by celestial powers and spirits (Neyrey 1990b, 161–65). As one anthropologist expressed it: "the person is in an abnormal position because the matrix of relationships in which he is embedded is abnormal" (Selby 1974, 15).

For group-oriented persons, then, deviance lies not within persons but outside them, in faulty interpersonal relations over which they inevitably have no control. While deviance refers to the evaluation of one's fellow human beings concerning failure to measure up to social expectations, norms, and customs, the causes of this deviance are inevitably external and caused by persons.

Social Awareness

Expanding on notions of conscience as knowledge shared with one's social group and of deviance as actions performed under the influence of powers external to the individual, we can further clarify the social controls over the behavior of group-oriented individuals by attending to the type of social awareness characteristic of such persons. In this aspect of behavior, as well, group-oriented persons stand thoroughly outside our experience of being psychologically minded and using introspection for self-assessment. Instead, group-oriented persons rely on institutional arrangements that serve as external social controls to back up social norms. For example, the eastern Mediterranean practices of keeping females away from males by means of women's quarters, chaperoning unattached females, and various gender-based space prohibitions (no males at the common outdoor oven or common water supply) indicate strong behavioral controls in specific social situations. Such institutional arrangements are rooted in the common belief that a male could not possibly suppress the strong urges that surely take possession of him every time he is alone with any woman. And all women are considered even more unable to resist males. Hence, both sexes then expect their "will power" to be provided by other people, rather than by personal inhibition (Hall 1959, 66–67). Collectivist cultures generally presume their members to lack personal inhibition and consequently develop strong social inhibition. Emphatically, behavioral controls lie outside the person. Such controls are not "psychological," inwardly assimilated, and overseen by the individual's "conscience." Rather, controls consist of situations that are socially controlled, and control of situations rests not with individual persons following internalized norms but with others in the group enforcing group norms in various ways. Onlookers control behavior with full force of custom, which grants honor (praise) or withholds it (blame). Little concern is given, then, to controlling persons with the full force of individually assimilated internalized norms (Hall 1959, 114). No one in a group-oriented context would understand something as culturally nonsensical as "Let your conscience be your guide."

If certain situations are highly controlled, there are others in which a person is expected to lose control, while group members are expected to provide due restraint. For example, close women relations are expected to attempt to jump into the grave (or pyre) of their deceased, but also to be held back by others; males ready to square off in a fight expect those around them to hold them back; feuds go on escalating yet mediators are to intervene to restrain the feuding parties (see Boehm 1984).

These social-minded, group-oriented, anti-introspective and nonindividualist perspectives have been duly codified in the stories and ethical systems of Israel, Christianity, and Islam. Paul, for example, acts as the jealous father of his family groups and so informs the people at Corinth of what a proper "conscience" is. He acts with knowledge of what is socially appropriate in regard to women's behavior and attire and so acts to control behavior (1 Cor. 11:2–16; 14:33–35); he controls what people eat (1 Cor. 8:10–13; 10:14–21, 23–29) and when they eat it (1 Cor. 11:33–34). He controls who may marry and who may divorce (1 Cor. 5:1; 7:8–15). In fact, 1 Corinthians 5:1–15 may be profitably read as a study in "social awareness" in which Paul articulates common notions of bodily control and so acts to control the social behavior of his family (Neyrey 1990b, 107–40). Note also Paul's emphasis on having his representative (Timothy) as an on-site overseer and, further, that he gets reports and will himself show up to see what is going on (1 Cor. 4:14–21).

Those values and lines of behavior that tend to strengthen group cohesion are considered positive values and virtues. On the other hand, those values and lines of behavior that can in any way be detrimental to group cohesion are considered negative values, vices, or sins. Such codification points to the powerful group quality of such ethical systems, to their sanctions in community control rather than in individual responsibility.

VALUES AND VIRTUES

A final way of articulating what a group-oriented person is like can be found in the study of cultural or social values. By value, we mean the
general directionality of behavior, that is, how a given instance of behavior is supposed to go (Plich and Malina 1993, xiii–xxii). As we noted earlier, when we compare the culture of the United States and the Mediterranean region, it becomes immediately clear that a constitutive part of the differences between the two can be identified by the values proper to each group. We may safely say that a paramount value in the United States culture is democracy, which is expressed by the unique individual’s right to vote, to own property, to make individual decisions binding oneself alone, to choose a career that satisfies individual aspirations, to marry whomever one pleases, and to be included in Gallup polls. What, then, were the social values of ancient Mediterraneans, who were group oriented and not individualists? (For a more complete sense of contrast between modern Western and ancient Mediterranean values and behavior, see the chart in Appendix 2.)

Differing Cultural Values

Persons, whether individualists or collectivists, follow the pathways marked by values in their choice of behavior. To better imagine the sorts of behaviors urged upon first-century group-oriented persons, we need to introduce a model developed precisely for discovering diverse values among different ethnic groups. Anthropologists F. R. Kluckhohn and F. L. Strodtbeck (1961) originally constructed this model, and John Papaiohn and John Spiegel (1979) subsequently adapted it to identify comparative variations in values between ethnic groups. The model enjoys wide currency today and has proved quite insightful and useful to a variety of people who wish to make comparisons across cultures.

The Kluckhohn-Strodtbeck model describes the fundamental values people prefer because of the way they were enculturated and socialized. The model operates on the basis of the following questions: When a crisis or problem arises, how are people expected to react? How are they supposed to behave? To what resource are they expected to turn? Five areas are considered: (a) activity, (b) relations, (c) time orientation, (d) relation of human beings to nature, and (e) the evaluation of human nature. Our purpose for introducing this value-preference orientation model at this point is to supply a somewhat broader canvas on which to depict the behavioral scenarios of our Mediterranean group-oriented persons. The model more than amply indicates that the values of ancient Mediterraneans are products of generation and geography, and they perceive themselves controlled by other persons, by sky beings of various sorts, and ultimately by God. Their roles and statuses are ascribed to them by God (1 Cor. 7:17; 12:18) and so belong to the order of creation and cannot be "uncreated." Thus, they tend to face crises and calamities somewhat passively, expressing their understanding of events in terms of a doctrine of divine providence, fortune, or fate controlling all existence. Given this view of reality, we should ascribe to ancient Mediterraneans the major activity of "being" and surviving, not solving problems or achieving. Endurance in the face of opposition and conflict is the proper, honorable choice. It is not by accident that Job became the model of "being" in crisis to ancient Israelites and Christians (see James 5:7–11).

Activity

When faced with a crisis or significant problem, U.S. persons are expected "to do something about it." Problem solvers regularly ask, "What can we do?" in response to a crisis or calamity. And they do not feel good about the problem unless they start doing something. Not so the ancient Mediterraneans. As we have seen in the previous chapters, ancient Mediterraneans are products of generation and geography, and they perceive themselves controlled by other persons, by sky beings of various sorts, and ultimately by God. Their roles and statuses are ascribed to them by God (1 Cor. 7:17; 12:18) and so belong to the order of creation and cannot be "uncreated." Thus, they tend to face crises and calamities somewhat passively, expressing their understanding of events in terms of a doctrine of divine providence, fortune, or fate controlling all existence. Given this view of reality, we should ascribe to ancient Mediterraneans the major activity of "being" and surviving, not solving problems or achieving. Endurance in the face of opposition and conflict is the proper, honorable choice. It is not by accident that Job became the model of "being" in crisis to ancient Israelites and Christians (see James 5:7–11).

Relations

In the United States, relations tend to be individualist, with a view to status based on success in competition; after all, that is what capitalism is all about: maximizing individual benefit (Bellah et al. 1985). The relations of
ancient Mediterraneans were basically collateral, that is group-oriented and nonindividualist. We recall how in the forensic defense speech and the encomium, identity derived from generation, that is, embeddedness in family, clan, and tribe. Not only did people take their basic identity from such collateral relations, but praiseworthy deeds were those done for others in the group. People were strongly embedded in a group whose goals and wishes prevailed over those of individual members of that group. Group well-being always came first. Group integrity was the priority.

In regard to Paul, we note that he has two sets of relations in view: (1) vertical (Neyrey 1990b, 33–41, 134) and (2) horizontal. As to the latter, he regularly addresses the members of his churches in kinship terms, “brothers and sisters.” He boasts, moreover, of his accommodation of his own desires for the good of the group and even the expectations of those outside his group: “Give no offense to Jews or to Greeks, or to the church of God, just as I try to please all people in everything I do, not seeking my own advantage, but that of many” (1 Cor. 10:32–33). Indeed, it was Paul’s strategy to be “all things to everyone” (1 Cor. 9:19–23), which was, on occasion, interpreted as shameful flattery or “pleasing people” (Gal. 1:10; see Marshall 1987, 70–90). Finally, one need only recall all of the special compound words Paul creates to indicate his relationship with certain people: Paul labels quite a few individuals as his “fellow workers” (synchronized): Ephaphroditus (Phil. 2:25), Clement (Phil. 4:3), Aquila and Prisca (Rom. 16:3), Urbanus (Rom. 16:8), and even Apollos (1 Cor. 3:1). Ephaphroditus is not only “fellow worker” (synchronized) but “brother” and “fellow soldier” (Phil. 2:25). Thus Paul particularly strives in Philippians to maintain “fellowship” (koinōnia) with that church (Sampley 1980, 51–77). We are reminded, moreover, of how Paul expresses collateral relationships as he attempts to form the group conscience of the Corinthians concerning marriage, diet, and public behavior. Furthermore, he instructs members of his churches not to please themselves, but others in the in-group: “We who are strong ought to bear with the failings of the weak, and not to please ourselves; let each of us please his neighbor for his good, to edify him” (Rom. 15:1). After all, Jesus did not “please himself” (15:3) but obediently served his God. Hence, a great value lies in being unmarried, for such persons may “please the Lord,” rather than please their spouses (1 Cor. 7:32–34).

Time Orientation

Most persons in the United States are quite aware of their future orientation. From childhood on, people constantly live in a state of “preparation” for the immediate future: schooling is for a job, the job enables marriage, while marriage and children require life insurance and plans for college education for those children. Throughout their adult lives, people save for a rainy day, contributing to their Social Security and retirement funds. The worst disaster, we are told, is to be underinsured. On the other hand, ancient Mediterranean people shared a time orientation focused primarily on the present and the past, not the future (Malina 1989:1–31). They were interested in today’s bread (Luke 11:3) and today’s problems (Matt. 6:34). They sought examples for imitation from the legendary heroes of the past, as their use of sacred writings indicates.

Paul, for example, often makes travel plans, but this is hardly a sign of his future orientation, as he rarely seems to have followed through with them (2 Cor. 1:15–17; 1 Thess. 2:17–18; 1 Cor. 4:18). Although he occasionally bemoans how frail he is and how likely to die, he invariably indicates that his main concern lies in his present service of the churches: “To remain in the flesh is more necessary on your account. Convinced of this, I know that I shall remain and continue with you all, for your progress and joy in the faith” (Phil. 1:24–25; see 2 Cor. 5:6–10). Even when he seems to discourse on the future, he disclaims all knowledge of when the forthcoming events will occur: “As to the times and seasons, you have no need to have anything written to you. For you yourselves know well that the day of the Lord will come like a thief in the night” (1 Thess. 5:1–2). Paul urges vigilance, watchfulness, and constancy—all present time indicators. Moral exhortation in the New Testament, which we label as group-oriented norms and values, focuses on hearing God’s voice “today” to enter into God’s rest (Heb. 3:7).

Indeed, after concern about the present, Paul places far more interest on the past than on any abstract future. The past contains the great exemplars of faith (Romans 4; Gal. 3:6–9), patterns of God’s consistent actions (Rom. 9:7–13), and warning figures (1 Cor. 10:6–11). The past yields the Scriptures, with all of their prophecies of the Christ, which have come true in the present time (Rom. 1:3–4; 16:25–26). The past yields the great tradition, which must be upheld in the present time in all its purity and wholeness (Neyrey 1993, 53–54).

Humans vis-à-vis Nature

Given the general “doing” orientation in the United States, people think that they can control nature and use it for their own success, even at the cost of environmental destruction. People in the United States believe that they should control nature so that the individual may succeed (i.e., that they should reroute rivers, seed clouds for rain, manufacture prostheses, promote immunizations, and the like). Ancient Mediterraneans, on the other hand, understood humankind as helpless in the face of nature. To master or subdue nature belonged to God alone. In the same...
way that they envisioned individuals as passive before God's providence, Fate, or Fortune, as determined by generation and geography, so they saw themselves as subject to nature and natural forces. Therefore, they tended not to be technologically progressive or ecologically aware. They were a people used to being put upon by famine, floods, storms, and locusts, and they understood endurance to be the proper response (see 1 Cor. 4:9–13; 2 Cor. 5:3–10).

Human Nature

Finally, as we saw above, most Westerners believe that human deviance derives from faulty childhood socialization or deficient education. Ancient Mediterraneans, on the other hand, viewed human nature as a mixture of good and evil, not neutral or therapeutically remediable. For example, New Testament writers—who understood persons in terms of geography and generation—viewed people from Crete as "always liars, evil beasts, lazy gluttons" (Titus 1:12) and believed "nothing good can come from Nazareth" (John 1:46). Similarly, regarding generation, all inherit the faults and sins of their ancestor Adam (Rom. 5:12–14), just as all of Abraham's offspring inherit his promise. Education consisted of "beating the ribs" of one's children on the supposition that they were fundamentally selfish and inclined to evil (Prov. 13:24; 22:15; 23:13–14; 29:15; Sir. 30:12; see especially Plich 1993a,101–7).

When Paul takes up the issue of human nature, he views it entirely through a dualistic group perspective, which contrasts social life before Christ and social life after Christ. "Then" is always the time of the former in-group, a time of unrelenting evil and sin, which is absent "now" in the present in-group (Dahl 1976, 33–34):

1. "Then" versus "now": "Formerly you did not know God, you were in bondage to beings that by nature are no gods; but now that you have come to know God..." (Gal. 4:8–9; see Gal. 3:23–27; Rom. 6:17–22; Eph. 2:11–22; 5:8).
2. "Once" but "now": "When we were children, we were slaves to the elemental spirits of the universe. But when the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son..." (Gal. 4:3–7; see Rom. 1:18–3:30; 3:21–8:39). Furthermore, Paul perceives all non-Christians through a comparable dualistic lens, contrasting their vice and uncleanness with virtue and purity in Christ (Neyrey 1990b, 159–61). Because acceptance into the Christian in-group involved entry into fictive kinship, and one became kin only by birth, baptism is likened to a new birth, which indicates a transition from an utterly negative past into a positive present:

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These sorts of dualistic perceptions clearly indicate that Paul considered human nature as evil and sorely in need of restoration. Indeed, Christ gave himself to redeem us from "the present evil age" (Gal. 1:4). For Paul and his contemporaries, it was easy to see the world in dualistic terms, as an arena where evil, Satan, and demons attacked God's holy people. This was a world of dishonoring sin and pervasive evil, to which a savior was sent to rescue those whom God chose (Ephesians 1).

At the very least, modern readers of Paul should be acutely aware that Paul and the people of his world shared value orientations that differed radically from those generally in vogue in the United States. Paul and his fellow Christians surely would appear quite different from contemporary Euro-Americans, as one would expect when comparing and contrasting individualist and group-oriented societies. The Kluckhohn-Strodtbeck model of cross-cultural values preferences, then, can be an initial, important step in clarifying the differences that marked a person's behavior preferences, and an especially important step in gaining insight into that other world.

Resulting Cultural Virtues

The foregoing model of values might seem quite abstract. When, however, we put it in conversation with other elements of this study of person in the first-century Mediterranean, we can begin to see specific values and virtues pertinent to the people of Paul's world.

"Being":
Endurance and Obedience

For example, "being" as a value correlates with what we described above as a collectivist or group-oriented person. In such collectivist culture, individuals are basically given their identity from their family and embedded in a specific primary in-group (generation). One's character is considered to be determined by geography. Moreover, role and status are understood in terms of group expectations and legitimated in the order of
creation (1 Cor. 12:18). The consequent moral norm, then, is clear: Be what you are! Born a slave, remain a slave (1 Cor. 7:17). One would assume that where the value of “being” is strong, one will find corresponding importance given to obedience, acceptance of suffering, endurance, maintaining the status quo, and contentment. The same norms apply to gender identity and roles.

From Paul’s letters we glean the following remarks indicative of two important values that reinforce the dominant value of “being,” namely, endurance and obedience. Concerning endurance, we present but a sample of his remarks, with special note about the variety of linguistic expressions for “being” (or enduring, practicing patience, remaining, and the like).

1. **Endure, put up with** (phereo): “God will not let you be tempted beyond your strength, but with temptation will also provide the way of escape, that you may be able to endure it” (1 Cor. 10:13; see 2 Tim. 3:11).


3. **Remain (meno)**: “God’s kindness to you, provided you remain in his kindness” (Rom. 11:22); “To the unmarried and the widows . . . it is well for them to remain single as I do” (1 Cor. 7:8; see Gal. 3:10).

4. **Bear, put up with** (stego): “We put up with anything rather than put an obstacle in the way of the gospel of Christ” (1 Cor. 9:12; see 13:7).

5. **Endure, tolerate (anechoma)**: “When persecuted, we endure” (1 Cor. 4:12; 2 Cor. 11:1, 4, 19-20).

6. **Persevere (hypo mano)**: “Love bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things” (1 Cor. 13:7; see 2 Cor. 1:6; 6:4; 1 Thess. 1:4).

7. **Patience (makrothymia)**: “Encourage the fainthearted, help the weak, be patient with them all” (1 Thess. 5:14; see Gal. 5:22).

The catalogues of suffering and affliction that we have commented on repeatedly in this study offer further evidence of Paul’s passive stance of “being,” not “doing,” in the face of ever-present adversity. Endurance, of course, belongs to the virtue of “courage” (andreia), and so Paul’s description of himself as well as his appeal to others for endurance would be readily perceived to reflect one of the culturally important virtues of antiquity.

Concerning obedience, we noted that in all his letters, Paul constantly expresses his sense of his God-given role, the will of God for him, the necessity laid upon him, and the consequent duty to obey and submit to his celestial patron. For example, Paul begins his Corinthian letters by indicating that his role and status were not of his doing; rather, he was “called by the will of God” (1 Cor. 1:1; 2 Cor. 1:1). He readily acknowledges that “God’s will” directs his career (Rom. 1:10; 15:32) and urges all people to learn that will (Rom. 2:18) to “prove what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect” (Rom 12:2). “The will of God is your sanctification” (1 Thess. 4:3), which includes constant thanksgiving to the celestial patron (1 Thess. 5:18). Paul likewise understands the figure of Jesus as one who gave himself completely to the will of God (Gal. 1:4) and was obedient even unto death (Phil. 2:8; Rom. 5:18).

Often Paul describes his role in terms of a “commission” from his heavenly patron (1 Cor. 3:10; 15:10; Rom. 15:15; for charis or “grace” as a patronage word, see Malina 1988b, 5-6). He speaks of a cosmic “necessity” (anagke) that compels him in his work (1 Cor. 9:16), comparable to the “necessity” whereby Christians must be subject to civil authorities (Rom 13:5). Even his trials are a form of “necessity” from God (1 Thess. 3:7). Another form of obligation is expressed by the term dei, which is generally translated as “must” or “ought” or “should,” implying that the obligation comes from God: “. . . as you have learned from us how you ought to live and so to please God, you do so more and more” (1 Thess. 4:1; see Rom. 12:3; 1 Cor. 8:2; 15:25).

In light of this, it is hardly surprising to find a rich variety of exhortations to submission and obedience in Paul’s letters.

1. **Obey (hypakouo, hypakoe)**: “We have received grace and apostleship to bring about the obedience of faith” (Rom. 1:5; 6:16-17; 2 Cor. 2:9).

2. **Obey (peitho)**: “For those who are factious and do not obey the truth, there will be wrath and fury” (Rom. 2:8; see Rom. 1:30; 10:21; 11:30-32).

3. **Be subject to, submit (hypotasso)**: “The spirits of prophets are subject to the prophets” (1 Cor. 14:32; see Rom. 13:1; 5; 1 Cor. 15:27-28).

4. **Submit to (enecho)**: “Do not submit again to a yoke of slavery” (Gal. 5:1).

5. **Under (hypo)**: “To those under the law I became as one under the law . . . that I might win those under the law” (1 Cor. 9:20).

Obedience, moreover, belongs to the cardinal virtue of justice (dikaiosynê), which would likewise be readily perceived by Paul’s audience as implying other consequent values such as faithfulness and loyalty.
“Collateral Relations”:
Common Good, Love, Self-sacrifice

The value preference for “collateral relations” suggests that individuals understand society as readily divided into in-groups and out-groups. To survive, persons belong to various groups, primarily to kin groups, but also to fictive kin groups (such as work groups, various clubs or collegia, Paul’s fictive kin groups or churches), fictive political factions (like John the Baptist’s reform group, Jesus’ revitalizing group), and political types of parties (Sadducees, Pharisees, Essenes, Herodians). The importance given here to horizontal relationships will express itself in concern for kinship relations, knowing who is one’s neighbor, the common good of the in-group, and love for that in-group neighbor.

In the world of Paul, we find many values consequent to the primary value of collateral relations. Things are valued by Paul precisely insofar as they “build up” the group rather than the individual at the group’s expense. Hence, he prefers the gift of prophecy over that of tongues because it strengthens group relationships and benefits the many rather than the few: “They who speak in a tongue edify themselves, but they who prophesy edify the church” (1 Cor. 14:4; see 14:5, 12, 17, 26). Hence, “love” (self-giving solidarity) is preferable to “knowledge,” for love “builds up,” whereas the latter “puffs up” (1 Cor. 8:1). The group and group integrity, then, come first (see 1 Thess. 5:11; 1 Cor. 10:23).

This leads us inevitably to Paul’s exhortation to “love.” Given the nonpsychological quality of group-oriented society, love will have little to do with feelings of affection, sentiments of fondness, and warm, glowing affinity. Rather, as has been argued, “love” is “the value of group attachment and group bonding” (Malina 1993c, 47–70). Unlike other spiritual gifts, which can tend to exalt the individual, this greatest gift strives precisely to put the group first, with maximum effort given to maintaining group integrity:

Love is patient and kind; love is not jealous or boastful; it is not arrogant or rude. Love does not insist on its own way; it is not irritable or resentful.
(1 Cor. 13:4–5)

Besides highlighting “God’s love,” an attachment that benefits others (Rom. 5:5, 8; 8:39), Paul regularly exhorts members of his churches to look to their collateral relationships to benefit those relationships. Such concern is transformed into bonds of kinship: “Love one another with brotherly affection; outdo one another in showing honor” (Rom. 12:10).

The only duty owed is “love” (Rom. 13:8); the worst evil is to harm another, which is to lack love (Rom. 14:15). This, too, would be readily recognized by Paul’s audience as one of the major virtues of antiquity, philadelphia, or “kinship bonding”: “Concerning love of the brethren [philadelphia] . . . you yourselves have been taught by God to love [agapēn] one another” (1 Thess. 4:9).

Finally, the value of constantly attending to collateral relations leads inevitably to the consequent value of “self-sacrifice.” Paul presents himself as the chief example of this, as he emphasizes how he is “poured as a libation upon the sacrificial offering of your faith” (Phil. 2:17). He praises the collection for the poor saints of Jerusalem as “a service” (leitourgia, 2 Cor. 9:12; Rom. 15:27). Christ, of course, is the exalted model of this value and behavior, for he “emptied himself” and “gave himself up” for the church. Thus it comes as no surprise to hear Paul praise various types of gifts and roles as “service” toward others (1 Cor. 12:3–6). Alternately, Paul expresses this in terms of “harmony and relinquishing of one’s own way” (Osiack 1993, 157). How praiseworthy are those who “do nothing from selfishness or conceit, but in humility count others better than themselves” (Phil. 2:3); they “look to the interests of others” (v. 4). “Let no one seek his own good, but the good of his neighbor” (1 Cor. 10:24). “Through love be servants of one another” (Gal. 5:13).

Present-Time Orientation:
Constancy, Loyalty, and Tradition

Present-time orientation is the usual value preference of groups and societies in which present survival needs cannot be taken for granted. As such, present-time orientation is typical of traditional peasant societies whose proverbs instruct: “Do not be anxious about tomorrow for tomorrow will be anxious for itself,” or “Let the day’s own trouble be sufficient for the day” (Matt. 6:34). People with this value orientation are not interested in promises about a remote future, whether it be a utopian transformation of the world or a delayed messiah. What is important is today. If today offers little, then it is to the past that one must look, for as we saw in the previous chapters, individuals are shaped by generation as well as geography. We are who we are today thanks to our ancestors, as our genealogies indicate (Luke 3:23–38). Tradition, custom, and ancient writings point to elements from the past that are still present, not unlike one’s inherited status, craft, house, and land. Values attendant to a present-time orientation tend to be loyalty and constancy, obedience to tradition, and endurance.

Paul’s exhortations to his churches focus on the duties of today, namely, “Live a life worthy of your calling” (1 Thess. 2:12; Phil. 1:27; Eph. 4:1). As we saw, such duties would include the present values of “love” and “service.” Even when disclaiming knowledge of the time of Jesus’ coming, Paul’s orientation is squarely on the present time, which he characterizes as a time of “soberness” and “vigilance” (1 Thess. 5:6, 8).

Moreover, if individuals are shaped by generation and geography,
their time orientation will tend to suggest that today’s advice and principles can be found in the past. Hence, we find constant value placed on knowing and observing “traditions.” Not only do the Gospels reflect how individuals cling to the “traditions of their elders” (Matt. 15:2, 3, 6), but Paul also was “zealous for the traditions of my fathers” (Gal. 1:14). As “father” to the Corinthians, he likewise insists that they follow his traditions: “I commend you because you remember me in everything and maintain the traditions even as I have delivered them to you” (1 Cor. 11:2). So many of Paul’s exhortations consist of bringing past traditions into the present, as in the case of the Eucharist (1 Cor. 11:23) and the resurrection (1 Cor. 15:3).

Another aspect clustering with the value of present-time orientation can be seen in the attention given to constancy and fidelity to past traditions. Paul’s “handing on” of what “he received” matters in the way his churches continue to “stand” in those traditions: “Now I remind you in what terms I preached to you the gospel, which you received, in which you stand, by which you are saved” (1 Cor. 15:1). Similarly, whatever instruction Paul gave in the past should be followed in the present: “We beseech and exhort you, that as you have learned from us how you ought to live and to please God, just as you are doing, you do so more and more” (1 Thess. 4:1). Just as God who has called the churches is “faithful” (1 Tim. 5:24; 1 Cor. 1:9), so disciples must likewise maintain an abiding loyalty and constancy in their beliefs and behaviors.

COLLECTIVIST SELVES: A CONCLUDING PORTRAIT

All the persons we read about in the ancient progymnasmata, rhetorical handbooks, physiognomic writings, as well as the New Testament documents, are group-oriented persons from collectivist cultures. By way of conclusion, we present here a summary description of the group-oriented person whom we have encountered throughout this book (for more details, see Malina 1986c). Admittedly, as a conclusion to a detailed study, this composite portrait of a collectivist self will be abstract and generalized, and so lacking in illustration and detail. But we believe that we have amply provided such detail in our exposition of the kind of person described in the panegyric, the forensic defense speech, and physiognomic literature.

First of all, collectivism, as opposed to individualism, may be described as the belief that the groups in which a person is embedded are each and singly an end in themselves. As such these groups ought to realize distinctive group values, notwithstanding the weight of individuals’ personal drive toward self-satisfaction. In collectivist cultures, most people’s social behavior is largely determined by group goals that require the pursuit of achievements that improve the position of the group, that is, “the common good.” The defining attributes of collectivist cultures are family integrity, solidarity, and keeping the primary in-group in “good health.” The salient features of collectivist cultures include the following:

In-group. The groups in which a person is embedded form in-groups in comparison with other groups, “out-groups,” that do not command a person’s allegiance and commitment. In-groups consist of persons who share a common fate because they have been generally rooted in similar circumstances of birth and place of origin (generation and geography). While individualists may belong to many in-groups—yet have shallow attachment to all of them—collectivists are embedded in few in-groups. Moreover, collectivists are strongly attached to these few in-groups, and the in-groups in turn dictate a wide range of behaviors. A person’s behavior toward the in-group is consistent with what the in-group expects. This feature is the root of an honor-based society: sensitivity to the expectations of others in the in-group. In contrast, behavior toward everyone else (for example, strangers) tends to be characterized by defiance of authority, competition, resentment of control, formality, and dogmatism.

Virtue and Value. The cardinal virtues of antiquity are collectivist virtues. They direct persons to emphasize the views, needs, and goals of the in-group rather than those of individual group members. These virtues encompass values such as: generalized reciprocity, obligation, duty, security, traditionalism, harmony, obedience to authority, in-group equilibrium, concern for what is proper, cooperation, fatalism, family centeredness, high need for affiliation, succor, abasement, nurturance, acquiescence, dependency, and strong superordination and subordination.

Social Virtue. As we have noted in the course of this chapter, collectivist cultures include a whole range of shared values, such as those mentioned in the progymnasmata and physiognomics, directed to bolstering group integrity. For example, ideally sexual relations exist exclusively for procreation, which is a fulfillment of social duty. The virtues extolled by collectivist cultures are social virtues, attitudes that look to the benefits of the group, rather than individualist virtues. Thus we find the following: a sense of shame, filial piety, respect for the social order, self-discipline, concern for social recognition, humility, respect for parents and elders, acceptance of one’s position in life, and preserving one’s public image. Anything that cements and supports interpersonal relationships will be valued.

Social Norms and Obligations. These are defined by the in-group rather than by behavior oriented toward personal satisfaction. Persons harbor
beliefs shared with the rest of the in-group members rather than beliefs that distinguish them from the in-group. And group members put great stock on readiness to cooperate with other in-group members. In the case of extreme collectivism, individuals do not have personal goals, attitudes, beliefs, or values but only reflect those of the in-group. As a matter of fact persons enjoy doing what the in-group expects.

Socialization and Duty. Socialization patterns are keyed to developing habits of obedience, duty, sacrifice for the group, group-oriented tasks, cooperation, favoritism toward in-group members, acceptance of in-group authorities, nurturing, sociability, and interdependence. Such socialization produces persons with strong emotional attachment to others, broad concerns for family and in-group cooperation, and group protectiveness. Thus persons in such collectivist cultures will do what they must as dictated by groups, authorities, and parents, rather than what brings personal satisfaction. The great temptation is to pursue some self-centered enjoyable activity. Should persons yield to such temptation and be found out, in-group sanctions run from shaming to expulsion. In conflict, collectivists side with vertical relationships (parents, authorities) over against horizontal ones (spouses, siblings, friends).

Nonindividualist Self. The collectivist person is a group-oriented self as opposed to an individualist self. A group-oriented self constantly requires another person to know who one is. Collectivist selves are group-oriented persons who tend to internalize group expectations and ideals to such an extent that they automatically respond as in-group norms specify without any sort of utilitarian calculation. This is a sort of unquestioned attachment to the in-group. It includes the perception that in-group norms are universally valid (a form of ethnocentrism), along with automatic obedience to in-group authorities, and willingness to fight and die for the in-group. These characteristics are usually associated with distrust of and unwillingness to cooperate with out-groups. As a matter of fact, out-groups are often considered a different species, to be evaluated and treated like a different species of animate being.

Collectivist persons define the self to outsiders, as we have seen, by generation, geography, and gender. Hence we find descriptions of persons largely circumscribed by generation and geography: family, gender, age, ethnicity, along with place of origin and residence. To out-groups, the self is always an aspect or a representative of the in-group that consists of related, gendered persons who come from and live in a certain place. To in-group members, however, the self is a bundle of roles that are likewise rooted in generation and geography. One does not readily distinguish self from social role(s). The performance of duties associated with roles is the path to social respect.

Effects on Others. Collectivist persons are concerned about the results of their actions on others in the in-group. They readily share material and nonmaterial sources with group members. They are concerned about how their behavior appears to others because they believe the outcomes of their behavior should correspond with in-group values. All in-group members feel involved in the contributions of their fellows and share in their lives. Thus individuals feel strong emotional attachment to the in-group, perceiving all group members as relatively homogeneous.

Shared Affect. Collectivism is associated with homogeneity of affect; if in-group members are sad, one is sad; if joyful, one is joyful (see 1 Cor. 12:26). Moreover, those in authority expect unquestioned acceptance of in-group norms as well as homogeneity of attitudes and values. Interpersonal relations within the in-group are seen as an end in themselves. There is a perception of limited good, according to which something good that happens to an in-group member is bad for the in-group because "good" is finite and thus resources are always in a zero-sum distribution pattern (John 3:26). Finally, the in-group is responsible for the actions of its members. This has implications for intergroup relations. Specifically, in collectivism one expects solidarity in action toward other groups, and joint action is the norm. Each individual is responsible for the actions of all other in-group members, and the in-group is responsible for the actions of each individual member.

At this point we have finished sketching a complicated model of the first-century Mediterranean person. If we have been successful, typical modern Western readers must feel perplexed. For if the model is accurate, contemporary U.S. Bible readers will find persons such as Paul and those who joined his churches quite strange, even bizarre by U.S. standards. Such a feeling at this point would be quite appropriate. And that points up the very value of this model. For if Paul and the persons with whom he interacts are so radically different from us, then an adequate scenario of person is absolutely essential if we are to understand them at all. How else can we escape imposing our notions of individualist personality on them?