

Nobel Ang

Curriculum Vitae

Department of Philosophy
Marquette University
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Education

- Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of Florida, May 2009
- M.A. in Philosophy, University of Florida, May 2004
- B.A. (Honors), Philosophy, National University of Singapore, May 2001

Areas of Specialization

- Ethical Theory
- Metaethics

Areas of Teaching Competence

- Applied Ethics
- Business Ethics
- Chinese Philosophy
- Philosophy of Biology
- Political Philosophy
- Early Modern Philosophy

Doctoral Dissertation

Title: *Homosexual poets and successful gangsters: An examination of Aristotelian Naturalism, and the skeptical worries confronting it*

(Abstract of dissertation available on page 4)

- Committee: David Copp (chair), Marina Oshana, Jon Tresan, Leslie Thiele (external member)

Academic Teaching Experience

- Visiting Assistant Professor, 2009-2010, Marquette University, Department of Philosophy
- Graduate Assistant and Instructor, 2001-2009, University of Florida, Department of Philosophy

Publications

- “Respect as Awareness of Rational Nature: A Modified Intellectualist Reading of Kant's Moral Psychology”, in Christopher A. Aflague, John A. Sweeney, David Jones, eds., *The Exquisite Corpse: The Selected Proceedings of the 2nd Annual North Georgia Student Philosophy Conference* (New York: Global Scholarly Publications, 2004)

Work in Progress

- An Aristotelian Dilemma: An Assessment of the Difficulties Confronting Recent Aristotelian Naturalistic Accounts of Goodness

Presentations: Conference Papers

- “An Aristotelian Dilemma: An Assessment of the Difficulties Confronting Recent Aristotelian Naturalistic Accounts of Goodness”, Iowa Philosophical Society 66th Annual Conference, Iowa City, Iowa, November 2009
- "The Impossibility of Kantian Moral Weakness of Will", Florida Philosophical Association, Jacksonville, Florida, November 2004.
- “Respect as Awareness of Rational Nature: A Modified Intellectualist Reading of Kant's Moral Psychology”, 2nd Annual North Georgia Student Philosophy Conference, Kennesaw, Georgia, March 2004.
- "Queerness in Kant's Moral Psychology", Second Biennial University of Washington Graduate Student Philosophy Conference, Seattle, Washington, October 2003.
- "What Exactly is a Spinozistic Attribute?", University of Florida/Florida State University Graduate Student Philosophy Conference, Tallahassee, FL, February 2003.
- "Kant's Teleological Argument", Florida Philosophical Association, Gainesville, Florida, November 2002.
- "A Closer Look at Kant's Teleological Argument at *Groundwork* 394-396 and its Philosophical Importance", 4th Annual Michigan State University Graduate Student Philosophy Conference, East Lansing, Michigan, September 2002.

Presentations: Comments

- Comments on Andrew Alwood, “Preserving Hume’s Law”, 2nd Annual Southeast Graduate Philosophy Conference, Gainesville, Florida, March 2007

Awards

- Distinguished Graduate Paper Award, 2nd Annual North Georgia Student Philosophy Conference, Kennesaw, Georgia, March 2004.

Courses Taught

As Instructor:

At Marquette University:

- PHIL 4320 Contemporary Ethical Problems (Fall 2009)
- PHIL 4330 Business Ethics (Fall 2009)
- PHIL 3710 Philosophy of State (Political Philosophy) (Fall 2009)

At University of Florida:

- PHI 3930 Business Ethics (Summer 2008)
- PHI 2630 Contemporary Moral Issues (Spring 2009, Fall 2008, Spring 2008, Fall 2007, Spring 2007, Fall 2006, Summer 2006, Summer 2005, Summer 2004, Summer 2003)

As Teaching Assistant:

At University of Florida:

- PHI 3950 Philosophical Writing (Spring 2006, Fall 2005, Spring 2005, Fall 2004, Spring 2003)
- PHH 3100 Ancient Philosophy (Fall 2003, Fall 2002)
- PHI 2630 Contemporary Moral Issues (Spring 2002)
- PHI 2100 Philosophical Logic (Fall 2001)

Language Study

- German
- Chinese (Mandarin)

Professional and Community Service

- Nominated for Graduate Teaching Award, Spring 2008
- Conference Organizer: Annual University of Florida/Florida State University Graduate Student Philosophy Conference, February 2003
- Vice President: Graduate Student Philosophy Society, University of Florida, 2002-3

Referees

- David Copp, University of California, Davis
- Marina Oshana, University of California, Davis
- Jon Tresan, University of Florida
- Roger Ames, University of Hawaii at Manoa
- James B. South, Marquette University

Dissertation Abstract

The work of my dissertation is motivated by the recent revival of interest in virtue ethics in moral philosophy. Specifically, I examine the plausibility of recent Aristotelian naturalistic views of goodness put forward by Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse. Overall, I argue that the prospects for this kind of Aristotelian naturalistic project are not very good. In the first part of the dissertation, I argue that it is possible to defend Aristotelian naturalism against recent challenges from evolutionary theory. I do this by constructing a functional Aristotelian account of goodness, one which I believe is the most plausible version of this kind of Aristotelian naturalistic view. Ultimately, however, the Aristotelian naturalist is confronted with a dilemma. On the one hand, if she stays true to the central aim of Aristotelian naturalism, and attempts to put forth a naturalistic account of human flourishing that is explicable in terms of contemporary biology, she would have an account that furnishes similarly structured naturalistic truth conditions for both moral evaluations of human actions and lives, and non-moral evaluations of plants and animals. Such an account, however, supports implausible moral judgments about virtue and flourishing. On the other hand, if she were to incorporate avowedly normative criteria for moral judgments into her account, she would have an account that supports a *prima facie* more plausible moral theory. However, insofar as such avowedly normative criteria do not admit of naturalistic explication, such an account would lack a naturalistic foundation. There does not seem to be any ready solution to this dilemma. In light of this, Aristotelian naturalism cannot be shown to be plausible as a view of the nature of goodness or as a foundation for virtue theory.